2001: 438). However, whilst not<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> divisive effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual sell<strong>in</strong>g arrangements have, anunequivocal statement <strong>of</strong> future trends is difficult to make. Whilst <strong>the</strong> competition authorities havecome to challenge exist<strong>in</strong>g arrangements, successfully <strong>in</strong> some cases but not o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong>re appears tobe will<strong>in</strong>gness to compromise, evidenced by <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> deals struck between <strong>the</strong> DG<strong>Competition</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> national leagues. Although <strong>the</strong> competition authorities <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> European Unionhave taken a keen <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> television rights, wholesale change to <strong>in</strong>dividual sell<strong>in</strong>ghas failed to materialise.iv. The growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clubs: corporatisation <strong>and</strong> br<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gTransformations <strong>in</strong> elite football follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> deregulation <strong>of</strong> broadcast<strong>in</strong>g markets <strong>and</strong>technological development have been accompanied by changes <strong>in</strong> club structure. The structure <strong>of</strong>clubs <strong>in</strong> Europe has varied from country to country, <strong>and</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ues to change, reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>historical differences between <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> football <strong>in</strong> different nations. In Germany, untilrecently clubs were structured as an ‘e.V’ mean<strong>in</strong>g ‘registered club’ – a public non-pr<strong>of</strong>it-mak<strong>in</strong>gsport<strong>in</strong>g society (Hesse-Lichtenberger, 2003: 28-32). In France clubs used to be one <strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong>structures <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g ‘a corporation with a sport<strong>in</strong>g objective’, ‘a mixed economy company’ <strong>and</strong> an‘association’ (Bourg <strong>and</strong> Gouget, 1998 quoted <strong>in</strong> Hoehn <strong>and</strong> Szymanski, 1999). Now, however,several specific legal structures have been created <strong>in</strong> order to cope with <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> clubs <strong>in</strong> terms<strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> commerce. The sport law <strong>of</strong> 1984, revised on several occasions, makes itcompulsory for pr<strong>of</strong>essional clubs to create a company <strong>in</strong> order to manage this commercial side.Most pr<strong>of</strong>essional clubs are now <strong>in</strong>corporated as an SASP (pr<strong>of</strong>essional sport limited companies), alegal structure created <strong>in</strong> 2001. Those companies cannot go public, but are allowed to distributedividends <strong>and</strong> to pay <strong>the</strong>ir directors. Though <strong>the</strong> historic association must no longer control amajority sharehold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this company, it still reta<strong>in</strong>s control over <strong>the</strong> registration number – neededto participate to any competition – <strong>and</strong> over <strong>the</strong> br<strong>and</strong> name. Both structures have to sign acontractual agreement, with a limited duration, to cover <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> those.Many clubs across <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent cont<strong>in</strong>ue to operate as members’ clubs or associationsbased on democratic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples. These clubs <strong>in</strong>clude some <strong>of</strong> Europe’s most famous names<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Barcelona <strong>and</strong> Real Madrid. <strong>Club</strong> structures have changed at different times <strong>in</strong> differentplaces. For example <strong>in</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>, clubs changed from associations to limited companies at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century, as a defensive means to limit <strong>the</strong> liability <strong>of</strong> those <strong>in</strong> charge (Conn, 1997:134). More recently, on <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>of</strong> Europe transformations have been predom<strong>in</strong>antly based onde-mutualisation <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>corporation. A comb<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> debt, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that mutual <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rstructures imposed commercial constra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> ability to raise <strong>in</strong>vestment has lead to a series <strong>of</strong>changes. In Italy, clubs <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1960s. In Spa<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Sport Law <strong>of</strong> 1990, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Decree<strong>of</strong> July 15 th 1991 obligated pr<strong>of</strong>essional football teams with losses to transform <strong>in</strong>to jo<strong>in</strong>t stockcompanies (Sociedades Anónimas Deportivas, SAD). 