Book II - Wilbourhall.org

IV.] POINTS IN THE HISTORY. Ixixthe fact that war was inevitable. In truth the realcause of the war, as Thucydides set himself to proYein the first book, was that Sparta and her allies hadbeen disgusted by the growth of Athenian powersince the Persian wars.After the banishment of Themistocles, who hadpursued a strongly anti-Laconian policy, Aristidesand Cimon had in turn done their utmost to conciliateSparta ; but their advances were met witha coldness which naturally caused indignation atAthens. This bitterness found expression in analliance between Athens and Argos in 461 B.C. ;and,a few years later, Pericles, whose influence was increasing,took up a defensive attitude against Sparta.This policy he continued to pursue throughout hisadministration. Consequently, in the war, Athenswas to act strictly on the defensive, her sole objectbeing to retain her empire. It was impossible forher to place an army in the field which would be amatch for that of the enemy. According to theestimate of Pericles (c. 13), Athens had at her disposalfifteen thousand eight hundred men. Perhapsby the greatest effort, and with such infantry as shecould obtain for land service in Greece from herallies,she might have brought together about twentythousand men. But how was such an army to protectAttica against a Peloponnesian force available forforeign service of about sixty thousand men ? Owingto this disparity of numbers, the negative principlesadopted by Pericles were to avoid a land battle, torefrain from dangerous enterprises, and to abandonAttica to the invaders. His positive plans were to