Responding to Gang, Crew and Youth Violence in the District of Columbia

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CHAPTER 5: LESSONS FROM THE FIELDintegrating publicsafety technology into Voices from the Districtthe work and fighting The whole concept of collaborationand coordination iscrime at the precinct “level. Other activities way easier said than done,in Minneapolis includedmentoring, job CBO community as well, butand this is likely true within thecreation, teen pregnancyprevention, par-definitely within government;There’s a lot of entrenchedviews within government inent and publicdifferent agencies. MPD thinkseducation, and mentalthis way, and DHS thinks anotherway. There’s also a lothealth and substanceabuse services. San out of our control in terms ofDiego’s plan attempted what agencies have to focusto saturate high-risk on. Many of our human servicesagencies are in courtcommunities with increasedpolice presence cases. So to tear down silosand community services,including mentor-and get people to collaborateis tricky and sometimes takesway more than expected.ing and tutoring, Safe”Passages programs,and employment services. The city also placed emphasison building the capacity of city agencies to service youthand families and developing criteria for documentinggangs. Similarly, Los Angeles divided its efforts acrossseveral levels of work, focusing dually on detention- andprison-based services and individual and family services inthe community that were gang-responsive. At the streetlevel,Los Angeles focused on building and maintainingtruces, quelling rumors, and enforcing safety zones. Intensivestreet-level violence intervention efforts were seento break cycles of violence and prevent retribution. Simultaneously,the city sought to increase recreational services,promote arts and culture among youth, reach out tothe lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community andengage youth in job training and employment, amongother things. Sites used multidisciplinary teams meetingweekly to share data and standardize protocols. Sharing of“street intelligence” across youth serving and law enforcementagencies and organizations was critical to identificationof the highest-risk youth.Baltimore sought to replicate Boston’s “Street Workers”approach and Chicago’s CeaseFire program, which resultedin the city’s Safe Streets Initiative. The city alsosought to increase opportunities for recreation, afterschoolactivities, and employment, along with strengthening thecapacity of community organizations. Law enforcementagencies standardized practice relating to gangs, and additionalpublic policy measures were proposed, particularlyaround the area of existing confidentialityconcernings surrounding targeted youth. Many programsbegan their work by intervening in areas exhibiting theproblem the most and targeting offenders. Using a parallelstrategy these programs tried to reach fringe membersand younger at-risk youth. There was not a lot of researchin this area. It appeared that short-term efforts should betargeted to those highest-risk youth with a history of involvementin the juvenile and criminal justice systems.Using a parallel strategy helped get to the right participantsinvolved; sometimes the gang leaders had younger membersdoing the serious, horrible crimes to distract fromthemselves. It was indicated that incarcerating gang leaderseventually can lead to the problem getting worse upontheir release. Intensive street-level, violence-interventionefforts were seen to break cycles of violence and preventretribution.Review of related programs and a literature search revealedthat suppression is a popular response to gang violence;but, it is not successful over time. Suppressioncampaigns used during crime surges are usually seen aspolitical strategies. 63 Additionally, police gang units thatdo not incorporatecommunity policingstrategies aren’t integratedinto the department’spatrol andinvestigative functions,and don’t havestrengthened managerialcontrols often becomeineffective. 64Suppression effortsalone cannot deteryouth violence. Targetedlaw enforcementsuppression strategies,balanced with evidence-basedservices,are more successful.Core public agenciesmust with communitybasedagencies to as-Voices from the DistrictWe need to build on the“strengths of young people,their families andcommunities, to build publicsafety; not just extinguish kids’bad behaviors, but help themand their neighborhoods andfamilies flourish.Too often we want to measuresuccess by focusing on theyouth not getting rearrested,not using drugs or notgetting into fights.Problem-free is not fullyprepared. I have a child and Idon’t say ‘It was a good day;you didn’t use drugs orget arrested.’”63 Judith Greene and Kevin Pranis, “Gang Wars: The Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective Public Safety Strategies” (Washington: JusticePolicy Institute, 2007).64 Ibid.65 Balanced approach: Model Operation Ceasefire and the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency (OJJDP) Comprehensive GangModel.34
