UEFA, Governance, and the Control of Club Competition in ...

individuals and businesses seek as far as possible to distance themselves from externalintervention. 17 Nations are, then, essentially characterised as having either an ‘interventionist’ or‘non-interventionist’ approach to sport regulation 18 . Critically, however, it is considered that incountries in which the government has traditionally played a more ‘hands-on’ role in sportsgovernance, it is argued that the greater conditions imposed by government on sporting clubs hinderthe ability to compete on equal terms (Szymanski, 2004b 12). Arresting the dominant trend ofgreater orientation towards the free-market on a national level therefore becomes highlyproblematic as clubs consistently assert the need for economic freedom in order to compete withtheir continental rivals. If that is the case then only a pan-European intervention would be likely tobe successful. UEFA has sought to achieve something like this by seeking formal exemption fromthe political and legal environment (UEFA, 2003).Calls for the increase in redistribution, both within leagues and between leagues also fail totake into full consideration a range of factors inhibiting the realisation of such proposals. First of all,clubs in a powerful economic position understandably, although perhaps unreasonably, resist thecall to share their revenues as they seek to gain a competitive edge over their rivals on top of anatural and inherent disinclination to subsidise others. The historical trend has been towards lessredistribution rather than more. In England, for example, gate-sharing mechanisms in the FootballLeague disappeared in 1983, and the emergence of individual selling of television rights in anumber of countries across Europe also points clearly to a decline of the collective interest.Additionally, the duality of league structure militates against a level of redistribution that wouldmake any tangible difference to the current levels of competitive imbalance. Redistribution withindomestic leagues is heavily resisted by the larger clubs due to the fact that they require additionalfunds to compete in European competition. Even the dominant clubs in the English Premier League,the largest grossing league in Europe, would resist more equitable distribution, as it would serve toerode their competitive advantage over their European rivals. More recently, it has been suggested,as a means to improve competitive balance within domestic leagues, that greater redistribution ofChampions League revenue to non-competing clubs would make ‘the threat of a Europeanbreakaway less likely’ (Michie and Oughton, 2004: 37), the argument being that a more competitivedomestic league would negate the impetus to seek a more competitive environment elsewhere.Whilst theoretically attractive, in actual fact the opposite is likely to be true. The big clubs alreadyconsider themselves to redistribute more widely than they see reasonable, as the following clubrepresentatives suggest. Any attempt to further ‘tax’ the big clubs would heighten the impetustowards breaking away from the existing structures:The whole concept of redistribution and trying to level the playing field is not an easy area. Ithink to try to interfere with some of those market forces to try and balance out competition isvery difficult … the panacea is to say you’ve got twenty teams in the Premier League, youstart to kick a ball in earnest on the 12th August each year, all of the media and the pundits aresaying, ‘God I don’t know, he could win it, and its all equal’. It’s not going to happen (DavidGill, chief executive, Manchester United FC, personal interview, 28 th January 2005).Of course, solidarity is an important principle, but it’s very difficult as King Canute found, toturn the tide. And bucking the market is sadly, phenomenally difficult … turning the clockback is virtually impossible. At the end of the day there aren’t many of the big clubs that areprofitable, and I’d rather keep the bigger clubs making bigger losses than the smaller clubs.17 For example, in 1997, the British Labour Government set up the Football Task Force to look at and address concernsraised about the growth of commercialisation within the football industry. Whilst a majority of the Task Force favouredthe introduction of external regulation, this was never seriously considered by the government. The reasons for this havebeen debated (see for example Brown, 1999 and Bower, 2003), but it is probable that the view that governments shouldnot unnecessarily intervene in the autonomous organisation of sport is was an important factor.18 For two in depth studies into different approaches to sport in Europe see Chaker, 1999 and 2004.41