Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA ... - York University

Page: 21[40] Turning to the ban on communicating in public for the purpose ofprostitution in s. 213(1)(c), the application judge found that the provision issufficiently connected to the objective of combating social nuisance as to beneither arbitrary nor overbroad. However, she concluded that by forcing streetprostitutes to forego screening customers, which she found to be an “essentialtool” to enhance prostitutes‟ safety, the effect of the law is grosslydisproportionate to its goal of curbing problems such as noise and congestioncaused by street prostitution (paras. 432-439).[41] Finally, the application judge determined that since the effects of all thechallenged provisions are grossly disproportionate to their legislative objectives,none could be upheld as a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter.Section 2(b) of the Charter: freedom of expression[42] Applying the Prostitution Reference, the application judge declared that thecommunicating provision constituted a prima facie infringement of s. 2(b) of theCharter.[43] Departing from the Prostitution Reference because of “the changedcontext” in the 20 years since that case was decided, the application judgeconcluded that the communicating provision could not be saved by s. 1 of theCharter. She explained, at para. 471:In my view, as a result of the changed context, theimpugned provision can no longer be considered to be