Two Royal <strong>Australian</strong> Air <strong>Force</strong> FA/18 Hornets, fly in formation over RAAF Base Williamtown, NewSouth Wales.
Letters to the EditorDivided LoyaltiesDear Sir,Major R. A. Hall's timely letter regardingProfessor Blaineys' opinions on the negative effectsof multiculturalism upon our <strong>Defence</strong><strong>Force</strong> should provide plenty of food forthought.Major Hall correctly argues that Aboriginalsand Torres Strait Islanders will be an invaluableasset in any future conflict especially in NorthernAustralia.But it is not so easy to brush aside thepossibility of divided loyalties. As a member ofthe Cadre Staff of an ARES Officer CadetUnit, I remember a Cadet of foreign descentsaying that he would never raise his rifle againstthe people of his ethnic origins regardless ofAustralia's stand in any conflict.NO. I'm not a bigot nor do I have any specialantipathy towards multiculturalism I simplyrepeat the sober statement of a potential<strong>Australian</strong> Officer who, along with his parents,held <strong>Australian</strong> Citizenship.Recently, a reportedly <strong>Australian</strong> born 16year old was shot protesting at the YugoslavConsulate. The reason for his protest? Ill treatmentof minorities in his homeland. I don'tknow whether the Blainey view is absolutelyright, if only I could be sure that it's wrong, ifC. T. AinslieCaptainConventional DeterrenceDear Sir,Lieutenant Colonel Smith's article, ConventionalDeterrence and <strong>Australian</strong> MilitaryStrategy, (DFJ Jul/Aug 88) approaches thesubject of conventional deterrence from aglobal perspective, then relates the lessons toAustralia's geostrategic circumstances.If approached from an <strong>Australian</strong> perspective,that is from the point of view expressed inendorsed strategic guidance, a strategy containingelements of deterrence is worth consideration.Based on possible contingencies pronouncedby <strong>Defence</strong> of Australia 1987, deterranceneeds to be examined at two levels. First,in the shorter term to deter an aggressor from acampaign of low-level operations; second, inthe longer term to deter an aggressor from largescale conventional operations.In relation to shorter term contingencies, anadversary's strategy is expected to indirect.That is, his military operations will be secondaryto other means of progressing the conflict.Andre Beaufre's excellent analysis of indirectstrategy in 'Introduction to Strategy', narrowsthe scope of this strategy when he describes the'erosion method'. The types of activities hedescribes here can be directly related to currentenemy concepts being discussed in <strong>Defence</strong>circles. Beaufre further describes measures tocounter this 'erosion method'. Large scaleresources should not be used and the concept ofthe 'exterior manoeuvre' needs to be applied.This manoeuvre is designed to assure freedomof action while simultaneously 'paralysing theenemy by a multitude of deterrent checks'. Hestates, 'As with all operations designed to deter,action will of course be primarilypsychological; political, economic and militaryresources will all be combined towards the sameend.'This would seem to place deterrence forshorter term contingencies at the level of nationalstrategy not military strategy. By combiningother elements of national power withmilitary power, Australia can have a believableand affordable national strategy to deter anenemy in the shorter term.In regard to longer term contingencies, someof Colonel Smith's conclusions and lessons mayappear valid. But again they are related toglobal perspectives and the replacement, as AirCommodore Ashworth pointed out (DFJNov/Dec 88), of the superpower nuclear deterrentwith conventional deterrence.Colonel Smith dismisses Langtry and Ballbased on historical evidence that 'indicates thatfar from being deterred from conflict, a positionof inferiority may actually provide acatalyst for military action.' Langtry and Ball'sdiscussion on relative combat power, doeshowever have relevance to a strategy of deterrencein longer term contingencies. The bottomline of this discussion is that an aggressor would
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