US Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook - Fort Huachuca ...

Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORMand responded to the coach—the CENTCOM J2. I met with the J2, Brigadier General Jack Leide, almostdaily during January and February before G-Day. He, in turn, gave us a superb liaison officer andprovided leadership and support. CENTCOM and ARCENT coordinated all intelligence judgmentsfully, and published no estimate that was not fully agreed upon.Liaison was another crucial aspect of this joint operation. Our liaison elements and individuals performedinnumerable, invaluable functions, especially identifying problems, exchanging intelligence, andkeeping communication open between higher and lower headquarters as well as laterally.Intelligence Focused DownwardlyOne key task in DESERT STORM was to focus all intelligence endeavors downwardly. From theARCENT view, that was on the corps, and through it to the captains, lieutenants, and sergeants whofought the war.In exercises, intelligence often supports training objectives which make it less than realistic. In DESERTSTORM, intelligence was real. It was a vital battlefield operating system, but the crucial link betweenwhat the ARCENT and corps commanders wanted and what intelligence provided did not come aboutautomatically or easily. Building a system that would provide specific intelligence for specific purposeswas a very complex task. In completing the task, we faced many challenges.Building the System—The ChallengesFollowing is a discussion of some of the challenges we faced.Finite Collection Systems. First, intelligence collection assets were finite. The enemy limited themeven more by only infrequently using their radios. Until just before G-Day, we had very limited HUMINT.Thus, we relied on imagery, which, in turn, was limited by weather and capability shortfalls. We couldtake wide angle, blurry photos or spot, clear photos. The former severely hampered accuracy. The latterprovided clear pictures but muddled our full comprehension of the battlefield. It was like viewing afootball game from the Goodyear Blimp with the stadium and city in view and then switching to a linebackerthrough a high-powered, stationary telescope. There was not much in between.Competing Requirements. Second, we had competing requirements, many of them from the corpsthemselves. With multiple number-one priorities over an area the size of Montana and with competingrequirements from other components and national decision makers, we did not satisfy everyone, all thetime. We did, however, focus on the corps and their main efforts.Intelligence Team in Transition. Third, as described earlier, we were just building the intelligenceteam at ARCENT level during the December-January period, at the very time when the corps demandedincreasing volumes and levels of intelligence detail. By early February, we could respond to corps needs.Then, the ARCENT G2 led theater Army intelligence and became a full member of CENTCOM’s jointintelligence team. The start-up in January was rocky, but we moved quickly to develop an intrinsic fieldarmy intelligence capability.Communications and Computer Links. Fourth, we had to provide connectivity to rapidly transmitintelligence requirements and responses (including imagery). We built a communications and computerlink (called DODIIS) directly into the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA). This gave us on-line computeraccess to data bases in AIA and DIA. With DODIIS, we could transmit a relatively high volume ofimagery from AIA to ARCENT. Next, we established communications, computer, and imagery linkswith corps and divisions.With outside help, we deployed TROJAN (for digital and secure voice satellite communications) tocorps and divisions, and Army Space Program Office-Secondary Imagery Dissemination System (ASPO-SIDS) (for imagery receive capability) to VII Corps and its divisions. XVIII Airborne Corps used itsTactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Tactical High Mobility Terminals and other285