ISSUE 14 : Jan/Feb - 1979 - Australian Defence Force Journal

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1979No. 14HBDEFENCEFORCEJOURNAL

DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALBoard of ManagementAir Commodore R. C. Rowell RAAF (Chairman)Captain P. R. Sinclair RANColonel F. P. Scott DSOGroup Captain J. M. Chesterfield RAAFMr B. W. OxleyManaging EditorMr K. J. TaylorIllustrations by members of the Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick.Printed and published for the Department of Defence, Canberra, by RuskinPress, North Melbourne.Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 wordsis the ideal length. Articles should be typed, double spacing, on one sideof the paper and submitted in duplicate.All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:The Managing EditorDefence Force JournalBuilding C Room 4-25Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600.(062) 65 2682 or if unanswered 65 2935

DEFENCEFORCEJOUR NALNo. 14ISSN 0314-1039January /February 1979A Journal of the Australian Profession of ArmsContents3 Editor's Comment4 Letters to the Editor15 The Surveillance of Northern Australia — its history. The Story of Stanner'sBush Commando 1942Captain Amoury Vane31 The Challenge to ManagementColonel John M. Hutcheson, MC34 A Programme in Problem SolvingCaptain B. D. Copeland43 Some Thoughts on ADFA (Australian Defence Force Academy)Captain S. J. Hollander, RNZIR46 Napoleon and SpainMajor G. G. Middleton51 Training War Games — A Third Dimension to TrainingMr. T. J. Millane54 Parachute Familiarisation Courses—"A Graduate's Report"Major M. R. Irvine56 Book ReviewsPermission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readily given by the ManagingEditor after consultation with the author. Any reproduced articles should bear an acknowledgementof source.The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own and should not be construed asofficial opinion or policy.Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information contained in their articles: theBoard of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact© Commonwealth of Australia 1 979

II*s"•(Defence Public KelatlcSoldiers undertaking rapelling training at RAAF Base Fairbairn during RMC annual field exercise wIroquois from No. 5 Squadron, RAAF.

^^\Editors Commentf DEFENCE]FORCE JOURNALUTHIS issue is, of necessity, a bit of a patchwork.No derogation of the authors is implied.Their articles are both interesting anddiverse, ranging as they do through Napoleonin Spain via Stanner in the Northern Territoryto management, training and parachuting.I am particularly pleased with the largevolume of letters received. In accordance witheditorial policy, they are all being published inthe current issue. It is, after all, Letters to theEdiior which have an urgency and currencywhich demands the quickest possible publication.If a short article has had to fall out tomake room for them, I'm sure you will agreethat it is for the best. Interesting and pressingissues are here discussed and a number ofdistinguished names appear among thesignatures.The letters and at least one of the articles appearin a slightly different type. It is cleaner,easier to read, and has at last done away withone of my particular befe.s noires, the slipping"s". This new type is set by computer, a greatadvance on the old hot metal type. The onlysnag is that the computer is unable to use itsbrains as the old hot metal operator used to doto correct obvious errors like the non-use ofitalics in ships' names etc. It emphasises theneed for still greater accuracy on my part. Theold hot metal galleys will soon be used up (a fewbook reviews remain) and it is hoped that by themiddle of the year the type will all be computerized.I have received two letters about the indexsystem in the Defence Force Journal. There isan annual index in each last issue of the year (atpresent issues 8 and 13). Librarians have expressedthe need for a cumulative index, bothfor the present Journal and its predecessor, theArmy Journal. This is an excellent idea, whichruns into two snags. One is lack of staff, theother lack of funds. It is, however, somethingto strive for, even if it can only be produced ona typed and photo-copied basis. I am gratefulto Ms Elaine Alexander of the DefenceRegional Library, Melbourne, for her offer tohelp in this undertaking.Talking of libraries, I have placed on p. 33 alist of defence libraries in which some of thebooks reviewed in this issue are available. Ihope with the help of the Director, InformationRequirements, that this service can continue.I am most grateful to those readers who haveresponded to my call for back issues, especiallyto Brigadier Parslow, the Solicitor-General inQueensland for the whole swag he sent me. Inreturn I have promised to run a small commercialfor his local RSL. (see p. 64) We are stilllooking for the following back numbers of theArmy Journal: 108, 109, 113, 114, 116, 121,123, 128 and 130. I would be most grateful ifanyone holding any of these issues surplus torequirements would forward them to me. Thiswould complete an unbound collection forphoto copying of individual articles. I hope topublish a list of the early issues still available tomake up readers' collections.I was reminded that in my list of "thankyous" in the last issues I forgot to mention MrsGwen Lawless of the Typing Pool who did sucha good job in filling in the wording in the rathercomplicated spiders of the article 'The Bi-Mobile Force'. The effect even in the greatlyreduced blocks is most pleasing.We welcome a new Chairman of the Board ofManagement, Air Commodore R.C. Rowell.We also have a new Naval member, CaptainP.R. Sinclair, RAN, who replaces CaptainM.W. Hudson, RAN on his promotion toCommodore. Mr J.G. Menham has also movedon and is, at least temporarily, replaced by MrB.W. Oxley.To all the retiring members of the Board ofManagement 1 would like to extend my personalthanks, but especially to Brigadier D..I.McMillan who has been a tower of strength tome and to the Defence Force Journal since itsinception.U

Dixon E2DEFENCE PRODUCTIONMr. A.G. Ciibbs, Chairman of the VictorianRailways Board, who worked with me when Iwas Managing Director of General MotorsHolden and also Director of OrdnanceProduction on the 2 pdr. anti-tank gun, hasbrought to my attention articles in yourDefence Force Journal, in particular "LeadTimes for Weapons — An Expert View", (DFJNo. 11 July/August, 1978) and especially aslisted on Page 1ft, Table 4 of DFJ No. 8(January/February 1978).As Director of Ordnance Production, fromits initiation until it was closed down at the endof the war, I was responsible for over 500 majorprojects some of which are mentioned in yourlist but one outstanding exception is the 25 pdr.Gun Howitzer, of which about 1,200 weremanufactured in Australia and the first one inrecord time of three months which was highlypraised and appreciated by U.K. and Canada.There is no mention of the most critical pointwhich we experienced in the last war namely,the overcoming of the non-availability ofoptical munitions. This shortage was nearly ourundoing and could have been a very seriousmatter if we had not overcome it.We produced, with much resistance fromoverseas interests, 4 grades of optical glass,designed optical systems and produced anenormous range of optics, lens, etc., exportingsome to U.S.A. for their military use.To bring this optical munitions intooperation took 10 months even though the thenAustralian High Commissioner, Sir StanleyBruce cabled the Prime Minister, Mr. BenChifley — "The Admiralty, Chance Brothersand other Authorities with experiences in theU.K. state that it would take at least 4 years andcost over a million pounds to achieve theresult."The point probably overlooked and notappreciated today and which condition couldeasily arise in the future, Australia did not havea line of supply of military equipment for 22months between Dunkirk and Pearl Harbor;our Army troops were moved from NorthAfrica to New Guinea and were to a remarkabledegree dependent on the munitions equipmentwe made in Australia, in particular the 25 pdr.Gun Howitzer.1 have a very extensive and full record of theoperations of the Ordnance ProductionDirectorate which the National University inCanberra will be taking over and to which Ihave agreed. They will be compiling the facts indue course.As pertinent 1 enclose a copy of therecollection of a memorandum I sent to thethen Prime Minister at his request, on my ideasof Defence In Australia, which I still think hasmuch merit.MMl. Eliza, Victoria Sir Laurence Hartnett,CBECONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL10th May, 1945.Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon. B. Chifley.L.J. Hartnett, Director, Ordnance Production,M.M.Defence Plan for Australia.You suggested I could submit to you a Planfor the Defence of Australia which need notfollow the traditional approach.I am not an expert in this particular field buthave a wide experience, served as a pilot, mademunitions and engaged in other aspects in twoWars some of which is known to you in the lastWar and overall is briefly recorded on theattached sheet.The Plan for the Defence of Australia I nowsubmit is certainly not traditional.It would be quite normal and natural for ourArmed Forces to oppose this Plan because theyhave been trained to use foreign designedequipment well suited probably to othercountries requirements, but not specifically toAustralian requirements. Our requirementsvary greatly to those of Europe and most othercountries.It is absolutely essential that a Defence Planis drawn up in every respect applicable to thecountry in question: no two countriesrequirements are exactlx alike. This especially

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 5applies to Australia in terms of length of coastline,population and financial resources.The requirements of the Plan must beprojected at least five years forward preferablyten years and forecasted further.Limiting factors must be recognised,accepted as challenges and means devised tominimise or even overcome them.Some are hazards which we must accept andlive with.We have magnificent examples of smallnations, like ourselves, who have devisedexcellent Defence Plans, designed and madetheir own equipment and been successful, suchas Finland, Switzerland and Sweden.As to Australia, we must recognise andaccept we are the largest single nation islandcontinent in the world. We have the longestcoast-line in the world and proportionally thelowest population. Our coast-line is 22,709miles and the population is 8,000,000. It isimpossible to fortify and garrison our coastline.It would be futile, even suicide, to selectlocations on our coast-line for fortifying. Wewould have a repeat of Singapore and similarsituations in the last War when landings weremade far away by air or water and attackedfrom the rear. Then in effect our fighting unitsand equipment, much of which are fixedfortifications such as radar, anti-aircraft gunswith predictors and artillery are lost.Attack and landings can come from anydirection, especially air borne, possibly fromthe South is least likely but even that cannot bedismissed. Accordingly, we want to be centrallylocated so that we can strike in any direction.Fortunately today this can be achieved by theuse of air transport and air protection. In thecentre of Australia, Alice Springs or TennantCreek or Mount Isa, there is stationed with adegree of local dispersement to reduce targetvulnerability a Mobile Force highly trained ofsay 25,000 who can move off at short notice asa Fighting Force by air to any coast section ofAustralia. Such force would have speciallydesigned light weight equipment manufacturedin Australia.As a founding Director of CommonwealthAircraft Corporation and as advised by theGeneral Manager, Mr. L. Wackett, the largefour engine troop and supply transport aircraft,one hundred or more of which would berequired, could be designed and manufacturedin Australia. Similarly, some 60 or moreprotective escort fighter aircraft could bedesigned and made in Australia.As regards weapons, guns, small arms,predictors, mortars, engineer equipment, allcould be designed and manufactured inAustralia as was effectively done in the lastWar.For some 22 months between Dunkirk andPearl Harbor*, we had no lines of supply opento us, and with our troops moved from NorthAfrica to New Guinea, yet we supplied all guns,rifles, ammunition and engines equipmentadequately with many modifications to suit theterrain and climatic conditions of New Guinea.In total some 3,000 artillery guns of fourdifferent calibres.Our Navy is another branch of our Defence,yet would be closely co-ordinated with theMobile Force to the extent that some personnelof the Mobile Force would in effect be Marinesand trained in underwater operations.I commend merit in numbers of high speedwell armed radar equipped torpedo carryingrelatively small craft rather than a few cruisertypes.The Air Force has many roles to play apartfrom transporting and protecting the MobileForce, including surveillance, submarine searchand destruction and air combat.The Ministry of Munitions should bemaintained even in shadow form. So much waslearnt in a hurry and its achievementremarkable, as acknow ledged by our allies.Practically every major project especiallyguns took no longer than 6 months fromapproval to production in volume as againstother countries — 11 to 16 months.Items on which we were nearly caught outwhich must be preserved and maintained asessential to our Defence are —1. Optical glass production in 5 grades.2. Design and production of Optical Systemsfor gun sights, cameras, binoculars, spiritlevels, microscopes, etc.3. Searchlight mirrors and lenses.4. Ball and Roller Bearings.5. Spark Plugs.6. Diesel Engine Injectors.7. Nickel.8. Copper.9. Aluminium.10 High Speed Tool Steel.11. Tool Room Capacity.12. Petrol.

6 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN FEB 79A serious situation in the early days of theWar was the non existence of drawings of mainitems of military equipment in use and requiredby the Services. Not only did this presentproduction but made it very difficult tomanufacture spare parts. An extreme case wasthe all important urgently required 25 pdr. GunHowitzer, approved and urgently required byCabinet. No sample or drawing in Australia.One set was smuggled through U.S.A. fromCanada with much difficulty weeks afterapproval. Even these drawings did not coverrecent modifications.Every item of equipment approved and in useshould have at least two sets of separatedrawings on record. Microfilm could suffice.Importantly, all modifications as made must berecorded on all drawings to ensure they are upto date.In Ordnance alone some 30,000 drawingswere involved.For the record Australia had no overseas lineof supply for munitions for 22 months fromDunkirk to Pearl Harbor, with strictneutrality by U.S.A. and nothing availablefrom U.K. Australian troops moved fromNorth Africa to New Guinea with littleequipment and that which was brought overneeded much modification plus landing craftand much of this special equipment — guns,ammunition, etc., all from Australia.Scientists. I had much benefit from Scientistswhich I co-opted, mostly leading physicistsfrom all the Universities.It started when we were in a parlous positionwith no optical glass or optics for gun sights,and other optical equipment.It later went to fungi problems in NewGuinea, in electrical and optical and otherinstrument equipment. I recommend suchactivity should be maintained as a Defencerequirement because when War occursimmediate problems of this kind always ariseand such organisation is invaluable. (Anexample of this scientific work was thedegaussing equipment to meet the problem ofthe German Magnetic Mine. A simple answerwas found in 14 hours and ships were safe tosail again).U/ ../. Hartnett.'Sir Laurence used the anglicized spelling Harbour in theoriginal. Il has been changed in this reprint lo conform u iiheditorial policy. — Editor.THE BOER WAR CONCENTRATIONCAMPSAs a student of military history, I was veryinterested in the article 'The Boer War 1899-1902' published in the DFJ No. 12(September October 1978). However, thereference to the concentration camps erected bythe British was coloured in such a way that thecasual reader might believe that the camps wereinnocuous and undeserving of criticism. In factthe record of these camps was infamous.In the two and a half years war, the Britishlost 22,000 men and the Boers, 6,000, yetduring the last two years of the war, 4,000 Boerwomen and 16,000 Boer children died in theconcentration camps'. Had the Boers persistedin their struggle their families would doubtlesshave been exterminated.Perhaps the concentration camps rather thanthe "scorched earth [policy] created the lastingbitterness which persists after 75 years betweenthe Afrikanders and their oppressors, theBritish" 2 .IIRAA F Staff College.D. T. Pollock,Fairbairn, ACT Squadron leader. RAAF.Acknowledgements1. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 20, London, 196H.2. Lawson, Colonel U.S. 'The Boer War 1899-1902'.Defence Force Journal No. 12. September October 78.DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE TWENTIETHCENTURYWith reference to the Book Review by Mr R.Pelvin (DFJ No. 12) I would like to make a fewpoints. Firstly it is not difficult to justify theinclusion of the Battle of Tsu-Shima. One ofthe aims of the book under review is to describebattles which have most affected the course of20th century warfare. As far as naval warfare isconcerned, Tsu-Shima has done just that. Thisbattle was decisive, dramatic and pregnant withlessons. It was the last naval battle which can bestudied before the outbreak of World War 1and showed how action experience generallylagged behind theoretical and technicaladvance. It as the first naval battle in whichwireless telegraphy was used and the last battlem which each gunlayer was responsible for hisown aim and fire, subject to no central control.Tsu-Shima emphasised certain trends in navalwarfare, ie. the increasing gun ranges, themixed armament of various calibres, refuellingat sea and it threw doubts upon the value of the

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 7armoured cruiser as a supplementary to thebattleship.Secondly, Mr Pelvin goes on to say that theRussian ships were of extreme age and doubtfuldesign. The nucleus of the 2nd PacificSquadron was made tip of four battleships ofthe Borodino class, launched in and after 1902,therefore just three years old when sent intobattle. The 16 other major Russian warshipswere on an average ten years old, ranging fromthe Osliaba launched in 1902 to the VladimirMonomakh launched in 1881. If these are shipsof extreme age at the time of the battle, what dowe call our three RAN DDGs? (launched 1963-66). The flagship Kniaz Suvoroff sank aftermore than four torpedo hits and after havingbeen under concentrated fire for five hours andtwenty minutes. Not bad for a ship of 'doubtfuldesign' and overloaded with coal.Finally in regard to the speed of the QueenElizabeth Class Dreadnoughts, Mr Pelvin andthe book under review are both wrong.Although the ships were designed for 25 knots,it is understood that 24 was about the bestobtained; as for the Queen Elizabeth herself,best speed in service was 22.5-23 knots. 1 havequoted these figures from Sir Oscar Parkes'book British Battleships.^Office of DNP,1. StrasserCanberra, ACTLeading SeamanVSTOL VARIATIONSA.k. Richardson's letter (DFJ No. 12September October 1978) could be consideredconfusing when he states that Vstol Variations(DFJ No. 9 March/April 1978) claims that'Aircraft weight is less than total lift prior topoint Z, equal to the lift of Point Z, and greaterthereafter'. "Prior", in this sense, would applyto the relative location of the event as depictedin Figure 1A when reading from left to rightacross the page; the opposite is of course true if"prior" is taken in the more commonly usedtemporal sense (as addressed in the article).Apart from some confusion caused (at leastto this writer) over the above, Mr. Richardson'spoint is well taken that an error has been madein the printing of Figure 1A and that weightwould in fact eqtial lift at the point of inflexionof the flight path, ie. approximately at point Y,(it would also have been clearer if Figure IBhad been printed to 'line up' with Figure 1A).A.K.R.'s observation does not of course alterthe basic theory of the situation.Ski-jump trials are apparently proceedingapace and over 17° has now been achieved.Launch weights of 3000 lbs. over and aboveflat-deck launch weights are expected — whichif converted to fuel endurance equates toperhaps an extra hour's thing time. Thebenefits of the ski-jump can therefore bereadily appreciated and the incremental aircraftperformance obtained cannot but amelioratesome of the criticisms which have been laid atthe door of sea-based VSTOL aircraft. WAustralian Division, A.M. HicklingCanberra Branch Honorary SecretaryThe Royal Aeronautical SocietyCOUNTER TERRORISMI have just been browsing again through theJuly/August issue (No. 11) of your DefenceForce Journal and 1 noticed your reference inthe Editorial to "Counter Terrorism".It struck me that the recently published bookPeace-keeping in a Democratic Society byRobin Evelegh might be a suitable book forreview. The author was a Colonel in the 3rd.Battalion of the Royal Green Jackets and hedeals with countering terrorism in general basedon his experiences in Northern Ireland. My ownreading suggests that he is rather too legalisticalthough 1 am inclined to agree with his verdictthat the Army there has not been given thepowers necessary to cope with the situation. IICliviger, Lanes, England VV.F. WhiteheadIN SUPPORT OF AN AUSTRALIANAMPHIBIOUS FORCEWhat a great job Commander Peter Shevlin hasdone pushing the amphibious bandwagon in theface of growing home and overseas opinionthat the sun has already set on the golden age of"gator" navies. I too believe that there is a rolefor an Australian Amphibious Force; castingaside the logistic, disaster relief and evacuationroles which are obvious, I would like to add afew thoughts to the section devoted tooperations on the Land Commander's rearwardflank. A quote from the Commandant of theUS Marine Corps, General Louis U. Wilson Jr.would not go astray. Speaking of striking at theflanks or rear he said,"Used in this way, amphibious forcesprovide, as they did in World War II, astrategy option which the enemy cannotignore. If history is an accurate guide, an

8 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79amphibious force would operate against theenemy's mind, influence his operations, andtie down a substantial portion of his forces."US Naval Institute Proceedings. November,1977I hose folk interested in the subject haveheard all the traditional arguments against thisline of thought, some of the more popular are:• The force will be detected by satellite andsurprise cannot be achieved.• Enemy air power will knock out the shipbefore the troops reach the shore, and• the Australian Navy won't have the extrashipping to maintain the force once it isashore.Naturally these arguments must be taken intoaccount, but the fact remains that any poteniialenemy would be very foolish indeed to leave hisflank or lines of communication exposedagainst a meaningful amphibious capability.Inchon still remains one of the greatestoperations in the history of warfare. It isdoubtful that any country in the world,including the U.S. will ever again possess thespecialized shipping to conduct an operation ofsuch magnitude, but the message still coniesthrough loud and clear. A small amphibiousforce may be able to exert influence out of allproportion to its cost and size.QHQ Training Command, W.J. ReynoldsSydney. NSWLieutenant ColonelWHO COMMANDS THE DEFENCEFORCE?One of the cornerstones of British civilization,one enshrined by the Magna Carta, is thespecially defined relationship between theCrown, the parliament and the armed forces.Yet we find that in Australia this cornerstonehas been precipitately demolished.The traditional relationship, which anhistorical perspective shows to be a correct one,is that in principle the armed forces arecommanded directly by the Crown without theintervention of the parliament. The parliamentexpresses the will of a majority of the people inexercising control of the resources that will bemade available to the Crown for the armedforces. In practice there are two qualificationsof this principle. The parliament advises theCrown on the employment of the armed forcesand, the will of the majority of the people maynot always coincide with that of the parliamenton particular issues.When the position of Chief of Defence ForceStaff was established in 1975, the Government(not the parliament you note) was introduced asan intermediary in the command chain betweenthe Crown and the armed forces of Australia.The Defence Act, as amended by the DefenceReorganization Act 1975, provides in Sections 8and of that "the Chief of Defence Force Staffshall command the Defence Force" and. "thepowers vested in the Chief of Defence ForceStaff . . . shall be exercised subject to and inaccordance with any directions of theMinister".I have wondered for several years how thispiece of subtle parliamentary draughtsmanshipwas able to go un-noticed or at least un-argued.After discussion with other officers 1 acceptedthat, if this portion of the Act were ever tested,it would be over-ruled by the Constitution.However, following the comments of GeneralHassett made public by the ABC and TheCanberra Times on 13 November 1978, to theeffect that the Constitution is merely anhistorical oddity, I am prompted again to ask"Who commands the Australian DefenceForce?" In particular, who commands in theevent of a conflict between the Crown and theparliament, and; who commands when theparliament is acting contrary to the general willof the people on a particular issue?As to the change itself, can the parliamentlegally give the Government or itself this power;and why was such a fundamental change madealmost surreptitiously, submerged in a morassof administrative detail? The informed cynicwould be suspicious of the motives behind thischange.iiDepartment of Defence,A - •'• LmmersonCanberraSquadron LeaderA REPLY FROM DALSI agree with Squadron Leader Emmerson thatone of the cornerstones of British civilisation isthe specially defined relationship between theCrown, the Parliament and the armed forces,but thereafter our views become divergent.Section 68 of the Constitution vests thecommand in chief of the naval and militaryforces of the Commonwealth in the Governor-General as the Queen's representative.However, the Governor-General must exercisethe command thus vested in him in accordance

