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z/OS Security and PKI services

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z/<strong>OS</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong><strong>PKI</strong> <strong>services</strong>Thomas HanickeSystems Architect+49-172-7355143© 2006 IBM Corporation207.04.2006 IBM Systems


Application Transparent TLS (AT-TLS) Overview•Solution:ƒTCP/IP stack performs TLSBNo application changesrequiredBTake advantage of z/<strong>OS</strong>unique encryptionƒTLS Configuration throughsystem wide policiesƒGUI supplied to easeconfigurationƒOptional API for applicationsthat wish to be “aware” orcontrol TLS informationOptional APIs forTLS-awareapplications tocontrol start/stop ofTLS sessionEncryptedApplicationsSocketsSystem SSL callsTCPApplicationTransparentTLS policy flatfileUDPIP Networking LayerNetwork InterfacesPolicyAgent507.04.2006 IBM SystemsIP<strong>Security</strong> Overview – Dynamic Key Distribution• SAs can be negotiated dynamically using Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocolƒz/<strong>OS</strong> Cryptographic Services System Secure Sockets Layer (System SSL)ƒPhase 1 SAs are negotiated to protect IKE traffic (IKE tunnel)ƒPhase 2 SAs are negotiated to protect IP traffic (IPSEC tunnel)• IPSEC SAs provide authentication, integrity, <strong>and</strong> data privacy – 2 security protocols:ƒBased on <strong>Security</strong> Associations (SAs) – defines type of service between 2 endpointsƒAuthentication Header (AH) – authentication/integrityƒEncapsulating <strong>Security</strong> Payload (ESP) – data privacy with optional authentication• Transparent to upper layersServer<strong>and</strong>TrustedCA'sCertificateIKERACF1. Negotiate phase I <strong>Security</strong> Association (Get amaster key)2. Negotiate <strong>Security</strong> Associations (phase II)3. Generate session keys, refresh keys <strong>and</strong> SAsServer<strong>and</strong>TrustedCA'sCertificateIKERACFInstall SAs <strong>and</strong>filters into IP stackSockets APITCP/UDPIP/ICMPData LinkIPSec <strong>Security</strong> Association(s)Sockets APITCP/UDPIP/ICMPData Link607.04.2006 IBM Systems


Tutorial907.04.2006 IBM SystemsWhat else ...• RACF <strong>Security</strong> Server now supports mixed case passwords► SETROPTS PASSWORD(MIXED)• FTP Server support for RACF Delegated Resource Profiles► If Cryptographic hardware in use for TLS <strong>and</strong> CSFSERV <strong>and</strong> CSFKEYS resource profilesare protecting access to cryptographic keys <strong>and</strong> hardware► FTP daemon & all FTP Login userids required access to CSFSERV <strong>and</strong> CSFKEYS► RACF allows identifying classes as delegated resource profiles – e.g.● RALTER CSFSERV CSFENV APPLDATA(‘RACF-DELEGATED’)• JES SAPI Interface change► FTP can be used to submit JES jobs <strong>and</strong> retrieve output► FTP.DATA JESINTERFACELEVEL controls scope of these tasks● If JESINTERFACELEVEL 2, access controlled by JESSPOOL class● With V1R7, JESSPOOL SAF CLASS required access is READ• AES encryption exploitation► FTP, Sendmail, TN3270E1007.04.2006 IBM Systems


Agenda• z/<strong>OS</strong> 1.7 – Integrated IP security► AT-TLS► IPSec• z/<strong>OS</strong> <strong>PKI</strong> Services• Encryption Facility for z/<strong>OS</strong>• IBM Data Encryption for IMS <strong>and</strong> DB2 Databases V1.11107.04.2006 IBM SystemsAuthentication – this is why You‘ll need certificates• Servers (devices) on zSeries or elsewhere► Server authentication, data encryption● SSL/TLS servers● VPNs (IPSec)● Internet Routers• Clients (workstations)► SSL client authentication● e.g., accessing protected web sites► Message encryption <strong>and</strong>/or signing (S/MIME E-mail)► File encryption1207.04.2006 IBM Systems


