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US Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook - Fort Huachuca ...

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U.S. <strong>Army</strong> <strong>Intelligence</strong> <strong>History</strong>: A <strong>Sourcebook</strong>II history program. The Historical Branch was formed in August 1943 with Lt. Col. John M. Kemper asits first chief. It was removed from G-2 responsibility in 1945.Under G2 was the Corps of <strong>Intelligence</strong> Police, which was renamed the Counter <strong>Intelligence</strong> Corps(CIC) in 1942. With the mission of recruiting, training and administering <strong>Army</strong> counterintelligencepersonnel, the Corps performed security investigations in the United States and sent 17-man detachmentsto combat divisions overseas. One of its first and most influential chiefs was Colonel H. Gordon Sheen.When the CIC was established in 1942, it had an authorized strength of 1,026. When Germanysurrendered in May 1945, that figure had risen to 7,500. In Washington, D.C., the headquarters wouldbe located in a single room in the Munitions Building until they were evicted to a series of other accommodationsin the city. They eventually settled into a private home on North Charles Street in Baltimore.Their activities were far-ranging and diverse, calling upon a resourcefulness that would characterize theirefforts in all theaters.In the United States during the war, over 13,000 members of the CIC “pushed nearly a billion doorbells,making more than two and a quarter million background investigations and running down leads forthousands of complaint cases [against suspected subversives].” In the U.S. the CIC was responsible forthe security of the Manhattan Project, the secret scientific work on the atomic bomb, and performedcensorship duties for all mail arriving from overseas. Counter <strong>Intelligence</strong> Corps detachments wereassigned to each <strong>Army</strong> division in the North African, European and Pacific theaters, with a total of 241CIC detachments operating during the war.The CIC detachment in Tunisia conducted psychological warfare operations in the prolonged fightingat El Guettar. In North Africa and Italy, CIC agents accounted for hundreds of prisoners from whom theyextracted valuable information. In Sicily they captured enemy radio transmitters and maps of enemyminefields. In Italy between October 1944 and April 1945, the CIC captured 200 German agents in theFifth U.S. <strong>Army</strong> area, including Dr. Kora, the commander of a German intelligence unit known asAbwehr Kommando 190. CIC agents were airdropped into Normandy on D-Day. They played an importantpart in the Battle of the Bulge and the counteroffensive that followed, blunting the subversion campaignof Col. Otto Skorzeny who had infiltrated English-speaking Germans in U.S. <strong>Army</strong> uniforms todisrupt operations.In Europe teams of CIC men followed U.S. forces into combat with the mission of scouting out andcapturing German work on the atomic bomb and rocketry, and taking into custody German scientists.This was known as the “ALSOS” Mission, led by Col. Boris Pash who with daring and imaginationpersonally led his teams into enemy-held territory. In addition to German and Italian scientists, theyseized over 70 tons of uranium and radium products that were shipped to the U.S. for use in Americannuclear projects.CIC units played an even more important role in the postwar occupation of both Germany and Japan,investigating and apprehending war criminals, rounding up Nazis, and countering Communist subversion.For instance, the 970th CIC Detachment in the American Zone of Occupation in Germany, pickedup over 120,000 Nazis after the war.In the European theater, many of the CIC’s counterespionage duties were usurped by the OSS. But inthe Pacific that was prevented by a command directive from General MacArthur’s headquarters, proscribingthe OSS from operating in the Southwest Pacific Area. There was another important difference in CICoperations in the Pacific. With fewer urban areas to secure or captured soldiers to interrogate, the CICwas able to devote more of their time assisting with combat intelligence and in working on captureddocuments. In the Leyte campaign, CIC took into custody officials working for the Japanese and in Luzonin January 1945, 30 CIC detachments came ashore with the invasion force.The CIC secured and captured enemy headquarters, interrogated prisoners, and impounded enemydocuments. They arrested or surveilled any suspected enemy agents. They surveyed and protected publicutilities, supply depots or any other potential targets of sabotage. They seized radio stations and tele-160

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