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 9with the principles of responsible government,namely, in accordance with the advice of hisMinisters. The British Sovereign no longerexercises the supreme command in person. Theking gave up personal command of the Army in1793, when the first commander-in-chief wascreated (See Clode's Military Forces of theCrown, p. 240). Similarly the supremecommand of the armed forces of Australiawhich is vested in the Governor-General, istitular.May I describe the position of the Governor-General, the Minister and the Chief of DefenceForce Staff as I see it.The Governor-GeneralI know there is controversy about the"command" of the Governor-General but I amcontent to rely on the view in the classicaltreatise on the Australian Constitution byQuick and Garran. These views are that theCommander-in-Chief of the naval and militaryforces is one of the oldest and most honouredprerogatives of the Crown. It invests the Crownwith wide powers as to the disposition and useof the Army and the administration of itsaffairs, and it is still largely uncontrolled byStatute. The manner in which these powers areexercised is constitutionally subject, like theexercise of other prerogatives, to the advice ofMinisters of the Crown.As an earlier edition of the AustralianMilitary Regulations and Orders pointed out:"The command in chief thus vested in theGovernor-General is not required to beexercised with the advice of the ExecutiveCouncil, as are the powers conferred on theGovernor-General under the Defence Act; butlike all other prerogatives is exercisable underthe advice of the responsible Minister.Finally, as Dr. Evatt points out in The Kingand His Dominion Governors (pp. 238-240):"In accordance with constitutional usage thepower vested in the Governor-General underSection 68 of the Constitution is onlyexercisable on ministerial advice and confers noactual military authority upon himpersonally."The MinisterChapter II of the Constitution deals with theExecutive Government of the Commonwealthand Section 64 states:"The Governor-General may appointofficers to administer such departments ofState of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish.Such officers shall hold office during thepleasure of the Governor-General. They shallbe members of the Federal ExecutiveCouncil, and shall be the Queen's Ministersof State for the Commonwealth."I remind Squadron Leader Emmerson thatthe Governor-General, not the Parliament,appoints Ministers.The Governor-General, acting with theadvice of the Federal Executive Council, makesan Administrative Arrangements Order settingout the principal functions of the variousDepartments and the enactments administeredby the Ministers heading those Departments.The Minister for Defence thus administers,inter alia, the Defence Act, the DefenceReorganisation Act, the Naval Defence Act andthe Air Force Act. Put shortly, the Minister forDefence administers all Acts relating toDefence, including those Acts which relate toorganisation and control of the Military Forces.The Minister is responsible to the Parliamentfor every legislative and executive act whichrelates to the Defence Force and its members.While Cabinet (for which there is noprovision in legislation) decides major policy, itis the Minister who, in the normal course,promulgates that policy to his Departmentwhich includes both the Public Service and theDefence Force, and answers for it in theParliament.Accordingly Section 8 of the Defence Act, inmy view, merely declares what is theconstitutional and long accepted practice.Chief of Defence Force StaffWith that background, it is plain that what isgiven to the Chief of Defence Force Staff is thepractical command of the Defence Force. He isassisted by the Chiefs of Staff of each Service.In the exercise of their command each issubject to directions from the Minister, andeach Chief of Staff is further subject to thedirections of the CDFS.The 1976 ChangeI cannot agree that the changes broughtabout in 1976 were un-noticed or un-argued.The Secretary and his senior Staff, the

10 DI \ -EM I FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN FEB 79Chairman Chiefs of Staff, each member ofeach Service Board, and the lawyers, civil andmilitary, were all vitally involved. Prior to thisthe issue had been given a wide airing in theSenate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairsand Defence. It is also understood there wascareful consideration in the Party Room ofeach of the major Political Parties.I believe it was ultimately fairly well acceptedthat the present Sections 8, 9 and 9A of theDefence Act did not depart significantly fromthe traditional position and therefore it was notsurprising that they did not provoke animateddebate in the Houses of Parliament. QDirector of Ma urj ce EwingArmy Legal ServicesBrigadierTHESE ARE FACTSKeith Isaacs' letter (DFJ No. 13, November/December1978) suggests that in my reviewof Sir Richard Williams' autobiography TheseAre Facts (DF.I No. II, July/August 1978) Iwas misled on two points. In fact, I was misledon only one point and that was the reference toKeith Isaacs having supplied some of thehistoric photographs — the misleading wasdone by the editorial staff of DFJ, and on that Iwill say no more.The second 'error' in the review as publishedwas the statement that Keith Isaacs "madeavailable many of the interesting annexes". SirRichard also noted this error and we havecorrespondend on the subject; as demonstratedto Sir Richard, the offending words were not inthe review as submitted by me but were addedby the editorial staff of DF.I.As a reviewer of longstanding I am keenlyaware of the need for accuracy in matters offact. Accordingly, and particularly in view ofthe implication in respect of facts contained inthe 'Editor's Comment' (DF.I No. 13,November/December 1978), would you please,in an early issue of DF.I confirm the foregoingand so redeem my undeservedly tarnishedreputation for accuracy in reviewing. MRAAF Staff CollegeJ.D.F. PhilipCanberraWing CommanderI was misinformed but lake fully responsibility for themistakes. I was particularly anxious to get DavidHammond's contribution recognised, over which there isno argument. I have already apologised to Sir Richard andto Keith Isaacs, and I should now like to place on record myregrets to Wing Commander Philip for any embarrassmentI may have caused him. — Editor.A POOR SORT OF MEMORYIn his generous review of my book, ,4 Poor Sortof Memory, (Defence Force Journal No. 13November/December 1978), Lieutenant-Colonel Hodgkinson mentioned that JockIrvine's drawings complement the text. They doindeed.Jock came to Duntroon fifteen years after Idid. By then there had been many changes —small, perhaps, when compared to those thatwere to come later, but still significant. It saysmuch for his sensitivity and something for thedurability of the place itself that he hasmanaged to show it and its people as Iremember them.The drawings are simple, often deceptivelyso. This was a quality Neville Cardus found inWilfred Rhodes' bowling; and just as the greatman's deliveries demanded the closest attentionso do Jock's drawings. For instance in "At thefeet of a latter-day Gamaliel" the expressionson the faces are those we all have seensometime, somewhere in the land of TFWTSand military make-believe. In "Afternoons inmore privileged surroundings" DuntroonHouse is shown just for what it is, a large,handsome but unpretentious colonialhomestead. Most other aspirants have shown itand the grounds as altogether too grand. Wherethey have failed Jock has succeeded.The subjects are seen with a nostalgic butsharp eye. The backs of the defaulters arepositively mutinous and the shoulders of thecadet whose bed has been upturned for the lasttime (or so he hopes) have the proper degree ofresignation. The gangling adolescents splashingin temporary freedom in the Murrumbidgeeshould be contrasted with their lack of it as theyare festooned around the Gymnasium. Thethree figures doing nothing in "One of life'ssimple pleasures" are as accurately observed asthose on the march in "Majura Lane was ourGrand Trunk Road". And, to take one moreexample, the gaggle of small children (note inparticular the bouncing pigtailed girl) cuttingacross the Commandant's bows, is a delight.In 24 Hours Peter Ryan finds the drawings"as authentic as they are informative" and forJohn Rowe writing in The National Times,"they evoke the gauzy images of old soldiermemories". For me they are and do. Others, Iam sure, will share my pleasure in them butthere is also a sense of personal gratitude theycannot share.ijCampbell, ACT. Geoffrey Solomon

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 11BASIC DEFENCE PLANNINGAt the end of his article "Basic DefencePlanning" (DF.I No. 12) Wing CommanderRusbridge promised a further article setting outhis views on how defence planning should beundertaken, but there are some aspects of hisfirst article, devoted essentially to a critique ofthe present practice, on which 1 would like tocomment.First, my understanding of the quotationfrom the Minister's statement of 22 September1977 is that because Australia's defenceproblems have some characteristics different inkind or degree from those of other countries,we should not be surprised if the solutions interms of defence force capabilities are notidentical to the solutions adopted by othercountries. This does not mean that we have toreject methods of analysis of the requirementsthat others have developed and found useful:all that the Minister has said is that because ourinputs to the analytical process are different,the outputs also are likely to be different. Thisis true even if the process we use is itselfidentical to that used by others.Secondly, and more importantly, there seemsto me to be some looseness in the terminologyused by Wing Commander Rusbridge, that hassomewhat confused the argument. This lack ofprecision has led to rather more emphasis thanis justified being given to the technique ofcontigency formulation and analysis, and a lackof clarity about the purpose of such analysis.The term "basic defence planning" is itselfambiguous. 1 suggest that there is a need tomake a clear and explicit separation betweenthe totality of defence policy formulation andthe formulation of policies concerning thestructure of the defence force and concerningthe doctrines relating to the use of that force incombat or otherwise. The latter seems to bewhat Wing Commander Rusbridge isdiscussing, but this is only part of the totalcompass of defence policy concern. In asituation where there is a low probability thatthe defence force will be required to engage inmajor military combat to protect Australianterritory or interests (which is what 1 take to bethe meaning of the term "low threat") theprimary objective of defence policy is tomaintain this situation. In these terms ouroverall foreign policies, including such things astrade and immigration policies as well as ourinternational political relationships, can be seenas part of our defence policy — as part of thecontinuing need to convince the governmentsand nationals of other countries that it is notnecessary or useful to mount a military attackon Australia or its interests.That Australia has only once in its history (in1942-3) faced unambiguously the kind ofmilitary threat that Israel, for example, hasfaced for every day of its existence does not, inmy view, in any way lessen the need for us tomaintain a defence force, but it does haveimplications for the structure of that force andfor the things the force should do. Part of theposture that contributes to the minimization ofthe likelihood of a threat to Australiadeveloping is the maintenance of an evidentmilitary capability and resolve to meet suchthreats if they should arise. Where there isroom for debate is not over this need, but overhow, and how far, it should be met.It is here that contingency analysis has animportant and, I suggest, an inescapable role.Australian defence force planners, as WingCommander Rusbridge pointed out, are in theunfortunate position of not having theexperience of regular military invasions ofAustralia to define the parameters of therequirement, so that 1 can see no alternative tothe process of postulating a variety of plausiblescenarios involving Australian forces incombat, and exploring the problems that wouldarise in dealing with the various situations todefine the force we need. Military exercises areone useful means of exploring somecontingencies, particularly as they permit apublic demonstration of capability to those thatwe would wish to impress, but the techniques ofanalysis on paper are a valuable adjunct whichpermit the examination of a much wider rangeof possible situations at minimal cost.It is true that to analyse any contingencymore than superficially a scenario must bedeveloped that is quite specific as to time,place, characteristics of the assumed enemyforce, etc., so that the solution cannot beassumed to be other than specific. However it ispossible to test the effects on the preferredsolution of varying the parameters of thescenario, and provided that a considerablenumber of contingencies are examined,covering a wide spectrum of situations and ofrequired force responses, it seems reasonable toassume that the common elements of thesolutions would indicate the universal

12 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN FEB 79requirements that the Australian defence forcemust meet. To go beyond these requirements tomake a judgment on the extent to which weshould develop capabilities that would berequired for some contingencies but not others,the defence force planner has to emerge fromthe world of hypothetical possibilities that wecall "contingencies" to the much more difficultworld of cost/benefit analysis within a limitedbudget, of competing capability requirements,and to the evaluation of whether a possiblethreat is of such likelihood, or seriousness, tojustify the acquisition of capability specificallyto meet it.The problems that I see facing defence forceplanners is not simply to establish whichcapabilities it would be desirable to establishand maintain in the defence force, but toidentify which of the various desirablecapabilities are sufficiently important that theyshould continue to be maintained even if thismeans that resources will not be available forother theoretically desirable capabilities. Wemay protest that on matters of nationalsecurity, cost should not be a constraint, but inthe world in which we live, it is.I therefore would not agree with WingCommander Rusbridge that there is any seriousdefect in the methodology of present defenceforce planning. 1 do have some concernhowever that the necessary study ofcontingencies by defence force planners leadstoo easily to the assumption that the study ofsuch contingencies somehow establishes thatthe threat that has been postulated as ananalytical hypothesis must be of sufficientlikelihood to be of immediate concern. In turnthis leads to the attitude that the proper andonly fuction of the defence force is to continueto prepare itself to engage in substantialmilitary combat with an enemy military force.In this view, such activities as coastalsurveillance to detect fishing craft, smugglers,refugee craft, etc., do not constitute "proper"defence force functions and should be passedon to someone else.Without asserting flatly that such a view iswrong, I suggest that it can at least be arguedthat in a situation where the probability of amajor military invasion of Australia seems low,and likely to remain so, but where theprobability of continuing minor encroachmentson Australian sovereignty is much higher, andthe significance of such encroachments maywell be increasing, and in a situation wherethere is strong competition for governmentfunds, a defence force which accepts as itsresponsibility the overall protection ofAustralian sovereignty in peace as well as warmay well be more effective in serving thenational interest and in providing a rewardingcareer for its members than one which dismisseseverything but preparation for the next war asan irritating irrelevance. Because such a forcewould be providing a necessary continuingservice to the community it could be expected tohave less difficulty than the present defenceforce in obtaining the resources it needs and inthe long term may well be able to better buildup the competence and resources for the strictlymilitary roles appropriate to the Australiandefence force than can be achieved at present.Whether this is so or not, 1 believe that theproper role of Australian armed forces in a lowthreat situation is an issue that deserves morethought and considered debate than it has yetreceived.QDepartment of Defence,Canberra, ACT.B.C. BrettTHE AUTHOR REPLIESThank you for giving me the opportunity sosoon to comment on Mr Brett's thoughtfulletter. It seems to me that Mr Brett makes twomain points. He first argues that, contrary tomy suggestion, there is after all, no seriousdefect in the present defence planning process.His second point argues, somewhat obliquely,in times of 'low threat', a defence force whichconcentrates on providing for the deterrence ofarmed attack to the detriment of other quasimilitaryroles does not serve the community asbest it could.To begin with, I believed that Mr Brett'ssecond point was none of my concern.Although I didn't agree with it, I couldn't seethe connection with his first point, and Iresolved initially not to comment on it.However, on reflection, I became more andmore concerned by his proposal to divert thedefence forces from their primary role. Indeed,1 eventually perceived a direct link between hisarguments, although perhaps not in the waythat he intended. Thus, I shall comment onboth of his arguments. I'd like to take thesecond point first and hope to persuade you

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 13that to argue for such a role diversion is yetanother symptom of the current problem weface — that current defence planning isincorrectly based.In the first place, any argument in favour ofmilitary role division must consist of two parts.The first part must argue that, in times of socalled'low threat', the overt requirement formilitary forces reduces. The second part mustargue that, in the light of this reducedrequirement, other quasi-military activities aremore appropriate for the existing forces.The first part of the argument seems to me tobe directly related to the question "Is the degreeof threat consequent upon the level of militarypreparedness, or is it the other way round?".The argument requires the latter alternative tosustain itself. I, however, am not convinced. Iwould like to see a much stronger justificationfor this idea than has so far been offered. Forthe time being I am quite satisfied that,whatever particular and transient circumstancesAustralia believes she currently faces, thedegree of threat is consequent upon one'smilitary preparedness. Thus, I could not agreethat, in times of so-called 'low threat' therequirement for military forces reduces. Theconcern that I referred to earlier arises from thediscovery that the contrary view is being arguedwithin the Defence Department.The appropriateness of the quasi-militaryroles suggested as alternative occupations forthe Defence Force is also open to question. Iwonder whether to argue for the introductionof military forces into what is really anextended civil police function is not tomisunderstand some deep-rooted and painfullyestablished precedents concerning the role ofpermanent military forces in a free society.Over the centuries we have learned the hardway that the inevitable power held by themilitary is not always used democratically tobenefit the ordinary citizen. We have learnedthat military aid to the civil power should bejust that and no more. It is supplementalpower, provided as a temporary measure at therequest of the civil power, that we can offer.The civil power should remain predominantand prime throughout. If a task can beperformed by a civilian organization withoutmilitary intervention, then free peoples seem tosleep more easily in their beds. I don't blamethem.The protection of national sovereignty inpeace is a task which can and should be borneby the community as a civil exercise. From timeto time, help may be needed from militaryforces but not in their primary role. The USCoast Guard is a good example of the properdischarge of a quasi-military role in peacetime.The changing involvement of the British armyin Northern Ireland is a good example of aid tothe civil power. This has varied from almosttotal responsibility as the civil power breaksdown to a reducing commitment as the civilpower recovers.The suggestion that we might more easilyobtain necessary resources through acontinuing quasi-military role of service to thecommunity only begs the question "Whatresources do we need; — guns or truncheons?".The proper role of armed forces in so-called'low threat' situations is just the same as for'high threat'. It is deterrence.To argue otherwise is, in my opinion, asymptom of having been misled by the study ofcontingencies — not the studies, per se, buttheir position in the planning process. Tocompartmentalize into low threat and highthreat, or 'the totality of defence policyformulation and the formulation of policiesconcerning the structure of the Defence Force',or capabilities we need now and those that canbe left till later is a consequence of contingencystudies. You cannot put things in little boxeslike that. All the boxes tend to have blurredoutlines and their contents tend to mix with oneanother. The term 'basic defence planning' isonly ambiguous if one insists on suchcompart mentalizat ion.The term means exactly what is says. It is thestarting point of the planning process and Ibelieve it should consist of a strategy, to befollowed by a concept of operations. They arewhat should form the core of the planningprocess. I don't believe they do at the moment.What is our strategy? Where is our concept ofoperations? They don't exist — perhapsbecause contingency studies tell us that we faceno significant threat in the foreseeable future.This information seems to so bemuse us that wecan go no further. The current Defenceplanning process can only perceive needs inrelation to a threat.Mr Brett uses perhaps unintentionallyrevealing terminology when he writes of the

14 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN FEB 79defence planner "emerging from the world ofhypothetical possibilities to the much moredifficult world of cost benefit analysis within alimited budget'*. 1 sympathize, it must be apainful emergence. The process I advocatewould have at least offered a strategic principleat an earlier stage based, not on transientfactors, but on factors that are always true, sothat the studies would have been given a surerfoundation. At least, it would lessen theconfusion, at best it would prevent defeat inwar.Sir, the current methodology is leadingnowhere. Are we really sure that there isn't abetter alternative?UDepartment of Defence,Canberra, ACTP.J. RusbridgcWing CommanderAward: Issue No. 13 (November/December 1978)The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original article inthe November/December issue of the Defence Force Journal to Lieutenant Colonel S. Krasnolfand Captain W. W. Houston for their article The Bi-mobile Force.We fight not for glory nor for wealth nor honours; but only and alone we fight torfreedom, which no good man surrenders but with his life.— Scots' "Great Declaration*.There are two levers for moving men: interest and fear.Napoleon.

The Surveillance ofnorthern-its historyhe story of Stamp'sCaptain Antoury VaneAustralian Army ReserveINTRODUCTIONTHIS story concerns a man and the unitwhich he invented and commanded duringWorld War II. Today the man is EmeritusProfessor W. E. H. Stanner, CMC, anthropologist,author and soldier, of Canberra.It has been possible to write the story onlywith the help of the Professor's many communicationsand discussions. Acknowledgementis gratefully made for these and also for detailsof the War Diary received from the Director,Australian War Memorial, Canberra, togetherwith help, by way of recollections, from exmembersof Stanner's unit.The Australian Army's historical wartimesurveillance of north and north-western Australia,over thirty-five years ago during the warin the Pacific against Japan, makes a storywhich may well be recalled today in view ofthe importance of northern surveillance to themodern Australian Defence Force.PreludeFlashback to the speeding, early, dangerousmonths of 1942. At that time, as McCarthy hasindicated in his volume of the Official Historyof Australia in the War of 1939-1945, theChiefs of Staff had decided that part ofnorthern Australia would have to be left undefendedand that the north-west would haveto remain an open door, through which theenemy could come, either to make their wayCaptain Vane is a medical practitioner. He served inWorld War 11 as a private soldier in SWPA. Laterhe served as a tneilical officer in RAAMC in theCMF/A Res. His civil occupation is Medical Officer,Headquarters, NSW Police Department, Sydney. Heretired from the Army at the end of 1977. He hascontributed to Army Journal.by a series of steps down the coast of WesternAustralia, as General Bennett thought, or tolaunch an attack against the western flank ofNT Force via the approaches of the Daly andVictoria Rivers, as General Herring, GOC NTForce, feared. Herring had the additionalworries that the Japanese might approach theeastern flank of his Force via the McArthurand Roper Rivers or attempt direct encirclementof Darwin with landings to its east andwest on the rivers and peninsulas.Requirements of the Chiefs of Staff and theGOC of a ForceThe decision of the Chiefs of Staff implieda requirement of highest priority—the surveillanceof the undefended continental coastline.Work on this had already begun. Not longafter the outbreak of war with Japan, Intelligenceat LHQ had sent an officer to report onthe security of the exposed north-west ofWestern Australia and of the Northern Territory.On his return he came to see the Ministerfor the Army.At that time there were three members onthe personal staff of the Minister for the Army— W. E. H. Stanner, C R. E. Jennings andH. V. Howe. The views of Stanner in particularwere sought for several reasons. He had justcompleted the report on the state of the defencesof Eastern Command in late 1941, whichhad been read to a secret session of FederalParliament. He was an anthropologist and hadconsiderable knowledge of Northern Australia,gained during travel and research there in 1932and in 1934-35 for the Australian NationalResearch Council.As well as this, Stanner had other relevantexperience. He had worked in Kenya in 1938-39

16 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79and had become quite knowledgeable aboutthe role of the Boer Commandos in the BoerWar and about the Germans' remarkable performancein World War I in East Africa undervon Lettow Vorbeck, in country and circumstancesnot unlike those which might face usin North Australia. Both had a considerableeffect on Stanner's outlook and thinking. Hewas also influenced by Lieutenant ColonelR (i. Henderson, IA, who befriended himwhile in Kenya.Learning of Stanner's interest in soldieringand of his certainty that war was coming,Henderson went to great pains to insist Stannershould 'see' large scale country in terms oftime, space, physical movement and supply.They saw an enormous amount of Africatogether, from Kenya to Uganda and theSudan.Shortly after the Intelligence conference,Stanner was asked by the then Deputy Chiefof the General Staff, Major General Rowell,to fly north to HO NT Force to be interviewedby Major General Herring, who, having returnedto Australia from the Middle East ascommander of the 6th Australian Division,had been appointed on 24 March 1942 asGOC NT Force.Herring and some of his staff officers hadleft Adelaide for Darwin on 27 March, a littleover a week since their return from the MiddleEast. On arrival at Darwin Herring found asomewhat dejected force, mainly deployed onthe coast in the immediate vicinity of Darwinitself. The deployment positions were tacticallyunsound and there was as well a disturbingsupply position.When Stanner arrived at NT Force, GeneralHerring and his BGS, Brigadier R. B. Sutherland,examined him closely on what he knewof the outlying country of Northern Australia.Stanner told Herring that he thought if theJapanese landed, they could gain tacticaladvantages from the use of the back bushcountry of Northern Australia. "WHAT tacticaladvantages?" Stanner was asked. Stannerwas asked to put his views on paper and hestopped up all that night to do so.It was realized that if the Japanese attacked,they would not come in 'by the front door butby the side windows or the back door' as theyhad done in Malaya. What Stanner proposedwas the formation of a new type of unit forthe Army, one so structured as to implementthe requirement of the decision of the Chiefsof Staff, which has already been referred to,and to carry out surveillance, reconnaissanceand scouting for the Commander, NT Force,of all the critical area of the north from theGulf country of Queensland to the north ofWestern Australia.Stanner was put through a grinder on everyaspect of the problem by Herring and Sutherlandand presently Herring said that it was hiswish that Stanner raise and command thespecial unit which he had suggested. "It isyour duty to do this," said Herring, or wordsto that effect. The BGS, Sutherland, told Stannerthat he must "get going", waste no timeand be back with his men in their positionswithin ten weeks. Actually it took Stannertwelve weeks but the aim was achieved.Formation of a Bush CommandoIt is a very rare flower in the history of anyarmy which can blossom in the face of dangeras readily as did Stanner's new unit. He conceivedand invented it, raised and organizedit, manned and equipped it, and put into thefield a unit of regimental size and specializedbeyond the then currents of military thought.It was a unit which fulfilled all the requirementsof the Chiefs of Staff and of the GOCNT Force.If Stanner had had his way, his new unitwould have been called the 'Bush Commando',which is what it was, or else the 'Bush Watch'or the 'Bush Scouts'. (The influence of Stanner'sstudies of the Boer War is apparent here.)Army Headquarters, however, had its way andin May 1942 issued a secret memorandum inconnection with the training of the new unit,which was called the 'North Australia ObserverUnit', The unit was approved by LHQ ashaving AIF status and hence, being an A IFunit raised prior to the cut-off date for AIFregimental titles (which was in September1942), it was entitled to the use of the prefix'2/ '. Quaintly, but correctly, it was the 2/1North Australia Observer Unit or 2/1 NAOU.At this stage the unit was regarded as beingin the nature of a special type of independentcompany and was allocated the coveted doublediamond shaped colour patch of the IndependentCompanies. The original colour patch

