US Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook - Fort Huachuca ...

U.S. Army Intelligence History: A SourcebookDESERT SHIELD made us much smarter in the way we supported DESERT STORM. Although ultimately,we couldn’t test our operations’ success because the Iraqi attack never came, we did get indicatorsthat our operations attracted Iraqi HUMINT and SIGINT collection attention.The key lessons from these initial deception operations are——With proper operator maintenance, both decoy and electronic deception equipment can operatesuccessfully in the desert environment for long periods.—To get sufficient resources to portray a believable deception story, corps and division deceptioncells must be consolidated.When we returned from DESERT SHIELD, we began to plan those deceptions that would supportoffensive operations. We developed six different deception courses of action to support the operationalcourse of action and its associated objectives. Just two weeks before the air war started, the CENTCOMplanning staff set up a theater-level deception conference and published the first deception guidance of thewar. ARCENT quickly followed suit with similar guidance. Significantly, our higher headquartersrecognized the importance of their participation in and support of deception. ARCENT and CENTCOMwere vital players in coordinating the large-scale deception effort needed to support offensive operations.The CENTCOM plan paralleled our fourth deception course of action. This made our planning rolerelatively easy. The deception’s objective was to reinforce the Iraqi belief that U.S. forces would attackdirectly into Kuwait and would not go west of the Wadi Al Batin. The deception story was that the twoArmy corps would attack into western Kuwait with the Marines coming up the eastern coast.False amphibious and airborne operations also fed the deception. The intent was to distract Iraqicollection efforts and to help conceal the further westward movement of the two corps. Consequently, theIraqis would present a weakly defended flank that we could take advantage of on G-Day.The XVIII Airborne Corps’ deception operations were very extensive. They required the consolidatedeffort of corps and all four division deception cells (including the 82d Airborne Division as well as thedivisions previously mentioned). On February 13, 1991, the corps and division cells deployed forward.During the next five days we established deception tactical assembly areas (TAAs) south of the westernKuwaiti border. Some 300 people took part in this operation: A signal company, four PSYOP sonicteams, a combat-heavy engineer platoon, a smoke/decontamination platoon, and an infantry platoon whichprovided vital complementary support. The corps G3 helped make the necessary support happen. Dayand night convoys, logistic sites, forward arming and refueling points, air and ground reconnaissance,command posts, tactical assembly areas, airborne and air assault demonstrations, and smoke and decontaminationtraining operations all showed a build-up of corps forces, which supported the deception story.Counterintelligence teams worked local communities to present the deception story to suspected IraqiHUMINT collectors. PSYOP air operations dropped more than half a million surrender leaflets north ofthe notional corps sector. Numerous small deceptions such as falsely marked unit signs and route markingsbecame pieces of the misleading puzzle we wanted the Iraqis to solve.However, the U.S. air campaign now underway was so successful that the number of Iraqi collectionassets was rapidly dwindling. Targeting took into account the theater deception plan, but eventually manysystems we wanted to feed no longer existed. Our deception keyed on remaining Iraqi SIGINT collectionassets (fixed and mobile) and a credible HUMINT collection asset. Iraqi IMINT was no longer a deceptiontarget of opportunity, except possibly what came in from other nations or sources. The unimpededmovement of two Army corps west of the Wadi Al Batin, and the surprise and success of the groundoffensive were the best indicators of our deception operations’ success. Additionally, intelligence interceptsindicated the Iraqis were confused right up to G-Day about the true disposition of U.S. groundforces. They believed XVIII Airborne Corps units were still located where the deception was conducted.Our DESERT STORM Phase II operations reinforced our DESERT SHIELD lessons. For example,we learned that to portray a deception of any size and scope, deception operations must be consolidated.On one hand, tactical level deception was usually planned and developed at division and lower levels.Also, tactical level deception can make best use of operational assets. On the other hand, operational and346