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U.S. Army Intelligence History: A SourcebookDam was closer, Krueger ordered its seizure first.Unfortunately, the population of Luzon had not used these dams as a source of water since 1938. TheXIV Corps (then later the XI Corps) plunged into the extremely rugged jungles of the Sierra MadreMountains and fought a very slow and costly campaign. To make matters much worse, all of the estimatescontinually underestimated the strength of the Japanese. By the end of May, the Americans had securedboth dams and broken the back of the SHIMBU Group. 14Northern LuzonAs the fighting began to subside in central and southern Luzon, Krueger’s I Corps prepared to moveagainst the SHOBU Group. By mid-February, it had gained footholds on the three highways running intothe mountains of northern Luzon. There, Yamashita waited with a force that outnumbered I Corps twoto-one.He deployed his force in a triangular redoubt with its apexes at Bambank, Bagiouo, and Bontoc.Krueger knew time was on the enemy’s side. The longer he waited to attack, the more time the Japanesewould have to dig into already superb defensive terrain.Good intelligence partly compensated for I Corps’ unfavorable troop ratio. Although underestimatingthe SHOBU Group’s strength, the Sixth Army G2 presented a sound estimate of enemy dispositions.Using guerrilla reports, captured documents, and aerial reconnaissance, Colonel White and his staff definedYamashita’s triangular defensive disposition with a rough composition. They also uncovered animportant supply line that linked the Japanese defenses. But discovering enemy positions and takingadvantage of that knowledge were two different things. Krueger’s soldiers still had to fight a determinedand well-positioned enemy with a capable leader. It wasn’t until the war’s end that Yamashita finallysurrendered. 15ConclusionOne of MacArthur’s greatest advantages over the Japanese was his intelligence system. In 1943 and1944, it helped him seize and maintain the initiative with relatively weak forces. With superior intelligence,he could bypass strong defenses, hit the Japanese at their weakest points, and achieve overwhelminglocal superiority. But if intelligence served him so well in prior campaigns, why did it perform soinconsistently on Luzon?Part of the answer obviously involves the SWPA G2. MacArthur believed Willoughby’s greatest assetwas his unquestioning loyalty. With MacArthur’s obsessive desire to return to the Philippines, one has towonder if Willoughby let this loyalty cloud his judgment and analysis. Did he make the intelligence provehis commander’s estimates?While Colonel White put seemingly discordant pieces of information together into a coherent whole,Willoughby did not. Willoughby’s failure caused inaccurate and fragmented estimates. Lacking flexibility,Willoughby never acknowledged that his original enemy strength estimate was too low. Therefore, heconsistently underestimated the Japanese strength. While the theater G2-s estimates cast long, dark shadows,he was not the largest problem the intelligence community faced on Luzon.On Luzon, the SWPA intelligence system lacked consistent long-range collection assets. In World WarII, these were aerial reconnaissance and radio intelligence. Yet, in early 1945, the intelligence staffs hadonly started perfecting IMINT in the SWPA. Worse, SIGINT, which had provided much operationalintelligence in past campaigns, performed unsatisfactorily on Luzon.With little or no SIGINT and limited IMINT, intelligence staffs enthusiastically embraced HUMINTsources. Captured documents and prisoners gave them excellent information. But most of it was tacticalin nature. Of the operational level HUMINT sources, the guerrilla reports were often confusing andunreliable, and there were too few Alamo Scouts. As a result, American soldiers had to bump into theJapanese to develop an accurate enemy picture all too often. The inconsistent performance of American200
World War IIintelligence on Luzon, illustrates the need for a balanced collection effort. We need all-source intelligenceat the strategic, operational, as well as tactical levels. Only then can one intelligence discipline’s strengthcompensate for another’s limitations. With a balanced and flexible system, there is no need to sendsoldiers out to “check the intelligence arithmetic.” 16________________1. Craig, J.P., et al, A Brief History of the G2 Section, GHQ, SWPA, and Affiliated Units, Tokyo: GHQ, Far East Command,m1948) 29-34; Sixth U.S. Army, Report of the Luzon Operations, 9 January 1945-30 June 1945 (n.p.: 1945), 12.2. James, D. Clayton, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 2: 1941-1945, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1975, 79-80, 179-180.3. Sixth U.S. Army, p.12; Mashbir, Sidney F., I Was an American Spy, Vantage Press, New York, 1953, pp. 221, 225; Leary,William M., We Shall Return! University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, 1988, p. 14; Craig, 37-44.4. Headquarters, Sixth Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Inside G2, 1945, p. 7; I Corps, History of the Luzon Campaign,1945, pp. 132, 134; Leary, pp. 69, 75; Sixth U.S. Army, 19: Drea, Edward J., MacArthur’s ULTRA: Code Breaking and theWar Against Japan, 1942-1945, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1992, p. 180.5. Sixth U.S. Army, p. 17; Drea, p. 184; I Corps, p. 134.6. Smith, Herbert Ross, Triumph in the Philippines, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1953, pp. 27-28; Drea, p. 181.7. Smith, pp. 93-94.8. Smith, pp. 141-142; Sixth U.S. Army, pp. 27-31.9. Drea, pp. 181-6.10. Drea, pp. 188, 197; Smith, pp. 211-12.11. Drea, p. 193; Smith, pp. 141, 189-90.12. Sixth U.S. Army, p. 17; Smith, pp. 173-6; Drea, 196-7.13. Drea, pp. 188, 197; Smith, pp. 211-12.14. James, p. 675; Smith, pp. 365-6.15. Smith, p. 464.16. Drea, pp. 197, 199.201
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RALPH VAN DEMAN * Historical Sketch
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OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOM
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U.S. Army Intelligence History: A S
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Page 150 and 151: U.S. Army Intelligence History: A S
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IndexSymbols101st Airborne Division
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Badham, William 144Baghdad baby mil
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Canan, Howard V. 28Canzona, Nichola
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Deutsch, Harold C. 166, 178, 179, 1
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Furlong, John 74, 75, 76Futrell, Fr
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Hoai Nhon district 239Hobar, Basil
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Katz, Friedrich 89Keegan, John 166K
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Mahon, John K. 14, 57Major Army Com
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Morgan, Charles 20Morgan, Frederick
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Photo interpreter teams, training i
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Sandburg, Carl 29Sargent, Frank B.
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Stuart, Meriwether 44, 45Sudley Spr
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WWaberski, Pablo [see Witzke] 84, 1
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