THE SURVEILLANCE OF NORTHERN AUSTRALIA 17worn in 1942 was a green and gold doublediamond; however, this was altered in late1943 to an orange and mid-green colour patch.The Role of the NAOUIt is customary in studying a particular unitto consider its allocation, role, organization,characteristics and tasks. In the case of theNAOU, the role as seen b> the Chiefs of Staffand the tasks as set by the GOC NT Forcewere decided first and the unit then built toachieve them. The implementation of thesesecret matters was given top priority by thenew Deputy Chief of the General Staff, MajorGeneral Vasey, who had succeeded Rowell,and who now stamped all aspects of the unitas 'MOST IMMEDIATE'. Shortly, Herring,who had so much to do with the formationof the NAOU and the setting of its tasks, waspromoted to Lieutenant General and givencommand of II Australian Corps. He was succeededas GOC NT Force by Major GeneralJ. Stevens who had been commanding the4th Division in Western Australia.The dramatic urgency of the role of the newunit is revealed on reading the terse wordingof the Operational Instruction received by thecommander of the NAOU from the Commander,Northern Territory Force, which was asfollows:"Your role will be to watch for and to reportto HO NT FORCE, by the quickest means,any landings of the enemy on the Australiancoast between NORM ANTON, Queensland,and YAMPI SOUND, West Australia, andyou will report any subsequent enemy movementincluding movement of his aircraft."Creating the North Australia Observer UnitStanner found raising his secret unit was nosimple job, with a dead-line of just over tenweeks and the risk of immediate action facinghim. General Vasey's 'MOST IMMEDIATE^stamp meant top priority, and opened manydoors which might otherwise have not openedat all or else opened very slowly and reluctantly.Stanner was aided by his service onthe staff of the Minister for the Army, whichhelped him considerably. Even so, he had tocut corners, especially as regards obtainingequipment in short supply and this tended toland him in trouble.He could not have succeeded in the assignmentwithout the enthusiastic help of JenningsTHE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITYNormanton?Cloncurry >

18 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79and Howe on the Minister's staff, and thepractical guidance of the ollicers of the GeneralStaff, such as Colonel Taplin and Major JimmyHarrison, a calm, diplomatic and skilful man,who was later to become Sir James Harrison,Governor of South Australia. They helpedStunner to design the unit's War Establishmentand its War Equipment Table. Other helpfuland envious members of the various arms andservices played their parts as well.The Observer War EstablishmentStanner wanted a highly mobile unit, horsedrather than wheeled (because as he liked to say,horses can go where wheels cannot), with goodradio links, with light weapons, considerablefirepower, and made up of men with a bushbackground who had an adventurous spirit,and who could live outdoors for months at atime, operating on their own initiative in smallgroups.A provisional War Establishment of approximately400 all ranks was prepared. Selectionof personnel for the new unit was made byrecruiting teams who called for volunteers forthe NAOU when they hurriedly visited all theAIF training units and depots as well as unitsof the Militia where they canvassed memberswho would join the AIF and then volunteeragain for the NAOU.Although the men were wanted urgently, astrict selection had to be made and the volunteershad to meet the following requirements:• Be volunteers aged 20 to 40 years.• Have medical fitness Class 1.• Have had bush experience in private life.• Horsemanship.• Possess initiative, resource and intelligence.• Be prepared to serve as follows:"The personnel of this unit will be calledon to undertake, in the north of Australia,adventurous duties requiring a high degreeof endurance and the ability to act independently."Many fine types of Australian men wererecruited for the NAOU and these included alarge number of experienced bushmen and alarge number with service in the pre-1939Militia Eight Horse Regiments. Also there wasa group with 'DX' army numbers who hadlived most of their lives in the Northern Territoryand had travelled into Darwin earlier toenlist in the AIF and who already had knowledgeof the far-out Australian Bush.By July 1942 a progress report gave thestrength as 20 officers and 399 other ranks, theestablishment now being for 421 other ranks.Eater, by taking with the main party the 'firstreinforcements', the unit was increased in sizebut even this was not sufficient for the observertask so eventually an over-strength unit ofnearly 700 all ranks was needed.The Means of MobilityAs the essence of Stunner's new unit was tobe mobility, as well as the swift transfer in ofthe personnel, there had to be a rapid allocationof nearly fifty vehicles and the selectionand the purchase of sufficient horses and seagoingschooners and motor yachts to mount,move and supply the NAOU throughout thevast area of its responsibility.The total number of horses purchased forthe Establishment was 1500; in addition insome areas later on. a large number of wildbrumbies were caught and broken-in andseveral herds of wild donkeys caught to increasethe number of pack animals. The bestof the horses were for riding and the strongestfor use as pack-horses. Naturally in such alarge number of horses, all grades and qualitieswere found.The NAOU was, as can be seen, the largestmounted unit which the Australian Army hasever had. Indeed it is interesting to note thata pre-1939 Cavalry Brigade (horsed, not mechanized)had an Establishment for the wholebrigade of 1846 riding horses (or 'rides' as thecorrect term was), plus 324 draught horsesand 159 pack-horses. This made a total of2329 horses for the brigade; the NAOU havingwith the Establishment purchases, the brumbiesand the donkeys, a total very close to the samefigure.As well as the mobility which the mountedtroops would have, Stanner had to provide forthe exploration and the investigation of riversand inlets and the coastal transportation bysea and river craft of personnel and theirequipment and supplies to inaccessible ForwardObservation Posts or coast-watcher points. Toeffect this there were on the Establishment a

THE SURVEILLANCE OF NORTHERN AUSTRALIA 19number of such vessels. These included a fleetcomprising the Lady Yelive, the Lady Ruth,the Toorbtd, the Hurricane and others. Inaddition, a number of craft were utilized whichwere found at places in the north where theyhad been abandoned after some incident of thewar. An important one of these was the largeKoolama motor launch. This had belonged tothe M.V. Koolama which had been bombedin the Joseph Bonaparte Gulf by the Japaneseon 20 February 1942. She beached on theshores of the

20 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14, JAN/FEB 79During the Wyndham raid the Kodama sankand turned turtle alongside the jetty, its launchalso being s::nk. Later when elements of theNAOU reached Wyndham, they refloated thelaunch and one of the platoons made gooduse of it for river work.Into the HeldMeanwhile the development of the NAOUhad been proceeding at the camp at Ingleburnin NSW. In early July a march-past of thewhole unit took place and within a day or sothe Advance Party left for North Australia.In the beginning of August the Main Partywas able to follow, travelling by railway fromSydney to Townsville and across to Mt Isa,thence by the trucks of an American TransportBattalion on through Camooweal into theNorthern Territory and up to Katherinc.What an ideal place Katherine was for theHQ of a unit like the NAOU, based as it wasin the roots of the giant salient which theNorthern Territory made. The IndependentCompanies stayed there; the 2/2 IndependentCompany was there for a few weeks beforeleaving for Timor in December 1941. The2/4 Independent Company, commanded byMajor Walker, had already arrived there inMarch and was now deployed at Herring'swish, watching and patrolling the lines ofpossible Japanese approach along the Roper,Victoria and Daly Rivers until they were relievedby NAOU in August. The next monththe Company departed to reinforce the 2/2Independent Company in Timor. Shortly, the2/8 Independent Company in its turn, madeits way also into the Northern Territory.Katherine had the advantage that wirelesstelegraphy worked well from there right acrossthe whole of the continent, allowing for suchproblems as skip-distance and so on. In addition,Katherine was central and communicationsby road and air easier. Further, it wasdeployed away from Darwin itself, which wasHerring's wish. The actual site of the HQ wason the southern bank of the river there, abouthalf a mile from the rail crossing and almostexactly on the present site of the CSIROexperimental station. It was a beautiful site,with fair cover from air observation, withsplendid water, and with heavy grass (whichwas not burned, but trampled under foot tokeep the dust from rising, a iesson many unitswere very slow to learn).From here, the grand deployment was aboutto begin. Its scope is even at this day, thirtyfiveyears later, difficult to appreciate withouta thrill: "your task", the men would say. eventhough but to themselves, for they were Australians,"your task lies from the Gulf Countryto the Kimberleys". To survey, in one's mind'seye the hundreds and the hundreds of horses,soldiers' horses, was to give back to these mena generation far past from their own present,from the trucks and tanks of modern war, asit was even then, to give them a glimpse ofthat epitome of the Australian Army, theMounted Soldier.Stanner noted in his diary, "28 August, Friday.Intense preparation all day. Loading ofgear in platoon and company lots to facilitatemovement and discharge. Officers' conferencelast night. Put Operation Instruction No. I intoverbal terms—as little writing as possible, as aprinciple—-discussed tactical disposition, use ofreserves and mobility and essentials of roleand method. All quiet and attentive."Stanner held his unit CO's parade at duskthat evening, under the trees at Katherine, themoon shining, all his men seated quietly onthe grass. A scene not easily forgotten. Stannerwrote, "All men seated in ihe grass near theOrderly Room, all very interested and responsive.Spoke strongly and told them they couldnot now turn back from a task so well begun."There was a general air of tension and ofexcitement in the atmosphere. The unit stayedup late and then slept restlessly and lightly.The next morning the 'A" Company and 'B'Company convoys moved out in good order,enormously long convoys piled high with themen and their equipment, off to the east and,longer still to the west, carrying thousands ofgallons of petrol for the journey out and backin. The work of NAOU had begun.On reaching their destinations the companieshad to implement at their level the implicationsof the operational role. This implied the patrolling,the exploring, the watching and the'backing-up' of the immense coast, with theadditional tasks of accumulating and collatingall topographical information likely to be ofoperational value and the constant observanceof the movements of enemy aircraft.

THE SURVEILLANCE OF NORTHERN AUSTRALIA 21DIAGRAM OF NAOU SIGNALS NETWORKSHQ NT FORCERAAF DARWINDirect links with Advanced HQof NT Force from each ofthe Coastwatch Posts.AHQ Darwin Coastwatchplatoon at WinellieRAAF TOWNSVILLEHQ Y0RKF0RCE,QLD.Vessels of NAOU fleetDarwin areacoastwatch postsHQ ' A' Coy, Roper Rivereastern NTPlatoon HQs ineastern NTrHQ'B' Coy,Ivanhoe W.A.Halls Creek J Alice Springs•AsPlatoon HQs inwestern NT and innorthern Kimberleys, W.A.IMounted patrols and observation posts.HQ'C Coy,Gulf area, QldICloncurry^ftPlatoon HQs inarea from Borroloola, NTto Normanton, Qld.NAOU Signals NetworkThe function of the NAOU depended uponthe reporting of information from observerpersonnel by a rapid and reliable wirelesstelegraphy network which was to be laid withspeed across the north of Australia.The chosen method of communication was,in the main, the transmission of messages inMorse Code using pre-arranged calendar codeblocks. Special consideration was given to theproblems of long distance communication. Thediagram of the unit structure and geographicaldistribution indicates this need. Equipmentneeded to be capable of both local net usageand infra-continental communication. Thesignallers had been trained in special schoolsbefore movement north and were strengthenedby the transfer in of members of Signals,1st Australian Corps.Older and unsophisticated methods of reportingwere used when wireless equipmentwas insufficient in quantity for a particulartask. Small groups of men, in twos or threes,might investigate an area of many miles ofcoast, without wireless equipment (because thesets were already being used by the other

22 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN FEB 79patrols), completely isolated from any outsidecontact should things go wrong, and then theirwork completed, would hurry back on horsebackto hand their reports >n to their platoonHQ or to a patrol with wireless facilities, inexactly the same way as mounted scouts didin reconnaissance against the Boers at the endof the last century.Stanner has said that as well as his armysets, the unit was linked in with the FlyingDoctor network of pedal radios which stillremained on cattle stations and outback townships,whence most people had been evacuated,but which still had a staff which carried on.Wyndham, for example, still had its post officestaff when the NAOU from 'B' Companyarrived, although the remaining populationmainly consisted of the storekeeper, the PoliceSergeant and the Town Marshal, but not forgettingthe Publican of the "Six-Mile Hotel"outside Wyndham. The town's main hotel wasclosed.The first wireless sets used were an IndianArmy type, the FS6, which were very cumbersomefor work out in the far bush. The setsneeded one pack-horse to carry the transceiverand its vibrator unit and aerial, another packhorseto carry the two very heavy accumulatorsin their protective boxes, and another packhorseto carry the Briggs and Stratton batterycharger .set to recharge the accumulators asthey ran down, and yet another pack-horse tocarry the drums of petrol to run the batterycharger and still another two or three horsesto work as reliefs for the others, owing to thegreat weight of this equipment. later on,lighter and more portable W/T and R/'T setswere obtained, especially for forward patrolwork.At each of the field company HQs, there wasa Company Net Control Station with its substationsat the platoon HQs and at the outlyingforward observation posts or on the mountedpatrols. Similarly, substations were located onthe NAOU coastal vessels. These nets were inturn linked to the main NAOU Unit ControlStation at Unit HO at {Catherine. Direct linkswere made between each of the Darwin coastwatchposts and advanced HQ of NT Force.Direct nets joined up HO NT Force, as wellas RAAF Darwin, RAAF Townsville, andHQ YORKFORCE, in Queensland. Fall-backlinks were to Halls Creek in W.A., Cloncurryin Queensland and to Alice Springs. Thisaggregate of networks is shown in the SignalsDiagram and extended from Normanton, atthe south-east corner of the Gulf of Carpentaria,around the continent, to the west of theCambridge Gulf in north-west of Australia,ending in the northern Kimberleys with themounted patrols from the Forrest River baseat Bremla Farm extending across to the oldDrysdale River Mission; officially to YampiSound.Operation of the Sub-Units and SectionsThe NAOU field companies were not organizedas separate administrative sub-units withtheir own WEs and WETs as are squadronstoday, but nevertheless when they were deployedit was so that each field company couldoperate independently in its observer task;local problems had to be worked out by theman on the spot. Each of the companies hadfour platoons, each with a platoon HO and anumber (on an as-required basis), of outposts,or 'OPs', and mobile mounted patrols movingthrough the platoon area. The theme for thisbasis was on the idea of 'best means for thework to be done', rather than by the deploymentof set sections, for each company andplatoon had its own different geographical andtopographical problems. There was, therefore,no set number of independent patrols whicha company might mount.Typical of these independent patrols or sectionsarc the following examples. In the 'B'Company area, a platoon HQ was establishedat the Timber Creek Depot on the VictoriaRiver. An outlying Forward Observation Postwas established by a section of an NCO andthree privates (one of them being a signaller)eighty miles down the winding Victoria River,on the slopes of Endeavour Hill, on thesouthern bank and directly behind BlunderBay at the river's mouth. Another section,mounted, was based at the Old BradshawStation across the river. As well as these,one or two mounted roving patrols coveredthe area between the Platoon HO at the Depotand the wild country south of the river westwardto Turtle Point, which lies some fortymiles further on north-west of Blunder Bay,the river here beins: lined by masses of man-

THE SURVEILLANCE OF NORTHERN AUSTRALIA 23groves and mudflats. Linking the platoon forsupplies and relief, there also was a rivermotor vessel to travel to Bradshaw and downto Blunder Bay. And all of this was the responsibilityof one platoon. The officers, each alieutenant, in command of each such platoon,were exceptional men with endless energy,initiative and reserves of personal substanceand resource.The arrangement in the northern Kimberleysis another example well worth studying. Herea platoon HQ was located at the Bremla Farmon the Forrest River. The site is not markedon the new Survey Corps maps (1964-69 series),but was on the southern side of the ForrestRiver, not too far away from the Forrest RiverMission Station (which lay over on the northside of the river), and was tucked away in thecurling foothills of a branch of the MilliganRanges; a site well supplied with fresh waterand well chosen from the point of view ofconcealment both from the land or from theair. One section of the platoon was stationedback at Wyndham with its lookout on the topof the hill behind the Wyndham Hotel, whichis a hill in its own right and not to be confusedwith the outcrops of the Bastions. From theHQ at Bremla Farm, patrols moved out toinspect and seek a path for a tactical withdrawalof the HO. if one should be needed inthe weeks ahead if the Japanese came, to anew site south of the Milligan Ranges nearthe water supply of Nulla Nulla Creek, a sitewhich was protected, should an invader occupyWyndham, by the large areas of mudflats betweenthe Steere Hills on its north and theDurack River on its south.A vers important wet-season mounted patroldeparted from the HO at Bremla to cross theForrest River going north and west of theCollison Ranges, across the wild country westof the Seppelt Ranges, over creeks and riversthrough hilly and stony country to reach theold Drysdale Mission at Mission Bay. Thispatrol was an important one because it was aclassic example of how a smul] patrol of aboutfour men. mounted on horseback and withtheir supplies on packhorses could set out inthe midst of the 'Wet' to make their way crosscountry, persisting in their purpose, sliding inthe mud. swimming across rivers and 'gettingthrough', no matter what the terrain or theseason. Two sorts of horses were found by theNAOU, the small footed mountain bred horsewhich would try hard enough in the 'Wet', andthe heavy-muscled, big footed horse whichwould revel in the water-logged land with feetso big even the biggest horseshoes the Armycould supply would barely fit. Between the twosorts, of course, was the average, good, dependablestockhorse purchased from the stations ofthe cattle country.Notable in the use of mounted surveillancepatrols was the absence of the noise whichrings out across the plains when armoured ortracked, or even transport vehicles are used.There was a big factor which modified theoperations of the sub-units. This was themaintenance of the health of the great numberof horses. The WE did not provide for aVeterinary Oflicer, as did the Establishmentsof pre-war mounted units, but officially therewere sergeant-farriers but not horse-breakers.The unit was lucky, just the same, and hadsome excellent farriers and horse-breakers whowere particularly good at handling raw, unbrokenbush horses. The horses had to be keptshod constantly and the platoons became adeptin the art of shoeing horses as well as otheraspects of horsemastership. The bushman'sskill in caring for his horses was soon to belearned by all. The horses were fed in the mainby grazing on grass, with a certain amount ofhard feeding with bran and oats. Even withgrazing, the feed bill must have been enormous.A reserve of remounts and packhorses had tobe kept at remount depots, such as at NutwoodDowns, some distance back from the areas oflikely first-contact.A certain amount of experimentalism had tobe allowed for Stanner's plans to be carriedout. He had to consider the functional efficiencyof the 'drover's plant' or 'mustering plant'concept for those regions in which there wouldbe no conventional Army back-up of the kindwhich would accompany the use of mountedtroops under ordinary conditions of service.Even so the care of the horses was very goodand a matter of pride. Looking back, Stannerhas said that he might have done better withmules for pack-work rather than horses. Theymay have carried as much, longer and fartherthan pack-horses would. None the less there aremany bushmen who do say they will worklonger, better, happier and with more courage

24 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14, JAN FEB 79with horses than with any other animal. Thedonkeys used were not, in mountain countryat least, very successful.Long Range PatrollingThe subject of long range patrolling and ofoperations carried out deeply (if the enemyoccupied parts of the north), and for indefiniteperiods, is a subject needing a careful approachif the concept of the NAOU is to be maintained.There is a tendency to consider that apatrol operating at long range and deeply,though it may do so for intelligence purposesonly, has within its structure, no matter howsmall or how equipped, the ability or thecapacity to carry out tasks in the nature of,for example, a sudden, small, limited, offensiveoperation, or to use its 'locale of patrol' toharass or disrupt the enemy. It might even beconsidered that this should be the principalpurpose of such patrols and other purposessecondary ones.It is obvious from what has already beenrelated that the NAOU could carry out withease, and in all seasons and over all sorts ofterrain, by day and by night, the longest oflong range patrols. Patrols of distances of 300and 500 miles, locating water as they went andliving off the land (for which purpose thepatrols were issued with shotguns to shootgame) and with no resupply, were organizedwithout fear. By the aid of water location andcaches of food, ammunition, medical suppliesand other needs, the patrols could, and did,continue to the limits of geography, pressingon through the bush, their clothing often intatters, saddlery hanging together with makeshiftrepairs, to come along, with no previousgroup with which to compare them, except perhapsthe Boer Commandos, with long beardsdown their chests after months on end in thebush, their hats and other gear worn out byexposure. Some of them after a second dryseason after a long 'Wet' spent out in the open,resembled nothing else but a group of bushrangers,reincarnated from an Australia of longago, as they rode into sight after a long patrol,appearing from among the trees as a long lineof riders and packhorses, coming on quietly.the horses nose to tail, with an occasionaljingle from the saddlery. Ragged they lookedand dangerous to tangle with, for bush scoutingdoes things to a man.It is with the difference in the intent of suchlong range patrols, that the difference betweenthe NAOU and certain modern units of a verysimilar nature and tradition is found. Stannerhas said there is a world of difference betweena unit manned, equipped and backed up, to goout and pick a fight at a great distance fromBig Brother, and (all technology and communicationsapart) one like the NAOU, whichwas manned, equipped and sent out into theblue, with a tight, limited, but positive role.The Hush VedettesWhen the NAOU began its operations andits roving patrols went out into the bush andstayed there, they were to act as vedettes, asmounted sentries patrolling and stationed awayfrom the outposts of NT Force itself. Thewatch and surveillance of the coast for theenemy landing apart, the essential role ofNAOU was to be through its patrols and OPs,the scouting and the reconnaissance of theenemy for the GOC NT Force, wherever theenemy might be, or move to, in the bush ofthe north of Australia from Queensland to theKimberleys.The important thing about the NAOU patrolswas that they were to be like shadows, hidingin the bush, coming out to scout the enemy'smoves and to report them to NT Force, andto keep on reporting them no matter what, sothat NT Force would not be caught unawaresupon its flanks, and then to return to theirhide-outs, to use the bush as their naturalelement, for its survival values as well as forits military values, for food, water, rest andshelter and recreation for tired bodies, as wellas for concealment, secrecy, surprise and as ahide-out for supplies, signal-posts and horseyards.They were prepared to stay out in thebush until kingdom-come.Certainly the NAOU patrols could hit theenemy and hurt him, if the chance arose,providing the patrol could get away quicklyafterwards, to hide again in its bush cover.The NAOU patrols actually were well preparedfor such events as these. Each patrolwas heavily armed with the 50-round drumtype of Thompson sub-machine guns as wellas rifles and grenades, a rare fire power insmall arms even for special units in those days.Carrying the ammunition for the SMGs wasalways a weighty problem in more ways than

