US Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook - Fort Huachuca ...

U.S. Army Intelligence History: A Sourcebookseconded by Major General Paik Sun Yup, an ROK divisional commander, who told his American corpscommander that he faced “many, many Chinese”—at least a division. By this time, three Chinese armiesbegan to maul the center and the right flank of the Eighth Army’s lines. However, when Colonel PercyThompson, the I Corps G2, briefed the 1st Cavalry Division’s advance party that they would face Chineseforces, his conclusions were met with “disbelief and indifference.”It wasn’t only 1st Cavalry Division officers who were skeptical. In an October 26 report, Tarkentonsaid Chinese POWs reported CCF reinforcements were helping to defend the border’s approaches; but hesaid, there was no open intervention by China. Still, little by little, as new prisoners were taken, Tarkentonraised his estimates of Chinese involvement. On November 5, he reported three Chinese divisions, about27,000 men, in Korea. Unfortunately, the G2 greatly underestimated the numbers of Chinese. ByNovember, the CCF had 180,000 men in six armies in Korea.There were several reasons why Tarkenton erred in his estimate. He was inexperienced and possiblyoverwhelmed by the task of trying to sift through over 2,500 intelligence items a week. He also dependedon aerial reconnaissance to detect massive movements of troops, which it didn’t. More likely, however,the FEC G2’s estimate of the situation “unduly influenced” and “colored” Tarkenton’s analysis.During the last week of October, Willoughby continued to dismiss any notion of a Chinese intervention.From October 25 until the end of the month, when U.S. forces were actually fighting the Chinese,the G2 still listed guerrilla operations above intervention in his list of predicted enemy courses of action.On October 27, he commented that reports of China’s entrance into the war were “based on POW reportsand [were] unconfirmed and thereby unaccepted.” He discounted the prisoners as insignificant volunteersor stragglers. The next day, he returned to the position that it was too late for the Chinese to intervene andthat tactically “it would appear that the auspicious time for such intervention has long passed.” 7November LullBy November 2, Chinese soldiers smashed the II ROK Corps and stopped the Eighth Army’s advance.Then, on November 6, they abruptly broke contact. This sudden withdrawal left American intelligenceguessing. Had the Chinese simply made a face-saving attempt to stop U.N. forces? Were they fallingback to protect the Yalu River power plants? Or did they intend to fully attack MacArthur’s forces anddefeat them? Unfortunately, over the next three weeks, intelligence would greatly underestimate CCFstrength in Korea and tragically misread Chinese intentions.Before the Chinese broke off their attacks, Willoughby pointed out the potential for a large-scaleChinese offensive, but concluded there were only between 16,000 and 34,000 CCF troops in Korea. Onthe day the Chinese broke off their attacks, the FEC G2 raised his estimate of CCF troops in Korea tobetween 30,000 and 40,000. He calculated another 350,000 ground troops in Manchuria that could forcethe U.N. into defensive positions to the south. Three days later, Willoughby again raised his estimate to77,000 Chinese in 12 divisions. In mid-November, he reported a potential threat to the X Corps on theeastern side of Korea, but made little comment on the Eighth Army’s front. Willoughby still did not havea clear picture of China’s strength and intentions. 8Nor did Tarkenton have a clear picture of the enemy he faced; he continued to believe China wouldn’tenter the war. Instead, after their attacks in late October, he believed the Chinese troops had fallen backto defensive positions to protect power plants along the Yalu. By later November, Tarkenton considerablyraised his estimate of CCF soldiers in Korea to 60,000. However, once the Chinese had brokencontact in early November, the impact of their attack wore off. Despite daily references to a Chineseoffensive potential from November 10 to 24, concern over a full Chinese intervention tapered off. “In thisconnection,” Roy E. Appleman, an official historian of the Korean War, noted, “that the controllingEighth Army viewpoint cold scarcely avoid being influenced somewhat by that of the Far East Command,which seems to have been that China would not intervene with major forces.” 9226