9 Most recently, <strong>the</strong> Deutsche Fussball Bund(DFB) allowed clubs to transform <strong>the</strong>ir structures from member associations to a number <strong>of</strong>different corporate vehicles <strong>in</strong> 1998 so long as <strong>the</strong> member association reta<strong>in</strong>ed 50 per cent plus onevote <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> overall sharehold<strong>in</strong>g. In Engl<strong>and</strong> a large number <strong>of</strong> clubs made <strong>the</strong> transition fromprivate to public limited companies as a means to generate <strong>in</strong>vestment. Indeed, it has beenpersuasively argued that club proprietors seized on <strong>the</strong> economic <strong>and</strong> technological conditions as ameans <strong>of</strong> self-enrichment (Conn, 1997).Inevitably, with <strong>the</strong> elite clubs operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly competitive Europeanenvironment, structures have changed accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clubs <strong>the</strong>mselves. The beliefthat corporate structures allow for a greater degree <strong>of</strong> commercial <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial flexibility, has beenconsistently <strong>in</strong>voked by clubs who fear that <strong>the</strong>y will be ‘left beh<strong>in</strong>d’ unless <strong>the</strong> changes towardsgreater commercial freedom are accepted (Walsh, 2000: 121). Whilst this justification has been9 Only four teams <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> top two divisions did not change: Athletic de Bilbao, Barcelona, Osasuna, <strong>and</strong> Real Madrid.See Garcia Villar, J. <strong>and</strong> Placido Rodriguez Guerrero, ‘TV Revenues <strong>in</strong> Spanish Football: Old Solution, NewProblems’.28
questioned 10 (Conn, 2005a), <strong>the</strong> changes <strong>in</strong> structure have added to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly commercialideology evident <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> football <strong>in</strong>dustry. The conversion <strong>in</strong> many countries <strong>of</strong> sport<strong>in</strong>g clubs <strong>in</strong>tocorporate structures has transformed <strong>the</strong> raison d’être <strong>of</strong> many football clubs (Walsh, 2000).Football clubs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1970s <strong>and</strong> 1980s clubs were considered to be ‘utility maximisers’ whichsought play<strong>in</strong>g success whilst endeavour<strong>in</strong>g to rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g solvent, ra<strong>the</strong>r than seek<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>of</strong>it (Sloane1971, 1980). Football clubs structured as PLCs, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, have a legal obligation tomaximise pr<strong>of</strong>it for <strong>the</strong> shareholder, thus creat<strong>in</strong>g a dual purpose to what might previously havebeen considered an entirely sport<strong>in</strong>g operation. Manchester United have always argued that <strong>the</strong>structure <strong>of</strong> a PLC assists its pursuit <strong>of</strong> sport<strong>in</strong>g success, <strong>and</strong> that only by w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> field can<strong>the</strong> company deliver f<strong>in</strong>ancial success to its shareholders, creat<strong>in</strong>g a virtuous circle. That <strong>the</strong> clubconsistently delivered trophies through <strong>the</strong> 1990s has meant that it has been difficult to questionwhere its greatest priority lies. Should <strong>the</strong> company enter a trophy-less period, with substantial<strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> team required, it will be <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to see how <strong>the</strong> company balances <strong>the</strong> need todeliver both prizes <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its.The <strong>in</strong>flation result<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>in</strong> television revenue has also led to consequent<strong>in</strong>flation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> sums required to deliver football<strong>in</strong>g success. Remarkably, <strong>the</strong> era <strong>in</strong> which JackWalker, a multi-millionaire steel trader, could buy a football club, <strong>and</strong> use part <strong>of</strong> his £300 millionfortune <strong>in</strong> Blackburn Rovers to purchase <strong>the</strong> Premiership title is now over. The purchase <strong>of</strong> Chelseaby Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich, <strong>and</strong> his <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>of</strong> over £400 million <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pursuit<strong>of</strong> success (Hamilton et al, 2004: 28), demonstrates <strong>the</strong> new reality <strong>of</strong> football f<strong>in</strong>ance. O<strong>the</strong>r clubshave also been pursu<strong>in</strong>g wealthy backers <strong>in</strong> an effort to keep pace, for example Liverpool. 