THE SURVEILLANCE OF NORTHERN AUSTRALIA 2>one, especially as to re-supply, if action didoccur.Stanner has said that he used to be hauntedby thoughts that elements of the NAOU wouldget involved in needless, close-contact fightswith the enemy, resulting in NAOU personnelbeing wounded and with absolutely no meansof casualty evacuation, and as well, by doingso, just for the satisfaction of the fight, leavingthe true role of shadowing, watching andreporting upon the enemy.A NAOU Bush Scout's DiaryIt is worth quoting here an entry from adiary of comments on scouting and patrollingin the bush by the NAOU, as follows:"We eat what we can shoot, and carry shotgunsfor that; we kill beef and make it intosalt meat the way they did years ago, and thereis damper made the way that drovers do in acamp oven and the coals of our fire, when wesee fit to make one. When we stop at the endof each day's march, we place the pack saddlesin a row, taking our bed-rolls, which have beenstrapped crossways over the pack saddles, offto make each our one night's home beneaththe stars, or if it is raining to seek the off windside of trees."We sleep on the ground after watering thehorses; we each have at least one or two toride and one or two are also ours to see totheir packs; the horses know us all by nowand teach us a lesson in patience as they waitto be unsaddled. We strip them completely;some we rub down, favourites I suppose, butwe look at all their feet and cheek each daytheir shoes and look them all over for sorebacks or for saddlery that really was not aswell balanced as we thought."It is good to watch our horses at the waterhole,they stand in it and blow water with theirnostrils', heavens, how much they drink! Theywill drink it dry we fear. We drink it too,brown, churned up, how strange it was to thinkthat water is always white and crystal clear,no, white is not the word, but brown will do,or else we strain it until it seems clear enoughin a billy full of black tealeaves, which presentlyis on the boil. They stand around us,the horses in their hobbles, they need eachother in their bush friendship, and even us itseems."We seldom wash and our clothes start towear to pieces on our bodies; we do not wearthe woollen breeches we started off with butjust the ordinary long trousers that all soldierswear, but ours are all wrinkled up in curves."We find that we can do without manythings out on patrol, and though we miss them,there comes a sense of pleasure after a whilefrom being the complete master of oneself andall one's possessions."During the night one of us is awake inturns for sentry and to watch the horses andbefore dawn, at what they call 'piccaninnydaylight', the last watch and also our faithfultracker (who is called 'Lightning') get the firestarted anew for breakfast. The horses havebeen grazing and sleeping through the nightand now wait to have their hobbles off and besaddled up.(Australian War Memorial Neg. 58473)Mounted detachment of NAOU."Up you get into the saddle, your waterbottleon one shoulder (you learn not to hangeverything on the saddle), and there is theproblem of one's rifle (no rifle-buckets, please,on this patrol), it is better carried over yourshoulders on its sling, and there is the shotgunto carry, whose turn is it today?"And do not forget your bandolier, please,with its ninety rounds, wear it yourself androuse on those who would dangle its weightaround their horse's neck. And so we go; itsall the same whether you head out for a dayor for a month, it matters not; only where'snext water's our only problem."Above all others, this bush life does developyour faculties, sharpen your senses of hearing

2h DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79and seeing, and in practical ways of thinkingtoo; it takes time of course to change a manand better him, but he soon starts to notelittle things and little portents and draws conclusionsfrom them and then he is reallyobserving things. And that's when you startto feel more alive than ever before. For everyday you are more or less dependent on yourown faculties. Not only for food and drink foryourself and your horses, but for your lifeitself, so you'll not break down nor careless bewith your trail or what you do. Your facultiesrespond to the call. Your glance as it scans thebush, the rocks, the plain, the hill, the river,becomes now more wary and you are vigilant;your ears, as you sit, or lie upon the groundresting, pick up the slightest sound, and it ora movement seen is questioned in the instant."Flexibility of Unit DeploymentThis characteristic is mentioned here, becausewith the continental-wide deployment of theNAOLf as took place, there may be a tendencyto consider the NAOU structure to have beena fixed affair, within the limits of the companymobile patrol areas. This even suggests to theresearcher, that there was a limited tacticalmovement possibility. Was this so? The answeris 'No'. Indeed nothing could be further fromthe truth.Very late in 1942, Stanner organized anexercise for total NAOU tactical movement.In this exercise the ability of the whole unitto move while keeping in good communicationthroughout its entirety was effected. The UnitHQ was moved from its fixed position out toone in the bush, and the companies from theKimberleys to Queensland, manifested in theirfar flung sections, were kept with every elementon the move and in good communication. Thisexercise was the widest geographically andfrom a Signals aspect, ever carried out by asingle unit of the Australian Army up to thattime. It was a success and it showed theNAOU concept would work and demonstratedthe tactical possibilities of the far out bushand showed the scouting and reconnaissancecapability of the NAOU, as distinct from itssurveillance of the actual landing of the enemy.Comments on Unit CharacteristicsThe characteristics of the NAOU have beenrevealed in a general way in what has alreadybeen presented in this study. However, thesecharacteristics do need some particular amplificationwhich is of benefit in the study ofmodern units of a nature which includes asimilar role.As regards the capability of rapid, limitedoffensive action and of limited defensive operation,it has already been stated that the NAOUwas especially well equipped with automaticweapons and that the small-arms firepower ofthe patrols and platoons was very high. Inaddition the Companies were equipped with acertain number of mortars. It has been statedalso that the NAOU patrols could hit theenemy and hurt him, PROVIDED they couldget away to their bush hide-outs and notendanger their true role.Had the enemy landed in 1942, the NAOUrole of surveillance to pick up the actual landingwould have then blossomed into its furtherand fuller capability of the scouting and reconnaissanceof the enemy in order to report onhim to HQ NT Force. The picture whichStanner had in his mind was, so far as offensive/defensiveaction, one of guerrilla activityrather than the commando style. Stanner hassaid that he had trouble with one or two ofhis officers in getting this idea across, ie., 'hitand hurt the enemy if the occasion arose butthen disappear in guerrilla fashion'.None the less, the point is made that aSection or a Platoon (less likely to be a Companyowing to the difficulty in getting the mentogether) might have had to take on, or todelay, an enemy party and if it did so it wouldhave been expected to have given a goodaccount of itself. This was also one of thereasons for having ammunition as well as foodand medical supplies hidden away in secretcaches around the coast and in the deep bush.Indeed it was this actual fighting capacity whichlead to the unit being regarded, in its earlydays, at least as an independent company.Such action was not, as a thing in itself, tobe sought, whereas the watching and reportingwas. The worry of needless close contact fights,which Stanner felt, has already been referredto. Of course the NAOU was not required tohold ground, nor could it undertake infantryoffensive operations.Comments on Unit TasksIn a general way the tasks of the NAOUhave also already been given. Further com-

THE SURVEILLANCE OF NORTHERN AUSTRALIA 27ment is made now on some aspects of these.The surveillance of the coast based upon theemployment of small self-contained patrols andthe performance of 'medium reconnaissance inlimited war', which is what the scouting andreconnaissance patrols for the GOC NT Force,to guard his flanks and to warn him, were allabout, have been discussed.The task of the collection of intelligence onthe location and movement of the enemy forces,has been said by Stanner to have involved fiveseparate screens. These screens were —• The off shore and river fleet of NAOUvessels.• The forward observation posts, at suchplaces as Cape Dussejour and BlunderBay on the Cambridge Gulf and on theVictoria River, Roper River and in theNormanton-Burketown area and by thecoastwatch around Darwin.• By the mounted roving patrols moving inall the coastal regions between the observationposts.• The Headquarters of each of the threefield companies, located on the RoperRiver, in the Ivanhoe-Ord River area andin Queensland, together with the Headquartersof the twelve platoons making upthe three field companies.• The pedal radio sets on the cattle stations,linked in via the Flying Doctor Network,together with the sets on the missionstations.All the information received from thesescreens was fed through the signals networkalready described to UHQ NAOU and thenceto HO NT Force.The task of providing ad hoc teams forspecial missions was acceptable. Indeed theformation of the Darwin Coastwatch Platoonin 1943 was an ad hoc party for a specialmission and its HQ and outlying coastwatcherposts around Darwin were rapidly put intoaction when NT Force received intelligence ofthe added threat at that time. On anotheroccasion a special mounted detachment wasraised from HQ Company to demonstrate its'ground clearing' ability in an NT Forceexercise.The reconnaissance of, the seizing initiallyand the marking of landing and dropping zoneswas a task, which had the enemy landed, theNAOU could have performed upon request.(Australian War Memorial Neg. 5H429)Lt Chapman, the Signals Officer with radio equipmentin pack saddles.Action to Harass, Disrupt, Ambush the EnemyThis has been given a separate heading,although it should be dealt with under the'Comments on Unit Tasks'. An effort hasalready been made to emphasize the realconcept which Stanner had when he inventedthe Observer Unit in early 1942—that the unitwould act as 'bush shadows' and cling to andhang onto the enemy, whatever he did andwherever he went and report on him and keepon reporting on him no matter what.Having again emphasized that and havingindicated the restraints on active limited offensive/defensiveoperations, it is clear that, froma guerrilla viewpoint, on the occasion presentingitself, harassment, disruption and the ambushof the enemy could well have been taskseffectively carried out. So far as ambush of theenemy goes, certain areas were actually considered,such as the Jasper Gorge, which lieson the way between Timber Creek and VictoriaRiver Downs.Unit Support, Its Resupply and Medical CareRcsupply and unit maintenance were effectedby the unit by its own vessels, trucks and packhorses.Elements in the far out bush wereexpected to live 'off the land', which meantshooting wild fowl, catching fish and killing

28 DEFENCE FORC E JOIRNAL No. 14. JAN FEB 19cattle found in the bush, the latter being converted,by the methods of the bushman, intosalt beef, which, with damper, made up thediet of lonely patrols for months on end. Theywere to find their own water supplies.Defects in nutrition were a concern and wereto be expected. Experiments in nutrition werecarried out, especially in the detachmentsstationed in the Kimberleys. An interestingaccount of these is to be found in the chapteron nutrition, chapter 28, in Volume 1, of theMedical Series of the Official History of theWar, 1939-1945.The dual questions or problems of the healthcare of the far-flung sections on their patrolsor at their OPs and the dilemma of medicalcasualty evacuation, caused Slanner both worryand anger. There was just no principle applicableto the medical care of such a widespreadunit—except perhaps not to get sick, or whenthe action starts, not to get wounded. Therewas no means of medical casualty evacuation.The NAOLJ WE provided for one RegimentalMedical Officer but it went into thefield without one. During the difficult initialperiod in particular, the unit had to functionwith none. Stanner complained to the mostsenior medical officer on the staff of HQ NTForce and was turned down with the remark"You don't need one, your men volunteeredfor a rough job, didn't they?" Stanner madea storm about it. and having to go to LHQon another matter, he asked whether, if hereturned with two or more doctors when hecame back, could he have one for the NAOU.At LHQ Stanner moved heaven and earthand ended up getting quite a good reception.As a result something like a dozen new RMOswere drafted to NT Force, but alas, they wereall posted to other units of NT Force. Stannerfelt this called for drastic action so he toldthe director of the medical services for NTForce that he, Stanner, would camp outsidethe latter's door until the NAOLJ was given amedical officer. Stanner did just that and stayedthere until he got one—which he did!The appointment of the medical officer didnot however do much towards solving thepuzzle of care for such sickness as might occurin the dispersed patrols and posts, nor did itreassure the commander of the NAOl' withregard to any wounded which might occur,when the action started, whether the NAOUtried to avoid close-contact fights with enemyor not, quite apart from an expected level ofaccidents such as might occur in active, mobile,mounted men out in the deep bush.Besides all this it would take the RMO somesix weeks—as it did Stanner too, of course—to get around the outposts. Indeed, try as hemight, the medical officer just could not get toall the men, all the time across the continent.There were a certain number of medical orderlies,but generally each platoon had an issueof medical stores and the help was sought ofsuch of the men as had some first aid experience.The self-help of the old bushmen had tobe called upon—just as had to be the case inthe care of the horses, as already mentioned.The big concern was if the action started, howbest the job could be done without casualties.It was a fact that, considering the distancesinvolved, should a patrol have got into serioustrouble with the enemy, the men would justhave been expendable.Men, Morale and a Word of PraiseTroops who served in North Australia wentthrough various ups and downs in moraleaccording to their time of service, whether itwas 1941, late 1941 -early 1942, 1942-43 or1944-45. There was a difference whether themen were in the arms units or in the servicesunits. In general the members of services units,who after all were doing their proposed tasksanyway, were of better heart than the membersof the arms units.Of the morale in 1942-43 in the arms units,there was a tendency, as the months went by,notwithstanding the extra threat in early 1943,for a drooping of spirits, with a wish amongstall ranks to be with their comrades in battlein New Guinea. This was marked notablyamong men who had enlisted in the AlF inlate 1941 and who were still to see action,whilst young members of the militia, in somecases even sons aged eighteen years, werealready at grips with the Japanese. The factthat the Operational Area, ie. the NorthernTerritory north of latitude 14° 30' S (or South),had already suffered over some sixty air-raidsdid little to alter these private feelings of theordinary soldier, who knew little of the threats

THE SURVEILLANCE OF NORTHERN AUSTRALIA :which the enemy held towards the Australianforces in the SWPA, or of the measures, eachof complementary importance, which must bedirected against him.With this background of soldiering in theNorthern Territory in 1942-43 in mind, it isparticularly refreshing to find records of theunusually high morale and pride in the Unitwhich existed in the NAOU. Indeed Stannernoted in his diary on 6 September 1942, whenhe, was in Alice Springs, discussing withBrigadier Loutit, the various possibilities opento the enemy in their approach to the NT,that the Brigadier said, "Your unit has themost interesting job in the AIF". And later,in 1943, when General Blarney inspected theNAOU unit headquarters at Katherine andlooked over the widely-spread signals chartand the details of the patrols and OPs, he saidexactly the same, "Stanner, you have the bestjob in the AIF".There were certain things which had muchto do with this hi«h morale in the NAOU.(Australian War Memorial Neg. 58458/1)Detachment crossing a river.As a basis was the fact that all the membersof the NAOU were volunteers for an unknown,adventurous and dangerous job in conditionsof extreme isolation. Many of the men wereexperienced bushmen, and there were stationhands, farmers and graziers, former membersof Light Horse Regiments steeped in the prideof old traditions now carried on into the largestof the mounted units raised in the AustralianArmy, and others—men from the cities, wholearned quickly the secrets of the bush andcould hold their own with anybody. Many ofthe men became expert marksmen, and Stannerencouraged expertise in rapid and formidablesmall arms fire capability. The men weremounted—and this really did make an enormouspsychological difference—and they knewthey could go anywhere in the bush, wherewheels would never go; they were kept activeby the constant patrols in the deep Australianbush, a land which may be benign when itwill, but which at other times or seasons maybe as malign as any wild country can be.In many cases the patrols lived off the land,as already detailed, and this in itself breedsquite a sense of inward superiority and confidenceas nothing else does. The men developedlots of self-reliance and good companionshipwhich filled in their lonely hours.They were very proud loo, of their selfchosennick-name — the 'Nackeroos' — whichhad its genesis in a humorous description ofthe unit by Lieutenant Travers, of 4 B' Company(who later went on to win the Military Crosson Tarakan). They were very proud of theircolour patch and fought for it too, when theywent south on leave eighteen months or solater.At the end of 1943 the unit was dismountedand in early 1944 most of the men went southon leave and for re-posting. The unit headquarterswas moved to Manton Dam; the fieldcompanies were disbanded; the horses weresold; the men were heartbroken. Stanner triedto interest the higher command into preservingthe disbanded segment of the NAOU and intoforming it into a long-range penetration groupfor a Chindit-type job in Java or Borneo orthe Philippines, but nothing came of it. TheAustralian Army was no longer interested inprivate armies and 'cloak and dagger' outfits.The men were posted, after leave, to variousdepots for re-training and then posting asreinforcements, to the AIF divisions. Thecommand of the remaining NAOU passed toMajor White and Stanner left for other duties.Stanner remained however in the memories ofhis men, with considerable affection; "There'sBill Stanner", some rough-rider would rememberhaving said when Stanner appeared at anoutlying detachment after a trip in Eddie Connellan'saeroplane, "it's him all right, I knowhim by his hat." (Stanner usually wore his hatstraight all round.)

30 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN FEB 79The smaller, and dismounted section of theNAOU continued through 1944-45 and did wellthe task allotted to it. The days in the deepbush were gone though, and with them theriders of Stanner's 'Bush Commando', comingalong beneath the trees, all in a line, horseshead to tail, generally quietly with an occasionaljingle from the saddlery, ragged they lookmostly, but dangerous too, for bush scoutingdoes things to a man.EpilogueIn the Australian Army newspaper. Army,dated 18 August 1977, there was published aphotograph of Stanner, who was described inthe accompanying article as "an elderly, whitehairedcivilian, dressed in camouflage greensand carrying a walking stick, who recentlyspent a few days with one of the Army'stoughest units". "Professor Stanner", the articlesaid, "was visiting the Special Air ServiceRegiment, which was exercising in the NorthernTerritory on Exercise LONG VIGIL. He hadbeen the commander of the 2/1st NT ObserverUnit, formed in 1942. The unit, formed by theProfessor, was the first of its type and wasused for coastal surveillance, scouting andreconnaissance . . . today a unit that followssimilar traditions is the SASR."And so the odyssey of the NAOU, begun solone ago, has had its fulfilment.UI Army Newspaper)Professor W. E. H. Stanner visiting the Special Air Services Regiment during Exercise Long Vigil in 1977.

THE CHALLENGE^MANAGEMENTColonel John M. Hutcheson, MCAustralian Army ReserveThe Adversary"Loyalty was not to the President of the UnitedStates, to truth or integrity, or even to subordinateofficers risking their lives; loyalty was to uniform,and more specifically, to immediate superior andcareer. It was an insight into why the military inSaigon, despite all the contrary evidence in thefield, despite the arrival of as bright an officer asDick Stilwell, managed to retain their optimism."'THE CHALLENGE. It is often wise formanagers, of all industries and professionsto look at the criticism of their managementby outside observers. It may transpirethat such outside criticism has little foundation.However, an unbiased examination seemsto be warranted if management is to leadeffectively. This article challenges the professionof arms to look objectively at its management.The Criticism. The above quotation by DavidHalbertson might be justifiable on his reputationas the recipient of the Pulitzer Prize andseveral other awards. On its own, and despiteHalbertson's reputation, the critic may rightlyquestion the validity of the purport of thequotation, even after reading the whole of hisbook. A second critic of military managementin Vietnam is C. L. Sulzberg who as a journalistfor forty-four years saw many battles. Hewrote on his retirement from the New YorkTimes.". . . The American century's greatest accomplishmentwas the New Deal . . . And itsworst accomplishment was the Vietnam War,which, although its initial goals were by nomeans so sordid as current history proclaims,was a compound of mismanaged drift, badgeneralship, increasing lack of purpose andbefuddled leadership at all levels."-The Sample. There are those who wouldconsider the foregoing sample of two quotationsas inadequate evidence, despite theColonel Hutcheson's article 'A Management Gametor Professionals and Sub-Professionals' appeared inthe SeptemberlOctober 1978 issue (No. 12).eminence of the authors as journalists. However,we did lose the war in Vietnam. That isassuming that "we" means those who foughtfor South Vietnam. One might argue that someelements, such as Australia were too small toinfluence the higher military management ofthe war, although there can be no denial thatthese smaller elements participated actively inlower management. Despite the small and perhapsbiased nature of the sample and smallnessof Australia's military involvement comparedwith the USA it might be wise for Australianmilitary management, at all levels, to looksubjectively if not objectively at our ownexpertise — past, present and future.The AttackThe Aim. It has been traditional in militaryand in formalized business management tostart with an aim. What should be our aim?If we accept at least some of the criticism itmight be appropriate to start with the aim —"To improve military management". There areprobably many variations on this theme butfor this article let us accept the foregoingsimplistic aim.The Method. History is replete with militarymismanagement. History also contains manyexamples of successful military management.There has been some thought that at leastsome of the principles of business managementare directly or indirectly applicable to militarymanagement. There has been a world-wideexplosion of research into business managementand related disciplines. Therefore, theremight be some grounds for a comparativeanalysis to be made between business andmilitary management, in particular in comparingpast military and business successes andfailures. Anyway, such analysis is at least astarting point.Some Business ManagementGeneral Management. "The successful generalmanager does not spell out detailed objectivesfor his organization, nor does he make

32 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN.FEB 79master plans. He seldom makes forthrightstatements of policy. He is an opportunist,and he tends to muddle through problems —although he muddles with a purpose. He enmesheshimself in many operating matters anddoes not limit himself to 'the big picture'."'"The general manager possesses five importantskills. He knows how to: firstly, keep openmany pipelines of information, secondly, concentrateon a limited number of significantissues, thirdly, identify the corridors of comparativeindifference, fourthly, give the organizationa sense of direction with open-endedobjectives and finally, spot opportunities andrelationships in the stream of operating problemsand decisions."' "My definition of a goodmanager is a simple one: under competitiveindustry conditions, he is able to move hisorganization significantly toward the goals hehas set, whether measured by higher returnon investment, product improvement, developmentof management talent, faster growth insales and earnings, or some other standard.Bear in mind that this definition does notrefer to the administrator whose principal roleis to maintain the status quo in a companyor in a department. Keeping the wheels turningin a direction already set is a relatively simpletask,compared to that of directing the introductionof a continuing flow of changes andinnovations, and preventing the organizationfrom flying apart under the pressure." 0Analysis. The above quotations by EdwardWrapp on general management arises from"working closely with many managers in manydifferent companies."" While some of the goalscould be couched in different (more) militaryterms, much of the thought might be appliedto military management. The separation of theadministrator from the manager is an interestingthought that has been also indicated byother writers. This separation may be criticalin military management thought. While thestatement that a "general manager muddles"may be repulsive to some, the five "importantskills" listed above will be recognized by mostmilitary managers.A Pot-pourri. If the foregoing has wettedthe reader's appetite, then the following mayassist in continuing the attempt to challengemilitary management to make a comparativeanalysis with business management. "The onlyconstant in the management of business organizationsis change. The leadership in adaptingcorporate operations to the changing businessworld must come from the chief executives." 7"For centuries social philosophers have beeninvestigating the proper relationships betweenindividuals and societies or organizations; thebalance between order and chaos. Earlythinkers, such as Hobbes, Rousseau, andMachiavelli, in varying ways thought that theintractable nature of man had to be subjugatedto the wishes of the whole in order for thereto be peace and security. The aims of theindividual and those of the collective werethought to be incompatible . . . FrederickHerzberg asserts that regardless of how organizationsshift tasks, fit tasks to individuals andindividuals to tasks, the individuals will notbe motivated unless their jobs entail someelements that allow them to grow and expandtheir competence . . . John J. Morse and JayW. Lorsch would add that an effective organizationmust also be designed so that its tasksfit its people, not some universal theory . . .Paul R. Lawrence maintains in 'How to dealwith Resistance to Change' that organizationalproblems occur when changes in social relationshipsare made at the same time technologicalinnovations are introduced." 8Military History"Every professional is concerned with theuse of knowledge in the achievement of objectives. . . the professional draws upon theknowledge of science and of his colleagues,and upon knowledge gained through personalexperience." 11 Case studies and other forms ofresearch on business enterprises may be continuallyupdated. Each successive war, battleor police action usually employs new technologiesand is often on a terrain requiringmilitary techniques which are different fromprevious campaigns. Unfortunately, unlikebusiness, wars are not continuous operations.Therefore, where personal experience was inadequateor rusty the military manager hasbeen forced to rely on military studies in theform of military history and the various formsof training exercises with and without troops,war games, etc. If history books are objectivelycritical, as well as reports of (all) the facts,then such books should be, at least, a partialsubstitute for experience. Perhaps there is arequirement for the inadequacies of the

THE CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT 33quantum of analytical military studies to bebalanced by the "best' from the vast arrayof analyses of the studies of the battles ofbusiness.Conclusionsli was not intended that this article shoulddo more than issue a challenge to militarymanagers, at all levels, not to repeat the shameof the Vietnam debacle. Either the critics, suchas Halberstam or Sulzberger must be answeredor military management must be perfected forthe next time. The role of an army in peace isto train for war. The role of military managementis to ensure that the development andpractice of their thinking in peace is more thanadequate for the next war. Having entered thewar, military managers must react quickly andpositively to their inadequacies to win that waron a cost effective basis. Some relevancy seemsto exist in using an intermix of analysis ofmilitary and business studies as a basic templatefor the training of military managers.However, such training will undoubtedly failunless bigotry, rigidity and other barriers tochange to meet new challenges are entrenchedat any level of military organizations. Are youable, let alone prepared, to overcome thechallenge to management? 'Kill' the critics! UNOTES1. Halberstam. David, The Best and the Brightest,New York. Random House. 1972, p. 280.2. Sulzberger, C. L., 'Faded Dreams and Old FashionedWars', New York Times Service, in theBoston Globe, 14 December 1977.3. Wrapp, H. Edward. 'Good Managers Don't MakePolicy Decisions', Harvard Business Review onManagement. New York. Harper and Row. 1975.p. 5.4. Ibid., pp. 15-16.5. Ibid., p. 18.6. Ibid., p. 18.7. Mace, Myles L., 'The President and CorporatePlanning'. Harvard Business Review on Management,p. 1 38.8. Harvard Business Review on Management, pp.355-356.9. McGregor, Douglas, The Human Side of Enterprise.Tokyo. McGraw-Hill, 1960, p. 3.BOOKS IN REVIEWThe following books reviewed in this issue are available in various defence libraries:Brown, Neville, The Future Global Challenge (p. 61).Russell, 2MD, 5MD, Cerberus, JSSC, RANC, RANSC.O'Neill, Robert (ed), Insecurity (p. 61).1MD, 2MD, 4MD, 6MD, Balcombe, Oakey, Albatross, Williamtown, Cerberus,Campbell Park, HQ Sup Comd (RAAF), Inf Centre, JSSC, Leeuwin, LWC,Lavarack, OCS, Puckapunyal, RAAOC, RANC, RANSC, Remington Centre,RAAF Staff College, Russell, School of Arty, SME, School of Sigs, DefRegional Library (Victoria), Watson, WRAAC.Hackett, Sir John, The Third World War (p. 62).Russell, JSSC. On order for 6 other libraries.Richardson, F. M., Fighting Spirit (p. 63).On order for Campbell Park and 6 other libraries.Books held for reviewIves, Alan (comp), Australia's Two War Historians, CF.W Bean and G. M.Lj.mg. A Bibliography, Canberra Pearce, 1978. (Series: Archives in Australia,No. 23)Dunnigan, James F. (ed.), The Russian Front, London, Arms and Armour,1978.Barber, L. H , Kia Kaha. Official History 6th Battalion (Hauraki), RNZIR,1898-1978, Tauranga, Baypoint, 1978.

