BUDDHIST MONASTIC CODE I

Pārājika Chapter 4moving it from its place. A similar set of offenses would apply in the stagesappropriate for taking any of the other types of objects listed above.Accomplices. A bhikkhu can commit an offense not only if he himself steals anobject, but also if he incites another to steal. The offenses involved in the actsleading up to the theft are as follows:If a bhikkhu tells an accomplice to take an object that would be grounds for apārājika, he incurs a dukkaṭa. When the accomplice agrees to do so, the instigatorincurs a thullaccaya. Once the accomplice succeeds in taking the object asinstructed — regardless of whether he gets away with it, and of whether he shares itwith the instigator — the instigator incurs a pārājika. If the accomplice is a bhikkhu,he too incurs a pārājika. If the object would be grounds for a thullaccaya or adukkaṭa, the only penalties incurred prior to the actual theft would be dukkaṭas.The Commentary insists that if the accomplice is sure to take the item, the bhikkhuincurs a pārājika as soon as the accomplice agrees to take it. However, as theVinaya-mukha notes, this contradicts the Canon, and there is no way to measurewhether a proposed theft is a sure thing or not.If there is any confusion in carrying out the instructions — e.g., if the accomplice,instead of taking the object specified by the instigator, takes something elseinstead; or if he is told to take it in the afternoon but instead takes it in the morning— the instigator incurs only the penalties for proposing the theft and persuading theaccomplice, and not the penalty for the theft itself. The same holds true if theinstigator rescinds his order before the theft takes place, but the accomplice goesahead and takes the object anyway.According to the Vibhaṅga, an instigator who wishes to call off the theft before it iscarried out but who for one reason or another cannot get his message to theaccomplice in time, incurs the full penalty for the completed theft.The Commentary also adds that the factor of the thief's perception does not affectthe penalties. In other words, if Bhikkhu A tells Bhikkhu B to steal object X, and Btakes Y, thinking it to be X, A is absolved of any responsibility for the theft.Conversely, if B takes X, thinking it to be Y, A is guilty of the theft.The Vibhaṅga also notes that if an instigator tells his accomplice to take an itemwhen he (the instigator) makes a sign — such as winking (§) his eye, lifting hiseyebrow, or lifting his head — he incurs a dukkaṭa in making this order, athullaccaya if the accomplice agrees to do as told, and the full offense when theaccomplice actually takes the item at the time of the sign. If the accomplice takesthe item before or after the sign, though, the instigator incurs no offense. The Subcommentary,noting that the signs mentioned in the Vibhaṅga are so fleeting that itwould be impossible to take the item at the very moment of the sign, interprets thislast statement as follows: If the accomplice starts trying to take the item right afterthe sign, then regardless of how much time that takes, it counts as "at the time ofthe sign." Only if he makes an appreciable delay before attempting the theft does itcount as "after the sign."39