BUDDHIST MONASTIC CODE I

Buddhist Monastic Code 1item carried across the frontier without entering the customs area would not countas impounded, even though the king would probably claim the right to impound oreven confiscate it if his agents apprehended the smuggler. Translated into modernterms, this would indicate that the evasion of other taxes claimed by the government— such as inheritance taxes — would incur the full penalty here only if the itembeing taxed was impounded on government property, and one evaded the tax bytaking the item out of impoundment without paying the required fee. Otherwise, thepenalty for tax evasion would be a dukkaṭa.None of the texts discuss the question of contraband, i.e., articles that a customsofficial would confiscate outright rather than allow into a country after the paymentof a fee. Apparently, such goods smuggled through a customs house would fall intothis category, although — as even the payment of a fee would not legally get themthrough customs — their selling value would be the determining factor in calculatingthe seriousness of the offense.c. Malfeasance: The Vinita-vatthu includes an unusual case in which a wealthy manwith two heirs — a son and a nephew — tells Ven. Ajjuka, "When I am gone, showthe place (where my treasure is buried) (§) to whichever of my heirs has the greaterfaith." After the man's death, Ven. Ajjuka sees that the nephew has the greater faithand so shows the place of the treasure to him. The nephew awards the Saṅgha witha large donation; the son accuses Ven. Ajjuka of having wrongfully deprived him ofhis rightful inheritance. On hearing this, Ven. Ānanda first accuses Ven. Ajjuka of apārājika, but when the wealthy man's wishes are revealed, Ven. Upāli convinces Ven.Ānanda that Ven. Ajjuka committed no offense.None of the texts discuss the details of this case, which seems to have postdatedthe Buddha's parinibbāna. The apparent assumption underlying the ruling is thatwhen X dies, the inheritance he leaves to Y belongs to Y from the moment of X'sdeath. Otherwise, the items in question would be ownerless until apportioned outamong the heirs, and thus would not fulfill the factor of object under this rule. Also,the taking in this case would be accomplished in line with the Vibhaṅga's standarddefinition for taking with regard to the objects involved — and not necessarily whenthe cheated heir gives up trying to reclaim the inheritance — for in Ven. Ajjuka'scase Ven. Ānanda was ready to impose a pārājika even though the son had notabandoned his claim.d. Destruction of property: The Vibhaṅga states that if a bhikkhu breaks, scatters,burns, or otherwise renders unusable the property of another person, he incurs adukkaṭa. Thus the simple destruction of property does not fulfill the factor of effortunder this rule. The Vinita-vatthu contains a case in which a bhikkhu intends to stealsome grass belonging to the Community but ends up setting fire to it instead, thusincurring a dukkaṭa. The Commentary notes that this ruling applies only because thebhikkhu did not move the grass from its place. What this means is that if he had firsttaken the grass from its place and then destroyed it in any way, the factor of effortunder this rule would have been fulfilled and — all other factors of a pārājikaoffense being present — he would have been guilty of the full offense.Special cases cited in the Commentary include the following:34