Certificate Life Cycle – this is why You‘ll need <strong>PKI</strong>ƒUser Renews CertificateƒUser Requests CertificaterejectsƒAdministratorApproves therequestƒCertificate ExpiresOrƒAdministrator orUser RevokesCertificateƒOwner uses thecertificateƒCA Generates <strong>and</strong>distributescertificate1307.04.2006 IBM SystemsBuy certificates ?Leave the room for1407.04.2006 IBM Systems


z/<strong>OS</strong> <strong>PKI</strong> Services Architecture<strong>PKI</strong> Administrator15RACFDBEnd UserOCSPRequesterSAF R_<strong>PKI</strong>ServRACFServicesHTTP server for z/<strong>OS</strong>HTTPDOCSP CGI *RACF Glue RtnSMFAuditRecordsPCCGI ScriptsSMFUnloadStaticWebPages<strong>PKI</strong> ExitSystem SSLICSFz/<strong>OS</strong> <strong>PKI</strong>Services DaemonCombined RA/CAprocessOCSF<strong>PKI</strong>TPLDAPDLInstall/Config:SMP/E Installz/<strong>OS</strong>LDAPDirectoryPost ApplyScript/JobRACF Set upEXECVSAMRequestQueueVSAMIssuedCert List* OCSP responder with z/<strong>OS</strong> R.707.04.2006 IBM SystemsIdentrus <strong>PKI</strong>To Identrus RootIssuing ParticipantRelying Participantz/<strong>OS</strong> CA - <strong>PKI</strong> ServicesRegistrationCertificationRegistrationAuthority (CA)(RA) Authority(RA)CertificationAuthority(CA)ValidationAuthority(VA)OCSPResponderIdentrus FIEnvironmentLocal RAClient(LRA)FinanceBackendSystemsIdent Pay...WarrTransaction Coordinator (TC)Identrus FIEnvironmentFinance BackendSystemsIdent Pay...WarrTransaction Coordinator (TC)Smart Card(SC)LDAP- z/<strong>OS</strong> <strong>PKI</strong> ServicesSigning Interface Library(SIL)SC ReaderClient AppsWeb browserIdent Pay...WarrDigital Signature MessagingSystem (DSMS)Web App.Srv.HSMe-business Apps- Other VendorSubscriberRelying Customer<strong>PKI</strong> Services at z/<strong>OS</strong> V1R5 <strong>and</strong> higher received Identrus official certification in July 200516http://www.identrus.com/company/press_releases/release_050706.html07.04.2006 IBM Systems


z/<strong>OS</strong> R.7 – enhanced functions• Enhanced Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Distribution Points► location of the CRL is self-contained in the extension• Create Authority Revocation List (ARL) Distribution Point► create ARL Distribution Point <strong>and</strong> put the extension in the CA certificate• Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder► <strong>PKI</strong> Services will provide the OCSP responder function itself● support to create the AuthorityInfoAccess certificate extensionThis is the extension that identifies the OCSP responder that should be called to checkrevocation. The responder would read the CRLs produced by <strong>PKI</strong> Services in order todetermine the revocation status.● OCSP responder is enabled when OCSPType is set to basic in the CertPolicy sectionof the <strong>PKI</strong> Services configuration file► None of the z/<strong>OS</strong> servers support OCSP yet.● System SSL is working on supporting OCSP in a future release.1807.04.2006 IBM Systemsz/<strong>OS</strong> R.8 - Multiple CA support1907.04.2006 IBM Systems


Banco do Brasil – <strong>PKI</strong> high available infrastructureContingencyLDAPMasterConnectionLDAP Replication ImplementationLDAPReplicaESCON/ FICONISC-3 LinksESCON/ FICONLPAR<strong>PKI</strong> 1z<strong>OS</strong> V1R7DB2 forLDAPServerLPAR<strong>PKI</strong> 2z<strong>OS</strong> V1R7CouplingFacility( ICF )VSAM RecordLevel SharingCouplingFacility( ICF )VSAM RecordLevel SharingLPAR<strong>PKI</strong> 3z<strong>OS</strong> V1R7LPAR<strong>PKI</strong> 4z<strong>OS</strong> V1R7DB2 forLDAPServerHTTP ServerHTTP ServerHTTP ServerHTTP ServerISC-3 LinksVSAMESCONICSF VSAM/ FICONCKDSICSFVSAMPKDSICL VSAMRemote CopyObjectVSAMPrimary<strong>PKI</strong> 1 StoreICL VSAMContingencyConnectionRemote Copy ImplementationVSAMICSFCKDSVSAMICSFVSAMPKDSICL VSAMObject<strong>PKI</strong> 4 StoreRemote CopySecondaryVSAMICL VSAM<strong>PKI</strong> 2ObjectStoreRACF<strong>PKI</strong> 3ObjectStoreRACF2007.04.2006 IBM SystemsAgenda• z/<strong>OS</strong> 1.7 – Integrated IP security► AT-TLS► IPSec• z/<strong>OS</strong> <strong>PKI</strong> Services• Encryption Facility for z/<strong>OS</strong>• IBM Data Encryption for IMS <strong>and</strong> DB2 Databases V1.12107.04.2006 IBM Systems


