Beckham’s progress for Real Madrid epitomises <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>in</strong> such transnational <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>game.This process has served to consolidate <strong>the</strong> popularity, market power <strong>and</strong> consumerpopularity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> biggest clubs. The clubs have sought to exp<strong>and</strong> this popularity fur<strong>the</strong>r, both <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong>ir own national markets (from which clubs still draw <strong>the</strong> most substantial part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>come 12 ),<strong>and</strong> also <strong>in</strong>ternational markets, epitomised by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly exotic pre-season tours embarkedupon by Europe’s biggest clubs. The commodification process, <strong>in</strong> which clubs <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly build<strong>and</strong> market <strong>the</strong>mselves as br<strong>and</strong>s, fur<strong>the</strong>r consolidates <strong>the</strong>ir position <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> market place. Such aprocess cannot be divorced from <strong>the</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g nature <strong>of</strong> football ‘f<strong>and</strong>om’. Support<strong>in</strong>g football is<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly seen as a ‘consumer act’ (Crawford, 2004: 4) <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clubs should beseen <strong>in</strong> a ‘complex organic dialectic between deregulated global capital <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fans who constituteits market’ (K<strong>in</strong>g, 2003: 135). Whilst K<strong>in</strong>g sees <strong>the</strong> excit<strong>in</strong>g new competitive possibilities generatedby <strong>the</strong>se transformations, S<strong>and</strong>voss sees <strong>the</strong> alienat<strong>in</strong>g result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘McDonaldisation’ (see Ritzer,1993 <strong>and</strong> 1996) <strong>of</strong> European football which sees <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ent’s elite clubs us<strong>in</strong>g global br<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g toremove <strong>the</strong>ir association with both locality <strong>and</strong> nation, becom<strong>in</strong>g multi-national corporations(S<strong>and</strong>voss, 2003; see also Duke, 2002 <strong>and</strong> Bryman, 1999). Of course, supporters/consumers willnot act uniformly to such transformations. As Williams states, “<strong>the</strong> so-called ‘rationalisations’ <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> TV dom<strong>in</strong>ated processes <strong>of</strong> sports globalisation <strong>in</strong> football are not simply a case <strong>of</strong> a dom<strong>in</strong>antglobal sports culture flow<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle direction, to uncritical <strong>and</strong> passive sports consumers …sport still means someth<strong>in</strong>g – <strong>and</strong> it means someth<strong>in</strong>g different <strong>and</strong> local – to all those who cont<strong>in</strong>ueto attend, watch <strong>and</strong> creatively consume it” (Williams, 2004). Whatever <strong>the</strong> merits <strong>of</strong> suchdevelopments, processes <strong>of</strong> consumption are clearly chang<strong>in</strong>g.Of course, <strong>the</strong> wealth <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong> particular clubs is not simply a result <strong>of</strong>‘rationalisation’ or ‘globalisation’, but also very much an extension <strong>of</strong> sport<strong>in</strong>g success. Thissuccess, <strong>in</strong> conjunction with broader trends has rationalised <strong>the</strong> club market <strong>in</strong> European football to<strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t where <strong>the</strong> ‘elite’ clubs have assumed not just greater wealth <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluence, but a greaterlevel <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest, <strong>and</strong> a heightened position <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> consciousness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> consumers <strong>of</strong> Europeanfootball. Neutral supporters are likely to cont<strong>in</strong>ue to root for <strong>the</strong> underdog, perhaps even more so.But <strong>the</strong> fact <strong>the</strong>y may do so is evidence <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that certa<strong>in</strong> clubs are considered <strong>in</strong>different terms to <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir competitors. These clubs also cont<strong>in</strong>ue to solicit <strong>the</strong> bestplayers. It is difficult to imag<strong>in</strong>e, for example, a player like Andrei Shevchenko play<strong>in</strong>g for half <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> clubs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> G14, let alone a club outside <strong>of</strong> it. Certa<strong>in</strong> clubs have assumed a position <strong>in</strong> which<strong>the</strong>y are difficult to turn down, notably clubs such as Real Madrid. 