UEFA, Governance, and the Control of Club Competition in ...

is no longer necessary nor indeed sufficient to gain automatic entry to the league stages of thecompetition’ (2003: 22). The introduction of UEFA co-efficients, a system of grading clubs on thebasis of their own performance, and the performance of clubs from the same national association, isaccused of creating a system that is essentially ‘self-perpetuating’ (Morrow, 2003: 23) whichreinforces market advantage and playing success’ (Moorhouse, 2002: 76). It may be the casehowever, that ‘sporting’ considerations have been too narrowly defined. Whilst qualification for theEuropean Cup may have been limited solely to national champions, it is unlikely that such aprocedure produced a tournament of greater sporting quality. It simply cannot be plausibly arguedthat the elite competition of European football would be of a higher ‘sporting’ quality, or evenethos, with the champions of Albania in the group stages rather than the runners-up, third or fourthplaced team from England, Italy or Spain, which is why the UEFA Cup was of a higher standardbefore the transformation of the Champions League.The desire to formulate a competition of genuine sporting quality and equality seem to be asjustifiable selection criteria as the sole selection of national champions, especially given that someof those national champions would be producing a quality of football more typical of the lowerdivisions in some of the larger nations. It is true to say that the competition benefits clubs from thebigger, wealthier markets, but that also recognises that the bigger, wealthier markets have mostfrequently produced, with some clear exceptions, the highest standard of football. The entryrequirements are no more or less sporting, but the means by which the selections are made havechanged. Indeed, one could argue that the system is now more meritocratic, given that thecompeting clubs are of broadly a far higher standard than was previously the case. Whilst it isprobably true to say that such a system of entry reinforces the participation of the elite clubs andnations, the opportunities remain open for clubs from the smaller nations to enter. Inevitably, thetension exists between the extent to which the Champions League should embody the right of the 52national associations to compete, and the extent to which it should comprise the elite footballcompetition of Europe, with the aim of raising sporting standards. The reality is that more of onenecessarily compromises the other, and it will be UEFA’s ongoing to task to manage and balancethese two objectives in the coming years.The manner in which Champions League revenue is distributed has also been subject to somecriticism (Morrow, 2003; Moorhouse, 2002). In 2003-04, of the CHF 885 million generated, CHF631 was paid to the clubs, with the balance split between national associations, leagues and clubs,and UEFA, to ‘foster solidarity’ and to fund running costs (UEFA and TEAM, 2004: 32-33).Perhaps most interesting, however, is the method used to distribute the money paid to competingclubs. The money paid to clubs is divided approximately equally between the ‘fixed amounts’, paidon the basis of participation and progress in the tournament, and the ‘market pool’, distributed‘according to the proportional value of each TV market represented by the clubs taking part in theUEFA Champions League, and be split among the number of teams (4, 3, 2, or 1) participating froma given association’. 15 Of the market pool, half is distributed on the basis of league performance inthe prior season (see table 2), the other half distributed according to the number of matches playedin the competition. The four factors therefore comprise: how many clubs from a market compete inthe Champions League; the league standing of a club in the previous season; performance in theChampions League; and the performances of other clubs from the same country in the ChampionsLeague. This means of redistribution has, unsurprisingly, been subject to some criticism, given thediscrepancies between sporting achievement and financial reward (Morrow, 2003: 22-27;Moorhouse, 2003: 74-77). For example, in the 2003-04 Champions League, Manchester United,reaching only the last sixteen, earned CHF 42.496 million, compared to Champions Porto (CHF29.980 million), finalists Monaco (CHF 40.081 million), semi-finalists Deportivo La Coruña (CHF28.175 million) and quarter-finalists AC Milan (27.106 million) (UEFA and TEAM, 2004: 35).15 UEFA (2004) ‘Financial memorandum concerning the 2004/05 UEFA Champions League’. Letter to UEFA memberassociations, for the attention of the President and General Secretary from the UEFA CEO, 19 th August. In 2003-04,nearly 50% of the money generated allocated through the market pool (CHF 311 million out of total CHF 631 million).33