11 Theconsequence has been to distance <strong>the</strong> elite clubs from both less successful clubs with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ownleagues, <strong>and</strong> clubs fur<strong>the</strong>r down <strong>the</strong> pyramid. Moreover, greater pressure will be placed on <strong>the</strong>democratic structures <strong>of</strong> governance that have helped shaped <strong>the</strong> game, by an altoge<strong>the</strong>r differentbeast. Judg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> motivations <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual owners may be a complex task, but it is unquestionably<strong>the</strong> case that <strong>the</strong> stewardship <strong>of</strong> clubs is chang<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> times, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>corporate wealth embodied <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> likes <strong>of</strong> Berlusconi, Malcolm Glazer, <strong>and</strong> Roman Abramovichmay cont<strong>in</strong>ue to grow disproportionately.Similarly, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g revenues from television have impacted on o<strong>the</strong>r areas <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> game.Developments <strong>in</strong> broadcast<strong>in</strong>g also go beyond <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>disputable economic facts. In l<strong>in</strong>e with broaderglobalis<strong>in</strong>g trends <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> European <strong>in</strong>tegration, television has opened up areas <strong>of</strong>European football that were previously considered exotic <strong>and</strong> distant. Not only is <strong>the</strong> viewer largelyspoilt for choice with regard to domestic football, he or she can access a multitude <strong>of</strong> leagues acrossEurope <strong>and</strong> beyond, fur<strong>the</strong>r erod<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> emphasis traditionally placed on <strong>the</strong> domestic game <strong>in</strong> allbut a few countries. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Wagg, ‘we are see<strong>in</strong>g, via <strong>the</strong> merg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> television <strong>and</strong> football<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> advent <strong>of</strong> satellite TV, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternationalisation <strong>of</strong> football culture at <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> consumption(1995b: 121)’. Such a trend can be seen <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g popularity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Spanish Primera Ligashown on BSkyB. The globalis<strong>in</strong>g effect <strong>of</strong> television has eroded rigid national boundaries, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>importance <strong>of</strong> locality. Overstat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> case, Wagg observes, ‘One th<strong>in</strong>g is certa<strong>in</strong> though: at topleague level, truly national football <strong>in</strong> Europe, if it ever existed, has disappeared <strong>and</strong> nationalleagues, <strong>in</strong> any event, have different publics (via satellite) <strong>in</strong> different countries. Belgians cansupport Fiorent<strong>in</strong>a, Swedes can follow Manchester United, Dutch can support Barcelona, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>rewill <strong>of</strong> course, be no go<strong>in</strong>g back’ (1995b: 122). Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> European competitionthrough <strong>the</strong> Champions League make <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> Arsenal relevant to supporters <strong>of</strong> Valencia, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> Barcelona relevant to <strong>the</strong> supporters <strong>of</strong> Chelsea. Similarly, <strong>the</strong> multi-nationalmovement <strong>of</strong> players leads to <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> leagues <strong>in</strong> which potential transfer targets play, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>progress <strong>of</strong> compatriots abroad. The media <strong>and</strong> public <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> Michael Owen <strong>and</strong> David10 Conn for example has argued that s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> flotation <strong>of</strong> Manchester United <strong>in</strong> 1991, <strong>the</strong> clubs has raised a total <strong>of</strong>£23 million from <strong>the</strong> Stock Market but that <strong>the</strong> total paid out <strong>in</strong> dividends was £61.74m. See Conn, D. (2005) ‘United’santi-Glazer campaigners seek return to <strong>the</strong> spirit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> railway’ <strong>in</strong> The Independent, 19 th February.11 Liverpool appo<strong>in</strong>ted Hawkpo<strong>in</strong>t to flush out options for new <strong>in</strong>vestment. It was reported that <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>in</strong>terest from<strong>the</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> Thail<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> American bus<strong>in</strong>essman Robert Kraft.29
- Page 1 and 2: ISSN: 1756-8811UEFA, Governance, an
- Page 3 and 4: ContentsAcknowledgementsIntroductio
- Page 5: AcknowledgementsThis project could
- Page 8 and 9: coming to play an increasingly infl
- Page 10 and 11: Section 1:Chapter 1.Theoretical per
- Page 12 and 13: So the ‘good governance’ of spo
- Page 14 and 15: Table 1: Theories of governanceTheo
- Page 16 and 17: the focal organisation will adopt a
- Page 18 and 19: different levels of the national ga
- Page 20 and 21: I think European sports are based o
- Page 22 and 23: The clubs, as the common denominato
- Page 24 and 25: mechanisms: committees, expert pane
- Page 26 and 27: It is a far cry from the simple the
- Page 28 and 29: intention of formulating a continen
