Responding to Gang, Crew and Youth Violence in the District of Columbia

CHAPTER 3: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DISTRICT EXPERIENCEand tools to change their lives; and give them incrementalsteps to make those changes.Findings from the District Scan1. Many critical components of a citywide violence preventionstrategy have already been proposed and tested in theDistrict but little has been done to learn from these efforts.Over the past two decades, numerous plans and reports onyouth violence prevention in the District have been preparedby both public and private agencies. A number ofprograms resulting from this body of work were implementedand have been recognized as national models andmany more have been considered successful by communitystakeholders interviewed for this report. However,there has been almost no investment in evaluation, and forprograms that were discontinued, closeout reports havenever been prepared. Therefore, despite the investment ofmillions of dollars over the years, there is no cumulativebody of lessons learned from which to guide future work.2. There is little publicly available data relating to crewsand gangs in the District.While MPD adult arrestforms have a placeto identify a crime thatis gang related, the juvenilearrest forms arenot designed to collectcomparable information.There is no citywideeffort throughwhich MPD, theschools and communityorganizationsshare intelligenceabout crews and gangs,gang and crew relatedtattoos and graffiti,jointly identify thoseVoices from the DistrictWe learned that there“weren’t many organizationsthat could go out there,engage and retain theindividuals that were involvedin the most risky behaviorsand risky activities. I thinkthere is some disconnect.It’s challenging work. It’s ahigh poverty area, but you canstill get the best of the highpoverty area pretty easily.It’s hard to get the worstof the worst.”groups that are engaged in violent behavior or at high riskof doing so or identify victims as being gang or crew involved.3. Support for community-based services has too oftenbeen driven by crisis or political considerations and hasnot been sustained over time.Funding for even the most successful of the District’s violenceprevention efforts has seldom been sustained overthe long haul. Programs are funded as a crisis response,and then lose support over time. Providers report that thelack of certainty of funding creates barriers for those interestedin serving the most at-risk population. Worse, allowingwell functioning services to be discontinued breakstrust with and feeds the disenfranchisement of the youthand neighborhoods they were designed to support.4. Those violence intervention and prevention programsthat are currently funded are disjointed and not part ofa broader citywide strategy.There are currently multiple funding streams for programsserving at-risk youth, each with different target populations,program goals, outcome measures, reporting requirementsand service delivery strategies. The design ofthe funding and the implementation of these programs donot incorporate existing programs and therefore communicationand collaboration do not occur.5. The bifurcation of the juvenile justice system in the Districtcreates unique and difficult challenges in developingan integrated approach to youth violence prevention.The District has two distinct systems serving juvenile offenders;Court Social Services (CSS), funded by the federalgovernment and managed by DC Superior Court, andthe Department of Youth Rehabilitative Services (DYRS).CSS is responsible for all juveniles from their point of arrestto sentencing, and provides ongoing services to youthfor whom criminal involvement has been determined. Thenumber of youth currently being monitored by CSS isroughly 1,700. These youth can live at home or in a varietyof community settings. Youth considered unsuccessfulin the community (often re-offending) or thought to be avery serious safety risk are committed to the custody ofDYRS. Approximately 20% of youth offenders get committedto the District in this way. These youth can live athome, in community settings including foster care andgroup homes, secure detention and residential placementfacilities.This separation in care and planning for DC youth offenderscreates many structural barriers to good, comprehensiveplanning and results in unnecessary threats to theyouth and community due to a lack of good communityplans:• Due to its federal funding and structure, CSS often operatesin isolation from other child/youth serving entitiesin the city; as a result CSS staff (probation officers) areoften not knowledgeable about services, supports, programsor activities available in the community.• Youth on probation most often only get access to servicesspecifically designed and funded by CSS though intruth they are eligible for a wide array of community basedand Medicaid funded supports.24