Technical detail of Encryption Services Feature• Data encrypting algorithm options:► TDES (3 key) CBC► AES128 CBCCBC = cipher block chaining• Only Physical Sequential (PS) files are supported,► e.g. no VSAM, no PDSs► note: non-PS files may be copied by user via IDCAMS REPRO (or similar) to create a PS file• Compression, via zSeries HW instruction,► No compression for Java Client in R1• No NLS• Key Management► Password► RSA Public Key (requires secure HW; CCF or PCI)● RACDCERT enhancement required (SPE back to R4)● Transfers public keys in Digital Certificates to ICSF PKDScontinued2407.04.2006 IBM SystemsEncryption Facility Logical FlowClear dataKey ManagementVia interaction withICSF, <strong>PKI</strong>, RACF, orJava Key Stores(depending on environment)controlstatementsEncryptBoth z/<strong>OS</strong>, <strong>and</strong>Java ClientEncryptedTransferFile / ArchiveDecryptBoth z/<strong>OS</strong>, <strong>and</strong>Java ClientcontrolstatementsKey ManagementVia interaction withICSF, <strong>PKI</strong>, RACF, orJava Key Stores(depending on environment)Clear data2507.04.2006 IBM Systems


Install Activities for Encryption Facility for z/<strong>OS</strong>z/<strong>OS</strong> 1.4 or higherIBM eServer zSeriesor System z9EncryptionFacilityfor z/<strong>OS</strong>2Install Web deliverable,“z990 <strong>and</strong> z890Enhancements toCryptographic Support”to z/<strong>OS</strong> system3Order <strong>and</strong> installprogram product,5655-P975Web downloadvia click throughlicenseEncryptionClientJava codez890z9-109z9904Service from PSPBucketsPartners,Customers,<strong>and</strong> Remote Sites261a1bMES of Crypto Hardware features (if necessary): CCF, PCIXCC, CPACF, or CryptoExpress2If not already configured, use HMC to set up LPAR, <strong>and</strong> use z/<strong>OS</strong> to update configuration files <strong>and</strong> ICSF securitydefinitions07.04.2006 IBM SystemsThe strategy of Mainframe EncryptionHelping to protect dataover the InternetHelping to protect dataleaving your enterprise *Tape **Disk **DataEncryption keys** Statement of Direction- offload to IBM system storage- centralized key management27CentralizedKey ManagementHelping to protectarchived data ** IBM Encryption Facility for z/<strong>OS</strong>07.04.2006 IBM Systems


Agenda• z/<strong>OS</strong> 1.7 – Integrated IP security► AT-TLS► IPSec• z/<strong>OS</strong> <strong>PKI</strong> Services• Encryption Facility for z/<strong>OS</strong>• IBM Data Encryption for IMS <strong>and</strong> DB2 Databases V1.12807.04.2006 IBM SystemsThe issue• Secure data requirements driven by►Sarbanes-Oxley & Co.►Competition ?►External <strong>and</strong> internal threats►. . .• any solution has challenges in this environment►Performance overhead►Key management►Application changes• Solution offered :►IBM Data Encryption for IMS <strong>and</strong> DB2 Databases● 5655-P03 Version 1.1 GA December 9 , 2005►Implemented using an IMS or DB2 exit● DECENC01 for IMS, Segment Edit/Compression exit specified in DBDCOMPRTN parameter DECENA01 for clear key support (APAR PQ94822)● DECENC00 for DB2, EDITPROC exit specified in EDITPROC clause ofthe SQL CREATE TABLE statement DECENA00 for clear key support (APAR PQ94822)User's Guide (SC18-7336-01)http://www-1.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?rs=434&context=SSZJXP&uid=swg27005552&loc=en_US&cs=utf-8&lang=en2907.04.2006 IBM Systems