A PROGRAMME .inPROBLEM SOLVING^0&&&0 oCaptain B. D. Copekmd,Royal Australian Army Education CorpsHOW many of us make errors through carelessness?Our errors may be quite small,of little consequence and of only brief inconvenienceto ourselves and others. The magnitudeof errors varies with the particular circumstancesoperating at the time. Two people mayleave their car windows open overnight, in themorning, one may find that the seats are wetfrom the evening storm. The other may findthat the car has been stolen. Small errors havecaused disasters. Basic training has emphasizedto us all the importance of safety catches andbuttoned pockets.Some errors result from lack of understandingby individuals of the processes involved ingiven situations. A car buyer may purchase astolen car if he does not realize that the preferredlicence and registration papers may notnecessarily belong to the seller. The buyer mustensure not only that the registration papersbelong to the car but also that the identity ofthe seller and owner is established. On aCaptain Copeland graduated from the Kelvin GroveTeachers' College in 1966. He enlisted in the RAAECin 1971. From 1971-1972 he was posted as EducationOfficer HQNQA, Townsville. In 1973. he attended atRAAF School of Languages and graduated as a 'B'grade interpreter /translator (Indonesian). In 1974 hegraduated from the University of Queensland in theFaculty of Arts. From 1976-1977, he was posted asan instructor to the Joint Services College of PapuaNew Guinea. During that time he worked also inpreparing training objectives and training programs.Work was begun on the Program in Problem Solving(PIPS) during this time. He is now posted as aninstructor to the Language Wing 1 RTB Kapooka.similar theme, we may recall soldiers on guardduty who ask incoming personnel to show theirID cards but who do not check the face withthe photograph. Many errors in the serviceenvironment are caused by members' neglectin checking and lack of understanding of thetechniques of double checking.Decisions and actions based on decisionsrequire the establishment of accurate conclusionsfrom evidence and a clear perception ofthe procedures necessary to the solution of anygiven problem. There is the absence of a coursein the Australian Army that promotes specificallythe development of the skills of 'ProblemSolving'.This article has been written to summarizethe Programme in Problem Solving (PIPS)developed for Officer training at the JointServices College of Papua New Guinea. TheCollege was established to train personnelselected for Officer training by the Papua NewGuinea Defence Force (PNGDF), the RoyalPapua New Guinea Constabulary and theCorrective Institution Services. The terminalaim of the program is to promote in OfficerCadets the ability to organize their thoughtprocesses in solving a range of job related'problems'.The processes of logical deduction and decisionmaking were dissected carefully and ahierarchy of enabling skills established to supportthe terminal skill. The skills were thenincorporated into a series of objectives. A rangeof 128 problems was established after a detailedsurvey into the tasks that a junior officer could

A PROGRAMME IN PROBLEM SOLVING 35be expected to perform in a work situation andin the area of personnel administration.The task analysis was conducted through adetailed survey of jobs. Existing statements ofjobs were examined. A job statement had beenprepared in 1975 by a team of RAAEC officersfor the junior infantry officer of the PNGDF.Key personnel from the three services wereinterviewed. There was extensive collation ofknown situations within the services and privateenterprise in which errors had been made andunfortunate circumstances had arisen. It wasconsidered that the collation of error situationsenabled the highest degree of job relevancepossible. The problems taken from privateenterprise were used for comparative purposesand for development of the Consumer Protectionaspect of the Programme.The performance of Officer Cadets wasstudied to ascertain areas of weakness. Againthere were interviews with staff and collationof error situations. This work was complementaryto and often merged with the taskanalysis.It was established that Officer Cadets founddifficulty in applying even a basic decisionmaking process to the solution of problems.Many failed to consider alternative conclusionsand courses of action. Many found difficulty inrecognizing the very existence of a problem inmany contexts. ("So what?'" "I don't know").Most had difficulty in applying insight gainedfrom the solution of one problem to the solutionof a similar problem in a different context.Much of this may be explained by the inexperienceof the Officer Cadets. It was intended thatsuch difficulties could be reduced significantlyduring their time at the College. These difficultiesare not unknown among Australianservicemen.The problems were to be simple enough toenable the solution of four to six problems inany one lesson period. This would permit acomparative approach to solving of problemsand the establishment and application of principlesof method. The program was developedin terms of the Systems Approach to Training.At the College, the skills of the programcomplemented those of the CommunicationsSkills and Administration Courses. It may wellbe that the skills of this program could beincorporated into any service course in PNGand Australia. Which service in the AustralianDefence Force would not benefit from a coursethat developed the skills of checking, errorlocation and establishment of check-lists?An overview of the program will now be provided.This will include a sample of problemsof one particular type, the related theoreticalbasis, the hierarchy of skills and a sample ofobjectives related to the hierarchy.The following problems comprise five of the128 problems that make up the program:• A man approaches a bank teller and seeksto withdraw money from a bank book.The account is with another branch ofthe bank. What is the teller's aim?factors? courses? steps?• a soldier is informed by a fellow soldierthat there is a unit stand-down on thefollowing day. The soldier had not previouslyheard of this.Aims? factors? courses? steps?• a shop attendant progressively passes fivepairs of trousers to a customer standingin the dressing room. The customerchooses a pair and informs the attendantthat he will wear the trousers home. Afterthe sale is completed, the attendant entersthe dressing room to find only three pairsof trousers. What has happened'.' errors?aims? factors? steps?• a police officer receives a phone call at thestation at 2200 hrs. The voice says: "Thisis Superintendent Miasa here. Go to thecells and release the prisoner. I will explainin the morning." Aims? factors?courses? steps?• a CIS officer has been assigned to constructa new prison farm. He obtains thetitle of the land and checks the dimensionsgiven to him by his supervising officer.He commences the clearing of the land.During the first day of clearing operations,a crowd of angry villagers arrives anddemands that the work be stopped. Theyclaim that the land belongs to them.Errors? aims? factors? courses? steps?From the solution of the problems above,the Officer Cadets reinforce the basic decisionmaking process. The theoretical backgroundis developed in terms of such concrete prac-

16 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79tical problems. The Officer Cadets apply thefollowing theoretical points:• logical development of 'cause' and 'effect'.• application of the techniques of checkingand double-checking by means of anindependent source of evidence.• recognition of deception as a possiblecause of a given situation.• recognition of the type of situation inwhich confirmation of evidence must takeplace before further action is carried out.Further situations involve checking duringthe process of carrying out the task(as in the response to a fire alarm) andchecking after the action has been complete(confirmation of a claim made by asoldier after emergency leave has beengranted).• development of basic Flow Chart Analysis.• development of the Staff Duties format ofService Writing. This framework is usedthroughout the program to develop theconcept and practice of 'the whole to thepart'.The performance statements are summarizedin the following hierarchy: 111.00 Identify a statement of fact1.10. Establish the characteristics ofa statement of fact.1.20. Select statements of fact froma given list.1.30. Select statements of fact froma given passage.2.00 Identify a statement of opinion2.10. Fstablish the characteristics ofa statement of opinion.2.20. Identify the types of statementsof opinion.2.30. Select statements of opinionfrom a given list.2.40. Select statements of opinionfrom a given passage.3.00 Establish the techniques of validargument3.10. Establish the validity of a givenargument.3.20. Prepare an argument.A convention of classification used in taxonomiesof objectives has been adopted.4.00 Establish the criterion for thearrangement of a given series of items4.10. Recognize 'spatial' order as thecriterion of arrangement.4.20. Recognise 'concrete to abstract'order as the criterion of arrangement.4.30. Recognize 'whole to part' orderas the criterion of arrangement.4.40. Recognize 'part to whole' orderas the criterion of arrangement.5.00 Arrange a series of items in terms ofa given criterion5.10. Arrange a series of items ingiven 'spatial' order.5.20. Arrange a series of items in'concrete to abstract' order.5.30. Arrange a series of items in'whole to part' order.5.40. Arrange a series of items in'part to whole' order.5.50. Arrange a series of items inalphabetical order.6.00 Describe a given subject6.10. Describe a given item.6.20. Describe a given process.7.00 Illustrate a given description7.10. Prepare a map.7.20. Prepare an Organization Chart.7.30. Prepare a Flow Chart.7.40. Prepare a Flow Diagram.7.50. Prepare a Gantt Chart.7.60. Prepare a Critical Path Chart.8.00 Establish a Conclusion from givenEvidence.9.00 Establish the Evidence that wouldbe required to establish a given conclusion.10.00 Establish the range of aims necessaryto the solution of a given problem.11.00 Establish the range of possible causesof a given situation.11.10. Establish the possible causesof a given situation.11.20. Categorize a given series ofsituations.12.00 Establish the range of possible effectsof a given action.12.10. Establish the possible effectsof a given action.12.20. Categorize a given series ofactions.

A PROGRAMME IN PROBLEM SOLVING 3713.00 Establish the range of factors thatappl\ to the solution of a givenproblem.13.10. Establish the factors thatapply in the design of a givenitem.13.20. Establish the factors thatapply in the development ofa given process.14.00 Establish the range of possible coursesof action relevant to the solution ofa given problem.15.00 Select a course of action from anestablished range of alternatives.15.10. Select a course of action thatinvolves confirmation of evidence.16.00 Establish the order of steps in a givenprocess.16.10. Establish a list of steps.16.20. Construct a Flow Chart.16.30. Construct a Flow Diagram.16.40. Construct a Gantt Chart.16.50. Construct a Critical PathChart.17.00 Establish the accuracy of a givenprocess by double-checking each stepin the process.17.10. Establish the techniques ofdouble-checking.17.20. Double check a given arithmeticcomputation.17.30. Double check a given administrativeprocess.18.00 Assess the effectiveness of a selectedcourse of action.18.10. Assess the effectiveness of agiven item in achieving arequired result.18.20. Assess the effectiveness of agiven process in achieving arequired result.19.00 Locate an error in a given process19.10. Locate an error in the preparationof a given argument.19.20. Locate an error in the categorizationof given items.19.30. Locate an error in the arrangementof given items.19.40. Locate an error in the descriptionof a given subject.19.50. Locate an error in the illustrationof a given description.19.60. Locate an error in the establishmentof a conclusion fromgiven evidence.19.70. Locate an error in the establishmentof the evidence thatwould be required to establisha given conclusion.19.80. Locate an error in the establishmentof the range of possiblecauses of a given situation.19.90. Locate an error in the establishmentof the range of possibleeffects of a given action.19.100. Locate an error in the establishmentof the range of possibleaims relevant to thesolution of a given problem.19.110. Locate an error in the establishmentof the range of possiblefactors relevant to thesolution of a given problem.19.120. Locate an error in the establishmentof the range of possiblecourses of action relevantto the solution of a givenproblem.19.130. Locate an error in the selectionof a course of actionfrom an established range ofalternatives.19.140. Locate an error in the orderof steps in a given process.19.150. Locate an error in the assessmentof the effectiveness of aselected course of action.The skills are developed in consecutive order.The Officer Cadets are to achieve the requiredstandard before proceeding to the next skill.It is the task of the instructor to ensure thatthose who proceed quickly are not held backand that all students are given the opportunityto achieve a minimum standard. There arethree stages to each lesson block—instructional,practice and evaluation stages.A Flow Chart of Instructional Strategy hasbeen prepared. The selection of problems isleft to the discretion of the instructor and thisselection may vary according to the type ofcourse. The instructor may choose to develop

38 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14, JAN/FEB 79a number of objectives within the frameworkof the same problems and bring each problemto complete solution. He may choose to focusupon only one objective in relation to a numberof problems and to leave solution of the problemsuntil the next objective is applied. Theprogram does not harness the instructor intoan imposed pattern. There is much left toprofessional discretion. Summarized below isa selection of objectives.Performance Conditii >ns Standards1.20Select statement of factfrom a aiven list.3.10Establish the validity of agiven argument.5.30Arrange a series of itemsin 'whole to part' order.• 3 sets of 10 sentences each containingat least 5 sentences of fact.• Set 1 — instruction.• Set 2 — practice.• Set 3 — evaluation.• Sentences to contain statements of factand non fact. Opinion not to beintroduced at this stage.• Refer to Flow Chart of InstructionalStrategy.• Handouts to be prepared.Use of supplementary exercises where necessary.3x4 sets of passages.Use of the same passages as in 2.40.• Refer to unsupported opinion, incorrectinformation, generalization, incorrectassumptions.• Refer to Flow Chart of InstructionalStrategy.• Handouts to be prepared.Use of supplementary exercises where necessary.3x4 sets of itemsto include:• descriptions of items as in a policedescription.Passage of logical argument —introduction body, conclusion,(whole to part to whole)lists of items and componentsto be distinguished from 'part to part'and unordered arrangement.Use of Staff Duties approach to serviceReport Writing.Refer to the Flow Chart ofInstructional Strategy.Handouts to be prepared.Use of supplementary exercises where necessary.Accurate in60% of examplesat practice stage.Accurate in80% of examplesat evaluation stage.Accurate in60% of examplesat practice stage.Accurate in80% of examplesat evaluation stage.Accurate in60% of examplesat practice stage.Accurate in80% of examplesat evaluation stage.PeriodAllocations

A PROGRAMME IN PROBLEM SOLVING 39PerformanceConditionsStandards-PeriodA lit xrations15.10Establish the order ofsteps.• 3 x 4 sets of situations in a givenprocess.• Examples from problems 1-128.• Situations to include:• no alternatives• alternatives• alternatives some of which areinterdependent.• Refer to the Flow Chart ofInstructional Strategy.• Handouts to be prepared.60% of examplesAccurate inat practice stage.Accurate in80% of examplesat evaluation stage.12Use of supplementary exercises wherenecessary.Summarized below is a selection of problemsthat are included in the program:(1) "Checking of the Water Tower"(2) "The Call to the Duty Officer"(9) "The Dying Pigs"(10) "The Non-arrival of Stores"(11) "The Prison Escape"(13) "The Navigational Error"(15) "Car 59, where are you?"(23) "The Soldier and the Salesman"(27) "Is that you, Joe?"(31) "The Soldier and the Car Repair"(38) "The Missing Unit Typewriter"(39) "The Car is broken down"(46) "The Discrepancy in the Bar StockTake"(48) "The Paying Officer"(49) "The Missing Document"(50) "Counting of Bar Takings"(55) "Confirmation of Transport"(60) "The Duty Officer and the MovieTakings"(61) "The NCO, the Soldiers and theReturn of Stores"• (79) "Loss of Equipment on theExercise"• (84) "The Error in the Noticas Report"• (103)•(108)"The March Out of the MarriedQuarter""Audit of the Club Books"• (113) "The Telephone Caller and theOrderly Room NCO"Each problem involves the Officer Cadet inestablishing a course of action based on soundreasoning. Many of the situations if handledincorrectly on the job can lead to disastrousconsequences. Error in checking the level ofwater in the water tower may result in disruptionof the water supply to the camp. Carelesschecking procedures in the Noticas situationmay lead to misidentification with the resultanttrauma to relatives.A number of the problems in 'error location'require the same basic procedures — the nonarrivalof stores, the navigation error, the missingtypewriter, the missing document, the lossof equipment on an exercise, the paying officer,the broken-down car. An officer will locate theerror; he may guide a subordinate to recognizehis error (did you check? how did you check?);he may prepare checklists to reduce the possibilityof future error.Certain terms have been used throughout theprogram and these require explanation.

40 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79• A Flow Chart is a diagramatic representation of steps that include alternatives:9Draft toTypistReceivefrom TypistAccurate'YESNOMakeCorrectionsReturn toTypistReceivefrom TypistDistributecT6Problem 53: "Submission of work for typing"A Flow Diagram contains no alternatives:CHLetter Received by P.O. Received by P.O.register —• Port MoresbyDaruat Lae and signed for and signed forA Gantt Chart sets out a series of stepsto be taken over a period of time, someof which must be carried out simultaneously.The simplest form of GanttChart is the pocket diary of the year'sactivities. In the present program theGantt Chart is used in the organizationof:(67) a mess function(69) an exercise(76) Unit activities(85) the monthly tasks of aMess Treasurer(75) a college work program.A Critical Path Chart enables the organizationof a process comprising a numberof steps. The time taken for each step isspecified. Step 1 can be carried out at thesame time as Step 2 but the completionof the step 1 awaits completion of step 2.For example, the walls of a prefabricatedgarage can be constructed at the same timethat the foundations are being laid but thewalls cannot be bolted into place until theDistributeSigned for / \bV~*\ )owner v. /foundations are completed. The CriticalPath consists of the establishment of thelogical order of steps in the process. Acritical path chart can be used for thefollowing processes:(20) construction of a prison(89) construction of a building(120) construction of an ambush site.Thus a process is set down in its most logicalform, in terms of available labour and thetime allocated. The Officer Cadets practise thetask of completing a job and employing theirsubordinates in the most efficient way.IISTILlC0«SI»»CI DOM .r7\ mi . W HITVi l(m *\2l \ w%'yy-\ \ S "l^l \nnmnri \fiiiitiiiois \I Mil Vrun• ITS , (CHSHIC1 1001 1IIIIIS . /Of'" 1 "Sogg ""ITbTfs "\1/ I O«T "vS/TbTnProblem 89: "Construction of a Building'

cA PROGRAMME IN PROBLEM SOLVING 41staft)InstructorexplainsprocessNOStudentpracticesthe skillsYESStudentcompletesevaluation stageYESNOProceed tonext skillFlow Chart of Instructional Strategy

42 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14, JAN/FEB 79Care has been taken to ensure accuracy,comprehensiveness and validity of the program.This has been achieved by conformityto the Systems Approach to Training, selectiveadaptation of existing frameworks of DecisionMaking, testing of selected problems in theclassroom and quality control by colleaguesskilled in the related areas.It should be emphasized that Officers mustbe able to make decisions and solve problemslogically and efficiently. To do so they mustdevelop an understanding of processes and beable to commit these to paper. They must becapable of transmitting the skills of logicalthinking to subordinates by example, counsellingand preparation of logical, clear paperwork.The program is still in its early stagesat the Joint Services College of Papua NewGuinea. The final test will come in the form offeedback from Commanding Officers of unitson the performance of future junior officers. QBelow: An example of a GANTT Chart.BIBLIOGRAPHYArmstrong-Wright. A. T., Critical Path Method —Introduction and Practice, London, Longmans, 1969.Black, M., Critical Thinking—An Introduction toLogic and Scientific Method, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1952.Bloom, B. S., Taxonomy of Educational Objectives(Cognitive Domain), London, Longmans,Bloom. B. S.. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives(Affective Domain). London. Longsmans.Christian. R. R.. Introduction to Sets and Logic,New York, Blaisdell, 2nd ed., 1965.Davis. R. H.. Alexander. L T. and Yelon. S. L.,Learning System Design — An Approach to theImprovement of Instruction, New York. McGraw-Hill. 1974.Gribhle. J., Introduction to the Philosophy of Education,Allyn & Bacon. 1969.Kimbrough. R.B. and Nunnery, M. Y.. EducationalAdministration -An Introduction, New York, Mac-Millan. 1976.Mager. R. F.. Goal Analysis, Fearon.Mager. R. F. and Pipe, P.. Analyzing PerformanceProblems or You Really Oughta Wanna.McCall. R.. Basic Logic—The Fundamental Principalsof Formal Deductive Reasoning, New York. Barnes& Noble. 2nd ed., 1965.Polya, G.. How to Solve it. Open University SetBook. Doubleday. 1957.Additional Reference:Avery, J.. Capt. and McBride, J.. Capt., Job Analysisof an Infantry Platoon Commander—PNGDF.MONTH OF NOVEMBER 77MONTUEWEDTHUFRISATSUNRECEIVE MOVIESWARNING IN SHEETBANKMESS BILLS001RECEI VEBANKBAR MNETHAPPYHOUR'MOVIENIGHTRECEIVE MOVIEWARNING IN SHEETBANKBANKRECEI VEBAR Mi NEYHAPPYHOUR'MOVIENIGHTRECEIVE MOVIEWARNING IN SHEETBANKRECEI VE BAR M iNEYBANKHAPPYHOUR'MOVIENIGHTRECEIVE MOVIESWARNING IN SHEETBANKRECEIVE MOVIESWARNING IN SHEETBANKCOMPLETE MONTHLYRECONCILIATION-,SBANKRECEIVEBAR MONEYBANKPREPARE Ml SS BILLS1 *-RECEIVE BAR N0s:i? ^COLLECT BANKSTATEMENTPREPARE - *"ACCOUNTSHAPPYHOUIT"MOVIENIGHT

1^Some thoughts on AD FA •*H5F «iF.f(Australian Defence Force Academy)Captain S.J. HollanderRoyal New Zealand Infantry RegimentBACKGROUNDTHE requirement to handle large bodies ofmen and quantities of material is animportant aspect in the profession of arms. Inthe Twentieth Century, this quantity factor hasbeen complicated by a quality factor as militaryplannersand commanders have access togreater and more sophisticated resources.These resources have increased the optionsavailable to defence planners and commandersalike. The need for senior officers tounderstand the complexities of TwentiethCentury technology and the consequent optionshas caused us to upgrade the educationalqualifications of officer aspirants.Most countries involved in training officershave come to accept that a proportion of itsofficer corps needs to be tertiary qualified,however, the proportion that need to be soqualified has not yet been universally resolved.The decision to create ADFA to provide theAustralian armed forces with its tertiaryqualified officers has caused an uneasiness inthe minds of academics and soldiers alike. Theneed for tertiary qualified officers is nowaccepted. The question becomes now, 'IsADFA the best way of providing theseofficers?'Despite the need to use the whole spectrum ofdefence resources in concert to gain the desiredeffect in future conflicts the nature of eachservice may require a different sequence ofinitial officer training. Do pilots do their flighttraining before or after their studies; do tertiaryCaptain Hollander, a graduate of OCS, Portsea, is atpresent on the Staff there.qualified midshipmen like going to sea (orshould this be established before attendance ona long and expensive course); and do armyofficer aspirants join to return to school or tolead men?COST OF ADFAThe last cost I saw for ADFA was $80m. (inan article in The Australian). This apparently isthe cost of providing the facilities for ADFA.Although I have not seen a detailed breakdownof this estimate, I suspect that this is an 'operahouse prediction'. It may not allow for theupgrading of the three service colleges requiredby the introduction of ADFA or the ongoingmaintenance and staff costs. It can notaccurately estimate the cost of 'academictradition', in money terms or in terms of thetime it will take for ADFA to gain recognitionfrom the academic community at large. Thisacceptance may be speeded by investment in thefield of research and the offering of researchscholarships, but at what cost? I suspect thatthe real cost of ADFA over the next 20 years,should it be established, will be many times thisoriginal estimate.In 1975 there were eighteen universities inAustralia (with 94 Colleges of AdvancedEducation and Feachers' Colleges). Theseuniversities received grants from the FederalGovernment through the State Governmentstotalling S443,980m.My own uneasiness about ADFA conceptstems from my understanding of the reasonsfor maintaining a defence force. We do notmaintain the armed forces so that they cancompete with another branch of government,(the education department). Nor is theestablishment of ADFA fully utilizing anexisting and very expensive national resource(the existing universities system).

