BUDDHIST MONASTIC CODE I

Saṅghādisesa Chapter 5Vibhaṅga illustrates these factors in action, they fall into two classes: (1) offensesand (2) the remaining nine factors.1) An example of using an offense as a ploy: One sees Bhikkhu Y actuallycommitting an offense. Although one perceives it as a lesser offense, one magnifiesthe charge to a pārājika. For instance, one sees him get into an argument withBhikkhu Z and in a fit of anger give Z a blow to the head. Z goes unconscious, fallsto the floor, and suffers a severe concussion resulting in death. Because Y'sintention was simply to hurt him, not to kill him, he incurs only a pācittiya. If onerealizes the nature of Y's intention and the fact that the penalty is a pācittiya, andyet accuses him of having committed a pārājika, one would incur a saṅghādisesaunder this rule. For ease of remembrance, this use of a ploy can be called "sameperson, different offense."2) An example of using any of the other nine factors as a ploy: X, who may or maynot be a bhikkhu, has something in common with Bhikkhu Y — they are both tall,short, dark, fair, share the same name, are students of the same preceptor, live inthe same dwelling, use similar looking bowls or robes, etc. One sees X committingan action that, if he were a bhikkhu, would amount to a pārājika offense; on thebasis of the similarity between the two, one claims to have seen Bhikkhu Ycommitting a pārājika. For instance, X and Y are both very tall. Late at night onesees X — knowing that it is X — stealing tools from the monastery storeroom. Onehas a grudge against Y and so accuses him of being the thief, saying, "I saw thisbig tall guy stealing the tools, and he looked just like you. It must have been you."For ease of remembrance, this use of a ploy can be called "same offense, differentperson."None of the texts mention the scenario of a double ploy — i.e., "different person,different offense" — but from the way the Vibhaṅga defines an issue that pertainsotherwise, a double ploy would fit the definition as well. In other words, if — havingseen X engage in lustful contact with a woman — one then accuses Bhikkhu Y, whoshares the same family name with X, of engaging in sexual intercourse with thewoman, the case would apparently come under this rule.A case that would not come under this rule is one based on seeing or hearing Ycommit an action that bears some resemblance to an offense but is actually not.For instance, one overhears him teaching Vinaya to some new bhikkhus and quoting,by way of illustration, a few of the statements that would count as claims of superiorhuman states. Because this does not constitute an offense, there is no issue(adhikaraṇa) pertaining otherwise that can be used as a ploy. In shorthand terms,this would count as "same person, no offense." If, realizing the context, one lateraccuses him of having violated Pr 4, the accusation would count as an unfoundedcharge and so would come under the preceding rule.The remaining explanations for this rule are exactly the same as those for thepreceding rule, except that in the non-offense clauses the Vibhaṅga states that ifone makes a charge — or gets someone else to make a charge — against theaccused based on what one actually perceives, there is no offense even if the issueturns out to pertain otherwise. For instance, from the examples already given: One121