EnvironmentDB2 V8 EngineSQL orUtility( Batch Job )DataEncryption( EDITPROC )z/<strong>OS</strong> 1.4+ with Features (*)Hardware CryptoFeature:- CEXC2 (z9-109)- PCXICC ( z990 )- CCF ( z900 )ICSF ServiceDB2TableDB2TableNo ENCRYPTIONCaseENCRYPTIONCase• IBM zSeries Processors ( z9-109, z990, z890, z900 )► Hardware Cryptographic Features which supports “Secure Key” (clear key with PQ94822 + PQ93943)● z9-109 : CEX2CC● z990 : PCIXCC● Z900 : CCF• IBM z/<strong>OS</strong> V1R4+ with following Features (*) installed;► z990 <strong>and</strong> z890 Enhancements to Cryptographic Support► z/<strong>OS</strong> V1R4 z990 Exploitation Support• IBM Middleware Products;► DB2 for z/<strong>OS</strong> Version 6 or higher► IMS, Version 6 or higherz9-109, z990 or z900 LPARDisks3007.04.2006 IBM SystemsInstallation Steps• Set up <strong>and</strong> validate crypto hardware► Validate? If from ICSF menu, Utility option for R<strong>and</strong>om Number works, ICSF <strong>and</strong> secure crypto hardwareworks● Clear key support with APAR PQ94822 + PQ93943• Generate <strong>and</strong> then store (in the CKDS) a triple DES encryption key for use► Use ICSF Key Generation Utility Program, KGUP► Read ICSF Administrator's Guide• Build the IMS or DB2 user exit, specifying the key name defined in step above• Back up your data• Unload your data• Create/install the exit• Reload the data, during which process the data is encrypted• Validate your output3107.04.2006 IBM Systems


Build DB2 user exit• “Data Encryption” Product <strong>and</strong> ICSF Cryptographic Key Settings;► “Data Encryption” Product;● Link-edit with SYSLMOD load module name ‘DB2DEXIT’.● A 10 byte string of “ICSFDB2KEY” is set to the load module by AMSPZAP utility.● The load module is placed within the DB2 ‘SDSNEXIT’ Library dataset.► “Key” Settings on z/<strong>OS</strong> ICSF Component;● User Key: 24 byte Triple DES Cryptographic Key generated from the string “ICSFDB2KEY”above, using KGUP Utility.● Master Key: Generated from the string “ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP” as the “pass phrase”.● “Data Encryption” product currently requires Master Key for “Secure Key” capability.//LINK EXEC PGM=IEWL,PARM='LIST,XREF,RENT'//SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*//SYSUDUMP DD SYSOUT=*//SDECLMD0 DD DSN=DSN810.ENCRYPT.SDECLMD0,DISP=SHR//SCSFMOD0 DD DSN=CSF.SCSFMOD0,DISP=SHR//SYSUT1 DD UNIT=SYSALLDA,SPACE=(1024,(50,50))//SYSLMOD DD DSN=DSN810.DB8A.SDSNEXIT(DB2DEXIT),DISP=SHR//SYSLIN DD *ENTRY DECENC00INCLUDE SDECLMD0(DECENC00)INCLUDE SCSFMOD0(CSNBENC)INCLUDE SCSFMOD0(CSNBDEC)NAME DB2DEXIT(R)//*[ Link-edit JCL ][ AMSPZAP JCL ]//BATCHTSO EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01,DYNAMNBR=25,REGION=0M,COND=EVEN//SYSLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=DSN810.DB8A.SDSNEXIT//ISPLLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=SYS1.MIGLIB ** For ZAP PGM AMASPZAP **//ISPPLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=DSN810.ENCRYPT.SDECPLIB//ISPSLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=DSN810.ENCRYPT.SDECSLIB//ISPMLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=DSN810.ENCRYPT.SDECMLIB// DD DISP=SHR,DSN=ISP.SISPMENU//ISPTLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=USER1.ISPF.ISPPROF// DD DISP=SHR,DSN=ISP.SISPTENU//SYSEXEC DD DISP=SHR,DSN=DSN810.ENCRYPT.SDECCEXE//ISPPROF DD DISP=SHR,DSN=USER1.ISPF.ISPPROF//SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=*//ISPLOG DD SYSOUT=*,DCB=(BLKSIZE=800,LRECL=80,RECFM=FB)//SYSTSIN DD *PROFILE PREFIX(USER1)ISPSTART CMD(%DECENC02 DB2 DB2DEXIT -ICSFDB2KEY )//*3207.04.2006 IBM SystemsSummary• Not an integrated solution but well tested <strong>and</strong> is the best around• Replaces the EditProc code providing encryption that may have been obtained <strong>and</strong>was 'AS IS'• Requires no application changes► Data base changes may need to occur● Ensure targeted data will be protected may need to rearrange data● Adjustments for data base product restrictions or considerations► Underst<strong>and</strong>ing IBM Crypto will be crucial to adhering to the regulations/requirementsdriving this solution• Weigh the options available► Not every segment or table needs to be encrypted► Evaluate need for● Encryption/decryption in cross-platform <strong>and</strong>/or sysplex environments● Disaster Recovery3307.04.2006 IBM Systems