44 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79One must ask w hat we get for our money andthe answer must be, initially, a series ofbuildings and facilities. The amount involved isa lot to spend on capital works at a time whenfinance to maintain and improve existingfacilities and buildings is limited.THE OFFICER CORPSTo reach the higher echelons within theofficer corps requires a commitment from eachmember at an early stage in life. The scope forentry directly into the middle or upper echelonsis very limited. Therefore, the corps itself isseen by many as a 'closed shop'. This causesmany outsiders to be skeptical about the corpsand its ability to examine itself. I do not believethis skepticism is well founded. "Hybrid vigor'within the corps has been achieved by dual ormulti streaming officers through various initialtraining systems and then broadening furtherofficer educational experience by using variousstaff colleges, joint service institutions, civilstaff colleges and the like. An 'elitist' label isstill put on the officer corps by some sectors ofthe community. In the light of the developmentof the elitist German General Staff, thisattribute is generally accepted as being a badone.Many factors contribute to prevent (heAustralian officer corps becoming a narrowmindedgroup of 'Golonel Blimps'. Theseinclude:• selection from all parts of Australia,• selection from all social/ economic groups;and• selection from all sectors of the populationregardless of race or creed.In the Australian Army, the dual streamingof officers provided by RMC Duntroon andOGS Portsea must have also contributed tobroadening the outlook of the officer corps.This system allows us to select from a broadpopulation base. Having a single stream basedon ADFA and then a single army officertraining source, will only restrict our outlookand ability to accept officer aspirants from thispresent wide population base.THE EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTAlthough accepting the argument that werequire a proportion of our officers to betertiary qualified, the reasons given for this areoften conflicting or confused. The argumentthat only a tertiary qualified person will becomea good officer is non sequitur. A tertiaryeducation in itself does not qualify anyone forhigh military command. A common, andpossibly an anti-intellectual, argument heard isthat we do not train officers in tertiaryinstitutions in fields of direct use to the services.This argument is then extended to theproposition that ADFA, under militarycontrol, would only teach subjects of 'directmilitary use'. I am at a loss to identify morethan a few subjects that are of 'direct militaryuse' which are not covered within the existinguniversity system. Before a physicist can applyprinciples to military applications or themathematician apply formulae to militarysituations, the principles must be broadlyunderstood. Sciences and the study ofhumanities may contain largely givenknowledge, however, the peripheral benefits oftertiary education cannot be overlooked.Exposure of students to the academic traditionof free thought will cause the development ofan enquiring mind. An enquiring mind andknowledge are the basic ingredients of originalthought.Some subjects that may have 'direct militaryuse' may include:• war studies,• strategic studies, and• military technology.To only study a narrow field within a militaryenvironment would put us in danger of losingthe real benefits of tertiary education.If a full list of subjects of 'direct military use'were drawn up, and then those subjects notalready taught in Australian universitiesisolated, we may be presented with a very shortlist. A proportion of the present estimates couldbe alloted (say S20m.) for the establishment offaculties within existing Australian universitiesto teach the subjects required. This would havethe following advantages:• Better use would be made of existingeducation department facilities andinstitutions while avoiding the huge initialcapital costs involved in establishing ourown facilities.• Scholarships to study in these facilities maybe given by the defence forces to promisingstudents in the same way as large civilianfirms give such scholarships.• Students within these and other facultiesmay be recruited directly from the campus.Those not chosen will still be of some value

SOME THOUGHTS ON ADFA4^in the community at large as people capableof speaking authoratively on defencerelated matters.• I he service may select applicants withproven, not suspected academic ability, atsome financial saving, from suchinstitutions. In this situation officerqualities and potential, rather thansuspected ability to pass an academiccourse, becomes the main selection criteria.At a time when the university system is trainingmore graduates than can be employed withinthe community at large, the idea of building yetanother university and not using this existingresource seems pointless.THE MILITARY TRAININGREQUIREMENTThe service responsibility for officerproduction must be to train each aspirant in thetechniques and procedures he will use as anofficer. Army experience has shown thatcompetent officers can be produced regardlessof tertiary experience. Therefore the timing oftertiary training is not critical to officerproduction. ADFA will impose a sequence thatmay not be appropriate for all services,branches or individuals. It seems that at everyturn the introduction of ADFA serves to limitour options — rather than broaden them.It is of little long term consequence that anofficer aspirant is recruited with a tertiaryqualification, given the opportunity to gaintertiary qualification within the service prior tocommissioning or gains such qualificationsafter being commissioned by part or full timestudy. The present army system leaves thesethree options open to us. If, at great expense,ADFA is established, how could we justify therecruitment of tertiary qualified aspirants? Thenumber of tertiary qualified members in thearmed forces has steadily risen this century.The need for a significant number of postgraduatequalified personnel has not beenrecognised to any great extent yet. The lack of asignificant post-graduate requirement withinthe services may cause ADFA to lack academicdepth.The cost of ADFA may distort our outlookin regard to the proportion of tertiary qualifiedofficers required. When such facilities areavailable, are we not ignoring their potential,unless all officer aspirants enjoy their benefit?The question must then be asked again; inpreparation for war, what proportion of theofficer corps should be tertiary qualified?The integration of academic and militarytraining under military control will be criticisedby the academic and military communitiesalike. These two communities have successfullyco-existed in the past but marriage may be morethan each could tolerate.CONCLUSIONAlthough estimates exist for the cost ofestablishing ADFA, it is unlikely that these bearany true resemblance to the final cost ofestablishing it and upgrading the supportingservice colleges.The establishment of ADFA would representa failure of the defence department to use anexisting resource (Australia's university system)and would be an indictment on the educationdepartment who, at a time when it producesmore graduates than can be employed in thecommunity at large, cannot train graduates forone of the nation's largest employers.The strength of the corps of officers has beenderived in part from the diverse backgrounds ofits members. The creation on a single initialstream for the three services must reduce thesize of the population from which we draw ouraspirants.There is no doubt that most of the subjectsthat will be taught at ADFA will be the same asmost of those taught at other universities.Therefore we have very little to gain from itsestablishment and risk losing some of theperipheral advantage of attendance atuniversities within the community at large.Any subjects not presently taught inAustralian universities but recognised withinthe existing system at a fraction of the costinvolved in building a new university.The prime responsibilities of the services is totrain for war. Failure to use existing resourcesto their fullest goes against that principle ofwar, economy of effort. Having committedourselves to such an ambitious project maylimit our options in the future selection ofofficer aspirants and this must be contrary tothe principle of flexibility, %f

NapoleonandSpainMajt >r G. G. MidtlletonRoyal Australian Corps of SignalsON 25 June 1807 Napoleon Bonaparteeffected the Treaty of Tilsit with TzarAlexander of Russia, it marked the height ofhis power having conquered Russia, Prussiaand Austria as well as most of the lesser statesof Europe.' He was. however, still at war withBritain which maintained a naval blockadeagainst France, a blockade which enabledBritain to control the seas and had resulted inher gaining a stranglehold over maritime trade,a consolidation of her existing colonies andthe acquisition of Capo Colony, Mauritius,Ceylon, British Guinea and several West Indianislands. 2Although France had extended peace feelersfrom time to time, they were rejected by Britainwho was not prepared to tolerate any singlepower dominating Europe, a situation whichwould inevitably lead to unfavourable tradingconditions.' The expeditionary forces Britainhad dispatched to the continent since theFrench Revolution had shown themselves tobe ill-organized, ill-supplied and ill-led. 4 Hercontinued existence as a belligerent dependedon the Royal Navy, but the Royal Navy alonecould not affect Napoleon's Grand Armeeduring a period in which Britain could raisean expeditionary army of only 60,000 soldierscompared with a million French and followingTilsit. Napoleon could call upon assistancefrom powerful European allies.Major Middlelon graduated from OCS Porisea in1968. After serving in several signals units, he waxappointed Adjutant of (he School of Signals in 1973and held the same appointment in 2 Sig Regt in 1975.From 1975 to 1977, he was an instructor at theSchool of Signals and is currently S02, Directorateof Communications—Army in Canberra. He is studyingfor a BA at the Australian National University.The Royal Navy ruled the seas with approximately100 battleships opposed to a combinedFrench-Dutch fleet of 75, some of which werein disrepair. French calculations had determinedthat they needed 50 per cent superiorityof ships to force the Straits of Dover andimpose a peace settlement on Britain, that isapproximately 150 ships. Napoleon attemptedto establish this superiority by treaty and byannexation and after gaining the support ofRussia and Spain by treaty, planned on annexingthe fleets of Denmark and Portugal.This was agreed on with Alexander in one ofthe secret clauses of the Tilsit Treaty.The British quickly learned of this threatand dispatched a powerful fleet to Copenhagenwhich seized the Danish fleeF while at thesame time retaining friendly relations with herlong time ally Portugal. However, the outnumberedBritish realized that they mustultimately be outstripped in the naval racesince Napoleon controlled much greater resourcesfor the manufacture of ships andarmaments as well as the manpower resourcesto crew a much bigger navy.The British strategy was one of maintaininga naval blockade against France, often bydesperate measures, and at the same timesearching for situations on the continent whichwould allow her to weaken France at an acceptablecost to herself. Napoleon responded with acontinental blockade aimed at stifling Britain'strade and collapsing her economy by drainingall currency from her. In order to mount aneffective blockade he needed the support of allmaritime trading nations of Europe and afterTilsit only Portugal, Sweden and Sicily maintainedtrade with Britain. The latter two wereeasily coerced into ceasing trade but Portugal

NAPOLEON AND SPAIN 47proved intransigent and in addition the prizeof the Portuguese fleet was even more tanalizingfollowing the British capture of the DanishFleet."Napoleon first tried to cower the Portugueseinto submission and addressed himself publiclyat a diplomatic reception to the Portugueseambassador thus:"If Portugal does not do what I wish, theHouse of Braganza will not be reigning inFurope in two months." 7When Portugal failed to sever relations withBritain, Napoleon sought Spanish permissionfor Marshal Junot's army to pass throughnorthern Spain to occupy Portugal and at astroke gave Britain the means of attackinghis army on favourable terms, for in occupyingPortugal he sent a small unprotected armyclose to a coast where Britain's sea powercould land and support troops to crush it.Nor did he succeed in blockading the British,as large scale smuggling was carried outthrough the Spanish ports, despite Spain beingtheoretically at war with Britain. 8Napoleon next decided upon determinedaction in Spain and was able to exploit thepolitical intrigues of the corrupt Spanish courtwith factions led by King Charles IV, CrownPrince Ferdinand and Manuel Godoy, thequeen's lover. He was able to remove theSpanish Court to Bayonne on the pretext ofmediating in their disputes and at the sametime insert troops into northern Spain underthe guise of reinforcing Junot in Portugal.Following civil rebellion against the Spanishthrone in March 1808, Marshal Murat occupiedMadrid and Joseph was named King ofSpain."He had compounded his initial error, foralmost immediately the Spanish in Madridrebelled against France even before Josephcould ascend the throne, while guerrilla warfareswept the country. The war which ensued wasto tie down large French armies at enormouscost for the following five years.Not only had Napoleon committed largenumbers of troops on the Peninsular but hehad lost the opportunity of turning to use thetraditional enmity of Spain toward Britainand Portugal. The situation was exploited byBritain who moved quickly to re-establishpeace with Spain, harbour the Portuguese royalfamily and remove the Portuguese fleet fromNapoleon's reach. In Napoleon's words,". . . when that disastrous affair of Spainpresented itself to effect a sudden changeagainst me and reinstate England in thepublic situation. She was enabled from thatmoment to continue the war; the trade withSouth America was thrown open to her; sheformed an army for herself in the peninsular,and next became the victorious agent, themain part of all plots which were hatchedon the continent . . ," 10Had Napoleon supported a Spanish regimehe could have neutralized Portugal and keptBritain out of Europe. Ultimately he couldeven have built a fleet powerful enough to haveinvaded her. As things turned out even hiscontinental blockade failed for it depended onthe co-operation of the civilian population andthis he never won." British trade continued toflow into Europe by smuggling under neutralflags, and by the bribery of customs officials.On 23 July 1808 Dupont's army was surroundedby Spanish forces and surrenderednear Baylen, the first surrender of a Napoleonicarmy. Over 18,000 French troops were forcedto lay down their arms and many were latermassacred. 1 '-' Apart from arousing tremendousenthusiasm throughout Spain the defeat had afar reaching effect on Europe. Austria hadalready begun re-arming against Napoleon inthe hope of just such an event. In the wordsof Metternich:"Napoleon's mind was full of the overthrowof Spain. He was preparing to appear personallyon the scene where the great dramawas to be played. This might lead to contingenciesfor which the Vienna cabinet mustprovide. The preparations made in Austriapointed to warlike designs." 13The downturn in Napoleon's fortunes becamesvident from the concessions he made whennegotiating with Tzar Alexander at Erfurt inOctober 1808. He agreed to withdraw his troopsfrom Prussia, reduce Prussian indemnities, givereassurances concerning Poland and drop hisearlier insistence that Russia evacuate Moldaviaand Wallachia. 14His standing was also damaged at home asdefeat encouraged Talleyrand and Fouche to

48 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79plot against him. Not only did Talleyrand spendthe nights at Erfurt undoing the negotiationswhich Napoleon had concluded bv day but hereturned to Paris and requested that Metternich(at this time the Austrian ambassador) worktoward a union between Austria and Russiasaying:"The interest of France itself demands thatthe powers which are in a position to holdNapoleon in check unite to oppose a damto his insatiable ambition. Europe can onlybe saved by the closest union between Austriaand Russia." 15In November 1808 Napoleon intervened personallyin Spain with over 200,000 of his besttroops. Despite the reoccupation of Madrid andseveral minor victories over Spanish forces hefailed to consolidate France's hold on Spainand allowed a British army under Sir JohnMoore to escape. Already he had found thehostility of the Spanish peasants costly as itdeprived him of intelligence and he had beenforced to guess at Moore's whereabouts. Whenrumours of a coup and Austrian rearmamentsent him hurrying back to Paris, Metternichnoted that Talleyrand and Fouche were readyto seize power given a suitable opportunitypointing to the:"very difficult position in which the Frencharmy finds itself in Spain ... It is said thatthe loss in the affairs with the English hasbeen horrible . . . The Emperor's returnproves more than the rest." 16From April 1809 when Wellesley (later LordWellington) returned to the Peninsular, theFrench were to become increasing involved,with disastrous results. The remarkable featureof Wellington's campaign is that he fought sofew battles over such a long period. 1 ' By maintainingan army on the Peninsular and encouragingthe Spanish and Portuguese, the Britishwere able to tie down a French army approximatelyten times the size of their own. Duringthe entire campaign Wellington's forces inflictedabout 45,000" casualties on the French buttheir total casualties were 3()0,()0(), 1!l the majorityof them inflicted by guerrillas. It is apparentthat Wellington's major achievement was increating a climate in which guerrilla warfarecould flourish. The situation became somewhatakin to the Vietnam War with the guerrillascast in the role of the Vietcong and Wellingtondarting in and out of Spain from Portugal performinga similar function to the North VietnameseArmy. Prime Minister Percival notedthat Portugal was the best theatre to fight thewar since it provided Britain with an opportunity:"to carry on operations with the most advantageto ourselves and most inconvenience tothe enemy". 20By February 1810 Napoleon had 324,996troops in Spain- 1 and had appointed one of hisablest generals. Marshal Andre Massena, Princeof Essling, to command 138,000 of them withorders to drive the British into the sea. Massenahad built a formidable reputation in the Italianand Austrian campaigns and was a specialistin mountain warfare. Nevertheless Wellington,conducting a brilliant withdrawal and scorchingthe earth as he retired, was able to lure himto prepared defences at Torres Vedras. Massenafound the positions too formidable to attackand eventually had to retreat over the samescorched earth, losing between 25,000 and30,000 men and abandoning much of his equipmentas he went.- 2 A British soldier followingthe retreat recorded:"We could not advance one hundred yardswithout seeing dead soldiers of the enemystretched upon the road, or at a little distancefrom it, who had laid down to die,unable to proceed through hunger andfatigue".- 3Napoleon was outraged at the defeat sayingto Massena's Aide-de-Camp, Pelet:"You have lost everything that you can losein war; you have lost the honour of arms.It would have been better if you had lostthe army! Damn it, sixty thousand Frenchmenretreat before thirty thousand English!Is my army to be as (ineffective as) my navyFrom this point on the French troops on thePeninsular were to be increasingly tied downby the guerrillas and the threat of Wellington'sarmy and never controlled more than theground on which they stood.The French defeat was hastened by theattitude of the indigenous population. Spain,unlike Germany and Italy, had been a unifiedstate with a strong sense of nationalism. Theimposition of a French king was an insult while

NAPOLEON AND SPAIN 49the occupation by French armies brought realhardships. Spain's agriculture was barelysufficient to sustain the population in normaltimes. The French policy was to make warsupport itself; in an ally's country sustenancewas required as proof of allegiance, in anenemy's it was taken as a right of war.-''French armies foraged as they moved, layingwaste to the countryside as they went andturning the peasants into guerrillas, as in thecase of the peasants of the Valles who statedin a proclamation in April 1809 that:"They held it a great honour to form a part,though a small one, of the Spanish nation . . .their peaceful habitations had been invaded,their property plundered, their womenviolated, their brethren murdered in coldblood, and above all, the religion of theirfathers outraged and profaned; nothingremained for them to repel force by forceThe French armies committed many atrocitiesalthough in fairness, the British onoccasions did likewise, and these reboundedon them. On 26 April 1809 the SpanishGovernment published details in its gazette ofatrocities at Viles in January 1809 involvingthe rape of 300 women.- 7 In February 1809the French burned the villages of S. Miguel deZequelinos and S. Christobal de Mourentanleaving 2,000 homeless,- 8 and on 17 April 1809they summarily executed 24 inhabitants ofArnifara as a reprisal for an attack on aFrench patrol.-" In June 1809 the Frenchhanged 30 religious and 49 leading citizens ofLourizin. In return the Spanish executed 130French prisoners. 30If the French placed little value on friendlyrelations with the Spanish the same mistakewas not made by the British who supplied2 million pounds ' in gold per year to assistthe Spanish Government as well as enormousquantities of munitions much of which waslanded clandestinely at coastal rendezvous withthe guerrilla forces. 1 - Even more fundamentalto amicable relations was the British systemof supply, whereby a properly stocked supplyservice in the army's rear provided for theirneeds. Where local supplies were requiredthey were purchased.So powerful did the guerrillas become thatFrench deaths by their hand averaged morethan a hundred a day and not even a messengercould move in the country without anenormous escort. They menaced tax collectors,attacked grain convoys, causing shortages inthe capital and keeping troops on constantalert. M The guerrillas were encouraged by theSpanish clergy who Napoleon found quite unliketheir Italian counterparts. A catechismcirculated in Aragon read in part: "Are we atliberty to kill the French? ... It is our dutyto do so."" In May 1812 a strong convoyescorting Spanish prisoners on the way toFrance was attacked by guerrillas; 600-700French were killed, 500 wounded and 150 takenprisoner. The 400 Spanish prisoners were setfree." In June 1813 Joseph sent desperateorders from Burgos ordering Clausel to joinhim. 1,500 men escorted the message whichreached Clausel but his reply did not reachJoseph. 36From the beginning to end, the Peninsularcampaign swallowed up 600,000 French troops,of whom 300,000 became casualties. Neverafter 1808 were less than 200,000 French troopsinvolved at times this rose as high as 370,000.Even following his defeat in Russia, Napoleonwas forced to leave 200,000 troops in Spainwhile Wellington commanded a mixed British,Spanish and Portuguese force of about 70,000aided of course by the guerrillas.The numbers involved on the Peninsular aresignificant when compared with the period ofThe Terror when France had an effectivearmy of about 600,000 although its theoreticalstrength stood at 1,100,000. The Peninsulargreatly weakened Napoleon elsewhere as rarelyafter 1808 was he able to muster a decisivemajority at the point of battle. Thus at Ratisbonin April 1809 he was able to muster only172,700 troops compared with ArchdukeCharles' 161,500" and at Wagram on 4 July1809, 189,000 against 167,500 supported byTyrolese rebels in Napoleon's rear. 38 Whenforced to meet enemies on equal terms hesuffered much greater casualties and the resultswere often inconclusive. In any case it isimprobable that his enemies would have takento the field had they not been encouraged byevents in the Peninsular.The Peninsular proved to be expensive inother ways. It diverted Napoleon's most successfulgenerals, including Massena, Ney,

50 DEFENCE FORCE JOl RNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79Mortier. Victor and Suchet and from this timeonwards French armies elsewhere fell intoerrors because the generals promoted in theirplace lacked their skill and experience incommanding large formations.Despite Napoleon's dictum that war shouldbe self supporting the French inability toinstitute an effective civil government, thegeneral poverty of the countryside and theharassment of tax collectors by guerrillasmeant that Joseph's kingdom became agigantic burden on the French treasury. ByJune 1813 the Spanish adventure had cost4,000,000,000 reals (over a billion francs) aswell as enormous quantities of material, armament,munitions and supplies."'Tf the Peninsular War was disastrous forFrance it enabled England to become not onlythe premier naval power but a major militarypower on the continent. In the overall senseit was Britain which gained most from theNapoleonic era including trade, colonies, navalsupremacy, a strong army and a greater leadin the industrial revolution.While we can only speculate on the differencethat the Peninsular War made to theactual invasion of Russia, since the problemsin Russia were more ones of distance andclimate, there is little doubt that the Peninsulararmy would have sufliced to stem the tidefollowing the Russian debacle had it not beentied down in Spain. As things were. Napoleonsalvaged less than 50,000 of the 450,000 hetook to Russia and had to levy raw recruitsagainst the invading forces. In any case it isdoubtful whether Russia would have becomeso intransigent in her relations with France asto cause Napoleon to invade her had Francenot been involved in Spain.It is clear then that the invasion of thePeninsular was the turning point on theNapoleonic era, up to that time he neversuffered a defeat on the continent, afterwardshe rarely gained a victory and the ones he didgain were both costly and ineffective. Spainbecame a greater drain on France than theBoer War on Britain and Vietnam on theUSA. Speaking with hindsight from St Helena,Napoleon said of it:". . . that miserable Spanish affair turnedopinion against me and rehabilitated England.It enabled them to continue the war. . . they put an army on the Peninsular(which became the agent of victory, theterrible node of all intrigues that formedon the continent . . . (the Spanish affair) iswhat ruined me". 4 " I)NOTES1. Parkinson. R.. The Peninsular War, London,Book Club Associates, 1973. p. 12.2. Liddell Hart, B. H.. The Strategy of IndirectApproach, London, Faber and Faber. revised1941, p. 2.3. Glover, M., The Peninsular War 1807-1814,London. David and Charles. 1974, p. 23.4. Ibid.5. Ibid., p. 24.6. Glover. Op. Cit., p. 26.7. Metternich. R. (ed.). Memoirs of Prince Metlernich,New York, Howard Fertig, 1970 ed.8. Parkinson. Op. Cit., p. 12.9. Ibid., p. 13.10. Las Cases, E.. Memorial de Saint Helene, Part4. London, Colburn. 1935. p. 195.11. Brunn, G.. Europe and the French Itnpcrium1799-1814, New York. Harper and Ross, 1938,p. 99.12. Parkinson, Op. Cit., p. 18.13. Metternich, Op. Cit., Vol. 1, p. 79.14. Brunn. Op. Cit.. p. 164.15. Ibid.16. Metternich, Op. Cit., Vol. 2, p. 315.17. Liddell Hart. Op. Cil„ p. 143.18. Ibid.19. Connelly, ().. Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms,New York. The Free Press. 1965. p. 263.20. Sherwig. J. M.. Guineas and Gunpowder. BritishForeign Aid in the Wars with France 1793-1815.Harvard University Press, 1969, p. 235.21. Parkinson. Op. Cit.. p. 108.22. Parkinson. Op. Cit.. p. 132.23. Howard. D. D. (ed.), Jean Jacques Pelet, TheFrench Campaign in Portugal 1810-1811, Uniof Minnesota Press. 1973. p. 283 Footnote.24. Ibid., p. 498.25. Southey R.. Hi\torv of the Peninsular War,Vol. 1, London. Murray, 1823, p. 23.26. Ibid., Vol. 2. p. 364.27. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 67.28. Ibid., Vol. 2. p. 169.29. Ibid.. Vol. 2. p. 207.30. Ibid.. Vol. 2. p. 331.31. Sherwig, Op. Cit., p. 238.32. Ibid., p. 237.33. Connelly. Op. Cit.. p. 259.34. Ibid., p. 257.35. Southey. Op. Cit., Vol. 3, p. 476.36. Parkinson. Op. Cit., p. 173.37. Esposito. V. J., and Elting. J. R.. A MilitaryHistory and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, NewYork.Praegar. 1964. Map. 94.38. Ibid.. Map 103.39. Connelly. Op. Cit., p. 263.40. Ibid., p. 270.

