ISSUE 24 : Sep/Oct - 1980 - Australian Defence Force Journal

AN OUTLINE OL I HE AI S I RAI IAN Mill fAKI IN\ ()[ VEMENT IN VIETNAM 47from the base, being less likely to be locatedand watched by the Viet Cong.On the other hand, it necessitated carefulexplanation to the civilians concerned andcreated resettlement problems which took sometime to soke.CommandFrom the outset IATF came underoperational control of 2 Field Force Vietnam.An Australian major served as a liaison officer,and. where necessary, an interpreter, on theU.S. headquarters and worked very closely withthe operations staff. The Task Force waspermitted to operate very much according to itsown methods.Summary of Initial OperationsPrior to the forward deployment of IATF,173 Airborne Brigade was given the task ofensuring that 5 Viet Cong Division was notwaiting at Nui Dat. On 24th May, 1966, 5RAR,which had arrived from Australia, was movedby helicopter from V'ung Tau to join 173Brigade in its operations north of Baria.It was operationally necessary to establishIATF forward as soon as possible and on 5thJune, Headquarters IATF moved from VungTau to Nui Dat where 5RAR was operating.By 14th June, 6RAR had arrived fromAustralia, completed its preliminary in-theatretraining at Vung Tau and moved forward tocomplete the 1ATF concentration.Both battalions carried out a settling downoperation. 6RAR completed the job of clearingand destroying the partially cleared Viet Congvillage of Long Phuc and 5RAR cleared the NuiNghe area. The Task Force dug in at Nui Datand established unit defended areas. TaskForce operational procedures were finalisedand rehearsed. The maintenance system wasestablished.Throughout this period, Viet Cong RegionalForces and elements of D445 ProvincialBattalion maintained contact in the patrolbattle, however no really serious resistance wasoffered. Small enemy patrols managed to takeadvantage of pouring rain and pitch darkness atnight to probe the perimeter, especially the gunareas on the southern perimeter and the logisticcompany. Soon, however, IATF was able toput a stop to this.From mid-July to mid-August, battaliongroup operations were conducted to expand thecontrolled area with accent on openingNational Routes 2 and 15 and to take advantageof information from SAS patrolling. Duringthis period of battalion group sized operationsthe Task Force influence was extended to BinhBa to the north, to the Long Tan area in theeast, to the Long Hai mountains in the southeastand to the Nui Thi Vai hills to the west.The operating battalion commander was givenhis complete battalion group as a manoeuvreforce. His artillery fire support bases were givenclose protection by a company from the otherbattalion, which also had to provide a taskforce reaction force of a company group andanother one or two companies to providepatrols within Line Alfa. Task Force patroloperations beyond Line Alfa were conductedby company groups. In this way the Nui Datbase was normally held by unit rear elementsand by only one rifle company. On the otherhand, the maximum effort was exerted outsidethe base and reasonable balance wasmaintained.During the last week of this period there weregrowing indications, in particular from agentreports and communications intelligence, that 5VC Division was in fact preparing to mount asizeable operation on the Nui Dat base from theeast. There had been similar indications beforefrom other areas, however the precaution wastaken of using company sized patrols and SASpatrols to check the area to the north and eastof Long Tan. It was one of these patrols, DCompany of 6RAR, which made contact with275 VC Regiment at 1608 hours on 18 August1966 in a rubber plantation near Long Tan. Asavage and heroic battle ensued which lasteduntil 1910 hours with the arrival of theCommanding Officer, 3 Tp 1 APC Sqn, and ACoy 6RAR.The results of the battle, fought mainly inpouring rain, were 245 enemy killed and anestimated 500 casualties evacuated, with theloss of 17 soldiers killed in action, one died ofwounds and 21 wounded. The company wonthe U.S. Presidential Citation for its action.It was believed that 275 Regiment had beenpreparing for an attack on the Nui Dat base.After the severe mauling it received, it wasforced to abandon its mission. 274 Regiment,which was believed to have moved a reinforcedbattalion from the Hat Dich base south-easttowards Nui Dat, took no active part in theoperations, other than helping evacuate 275Regiment wounded. It was a long time before