International JournalismReporting Stories in Russia That No One Will PublishThose who own and control the media want to secure political influence, not touncover political corruption.By Yevgenia AlbatsAfter Watergate and the workof The Washington Post’s BobWoodward and Carl Bernsteinthat led to President Nixon’s resignation,young reporters dreamt of emulatingthis kind of investigative journalismfeatured in the movie “All thePresident’s Men.”However, quite often in many othercountries—including Russia, where Iwork as an independent, investigativejournalist—the situation can turn outvery differently. The upcoming movie“The Insider,” rather than “All thePresident’s Men,” often turns out to betrue. “The Insider” tells the well-knownstory of CBS’s “60 Minutes” famouscorrespondent Mike Wallace, whosebosses refused to broadcast a piece onBig Tobacco. Those who owned themedia outlet were fearful of losing advertisingrevenues and of getting embroiledin a costly lawsuit with tobaccocompanies. In short, an investigativescoop was held because of the owner’sfear about consequences if the storywas broadcast.In my recent experience, unfortunately,this is a very familiar script. Thereasons for this reside in Russia’s historyand its current political situation.Despite the new democratic elections,Russia has failed to create strong democraticinstitutions, but succeeded inbecoming one of the 10 most corruptcountries in the world, according tothe Transparency International CorruptionPerception Index. This oughtto provide plenty of fertile ground forinvestigative reporting. However, at thesame time, the notion that “free speech”and “uncensored media” create thefoundation for the practice of democracyis still not well understood. Sowhat happens is that media outletsbecome controlled by the elite andpowerful who don’t want their powerand prosperity to be threatened.Let me share a few examples of whatI’ve experienced in my reporting:November of 1996. It was just fourmonths after Boris Yeltsin’s overwhelmingvictory over his communist competitor,long-time communist partyapparatchick Gennady Zyuganov.Izvestia, then the biggest and the mostrespectable national paper which Iworked for, asked me to write a pieceon my long-time “heroes”—the KGB,the Russian secret police who werenotorious for their violations of humanrights. The essence of the Russian secretservice had changed little after theSoviet Union ceased to exist. I wrotethe piece—but 15 minutes before thepaper went into printing, the articlewas called back from the page. Twohours later, my story somehow foundits way to my “heroes” on Lubyanka(the place in Moscow where KGB headquartersare located). What had happenedbecame clear a couple of monthslater. Izvestia had been put up for sale.(In the Soviet Union the paper hadbeen owned, as all media were, by thestate; since autumn of 1991 it had beenowned by its own journalists.) One ofthe major investors in Izvestia, for somereason, did not want to attack the secretpolice. I went public about thecase, because when one writes storiessuch as this on the KGB publicity is theonly protection a journalist has from acontract killer. Izvestia fired me. I fileda lawsuit and won, but the newspaper’spages were closed to me.May of 1997. I am the anchor andauthor of the TV magazine on pressand politics—something like NBC’s“Meet the Press”—produced by NTV(Non-government television), Russia’sfirst—and still the very best—independentnetwork owned by the MOSTmedia.A person whom I interviewedon the air spoke harshly of the chieflieutenant of one of Russia’s most powerfulmedia moguls, Boris Berezovsky,who was then an ally of the owner ofNTV. Six days later my TV magazineshow was cancelled by the network’sbosses, and I was out of a job.September of 1997. I did an investigativeseries on the Moscow MayorYuri Luzhkov, who is currently a presidentialcandidate in the upcoming 2000presidential election in Russia. Theseries, written soon after Americanbusinessman Paul Tatum was killed inMoscow, was far from complementaryof the Mayor. In my reporting, I duginto Luzhkov’s connections with someRussian businessmen who were subjectsof Interpol’s interest. (My investigationof this aspect of the case wasmade with the help of colleagues fromtwo other countries.) I took my story tofour major Russian newspapers andweeklies before I was able to get itpublished in a then-new and independentweekly, Novaya Gazeta. The reactionof the editors at the four otherpublications was almost hysterical: “Areyou crazy? The day after we publishsome negative story exposing Moscow’sMayor or his closest entourage, ourbills on electricity, water, office rentwill double or even triple. We are notsuicidal by any means!” They were beingbrutally honest. Novaya Gazeta didget into trouble as a result of publishingmy series: The renovation of itsnew office space was stopped, apparentlyunder the order of the Moscowcity government. I also received a letterin my mailbox—“You deserve a bullet”—along with some nasty phonecalls.March of 1998. I was trying to publisha story that was the result of athree-month investigation I’d done thatexposed Russian government and semi-<strong>Nieman</strong> Reports / Fall 1999 25