I fIfA THIRD DIMENSION TO TRAININGMr T. J. MillancServices Analytical Studies GroupWHAT can war-games do for the trainingof military personnel in the art of war?The answer to this question was provided by thePrussians in the last century when theyemployed war-games to develop their summermanoeuvre exercises. The skills that wereacquired as a result of these war-game activitiesin the 19th Century were passed on throughWorld War 1 and the success of this techniquein the opening phases of World War II is wellknown to students of military history.What is the role of a war-game in training?This question may be simply answered bysaying a war-game provides a facility for astudent, having prepared a plan, to execute thatplan, obtain the results of that execution and onidentifying a weakness, or another option,change his plan, exploit that situation andobtain a further result of that action.Throughout this process the student isobtaining intelligence as he would in real war.The Services Analytical Studies Group(SASG) as a section of Defence Science andTechnology (DST) has developed a series ofwar-games to meet a wide spectrum of trainingrequirements both in tactical and administrationareas. The games being:• a one-sided movements war-gamedesigned to assist instruction in criticalareas of transportation. These areasinvolve the movement of supplies,terminal facilities and modes of transport.Mr Millane is a graduate of the Royal Melbourne Instituteof Technology and a Major in the Army Reserve. He gainedconsiderable e\perience in computer systems at theWeapons Research Establishment in South Australia. In1968-69 he spent 15 months with the Regular Army, including12 months in Vietnam. Since 1970 he has servedwith the Scientific Advisers Office on Army researchstudies. He is at present n ith the Services Analytical StudiesGroup, Department of Defence, working on training wargamesfor the Australian Arnn .• a two-sided Corps III level tactical wargamedesigned to provide instructions inboth armoured and infantry tactics.• a two-sided Task Force/Battalion HQlevel war-game designed to exercisestudents in the application of theprinciples of tactics and staff work.• a two-sided Division HQ level war-gamedesigned to exercise a divisional staff inthe production and execution of bothoperational and administrative plans.In addition to these, SASG is at presentdeveloping a family of games in an Australiansetting from Division level through Corps,Comm Z to support area. When these gameshave been developed it may be possible toobtain a more coherent approach to theunderstanding of the sensitivity of a changefrom the steady state in the main support areato its effect on the Combat Zone (see Map).Method of PlayIn a war-game only the initial problem isissued to the player teams and random numbersare then employed to select the sequence ofevents which will occur during the game. Thus adynamic rather than fixed approach isachieved. Another important aspect of the playis that the players must make decisions and takeaction to gain intelligence which in a TEWTwould be presented to them.Sequence of play is as follows:a. Control issues:(1) Pre-game intelligence (Instructionsand Background Narrative);(2) Initial unit deployment and tacticalsituation (General Idea); and(3) The local situation (Special Idea).b. Problem One is issued.c. Player teams develop their plans and thensubmit their plans to control. (The plansare examined by assistant controllers forincorrect use of planning data such asMovement Rates, etc.). The plans areprepared as overlays with their associatedorders.

52 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14, JAN/FEB 19d. Control then adjudicates and feeds theresult of the adjudication back to theplayer teams.e. The player teams on receiving the result ofadjudication make adjustments to theirplans, re-submit and so the cycle isrepeated.This continuing process emphasises theessential difference between a war-game and aTEWT. In a TEWT a series of problems is set.In a war-game only the initial problem is issuedto player teams. From then on it is the result ofadjudication that determines the sequence andtype of problems that are presented to theplayer teams.ControlControl has two important roles, the firstbeing game management and the second beingadjudication.• Game Management. The mostimportant area of game management is toensure that the conduct of play meets thegame objectives and to ensure that acomfortable relationship between gametime and real time exists.• Adjudication. The adjudication rules asemployed in a training war-game aredesigned to give the controller aquantitative guide to assist him to make aqualitative judgement. The basis ofadjudication in combat engagement is theFire Power Score whose value is ameasure of the Combat Power of a Force.The adjudication process employsprobabilistic rules which were obtainedfrom US training games. The rules havebeen developed from data obtained fromWorld War II and the Korean War andupdated as a result of training exercisesand improved technology.The Player's RolePlayer teams must undertake the followingactivities:• Prepare a plan with associated orders.• Cain intelligence.• As the intelligence base develops, furtherdevelope plans to cover the new situation.The Adjudicator's RoleThe adjudication sequence is as follows:• Determine physical limitations, weather,visibility;• Determine intelligence (sightings);• Adjudicate any independent engagementssuch as artillery, air or armour duals;• Adjudicate the results of combined armsengagements. A more detailed descriptionof the method of adjudication will becovered in a later article. The controlteams must at all times be aware of thedual role of control; that is, gamemanagement and adjudication.The employment of war-games intrainingWar-games may be employed in three ways:• As an aid to Instruction. In this form ofplay the war-game resembles the modelexercise employing simplifiedadjudication rules and maximum playerparticipation. Here player teams arepresented with problems pertaining toboth the Red and Blue forces with theinstructor carrying out the adjudicationand the player teams (students) reacting inturn to the adjudication and the result oftheir plan. An example of the use of thistype of play would be in providinginstruction in the Phases of War or theidentifying of movements problems atterminals.• The Testing of Concepts andProposed Doctrine. In this role theapproach to play would be more generaland imaginative, fewer players would berequired and several repeats of play mightbe required. Possible requirements forwar-games in this role would be toestablish criteria for, say, the role ofmechanised infantry, the development ofa large scale field exercise, theemployment of containers in a supplysystem and the providing of assistance toconcepts teams.• Staff Work. War-games provide trainingfor HQ staff. In this role game play mustadhere to all the requirements of standingoperating procedures and staffprocedures.Essential Requirements of Game PlayThere are three important requirements ofgame play that have to be considered. These areas follows:• the recording of game play data;• analysis of data; and

TRAINING WAR GAMES — A THIRD DIMENSION IN TRAINING 53ENDEAVOURCOLDicil IsliilI liritniiIKONHON*• computer assistance (work in this area hasalready commenced).The Recording of Game Play DataThe recording of game play is important forthe following reasons. In the developmentphase of the war-game records of play wouldprovide a data base from which the requirementfor changes in the game design could beassessed, and in the final stage would provide arecord of game play for further analysis. Asuggested method of recording game playevents would be to use a field army teleprintersystem for game play communications. The useof such a system would provide a paper taperecord of game play in a form that could beprocessed by a computer.Analysis of DataThe analysis of war-game play is a veryimportant requirement of war-gaming. If it isnot carried out correctly many man-hours ofgame play may be wasted. The method ofanalysis to be used together with what aspectsof game play are to be analysed must beconsidered in conjunction with game play andthe game objective. It would be from theanalysis of game play that study groups couldobtain the design criteria for future war-games.The validity of the design criteria wouldimprove with the number of game plays.t?Computer AssistanceAs the number of game plays increases, onearea of concern to be examined would be towhat degree a manual war-game could beautomated, in particular in the adjudicationand planning area, without effecting the criteriaof military participation. The game plays wouldbe observed and the result of game playanalysedand examined for repetitive tasks notinfluenced by military participation. These arethe areas which would benefit from computerassistance. As examples, the results of a tanktankengagement, movement planning data,stores accounting and ammunition expenditurewould all fall into this category.ConclusionWar-games are not the complete cure for allof the Army's training problems; they are onlya means to an end, but in the areas where theyare best suited, they have a lot to offer for alarge saving in cost. They provide aninexpensive means to familiarise leaders withthe complexity of battle, military decisionmakingand practise in the function ofcommand and staff relationships. They providea third dimension to training.U

\PARACHUTEFAMILIARISATIONCOURSES"A Graduates report"Major XL R. IrvineRoyal Australian InfantryGeneralTHIS report is designed to provideinformation to those who have neverheard of the course or are still hesitating.VenueThe course is conducted at PTSWILLIAMTOWN. PTS is not a privatetransport system (although it acts as one) butPARACHUTE TRAINING SCHOOL, anArmy-run school at the RAAF BaseWILLIAMTOWN.The CourseThe CI introduces himself (Good morning, Iam LT. COL . . . , CI of PTS; on behalf of theBase Comd. . . .) and gives a brief on thecourse. The brief is well presented and theattitude of the CI, and the humour of the slides,relax (temporarily) all but the most devoutcowards. You learn that:a. if you are in the Army, you are probablytoo old or too important to be fullytrained as a military parachutist (heforgot too much of a coward);b. the course is nothing more thanfamiliarisation, that is, you don't get'wings', a certificate or even a chickenfeather; andc. you will enjoy yourself (sickly grins).You then observe a live commercial (called ademo by PTS) for the parachute. This leads youto believe (temporarily) that:a. there is no chance of the 'chute NOTopening;b. your arms are not going to be ripped off;andc. there is no need to cancel any plannedvasectomy; all parts will still befunctional.If you are chosen to be in the first flight (thatis, you stood in the front rank when they lineyou up), you move to your equipment whereyou are:a. introduced to the life jacket (goodmorning Miss West);b. shown how to fit and adjust yourparachute (I might cancel that vasectomyafter all);c. practised in exit position, descentpositions and water entry drill (haven't Imentioned landing in the water'. 7 ).You then move to the mock-up Caribouaircraft (which is cunningly disguised as apartly finished shed) where you practisehooking-up and stepping out of the aircraft. Bythis stage, you feel that you are thoroughlyfamiliar with parachuting and can go home.But no!You then are given a cup of tea or coffee (1declined due to a funny sensation in my lowerabdomen), lined up and counted off in fours.You are delighted to find that this is yourjumping order and not teams for a tagwrestlingmatch.

PARACHUTE FAMILIARISATION COURSES A GRADUATE'S REPORT" 55You put on your parachute, line up for acheck (buckles, straps, pack, NOK); and boardthe bus in the reverse order to jumping order.First into bus, last into aircraft, first into water;last into bus, first into aircraft, last into water.At least it gives you something to think aboutfor a while.The FlightCaribous are still noisy; the pilot looks soyoung (Does your mother know you're out?).You reach the right height and speed (about1500 feet, 100 knots, or for non-technicalpeople — awful high and fast) and approachthe DZ (Drop Zone or Dribbling Zombie,depending on who you are).The dispatcher (the grinning clown whoknows he's not going out) throws out somestreamers. I'm told they establish wind driftand are not for use by the nervous to cleansecertain parts of the anatomy. (Why did thewater look a funny colour after the first drop?Then, four at a time, you stand up, hook up,stand in the door and GOOOOOOOOOO!Initially it's a shock to see them standing thereone minute and completely out of sight the next(reminds me of some lifts in the city).You also learn if you're not first out that:a. the dispatcher can break the tight grip ofthe jumpers arm;b. bending at the knees as you walk downthe ramp doesn't get you lhal much closerto the ground;andc. the parachutes DO work (at least up untilnow)!Then it's your turn, 30 seconds — Red light— Green light — GO. If you're not first in line,stare intently at the back of the head of theperson in front; when he goes, gaze fixedly atthe horizon (I don't think they taught that, butit was better than looking at that drop below).I must admit 1 have no recollection of thetime from hearing 'GO' to the time I felt a tugon my shoulders, opened my eyes and saw- thatbig, beautiful, wonderful parachute open aboveme (fear does some funny things). Even if it wasall twisted, it looked good. Remember theinstructor said if it's twisted, don't worry, itwill untwist itself! It did! (I mean whatcondition was 1 in to do anything about it?) Bythis time about 20 seconds have elapsed sinceyou took that first step.For the next 20-30 seconds you really enjoyyourself. The feeling of floating free, thescenery, the admiring (?) crowds on the beach,the fact that you're still alive makes it allworthwhile. Then you remember somethingabout preparing to land!Level with the hills (500 ft), work yourselfinto the straps so that you're sitting in theharness, grasp the rigging with one hand, turnand hit the buckle releasing your straps, flickthe leg straps clear, grasp the rigging with bothhands and prepare to hit the water. It DIDwork when we practised it! Oh well, don'tworry about sitting in the harness, wait a fewmore seconds. There! You can see the pick-upboat clearly — must only be about 100 ft below— undo the buckle — you can hang on with onearm (King Kong couldn't break that grip).Straps free; both hands gripping shoulderstraps, feet hit the water and you're under.Arch your back, arms up and the parachutedoes come clear! Up to the surface, crew menwith grinning faces pull you into the boat,collect your 'chute and take you to shore. It isthe cold water making you shiver!A change of clothes, cup of coffee and asandwich and down to the local for a couple ofbeers, swap lies with the others and watch thesecond plane-load descend. Being an expert youcan now appreciate the ungainly exits andwatch it all with condescending amusement.Was it worth it? Would 1 do it again? Myoath! t*

" \AUCHINLECK, by Roger Parkinson, London,Grenada, 1977.Reviewed by Major General E. H. DarPakistan ArmyROGERPARKINSON is not exactly aprolific writer but he is on the way tobecoming one if he keeps up with his publishers'date line of a book every two yearsand this he has done with alarming punctiliousnessso far. His latest book is a biography ofField Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the lastCommander-in-Chief of the Indian Army andthe spirited, if luckless, commander in thedesert from July 1941 to August 1942.Parkinson claims that "much invaluablematerial has become available not contained inthe Auchinleck Papers. Chiefly, this additionalinformation is to be found in the War Cabinetpapers, including the documents relating to theChiefs-of-Staff and other military files, whichwere opened in 1970 . . . the official documentsbring to light startling new facts . . ." But thebook fails to show what these startling newfacts are except possibly a few allusions of apersonal nature for or against Auchinleck.There is nothing new in the central theme andparameters of the book:• That there were two battles of Alamein.The first—a defensive battle—was foughtand won by Auchinleck. The victor of thesecond, Montgomery, was both unfair anduncharitable in denigrating Auchinleck.• That Auchinleck was shabbily treated byChurchill.There is much in this story that wouldinterest the military historian and the generalreader. For the military historian the study andanalysis of offensive operation code named'Crusader' especially Auchinleck's interventionand enterprise is an excellent study in command.His second intervention following theaxis counter offensive which the official SouthAfrican historian calls "Crusader in reverse"but was named operation 'Venezia' is equallyinteresting. He intervened in a halting andenigmatic fashion but was firm and decisivein its later stage. The last phase came to beknown as the First Battle of Alamein.The general reader sees Churchill at his bestand worst, the interplay of local parliamentarypolitical pressures, the conflicts between globalstrategy, theatre strategy, compaign strategyand the shadows cast by political pulls andpressures.Auchinleck's career can be easily summarised.He was a company commander during theFirst World War for almost two years with abrief period as the acting battalion commanderof 6/2 Punjabis (now First Battalion, The PunjabRegiment, Pakistan Army). He took part indefensive and offensive operations in Mesopotamia(now Iraq) and during 1917-18 wasappointed Brigade Major of an infantry brigadeand later General Staff Officer grade 2 in adivisional headquarters. In 1933 and 1935 hetook part in anti-Mohmand operations as abrigade commander. He distinguished himselfboth in command and staff. But two pointsmust be noted. First, that he belonged to theIndian Army. Inevitably there was considerableenvy between the British Army and the IndianArmy and there is much that can be said tosupport either. But of one thing there is nodoubt: the Indian Army was treated as acolonial army, its fighting capacity and qualitiesespecially in continental environments weredoubted. There is enough evidence to supportthis view. Churchill's low opinion is recorded.Montgomery, on assuming command of the8lh Army ordered disbandment of Indiandivisions, and their employment in rear areasand line of communication duties. GeneralTuker Commanding 4 Indian Division threatenedto resien and »ot the decision reversed.

BOOK REVIEWS 57No Indian Army formations were used duringthe World War II in France or Germanyand even during the World War I the decisionto employ them in France had beenreversed. And the reasons—at least from theBritish point of view were part political, partmilitary. It is for this reason that an IndianArmy Ofliccr howsoever capable and promisinghad no long range future outside the IndianArmy. Auchinleck's employment during theSecond World War in Norway, as corps andarmy commander in England and his appointmentas Commander-in-Chief Middle East wasmost unusual and a tribute to his militaryreputation and ability.Secondly, in the two world wars the decisivetheatre of war was in Europe. Auchinleck hadno experience of—even if he had the knowledgeand understanding of—European war. And allhis colleagues and rivals had savoured thesmoke and cordite in Europe.But if Auchinleck started with such seriouspsychological and functional handicaps, he didlittle to improve the state of affairs while incommand. It is difficult to fault his selection ofCunningham as the 8th Army Commander,although Wilson, proposed by Churchill anddisregarded by Auchinleck, presumably becauseof personal reasons, would have been a betterchoice. But his subsequent choices are incomprehensible.Both Ritchie and Corbett werechiefs-of-staff and it is most unusual for themto have been appointed or selected to commandan active Army during operations. Even if theywere eminently suitable their selection andappointment would create an unsavoury effectof intrigue and jockeying. It will be noted howBrooke declined to step into the shoes of Auchinleckwhen offered and urged by Churchill.Auchinleck's handling of Ritchie — a subordinatearmy commander—is equally opento question. There is no shortage of writtennotes and memoranda which were sent andproffered in true Churchillian form and one istempted to remark perhaps in unconsciousimitation. In the strategic field, as a theatrecommander, Auchinleck showed more concernfor a battle yet to come than was necessary.Assuming that the Germans had broken throughthe Caucasus the primary responsibility at grandstrategic level lay with Churchill and the Chiefsof-Staff.In any case there would have beenenough warning and the time and space factor,as also the communications and movementproblems were not entirely unmanageable.Placed in more difficult environments, what wasRommel's worry: Malta? Northwest Africa?or the war in the desert? Therefore, Churchill'smoan that what mattered except Rommel'sdefeat, has much sense and substance.Some of Auchinleck's difficulties were institutional.He says in his preface to DesmondYoung's biography of Rommel that the Germanswere better grounded in minor tacticsand mobile warfare. The resilience and ripostemounted time and again by Rommel areapposite pointers. He recovered much morequickly from 'Crusader' to mount a "Crusaderin reverse". Churchill was impatient at what hethought was the slow regrouping, re-equippingand an operational response which showedlack of alacrity and bounce. Was it really anirrelevant criticism after all? The British Armytended to be slow as an institution.Roger Parkinson makes no mention of thefact that German codes had been broken andthe extent to which knowledge of German planswas known to Auchinleck. The Field Marshalis also silent, although this could, in part, bean explanation of Churchill's impatience. Heknew what the enemy was going to do andpresumably what he was capable of doing.It is interesting to reflect if the First Battleof Alamein would have acquired the controversyand reputation that it did, had it not beenfor the inept, anti-Auchinleck observationsmade by Montgomery.. After all how manydefensive battles and their commanders are thusvenerated? Is Rommel known for his defensivebattles? Auchinleck may have been more dignifiedbut he has not been entirely silent—notthat he should have remained silent againstsuch grave provocation caused by seriousaspersions on his military ability and capacity.Following the publication of Montgomery'smemoirs, which were serialised in the SundayTimes, he wrote, almost immediately a letterof protest to the newspaper, followed by contactwith the publishers of Montgomery andChurchill leading to amendments and revisionin books. He also tried, if unsuccessfully, to getthe 8th Army clasp for his period of commandfor the Middle East Medal.Auchinleck's reputation rests on his decisiveintervention in 'Crusader' and a late but

58 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN FEB 79equally effective intervension in the summerbattles in Libya and Egypt. Auchinleck showedbetter strategic sense than any contemporaryBritish General at the time, an ability to assessthe centre of gravity correctly, and adherenceto the maintenance of aim and an admirableolfensive spirit. Where he misjudged was hisown troops, their capacity and incapacity. Andfinally, could he or should he have continuedto attack in July 1942? General Bayerlein says,"You very nearly succeeded in breakingthrough our position several times betweenthe 10th and 20th. If you could have continuedto attack only a couple of days more you couldhave done . . ." To sum up, in his encountersagainst Rommel, Auchinlcck won the firstround and was even in the second. He proveda brilliant fighting general. This much is shownby a critical after event study. During the war,both Churchill and Brooke appear to havegiven considerable importance to the subjectivefactors of Auchinleck's background andexperience.There is one aspect of Auchinleck's role asCommander-in-Chief India, which, thoughmuch beloved of his biographers is open toserious disputation. Immediately followingpartition and independence, the ruler of Kashmirhad prevaricated. He should normally havejoined Pakistan but following a planned andsystematic massacre of Muslim population ofKashmir and tribal intervention, decided insteadto accede to India. This brought in the IndianArmy in October D47. In his despatch tothe Chiefs-of-Staff, Auchinleck cabled on 28October 1947, "Gracey (Acting Commanderin-Chiefof the Pakistan Army) reported byphone to me 01.00 hours night October 27-28that he had received orders from Jinnah which,if obeyed, would entail issue 'Stand Down'order. (The 'Stand Down' order meant thewithdrawal of all British officers). Flew Lahoremorning October 28 and met Gracey who saidorders which he had not obeyed were to sendtroops into Kashmir to seize Baramula andSrinagar also Banihal Pass and to send troopsinto Mirpur district of Janimu. Met Jinnahwho is in Lahore and discussed situation atlength explaining situation vis-a-vis Britishofficers very clearly . . . Jinnah withdrew ordersbut is very angry and disturbed by what heconsiders to be sharp practice by India insecuring Kashmir's accession . . ."In the first place the Indian Commander-in-Chief, General Lockhart had sent troops whenordered by the Indian government even thoughthere was a possibility of clash with PakistanArmy and the probability of issue of a 'StandDown' order. Secondly, General Gracey whosucceeded General Messervy as the Commander-in-Chiefof the Pakistan Army was towrite an appreciation within weeks of theseevents and to recommend to the government ofPakistan, military intervention by the PakistanArmy in Kashmir. These recommendationswere implemented and the two armies clashed.No one thought of the issue of the 'StandDown' order either then or later, even thoughthe war lasted for many months. Auchinleck's'decisive' intervention showed failure in appreciatingthe geo-political factors and a legalisticadherence—albeit of no consequence to Pakistanand to Indo-Pakistan relations. The 'latestof the many services' was not much of a serviceafter all.It now remains to add a personal note. 1 sawField Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck when hevisited the Pakistan Military Academy in 1459where I happened to be an instructor at thetime. He was tall, impressive, exuding warmth.He was closely questioned by some instructorson his side of the desert war and the need topublish his memoirs. He paried all questionsin his charming and genial way. And that isthe year of publication of Auchinleck by JohnConnel—the first authorised biography of theField Marshal. In the following year I metField Marshal Montgomery in an armv OfficersMess in England where he was the chief guest.We had a brief chat. He commented on theextreme cold of Quetta and asked if I knew thehouse where he had lived as an instructor atthe stall' college. My negative reply (I havestayed for many years in Quetta but have nevergiven this matter much importance) did notdiscourage him and he observed, "I am toldthey still run the exercises which I had written."I replied rather innocently that perhaps theywere in the College Museum. The Field Marshalquickly moved away. He was short, wiry, andif this brief and solitary encounter is an indication—singularlyvain. These encounters providean inkling of the contrasting character traits ofthe two Field Marshals. Their character traitsnotwithstanding, it would be difficult to disputethe military reputation of Montgomery which