- Page 30 and 31: eceived from the sale of broadcasti
- Page 32 and 33: institutions of Europe. Much of the
- Page 36 and 37: Beckham’s progress for Real Madri
- Page 38 and 39: which UEFA itself was one of number
- Page 40 and 41: Table 2: Champions League market po
- Page 42 and 43: opportunity provided by Media Partn
- Page 44 and 45: For Hecht, the surprise was the clu
- Page 46 and 47: competition (Hamil et al, 1999; Ham
- Page 48 and 49: So to cut off revenues from bigger
- Page 50 and 51: clubs in question, their different
- Page 52 and 53: organised. 20 Analysis has correctl
- Page 54 and 55: Radnedge, commenting on the role of
- Page 56 and 57: would resolve these problematic iss
- Page 58 and 59: for a programme which includes show
- Page 60 and 61: literature. It is the contention he
- Page 62 and 63: Section 3:The stakeholder challenge
- Page 64 and 65: coalition there are ‘maximalists
- Page 66 and 67: League, rather than being drawn ent
- Page 68 and 69: egulatory authorities will take the
- Page 70 and 71: iii. The ‘specificity’ of sport
- Page 72 and 73: worry very greatly that once it’s
- Page 74 and 75: consideration for the ‘specificit
- Page 76 and 77: and should be extended. The startin
- Page 78 and 79: The governing bodies’ failure to
- Page 80 and 81: in 2000 and this is reflected in th
- Page 82 and 83: up whether it’s a meaningful prop
- Page 84 and 85:
Europe, other scenarios can be envi
- Page 86 and 87:
possibility of breakaway competitio
- Page 88 and 89:
With regard to the governance of UE
- Page 90 and 91:
Will’s contention that policy has
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management. The strength of this re
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exclusively consultative rather tha
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iv. The elite clubs and the G14When
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structure of the International Foot
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A lot of people think G14 is a supe
- Page 102 and 103:
at the same time, the truism that c
- Page 104 and 105:
to build on it. In the three years,
- Page 106 and 107:
the homegrown players … you hear
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It is very important for profession
- Page 110 and 111:
Thus it may be that co-operation wi
- Page 112 and 113:
domestic football to influence the
- Page 114 and 115:
with a four year maximum term (Darb
- Page 116 and 117:
articulated elsewhere (Sugden and T
- Page 118 and 119:
UEFA’s day-to-day involvement in
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good, I think it will be a hugely s
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diverging from those of a different
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It is likely that these bodies will
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The corporatisation of UEFA structu
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Chapter 7.UEFA and the structure of
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pressure. According to Moorhouse:
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Either way, the primacy of the nati
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extend beyond unpredictability. It
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iii. A two-tier Europe? Standards v
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problem with the present system was
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would be delighted by the demotion.
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football, and their role in the ove
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in European football. Does European
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the necessary connection of the sta
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Super Cup should have a role in dec
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ii. A two-pillared UEFA? The nation
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an association level so you don’t
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football they do not adequately rep
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therefore have a greater say in cal
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merits, there are also implicit dan
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protect the rights of less affluent
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elative input of the executive comm
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levels - thus ensuring solidarity a
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ii. Regulating the clubs: UEFA Club
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‘European financial control commi
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maximise the impact of this regulat
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The growth of UEFA has posed new pr
- Page 174 and 175:
Using this control of competition a
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Appendix 2:UEFA Champions League re
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Appendix 4:Club Competitions Commit
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6. The UEFA secretariat shall be re
- Page 182 and 183:
• to gather and exchange informat
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BibliographyAgnew, P. (2005), ‘Dr
- Page 186 and 187:
The Combined Code on Corporate Gove
- Page 188 and 189:
Galaskiewicz, J. and Wasserman, S.
- Page 190 and 191:
Kurth, T. (2004), ‘Message from T
- Page 192 and 193:
Pierre, J. and Peters, B. G. (2000)
- Page 194 and 195:
UEFA (2003c) Creating a Better Futu
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Reding, V. (2002) ‘Sport and Tele