International Journalismgovernment bodies’ scandalous anddirty deals in trading highly sensitivetechnologies to Iran. I called it “OurMen in Teheran.” Three major newspapersrejected this story. Their argumentscan be characterized in this way:“This story is against Russian nationalinterests.” “Why?” I would ask. And theeditors would say, “Prime Minister VictorChernomyrdin, during his 1998visit to the United States, said publiclythat Russia was not and is not involvedin any illegal technology trading withIran and Iraq.” Yet my investigationpresented hard evidence that the PrimeMinister either didn’t have proper informationor just lied, I argued. “Nevermind, the story is damaging to theRussian interests.” “Whose interests doyou have in mind?” I would then ask, inwhat was becoming an obvious failureto get any newspaper to publish mystory. “Are they the interests of bureaucratswho are putting big bucks intotheir own pockets because of thesedeals? Or the interests of the Russianpeople who are about to lose $50 billionas a result of sanctions that mightbe imposed by international financialinstitutions because of those illegaltrades?” There was no response.September 1998. January 1999. April1999. I produced stories about differentinvestigations. I took them to thesame publications. I had many of thesame conversations, resulting in thesame outcomes.I tell these stories not to be pitied,but to offer specific examples of whatinvestigative journalists are up againstin Russia these days. But the sad fact isthat even exposure of this situationlikely does no good. My colleaguesrecognize that journalism is a highlycorporate industry that dislikes—if notto say, rejects—those who expose suchdetails of our profession. After my lawsuitagainst Izvestia was publicized,executives at other news outlets toldme the following: “You are dangerousto deal with. You write the story andyou want to publish it.” “Oh, really?” Iwould say. “What about other reporters?Don’t they want to publish theirstories?” Their answer: “Others knowthe rules of the game and obey them.”The price for such candidness iswell known: You become the onlyreader of your stories. As a popularsaying among Russian journalists goes,“He (she) is the author of unread andunseen (by anyone but the author)famous stories.”I have, however, made my choice: Ichoose to seek my freedom as an independentjournalist.To me, the continuing erosion ofindependent media outlets means Iam free to do my investigations and towrite stories but I am likely to becometheir one lonely reader.As much as it sounds paradoxical,the Russian media lost the freedomthey had long been seeking as a resultof the 1996 presidential elections. Thiswas the election when Boris Yeltsin,Russia’s first democratically electedPresident, beat his Communist opponentand communism, as the ideologyof the totalitarian state, was pronouncedforever dead in Russia.Officially censorship was abandonedin the Soviet Union as early as 1989,during Glasnost. However, in reality,the press remained under strict controlof the weakening totalitarian stateuntil late autumn of 1991, when theSoviet Union collapsed. The chaos ofthose first years of the reforms madejournalists poor but gave them unprecedentedfreedom. Both print and electronicmedia, while struggling for survival,were admired by the public, whichitself was seeking freedom from theconstraints of a totalitarian state. Reportersdid a decent job in exposingdirty deals of the collapsed Soviet stateand of the new/old Russian bureaucracythat inherited both the wealthand the troubles of the no longer existent“evil empire,” as President RonaldReagan once called the Soviet Union.By 1995, however, the first of Russia’snew rich had started to invest in media.It turns out that these new ownerswere looking to make both financialand political profits out of their investmentsin the Russian media. In 1996,the presidential campaign clearlyshowed that those who had dared toinvest in media were gaining powerand political influence. Thus, by late1996 and into 1997, Russia’s so-called“oligarchs”—a half dozen or so superwealthytycoons who, before last year’sfinancial collapse, dominated thecountry’s economy—went hunting fornewspapers, magazines, TV and radiostations to buy.By late 1998, independent nationalmedia accounted for 1.42 percent outof all national print and electronicmedia. Now, one year later (and a yearprior to the next presidential electionand six months before the parliamentaryelections), independent media(those media institutions owned bythe public, predominantly journalistswho work there) account for a very tiny0.7 percent.Since 1996, the Russian oligarchswho acquired the major national mediaand concentrated ownership in justin a few hands have learned how to usetheir newspapers, magazines, TV andradio stations to undercut competitorsand further their influence in the Kremlincircle, which is led by the sick andunpredictable Boris Yeltsin. Politicalinfluence in Russia leads to money: bigmoney, very big money. It allows thesepowerful people to acquire profitablecompanies, to receive low-interest creditsfrom government-owned banks, toget insider deals and commercialbreaks, i.e. privileges that others withoutaccess to the media do not get. Ingeneral, political influence that isgained because of media ownershipbrings millions, if not billions of dollars,that are often channeled into offshoreaccounts outside of Russia. Andmaintaining control of the media hasbecome a powerful instrument in obtainingsuch political influence.Meanwhile, the price journalists andtheir profession must pay is a clearone: Journalism, as it is known andrespected in democratic countries, isnow on death row in Russia.■Yevgenia Albats is an independentjournalist in Russia. She is the authorof four books, including “TheState Within a State: The KGB and ItsHold on Russia,” Farrar, Straus &Giroux, 1995. She is a 1993 <strong>Nieman</strong>Fellow.26 <strong>Nieman</strong> Reports / Fall 1999