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International Journalismemies; that is, you have to knowhow the other side is presented.That’s why it pays to see it and stayabreast of things.”These viewers are angry, but theydon’t switch channels and ratings arenot affected. This disconnection addsto the misperceptions that Russianelites hold about ordinary citizens.These elites apparently do not understandthat the public brings to its consumptionof news and public affairsprograms the willingness and ingrainedhabit to engage actively with the news.They may not change the channel andtherefore the ratings. Nonetheless,behind this passive strategy is a veryactive challenge to the news.Television cannot remake Russia; itcannot eliminate the profound cleavages,solve the unanswered constitutionalquestions, or alleviate the economichardships. However, it can anddoes alter in substantial ways the informationenvironment of ordinary peopleand elites alike by affording them agenuine, if limited, choice in news coverage.Even in its much-weakened condition,the narrow and imperfect televisionmarket has been the main propof news diversity. Keeping such choicesalive is the most important public serviceRussian television can perform. ■Ellen Mickiewicz is the author of“Changing Channels: Television andthe Struggle for Power in Russia,”revised and expanded edition, DukeUniversity Press, 1999. She directsthe DeWitt Wallace Center for Communicationsand Journalism atDuke University.Russian Regional MediaThe nation’s financial crisis threatens journalists’ independence.By Virginie CoulloudonSeeking survival in a fracturedeconomy, many regional newspapersin Russia tried to establish relationshipswith local businesses and regionalbanks. They did this in an attempt toavoid succumbing to the dictates oflocal authorities and powerful industrialgroups.This might have seemed a prudentstrategy before the nation’s financialcrisis in August of 1998. But what happenednext worsened their plight.Banks now faced enormous difficulties,including collapse. And in the midstof this economic chaos, political leaders—manyof them provincial governors—whofavored the return to anoligarchy were able to strengthen theirexecutive power both in terms of governanceas well as in the oversight ofbusinesses in their region, includingnewspapers.Today, with poor distribution of thenational press in Russian provinces,regional newspaper journalists willassume a major role in the coverage oflegislative and presidential electionsscheduled for December of this yearand June of 2000, respectively. Onething is certain: The local political leadershipwill try to assert greater controlover the press in an attempt to securetheir governing positions. For journalistswho work at these regional papers,how they perform under this pressureand during these elections will providea test of whether local journalism inRussia will be able to perform as anindependent press. Should they followtoo closely the propaganda of the localauthorities, they will be perceived as“full members” of the political eliterather than be seen as representativesof a civil society. And by doing so, theywill run the risk of losing the confidenceof their readers.Political Pressures onJournalistsAlready there are numerous examplesof political pressure being exertedon local journalists. Provocations—andeven murders—are nolonger uncommon in the provinceswhere local leaders act in authoritarianways. The Moscow-based Foundationfor the Defense of Glasnost regularlypublishes reports about attacks onRussian local journalists and tracks insystematic ways the human rights issuesthat arise.In the northern Caucasus autonomousrepublic of Kalmykia, the Editorin-Chiefof Sovetskaya KalmykiaSegodnya (Soviet Kalmykia Today), anewspaper opposed to local PresidentKirsan Ilyumzhinov, was killed in June1998. The murder of this journalist,Larisa Yudina, who was consideredclose to the Yabloko democratic partythat is represented in the Russian parliament,was immediately perceived asbeing politically motivated. A year later,it has become clear that the only motivefor the murder was Yudina’s investigativereporting concerning illegaluses of the government’s budget inKalmykia. For a brief time, the Presidentwas suspected of ordering the30 Nieman Reports / Fall 1999