BOOK REVIEWS 59is based on solid achievements. "The Art ofWar," says Napoleon, "is a simple art. Everythingis in performance." Montgomery was themost successful British general of the war.Auchinleck was not.UA RUMOR OF WAR, by Philip Caputo,London, Macmillan, 1977, pp 346, £5.50.Reviewed by Dr T. Stapleton, Immediate PastPresident, Australian Institute of InternationalAffairs.LI 1 III did one expect to read a betterbook about the soldier in Vietnam thanR, J. O'Neill's "Vietnam Task", hut here it is.No account has brought the feelings and thechanging attitudes more visibly into focus thanCaputo's autobiographical sketch.Growing up in a small country town in theUnited States of America where everythingopened and shut, even,one had all he neededand "with dirtless streets on which nothingever happened", there was no challenge ayoung man had to meet. The call of PresidentKennedy to save Asia from an imaginaryvision of communism provided a useful justificationfor him to join the Marine Corps.Only then did he find out the extent of hisphysical ability and what is meant by fitness.The description of Boot Camp is superb. Theexperience converted him from a soft, smalltownyouth into a self-confident man but not,as he guiltily suggests, with a diminished capacityfor compassion. "Even if the essence ofthe Marine Corps experience was pain, I feltproud of that spirited company and happythat I was one of them" and he realised thatthe most important changes in him were notthe physical ones. What a pity many of ourAustralian youth, especially those entering theservices, are not having a comparable experience.Then, in Vietnam, his real education began.Over sixteen months he saw horrors he hadnever dreamt of: had opportunities, and tookthem, to behave generously and decently tofriend and foe (his men gave no approval to aMarine who tried to emulate an Australianwho had taken "two brown and bloodstainedhuman ears" as a trophy); understood the emotionson both sides "There were also severalwallet-sized pictures of girl friends or wives... I wondered if the other side had a system.as we did, for notifying the families of casualties.I hoped so." A PFC said: They're justlike us, lieutenant. It is always the young menwho die."Sometimes he felt a hatred for everything inexistence except his men. "Yes, except thosemen of mine, any one of whom was betterthan all the men who had sent them to war."So, as his time sped on. human feelings, duty,preservation for himself and his men, draggedhim in conflicting directions.Finally, the torture of a mistake: "There wassomething about the dead man that troubledme . . . It was such a young face and, whileI searched him, I kept thinking, 'He's just aboy, just a boy'. 1 could not understand whyhis youth bothered me." The reader must waitfor the climax in the penultimate chapter.Ten years later, he returned as a war correspondentto cover the last few weeks of theAmerican withdrawal. "Those men had diedfor no reason. They had given their all fornothing."This is a great war book, so gripping thatno officer cadet will put it down, and yet abook that will make him think deeply abouthis responsibilities. By the end, it has becomea great peace book. i$Mil ITARY MINIATURES THE ART OFMAKING MODEL SOLDIERS, by SimonGoodenough and "Tradition", $10.95, availablein Australia through Hodder and Stoughton(Australia) Ptv. Ltd., 2 Apollo Place, LaneCove, NSW 2066.Reviewed by D. V. GoldsmithMOST of us as small boys collected toysoldiers. Some of us were lucky enoughnever to grow up, and continued our collectinginto middle age and beyond, though somewhatdisdainful these days of the tag 'toy'. Until afterWorld War II, the toy variety was the onlytype available, at least to the collector ofmodest means. About 1950, high class professionalmakers of model soldiers began toappear, among them the British firm ofTradition, which has held the spotlight amongcollectors ever since.Simon Goodenough, journalist and militaryhistorian, has now co-operated with Traditionto produce a handsome book. Its contents cover

60 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14, JAN/FEB 79the history of the model soldier from AncientEgyptian times, sources available to the privatecollector, painting, and methods of makingone's own figures, from simple conversion to'scratch building' an original, then mouldingand casting it. There is a guide to dioramas,and a few words on war gaming.The book is illustrated profusely, with qualitycoloured photographs showing the work ofskilled professional modellers, Tradition appearingregularly but unobtrusively amongthem. Many snippets of interesting informationare scattered through the text such as the factthat, here in "London's model soldier Mecca",enthusiasts for the World Wars period buy20 German figures for every Brit, the authorattributing this to a sort of preference for thelosing side. A similar sentiment could explainthe absorption with the armies of Napoleon,though here at least there is the saving graceof colour and spectacle.The real aim of the book is to draw thebeginner to the serious business of modelsoldiering, and it claims to be a simple introduction;for example, included is a glossary,defining such terms as "sword knot", "aigulette"and "bandolier". The reader with acasual interest in the subject will find it attractive,though perhaps rather expensive at $10.95.For those who might be hooked by this bait,there is available for further reading a widerange of instructive books, many inexpensiveby comparison with Military Miniatures.In illustrating the various modelling techniques,there is a tendency to oversimplify.The 'raw material' metal models used asexamples are most expensive (a fact notstressed in the book), and the beginner shouldnot lightly set to work with hacksaw and paint.I for one have watched with horror somedollars' worth of metal model dissolve undermy soldering iron, unskilfully wielded. As inmany other areas, plastics have come to stayin the model soldier world, anil in fact arepushing the metal variety hard, the French firmof Historex in the van. On the whole, fairtreatment is given in this work to plastics, thefinest illustration of the modellers art in thebook, from Gericault's painting of a Chasseurof the French Imperial Guard, being an adaptionfrom a plastic kit. However, Tradition isa 'metal' firm, and one could dispute theauthor's inference that the metal ficure issuperior, and something to which the noviceshould aspire after an apprenticeship in plastics.Another point that might have been stressedis that plastic models on the whole are cheaperthan metal, a strong factor in their favour forthe beginner's experiments.For anyone with experience as a collectorcum-modeller,this book is a handsome thoughnot essential addition to his bookshelf. For thenewcomer, it is a good if expensive starter,provided he is wary of the pitfalls that thesimple line drawings and text tend to conceal.QTHE FUTURE GLOBAL CHALLENGE, byNeville Brown, Royal United Services Institutefor Defence Studies, London, 1977, 402 pp.,£9.95.INSECURITY!, edited by Robert O'Neill,A.N.U. Press, 1978, 280 pp., S9.50.Reviewed by Dr Hugh Smith, Department ofGovernment, University of New South Wales,RMC, Duntroon.NEVILLE BROWN'S book is subtitled'A Predictive Study of World Security,1977-1990'. In 400 pages it provides anaccount, as exhausting as it is exhaustive, ofall the factors which might influence worldsecurity in the next decade and a half. Itembraces such disparate topics as urban terrorism,inflation, pre-natal sex selection, changesin global temperature, food shortages, nuclearenergy, the fast patrol boat and satellite surveillance.It examines nuclear and conventionalstrategies. It diagnoses the problems faced byRussia and America, not forgetting the countriesof Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America,and the Middle East. The raw material intrends and events of the last ten or twentyyears mixed in with predictions, extrapolations,guesses and speculations.In vain one waits for some attempt to tieeverything together, to lift the book above thelevel of good journalism. There are someinteresting points if you can find them: militarystrategy cannot as in the past ignore social andeconomic factors; democracies with internalproblems find it difficult to concentrate onproblems of international order; the philosophyof education will become increasingly importantin debates on public policy. But there isno indication of which factors are more signifi-

BOOK REVIEWS 61cant than others, no real analysis of how theywill affect military strategy (Brown has donethis better in other publications), no satisfactorydefinition of world security. There aresome prescriptions such as promoting parliamentarydemocracy and according higherpriority to the North-South division but thereare few useful suggestions on how to carrythem out.It is difficult to perceive the purpose forwhich this book was written unless it was toconvince readers of the complexities andproblems which the world must face in thenext decades. Readers might be more convinced,however, if arguments were spelled outand the sheer volume of facts and speculationreduced.The O'Neill book is also concerned withsecurity. (One man's security, it is said, isanother man's insecurity.) This collection ofnine articles and a conclusion is focused on aspecific topic, namely the spread of weaponsin the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Not that theissues raised are simple or narrow. On thecontrary, most of the elements that affectAustralia's security are discussed in one formor another.There is a chapter on nuclear proliferationand President Carter's initiatives (MichaelNacht) and another on the enormous expansion,acceleration and diversification of theconventional arms trade (Ron Huisken). StevenRosen looks at some current weapons development,arguing that the implications for offenceand defence are far from self-evident. MichaelMccGwire's chapter on maritime weaponsproliferation in the Indian and Pacific Oceanspoints up the fact that for some time yet onlythe United States will be capable of invadingAustralia. Various other authors look at politicaldevelopments in the Indian Ocean littoral,South-east Asia and North-east Asia, whileTom Millar laments that even in the SouthPacific we can't get away from it all.These studies, most of them presented to aconference at the A.N.IJ. in July 1977, areclearly wide-ranging. They indicate the numerousand diverse factors that must be observed,if not influenced, by Australian policy-makers.Australia's security is an immense problemwhich, at least in the defence field, has to bereduced to a more or less coherent strategyinvolving very concrete decisions: how manytanks? what sort of fighter aircraft? what tasksfor the Navy? This book provides support forthe view that security in the contemporaryinternational situation is both necessary andimpossible.The book does not attempt to spell out theimplications for the security of Australia. Thisis outside its brief and is left to the reader.Robert O'Neill does contribute some briefgeneral observations on how the proliferationof weapons in the areas concerned might bemodified. But inevitably the prospects for armscontrol appear minimal. All the more reason,therefore, for studying insecurity.IITHE THIRD WORLD WAR A FUTUREHISTORY, by General Sir John Hackett andOthers, Hutchinson (Australia), 368 pp.Reviewed by Captain B. Cameron, MC, RAAC4 Cav Regt, Enoggera, QUIWILL Australia's Military Forces becomeinvolved in a NATO vs Warsaw Pactconflict? General Sir John Hackett, in his bookThe Third World War, projects into the scenariothe engagement of Soviet naval and airforces in the Middle East, by a combined US,British and Australian force. He assumes therefore,that in the circumstances portrayed, Australiawill declare war on the Soviet Union.The considerations involved in making sucha declaration, the mobilization of Australianforces, and their allotted tasks, are not thesubject of this book. It is left to the readerhimself, in light of the disturbingly credibleprogression of events, to judge what partAustralia might play and how her future mightbe affected, as the outcome swings in thebalance.The consequences for Australia would not,however, be completely unconsidered by theprincipal author. John Hackett was born inWestern Australia in 1910, and educated inVictoria, before completing studies at Oxford.The imminence of the World War II ledto the commencement of a military career thatincluded the command of a parachute brigadeat Arnhem, and finished with the posting ofCommander-in-Chief. British Army of theRhine. On retirement from military duty,General Sir John Hackett, GCB, CBE, DSOand Bar, MC, MA, BLitt, LLD, has in con-

62 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14, JAN FEB 79junction with other highly qualified contributors,compiled a book that hits like a 'neutronbomb' at public apathy towards defence.The gripping narrative is put together asthough it were written shortly after the conclusionof World War 111. This war commencedat 0400 hrs on 4 August 1985, when WarsawPact forces invaded Western Europe. It finishedthree weeks later, with consequences whichcompletely changed the course of the world.The international background, causes of conflict,daily progression of events, aftermath,and lessons learnt, are all convincingly described.In military terms, a very realisticprojectionof weapons technology and appreciationof the capabilities of opposing forces,is used to startling effect. It is not just theEuropean situation that is described either, thecauses and resulting effects are related to theworld as a whole. 'Only names are changedto protect the innocent" is a phrase which canbe said to be applicable. The identity, however,of a bulky Ugandan Field Marshal, who meetshis demise by being blown from the mu/zle ofa 76 mm gun, is not hard to imagine.Imagination is, in fact, stimulated throughoutthe book. Personal narratives of those involvedin the actual battle itself, add considerableexcitement. These include a Royal Tank Regimentsquadron commander, a German fighterpilot and an anti-tank guided weapon sectioncommander. Skilful and plentiful use of photographsand maps also adds to the impressionof realism, as does the inclusion of appendicescontaining supplementary details on suchaspects as British Defence Policy; the Rise ofSoviet Sea Power; and extracts from diaries ofBritish Civil Defence members.No comment is herewith made as to thevalidity or likelihood of the events described.Many will probably say that "it could neverhappen" — they have before. It can only besuggested that, before such a view is taken,the qualifications and experience of the authorsbe considered.One might well ask why so many eminentmen have become involved in the publicationof this book. Part of the answer is thought tobe found in the Authors' Note at the end ofthe book, "There is (also) the very high probabilitythat unless the West does a good dealwithin the next few years to improve its defences,a war with the Warsaw Pact could endin early disaster". Another quote, taken out ofcontext from earlier in the book, is consideredto be indicative of Sir John's intention. "If hisreputation meant anything at the end of thiswar he would do his damnest, he resolved, tosee that the politicians did not forget a secondtime".1 regard The Third World War as a bookwhich should be compulsory reading formembers of the Armed Services. WFIGHTING SPIRIT: Psychological factors inwar, by Major General F. M. Richardson,London, Leo Cooper, 1978. 1^2 pp.Reviewed by Major W. //. Bishop,Directorate of Personnel Plans.Army Office, CanberraMAJOR GENERAL RICHARDSON (exRAMC 1927-61) has long been interestedin morale and the psychiatric casualty.He lectured on morale at Staff College Camberleyfrom 1953 almost to retirement. Heresumed after retiring. The hiatus was causedby a superior RAMC officer (down from theWar Office) who disapproved some aspects ofthe lecture.Fighting Spirit gives the impression that it isan expanded version of the Camberley lecture.The style is conversational and quite readablealthough I found the frequent use of quotesfrom oilier sources distracting at times. Indeedin many instances the impression was that theauthor had written around the quote and notmerely used it to support the argument.The main theme of the book is that advancesin science, technology and society have changedthe nature of warfare which in turn has affectedthe problems faced by soldiers. No longer dosoldiers line up in their squares or retire forthe night. No longer can the commander displayhis presence at a battle with "a brief tittupalong the line to a ripple of cheers". Moreover,whereas soldiers in "those days" were tough,says Richardson, the modern soldier has to betoughened. The effect is that the pressures inbattle on the less psychologically strong soldierare greater. The solution according to Richardsonis proper selection and training and attentionto the various aspects of morale—fromindividual to through esprit de corps to nationalspirit. Indeed he suggests even broader cohesionis feasible—in his term "esprit de NATO".

BOOK REVIEWS 63There is nothing new in Richardson's viewof morale or the effects of low morale. Thereis some novelty in how morale should bedeveloped and maintained. He would like tosee soldiers kept fully informed and urgesfrank discussions aimed at helping soldiersunderstand the psychology of fear and thecauses of psychiatric casualties. Richardsonalso describes his method of teaching that itis a disgrace for a unit to have many casesof '"exhaustion": publication weekly of adivisional health ladder listing all units reportingcases of exhaustion. The idea is that unitsstrive to climb off the ladder.Richardson proposes that soldiers in "shellshock" should be treated as any other casualty—as far forward as possible. Too often, hesays, do we allow soldiers to use psychological'injuries' as a means of escaping nobly fromthe battle field. Too often, he says do officersand NCOs fail to detect the incipient signs ofimpending breakdown. We need to teach leaderswhat to look fot and what preventive orremedial action to take to arrest the problem.I would have preferred a more succinctstatement of Richardson's thesis. The significantpoints are often buried in the conversation.However, the book contains someinteresting and thought provoking ideas. It isessentially a book on man management whichasks officers and NCOs to consider whetherthey are "come on" or "go on" leaders. MCANADIANS ON THE NILE, 1882-1898, byRoy Maci.aren, Vancouver, University ofBritish Columbia Press, 1978, 206 pp.Reviewed by Captain C. I). Coult hard-Clark,Australian Intelligence Corp.',ON 7 Eebruary 1885 news reached theAustralian colonies that Khartoum, onthe remote upper reaches of the Nile in theSudan, had fallen to Dervish besiegers and thatthe garrison had been massacred along withits charismatic commander. General Gordon.Five days later a retired commissary generalSir Edward Strickland—made his now-famoussuggestion in the Sydney Morning Herald thatAustralia should send a contingent to aidimperial forces in reconquering the rebelliousSudan, with the result that New South Walesembarked on Australia's first experiment inmilitary adventurism. Strickland had acted, atleast partly, in the belief that Canada hadoffered 600 men to assume duties in Englandto free more regular troops to aid in the rescueof Gordon. This desire to prove that Australia,in Strickland's words, 'yields not to Canadaor to any portion of the British Empire inloyalty and affection towards our mothercountry'was to figure again in Australia'sparticipation in both the South African Warof 1899-1902 and again in 1^14. but in 1885the reports of a Canadian contingent wereerroneous.MacLaren shows in this book that Canadawas not eager to become embroiled militarilyin the Sudan on Britain's behalf, despite theefforts of Canadian militia men to get to thescene of the fighting. As Sir John Macdonald,Canada's Prime Minister, frankly told his HighCommissioner in London: "The Suez Canal isnothing to us, and we do not ask England toquarrel with France or Germany for our sake.The offer of . . . [the Australasian] coloniesis a good move on their part. . . . Why shouldwe waste men and money in this wretchedbusiness?" Canada's participation in the Sudanwas consequently a civilian effort, althoughmilitia officers directed it. In 1884 GeneralGarnet Wolseley recruited 400 Canadianvoyageura to assist in transporting imperialtroops up the Nile in a daring but dilatoryattempt to relieve Khartoum, recalling theirunique skills and special aptitudes from hisearlier military life in Canada. A generationlater, another Canadian, Sir Percy Girouard,built the desert railway which enabled Kitchenerto capture Khartoum in 1898.Many Canadians won distinction in theSudan excursions, and Macl.aren's conclusionthat their participation contributed to theimpetus to full nationhood as Canadians becameaware of their separate identity throughtheir military achievements can, to a very muchlesser extent, be viewed as one of the fewbenefits for Australians derived from NewSouth Wales' action in 1885. Equally hisattempt to answer the question of why Canadiansshould want to serve in such exoticoutposts of Empire offers interesting insightsinto the motives which inspired Australiansalso. MaeLaren's book is a perceptive, excitingand frequently humorous account of thepersonalities and events of the time.

64 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 14. JAN/FEB 79SOLITARY IN THE RANKS—LAWRENCEOF ARABIA AS AIRMAN AND PRIVATESOLDIER, by H. Montgomery Hyde, Hutchinson(Australia), 288 pp.Reviewed by Captain B. Cameron, MC, RAAC4 Cav Regt, Enoggera, QUISOME ten years ago I was given the task,as an assignment in Military History, tocompare the tactical concepts of Mao Tse-tungwith Lawrence of Arabia. This involved thestudy of The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, andkindled my interest in T. E. Lawrence. I wasthus enticed to subsequently read amongstothers The Mint and With Tawrence in Arabia(by Lowell Thomas). During a stay in theUnited Kingdom, I also visited Lawrence'scottage at Clouds Hill.As one who therefore had certain ideas about'The Man' and 'The Legend', I wondered whatSolitary in the Ranks had to offer. Was it to bea rehash of past writings and 'in depth' appraisalsfrom people who, like Lowell Thomas,had only met Lawrence twice? The short answeris "no". In fact, H. Montgomery Hyde's treatmentof the life of T. E. Lawrence during hisservice in the RAF and Royal Tank Corps(1922-35), turned out to be completely thereverse. The portrayal of Aircraftman Ross,Private Shaw and Aircraftman Shaw (thenames Lawrence used to conceal his identity),is drawn, in the main, from previously unpublishedpersonal correspondence. The materialmade available to the author provides a penetratingand comprehensive account of thisremarkable man. Quotations are taken, forexample, from letters between Lawrence andAir Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of theAir Staff, whom Lawrence met at the CairoConference in 1921, and with whom he was todevelop a firm friendship. This relationship isin itself fascinating and probably unique, withregard to its being between the lowest andhighest ranks of an Armed Service. In hisForeword, Viscount Trenchard states that theauthor "has, as I know my father would havewished, brought out the strength of the pluspoints of this eccentric and courageous genius".Although H. Montgomery Hyde does deviatefrom the strict scope of the book to describeLawrence's family and upbringing, he does notelaborate on his desert exploits. He thus rightlyleaves The Seven Pillars of Wisdom to be thetestament to this aspect of Lawrence's life.Another temptation which the author hasfortunately avoided, is that of colouring thenarrative with his personal interpretation ofLawrence's actions, and resulting character dissection.In consequence one is enabled to lookat Lawrence's thirteen years 'in the ranks',as if seeing it through his own eyes, and inso doing, thus seeing Lawrence himself. Theobservation gained is a more encompassing onethan that provided by The Mint (written byLawrence himself whilst in the RAF), thoughof course neither book could be considered areplacement for the other.The story (for it reads as such) is taken upon Lawrence's return from the Desert. Onewonders what history would have made ofColonel Sir Thomas Lawrence, KCB, DSO, hadhe not declined all the honours (he was alsorecommended for the VC, and offered theOrder of Merit). Following enlistment, withTrenchard's help, in the RAF, the sequence ofLawrence's service experiences and personal relationshipsis masterfully tracked. The changeshe was instrumental in making within the RAF,the donation of all the profits (£20,000) of theabridged version of The Seven Pillars ofWisdom to an RAF Benevolent Fund, whichstill exists in his name, and his involvementwith people such as George Bernard Shaw,Thomas Hardy, and Winston Churchill, aswell as his personal friends in the ranks, arejust some aspects that make tremendouslyinteresting reading.Solitary in the Ranks is a book that oneregrets, during the course of reading, is comingto a close, especially if one is aware of thetragic end, to which it is leading, of a manwho surely had the measure of greatness. PSANDGATE RSL, QUEENSLANDSandgate RSL are looking for militaria to fill their showcases, constructed to preserve theservice atmosphere of the club. Weapons, badges, colour patches, insignias. books, photographs,paintings and other souvenirs no longer wanted should be sent to Brigadier ThomasParslow. ED. LLB, QC. MIBA, (RL) : C/- the RSL. Keogh Street. Sandgate. Qld 4017.

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