A BLUEPRINT FOR ACTIONsure key specialized supports; e.g., education, mentalhealth, and substance abuse treatment. 65The Los Angeles model emphasized that a locale implementinga community-based strategy should at a minimuminclude street mediation, truce development, peace agreementmaintenance, crisis intervention, evidence-basedmental health services, job training, development andplacement, removal of gang-related visible tattoos, juvenile/criminaljustice support/alternatives, and educationalsupport and services. Programs that link mental healthservices to an intensive supervisory system are seen tohave more success in reducing recidivism and violencetheir either approach alone.ResultsSome of the plans and programs included some degree ofmeasurement and reporting to support the work proposed.Minneapolis observed reductions in both overall and juvenilecrime by the end of 2007. The city also tracks violentacts committed against or by young people, riskfactors, and additional protective measures related to lowerlikelihoods of violence. Evaluations of Chicago Cease-Fire are mixed, but the program has recorded reductions inthe number of shootings and homicides in the city. 66 LikeLos Angeles, Baltimore outlines a number of measuresand objectives for its plan. In addition to monitoring gunviolence and other indicators of youth crime, the city’splan establishes objectives related to reducing drop outrates, increasing student achievement, providing supportsto youth after incarceration and strengthening communitybasedinterventions. Oregon annually publishes data onprogress toward state goals, including details surroundingcrime and public safety.The Urban Institute conducted an evaluation of the GangReduction Program sponsored by the Office of JuvenileJustice and Delinquency Prevention that included Los Angeles,Milwaukee, North Miami Beach, and Richmond. Atthe time of this preliminary evaluation, Los Angeles wasthe only site that showed a significant reduction in gang relatedincidences and violence. 67 The strategies developedand administered in Los Angeles to combat youth gangproblems were community mobilization, opportunitiesprovision, social intervention, suppression and organizationalchange and development. They were deemed to besuccessful in part due to efforts of city-county governmentleaders, effective development of a steering committee,inter-organizational collaboration and the use of an interdisciplinaryintervention team.SummaryAcross all of the metrics examined, we find that city andstate initiatives employ mixed methods to combat youthviolence. The most robust plans include strategies that extendwell beyond crime reduction and focus on improvingthe social and economic station of high-risk children andfamilies. These plans are accompanied by defined measuresof success and detailed objectives and timelines foraccomplishing this important work. It was evident fromthe research that a comprehensive approach that balancesprevention, intervention, and suppression has the highestpotential of reducing gang/crew violence. The use of evidence-based,best and promising practices to obtain resultswere also indicated.Summative Findings fromthe National ScanThe following summative findings are based on workscited and consulted regarding best practices in youth violenceprevention as well as a review of implementationplans addressing youth violence and gangs developed incities across the country. It is evident that gang/crew violenceis largely preventable.1. Gang assessments are necessary to determine thescale of the problem.Regardless of population size, any community that sensesit is experiencing a youth gang problem needs to undertakea thorough, objective, and comprehensive assessmentprior to considering any type of response. The NationalYouth Gang Center has developed an assessment protocolthat any community can use to assess its gang problem.This assessment guides the development of a comprehensive,communitywide plan of gang prevention, intervention,and suppression. 682. Community input and ownership are essential to effectiveprograms.Given that all communities are unique, each communityneeds to thoroughly assess its problems utilizing the publichealth approach to develop and implement preventionand intervention programs and services suitable to it’s spe-66 Wesley Skogan, Susan Hartnett, Natalie Bump and Jill Dubois, “Executive Summary: Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago”, (Chicago: Institute for Policy Research,Northwestern University, 2008).67 “Community Collaboratives Addressing Youth Gangs: Interim Findings from the Gang Reduction Program Research Report” (Washington: Urban InstituteJustice Policy Center, 2008).68 National Youth Gang Center, 2002.35
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Responding to Gang, Crew and Youth Violence in the District of Columbia

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