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Words & Reflectionssome of the most exhilarating in thehistory of the Times and…in the historyof American journalism.” Punchwrote managing editor Abe Rosenthalafter the Pentagon Papers episode wasover, with the Times more secure thanever in its greatness.The same could be said of Punch.The publication of the Pentagon Paperswas his grand, defining moment,a moment in which he took his bearingsfrom his heritage and his ownvalues and instincts, and steered thepaper safely and surely toward the“right” decision.…Punch was deeply anxious about theconsequences of his decision, but hehad no real qualms that his choice wascorrect. He had not consulted hismother or his sisters, but simply informedthem of his decision shortlybefore publication. Likewise, the Times’directors had no idea ahead of timethat the paper was about to put itself atrisk. The board doesn’t discuss editorialmatters,” Punch explained….It took Sheehan a month to sortthrough the papers and prepare hispresentation. In a meetings with theTimes’s top editors, he briefed themon the origin and scope of the Pentagonstudy. All agreed that this secrethistory of the Vietnam War should bepublished.…in a conference room off theTimes’ third-floor newsroom, [Abe]Rosenthal, Scotty [Reston], and othertop editors told Punch about the Pentagonreport for the first time. “Themore I listened, the more certain Ibecame that the entire operationsmelled of twenty years to life,” Punchwould recall more than two decadeslater. At the time, he said little. “I’m notsure we should publish this stuff,” hemuttered to Sydney Gruson as theywent back upstairs. “The question isnot whether we should publish it,”Gruson replied. “The question is howwe’ll publish it. That’s all.”A few days later Punch convened aconference of editors, senior executives,and lawyers in the Times’ boardroomto discuss what should be done.With Adoph looking down from hisportrait above the fireplace, the meetingquickly turned tense. Louis Loebargued passionately against disclosureof secret information. By publishingclassified material, the paper not onlywould be in violation of the EspionageAct, he warned, it would violate its owntradition of responsible journalism.Executive vice president HardingBancroft, a former legal adviser in theState Department, agreed: to publishwould be to invite economic and politicalruin.The editors lined up unanimouslyon the opposing side. The Times hadpublished classified documents manytimes in the past, they pointed out.After all, hadn’t Scotty Reston won aPulitzer Prize for his stories on theDumbarton Oaks Conference, whichwere based on privileged information?Of the lawyers present, only [James]Goodale, the Times’ general counsel,allied himself with the editors. If thestories were presented carefully, hesaid, higher courts would never sustainan injunction or criminal convictionagainst the Times.After listening to the debate, Punchtold Rosenthal to continue preparingthe material but that he had not yetmade up his own mind about whetherthe Times should publish it. ThoughPunch almost never interfered in thenews judgments of his editors, in thiscase, he said to Rosenthal, he and healone would make the final decision….Meanwhile, the battle for the soul ofPunch was in full cry. About three weeksafter the acrimonious meeting in theboardroom, a delegation from LouisLoeb’s law firm, Lord, Day & Lord,convened with Punch and three of thepaper’s senior executives; this time noeditors were invited. AccompanyingLoeb was senior partner HerbertBrownell, an éminence grise of theRepublican Party. As Eisenhower’s attorneygeneral, Brownell had draftedthe presidential executive order establishingthe system for classifying documents.In the publisher’s back sittingroom he solemnly predicted that if theTimes printed the Pentagon history,Punch and others would probably goto jail and the Times would be damagedbeyond imagining. “He scaredthe bejesus out of me,” recalled Punch.Goodale, who was present, urged Loeband Brownell to at least look at thedocuments before they made such arigid judgment, but they refused, claimingthat even to read them constituteda crime. Loeb then invoked a namecertain to resonate with Punch. He wasabsolutely certain, he said, that ArthurHays Sulzberger would never publishsuch material.For weeks Punch had wrestled withevery aspect of the dilemma, knowingfull well that the decision before himwas actually a series of decisions. Firsthe had to choose whether to publishanything at all; then, how much material;and finally, in what form. Eachelement provoked a roiling debate. Hisgut told him that Goodale was right:even if the government went after theTimes, the courts would ultimatelyleave the newspaper alone. “I did notbelieve that the risks were what HerbBrownell had told me,” he said. “Ididn’t think they were going to comeand lock me up, but I thought theycould fine us one hell of a lot, and wedidn’t have all that much money.”One of Loeb and Brownell’s strongestarguments was that by disclosingtop-secret documents, the Times riskedlosing its credibility with readers.Punch, however, was equally concernedabout losing credibility with hiseditors, who had told him that notpublishing the account would foreverbring dishonor on the Times. “After all,[the report] should be in the publicdomain because it was history, and itwas not secret; it had been illegallystamped SECRET,” said Punch….Early on, Punch had told Rosenthalthat he wanted to read what was intendedfor publication before makinghis final decision. In late May Rosenthal,with barely contained glee, wheeled agrocery cart containing the relevantdocuments into Punch’s office. Untilthen, remarked Punch, “I did not knowit was possible to read and sleep at thesame time.” He found the material soturgid that he began to wonder whetherit was worth the expense of releasing it.The tentative publication date ofJune 10 was fast approaching, andPunch still had not given a clear signalNieman Reports / Fall 1999 65