13 The growth <strong>in</strong> prestige <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>biggest clubs is <strong>the</strong>refore recognised by <strong>the</strong> players <strong>the</strong>mselves, <strong>and</strong> if <strong>the</strong> best players will onlyplay for a small number <strong>of</strong> elite clubs, <strong>the</strong>n this can create only a virtuous circle <strong>of</strong> both economic<strong>and</strong> sport<strong>in</strong>g success.v. The growth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clubs: Media Partners <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Champions LeagueA number <strong>of</strong> key developments have occurred to <strong>the</strong> structure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> European Cup at various po<strong>in</strong>ts<strong>in</strong> its history. The elim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> Juventus by Real Madrid <strong>in</strong> 1986 <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second round, <strong>and</strong> Napoli<strong>in</strong> 1987 by <strong>the</strong> same side ultimately led to seed<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> competition (K<strong>in</strong>g, 2003: 139). Variousproposals advocat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> European league had been made at various stages. The concept,however, was most seriously advanced <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> late 1980s by Silvio Berlusconi, who employedSaatchi <strong>and</strong> Saatchi executive Alex Fynn to develop a bluepr<strong>in</strong>t. Whilst <strong>the</strong> Champions League12 Manchester United for example, <strong>of</strong>ten cited as hav<strong>in</strong>g exp<strong>and</strong>ed greatly <strong>in</strong> overseas markets, from 1 st August 2003 to31 st July, earned £9.43 million abroad out <strong>of</strong> a total <strong>of</strong> £159.65 million, only 5.9 per cent (Manchester United, 2004: 61)13 Comment<strong>in</strong>g on Michael Owen’s transfer from Liverpool to Real Madrid Engl<strong>and</strong> coach Sven Goran Eriksson said:‘I absolutely do not blame Michael for mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> move, because <strong>the</strong> chance to jo<strong>in</strong> a big club like that might not comearound aga<strong>in</strong>. If you have <strong>the</strong> ability you just have to say yes, o<strong>the</strong>rwise it would keep you awake at night wonder<strong>in</strong>gwhat might have happened. It was <strong>the</strong> same when I was <strong>of</strong>fered <strong>the</strong> chance to manage Engl<strong>and</strong>. It did not take long toth<strong>in</strong>k about, <strong>the</strong>re are some th<strong>in</strong>gs you just cannot turn down’ (Wilson, 2004).30
would not take shape for ano<strong>the</strong>r four years, Fynn claims that it was <strong>the</strong>se proposals that ‘set <strong>the</strong>ball roll<strong>in</strong>g’ (quoted <strong>in</strong> K<strong>in</strong>g, 2003: 141). In 1990, representations were made by Rangers FC,propos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> a league stage <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> format <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> European Cup. This wasultimately achieved <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1991-92 tournament with <strong>the</strong> replacement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quarter-f<strong>in</strong>als <strong>and</strong> semif<strong>in</strong>alswith two groups <strong>of</strong> four, <strong>the</strong> w<strong>in</strong>ners <strong>of</strong> which went directly to <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al. The <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> ‘league’ stage <strong>in</strong> 1991-92, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> subsequent renam<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> re-br<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> competition <strong>in</strong>1992-93 marked a pivotal turn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> European competition.Over <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> next decade <strong>the</strong> competition would undergo a number <strong>of</strong>transformations. In 1993-94, <strong>the</strong> group stages would lead to <strong>the</strong> semi-f<strong>in</strong>al ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g season, 1994-95, four groups replaced <strong>the</strong> first <strong>and</strong> second rounds. In 1997-98, <strong>the</strong>group stage <strong>in</strong>cluded six groups with <strong>the</strong> w<strong>in</strong>ners <strong>and</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> runners up enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> quarter-f<strong>in</strong>alstage. Also, for <strong>the</strong> first time <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> competition, teams o<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> nationalchampions from Europe’s top ranked leagues were also able to enter. The growth <strong>and</strong> development<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> competition has <strong>in</strong>itiated a transformation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> wider European game, arguably underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> traditional, national competitive structures, usher<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an era <strong>of</strong> heightened economic <strong>and</strong>sport<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> European spectacle. Pressure applied by <strong>the</strong> clubs certa<strong>in</strong>ly played animportant role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tournament, but o<strong>the</strong>r forces were also at work. Guidedby <strong>the</strong> commercial transformations evident <strong>in</strong> European football, <strong>the</strong> market<strong>in</strong>g organisation,Television Event <strong>and</strong> Media Market<strong>in</strong>g (TEAM) was formed by Klaus Hempel <strong>and</strong> Jurgen Lenztwo former executives <strong>of</strong> ISL who had worked under Horst Daßler. The grow<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>and</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>clubs <strong>the</strong> late 1980s <strong>and</strong> early 1990s played <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> h<strong>and</strong>s <strong>of</strong> ‘TEAM’s market opportunism’(Sugden <strong>and</strong> Toml<strong>in</strong>son, 1998: 77) who understood completely <strong>the</strong> rewards that could be generatedby <strong>the</strong> astute exploitation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> golden triangle <strong>of</strong> football, sponsorship, <strong>and</strong> television. <strong>UEFA</strong> itselfalso understood <strong>the</strong> commercial potential <strong>of</strong> exp<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g Europe’s flagship competition:<strong>Competition</strong>s will always be adjusted. The senior most important fact <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong>football as a world sport <strong>and</strong> a successful European enterprise is <strong>the</strong> fact that we have hadleaders able to adjust accord<strong>in</strong>g to development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> environment. The development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Champions League was, <strong>in</strong> my op<strong>in</strong>ion, not so much driven by wishes from <strong>the</strong> bigger clubs,as <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> television companies … Hempel <strong>and</strong> Lenz were early <strong>in</strong> this process <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong>y created with Johansson <strong>and</strong> Aigner <strong>the</strong> concept for <strong>the</strong> Champions League, based on <strong>the</strong>needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> television which means that <strong>the</strong> major markets had to be better represented, soyou couldn’t stick to <strong>the</strong> knockout competition <strong>and</strong> you have to agree to a certa<strong>in</strong> number <strong>of</strong>matches o<strong>the</strong>rwise <strong>the</strong> programm<strong>in</strong>g doesn’t fit … <strong>the</strong>se ideas were before <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s camefrom <strong>the</strong> clubs (Lars Christer Olsson, <strong>UEFA</strong> chief executive, personal <strong>in</strong>terview, 16 thNovember 2004).Whilst Olsson may underestimate <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> clubs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process, TEAM unquestionably playeda sem<strong>in</strong>al role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tournament. The relationship between <strong>the</strong> govern<strong>in</strong>g bodies<strong>and</strong> event management companies has been <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> some analysis. Sugden for example, hasreferred such companies as <strong>the</strong> ‘cement <strong>of</strong> network football: <strong>the</strong> go-betweens who l<strong>in</strong>e up <strong>the</strong>corporate <strong>and</strong> media partners <strong>and</strong> stage-manage <strong>the</strong> spectacle’ (Sugden, 2002: 67). ISL was highly<strong>in</strong>fluential <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> commercial development <strong>of</strong> FIFA, <strong>and</strong> as such played a pivotal role <strong>in</strong>consolidat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> political authority <strong>of</strong> its two most recent presidents Joao Havelange <strong>and</strong> SeppBlatter (see Sugden <strong>and</strong> Toml<strong>in</strong>son, 1998 <strong>and</strong> 2003). TEAM has also been considered to have had asimilarly <strong>in</strong>fluential role <strong>in</strong> European football: ‘Watch<strong>in</strong>g FIFA <strong>and</strong> <strong>UEFA</strong>’s hugely <strong>in</strong>fluentialpartners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Havelange <strong>and</strong> Johansson eras – ISL, TEAM, or o<strong>the</strong>r equivalent agencies <strong>of</strong>personnel – police <strong>the</strong> commercial <strong>and</strong> company icons <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fully commodified modern footballstadium, check<strong>in</strong>g every detail <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir constructed world like bodyguards protect<strong>in</strong>g an Americanpresident, is to catch a glimpse <strong>of</strong> who controls <strong>in</strong>ternational football’s golden triangle <strong>in</strong> anexpansionist phase <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people’s game’ (Sugden <strong>and</strong> Toml<strong>in</strong>son, 1998: 99). There is little doubtthat TEAM was <strong>in</strong>strumental <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> expansionist phase, educat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>UEFA</strong> <strong>and</strong> driv<strong>in</strong>g change <strong>in</strong>31
- Page 1 and 2: ISSN: 1756-8811UEFA, Governance, an
- Page 3 and 4: ContentsAcknowledgementsIntroductio
- Page 5: AcknowledgementsThis project could
- Page 8 and 9: coming to play an increasingly infl
- Page 10 and 11: Section 1:Chapter 1.Theoretical per
- Page 12 and 13: So the ‘good governance’ of spo
- Page 14 and 15: Table 1: Theories of governanceTheo
- Page 16 and 17: the focal organisation will adopt a
- Page 18 and 19: different levels of the national ga
- Page 20 and 21: I think European sports are based o
- Page 22 and 23: The clubs, as the common denominato
- Page 24 and 25: mechanisms: committees, expert pane
- Page 26 and 27: It is a far cry from the simple the
- Page 28 and 29: intention of formulating a continen
- Page 30 and 31: eceived from the sale of broadcasti
- Page 32 and 33: institutions of Europe. Much of the
- Page 34 and 35: 2001: 438). However, whilst noting
- Page 38 and 39: which UEFA itself was one of number
- Page 40 and 41: Table 2: Champions League market po
- Page 42 and 43: opportunity provided by Media Partn
