Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA ... - York University

Page: 74it targets many of the social harms associated with bawdy-houses. However, likethe application judge, we conclude that the bawdy-house prohibition is overbroadbecause it captures conduct that is unlikely to lead to the problems Parliamentseeks to curtail. In particular, the provisions prohibit a single prostitute operatingdiscreetly by herself, in her own premises. We also agree with the applicationjudge that the impact of the bawdy-house prohibition is grossly disproportionateto the legislative objective, because the record is clear that the safest way to sellsex is for a prostitute to work indoors, in a location under her control. It followsthat the prohibition cannot be justified as a reasonable limit under s. 1.[173] While we further agree with the application judge that the current bawdyhouseprohibition is unconstitutional and must be struck down, we suspend thedeclaration of invalidity for 12 months to provide Parliament an opportunity todraft a Charter-compliant provision, should it elect to do so.(1) Legislative history and judicial interpretation[174] The legislative history of the bawdy-house provisions at issue on thisappeal (i.e. the definition of “common bawdy-house” in s. 197(1) and theprohibition in s. 210) reveals a gradual broadening of the reach of the legislation:see R. v. Corbeil, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 830, per L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting), atp. 846.