BUDDHIST MONASTIC CODE I

Buddhist Monastic Code 1We can extrapolate from this discussion and say that any physical gesture that,from the context of events, is intended and understood as an order to take an item,would count under the factor of effort here. This extrapolation will be useful whentreating the unauthorized use of credit cards, below.The Vibhaṅga states that if there is a chain of command involving two or morebhikkhus (not counting the instigator) — for example, Bhikkhu A telling Bhikkhu B totell Bhikkhu C to tell Bhikkhu D to commit the theft — then when D agrees to committhe theft, the instigator incurs a thullaccaya. Once D takes the object as instructed,all four incur the penalty coming from the theft. If there is any confusion in the chainof command — e.g., Bhikkhu B instead of telling C tells D directly — neither A nor Cincurs the penalty for the theft itself. Bhikkhu A would incur a dukkaṭa for telling B,whereas C would incur no penalty at all.The Commentary notes that the instigator in any of these cases incurs the penaltyonly if he gives an explicit command to take the item (although this statement has tobe qualified to include signs meant as commands, as mentioned above). If hesimply tells his accomplice that such-and-such an item is located in such-andsucha place and would be easy to steal, he incurs no penalty even if theaccomplice actually commits the theft. This point applies to many of the rules inwhich giving a command to do an action that would break the rule would also fulfilthe factor of effort: A statement counts as a command only if it is a clear imperativeto do the action. Under the few rules where this is not the case, we will note theexception.None of the texts mention the scenario in which Bhikkhu A tells Bhikkhu B to take anitem for him without letting B know that he is committing a theft — for instance,telling B that the item belongs to him (A), that it is ownerless, or letting B come toeither conclusion on his own. Nevertheless, it would appear that if B then actuallytakes the item as told, all of the factors for an offense would be fulfilled for A: Hegives the command to take (the imperative the Vibhaṅga uses in illustratingcommands to "steal" — avahara — can also simply mean to "take"), he knows thatthe item belongs to someone else, he intends to have it taken, and it is taken as aresult of his command. As for B, he would not be committing an offense, as hisstate of mind would not fulfil the factors of perception and intention for a theft.Cases of this sort would not fall under Deceit, discussed below, because thatcategory covers only cases where one deceives the owner of the item, or his agent,into giving the item, and thus technically the item counts as given. Here the item isnot given, for the person deceived into taking it is not responsible for it at all.As with the extrapolation from the discussion of signs, this application of the GreatStandards will also be useful when we discuss unauthorized use of credit cards,below. It will also prove useful in our discussion of the following rule.Shared responsibility. If bhikkhus go in a group to commit a theft but only one ofthem does the actual taking, all still incur the penalty coming from the theft.Similarly, if they steal valuables worth collectively more than five māsakas but whichwhen divided among them yield shares worth less than five māsakas each, all incur40