- Page 44 and 45: For Hecht, the surprise was the clu
- Page 46 and 47: competition (Hamil et al, 1999; Ham
- Page 48 and 49: So to cut off revenues from bigger
- Page 50 and 51: clubs in question, their different
- Page 52 and 53: organised. 20 Analysis has correctl
- Page 54 and 55: Radnedge, commenting on the role of
- Page 56 and 57: would resolve these problematic iss
- Page 58 and 59: for a programme which includes show
- Page 60 and 61: literature. It is the contention he
- Page 62 and 63: Section 3:The stakeholder challenge
- Page 64 and 65: coalition there are ‘maximalists
- Page 66 and 67: League, rather than being drawn ent
- Page 68 and 69: egulatory authorities will take the
- Page 70 and 71: iii. The ‘specificity’ of sport
- Page 72 and 73: worry very greatly that once it’s
- Page 74 and 75: consideration for the ‘specificit
- Page 76 and 77: and should be extended. The startin
- Page 78 and 79: The governing bodies’ failure to
- Page 80 and 81: in 2000 and this is reflected in th
- Page 82 and 83: up whether it’s a meaningful prop
- Page 84 and 85: Europe, other scenarios can be envi
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possibility of breakaway competitio
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With regard to the governance of UE
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Will’s contention that policy has
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management. The strength of this re
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exclusively consultative rather tha
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iv. The elite clubs and the G14When
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structure of the International Foot
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A lot of people think G14 is a supe
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at the same time, the truism that c
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to build on it. In the three years,
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the homegrown players … you hear
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It is very important for profession
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Thus it may be that co-operation wi
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domestic football to influence the
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with a four year maximum term (Darb
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articulated elsewhere (Sugden and T
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UEFA’s day-to-day involvement in
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good, I think it will be a hugely s
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diverging from those of a different
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It is likely that these bodies will
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The corporatisation of UEFA structu
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Chapter 7.UEFA and the structure of
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pressure. According to Moorhouse:
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Either way, the primacy of the nati
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extend beyond unpredictability. It
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iii. A two-tier Europe? Standards v
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problem with the present system was
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would be delighted by the demotion.
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football, and their role in the ove
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in European football. Does European
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the necessary connection of the sta
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Super Cup should have a role in dec
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ii. A two-pillared UEFA? The nation
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an association level so you don’t
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football they do not adequately rep
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therefore have a greater say in cal
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merits, there are also implicit dan
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protect the rights of less affluent
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elative input of the executive comm
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levels - thus ensuring solidarity a
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ii. Regulating the clubs: UEFA Club
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‘European financial control commi
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maximise the impact of this regulat
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The growth of UEFA has posed new pr
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Using this control of competition a
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Appendix 2:UEFA Champions League re
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Appendix 4:Club Competitions Commit
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6. The UEFA secretariat shall be re
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• to gather and exchange informat
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BibliographyAgnew, P. (2005), ‘Dr
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The Combined Code on Corporate Gove
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Galaskiewicz, J. and Wasserman, S.
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Kurth, T. (2004), ‘Message from T
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Pierre, J. and Peters, B. G. (2000)
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UEFA (2003c) Creating a Better Futu
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Reding, V. (2002) ‘Sport and Tele