Agenda• z/<strong>OS</strong> 1.7 – Integrated IP security► AT-TLS► IPSec• z/<strong>OS</strong> <strong>PKI</strong> Services• Encryption Facility for z/<strong>OS</strong>• IBM Data Encryption for IMS <strong>and</strong> DB2 Databases V1.1• . . . <strong>and</strong> what about the future ?3407.04.2006 IBM SystemsVirtualization & Certification on System z9 <strong>and</strong> zSeriesLogicalPartitionLogical <strong>and</strong>PhysicalResourcesLogicalPartitionLogical <strong>and</strong>PhysicalResourcesLogical PartitionLogical <strong>and</strong> Physical Resourcesz/VM CPLinux Linux LinuxGuest VM Guest VM Guest VM•SUSE LES9 certified at EAL4+ with CAPP•Red Hat EL3 certified at EAL3+ with CAPP•Red Hat EL4 EAL4+ in progressz/<strong>OS</strong>LinuxLinux Linux LinuxVirtualDevicesVirtualDevicesVirtualDevicesz/VM 5.1 RSU1 + RACF, certified at EAL3+with CAPP <strong>and</strong> LSPP (26.10.2005)Guest LANIUCVVCTCz/VM Control Program virtualizationHiperSocketsPR/SM Microcode virtualization• z/<strong>OS</strong> 1.6 + RACF, certified at EAL3+with CAPP <strong>and</strong> LSPP• z/<strong>OS</strong> 1.7 EAL4+ with CAPP(CeBit 10.03.2006)See: www.ibm.com/security/st<strong>and</strong>ards/st_evaluations.shtml35PUsFICONChannels<strong>OS</strong>A-ExpressCryptoszSeriesHardwarez800, z900, z990 PR/SM certified at EAL4/EAL5with specific Target Of EvaluationzSeries Crypto coprocessors:FIPS 140-1 level 4FIPS 140-2 level 4 (Crypto Express 2) – In progressIdentrus certification for z/<strong>OS</strong> 1.5 <strong>PKI</strong>DB2 V8 certifcation for MLS (w/ RACF)WS AS V6.02 in evaluation fo EAL407.04.2006 IBM Systems


IBM <strong>Security</strong> Strategy• Mainframe security►Can be a key IBM System z9 <strong>and</strong> eServer zSeries ® differentiator►One of the primary strengths of System z9 <strong>and</strong>zSeries►Enables a strong IT infrastructure fabricOur goal is to continually increase value toprotect our customers’ investments byextending premiere System z9 <strong>and</strong> zSeriescapabilities across heterogeneous platformsto become the ‘Secure Vault’ 1 <strong>and</strong> ‘EnterpriseTrust Authority’ for On Dem<strong>and</strong> Business.1 Secure Vault represents the role <strong>and</strong> ability of zSeries to provide a highly resilient <strong>and</strong>security-rich enterprise wide environment for enterprise data <strong>and</strong> transactions.3607.04.2006 IBM SystemsJim Stallings (General Mgr. IBM System z division)Interview ComputerworldMarch 30th 2006• The no. 1 concern/question that I get from customers is about security.► What they want to talk about is how do they exploit the full capability of the mainframe.● Everything from key management, centralised management of encryption across theenterprise, AES, intrusion detection.► They want us to help them manage <strong>and</strong> exploit the capability for security on a mainframe.► Most of our customers tell me it's one of the principal reasons they buy a mainframe,because it's secure.► They are asking is to help them run enterprise-wide security, but using our platform as theplatform that manages security for all other platforms across the entire enterprise, nomatter where they are.► We're learning new things that we need to go invent <strong>and</strong> build for them.● make the security be as intelligent as possible <strong>and</strong> not have to rely on individuals.● The direction is in the area of autonomic <strong>and</strong> automation around security.3707.04.2006 IBM Systems


3807.04.2006 IBM SystemsFrohe Ostern !3907.04.2006 IBM Systems

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