3.3.1 REGULATORY CONTEXTUnlike the compliance market, the voluntary schemes do not rely on legallymandated reductions (Bayon et al., 2008). There is no emissions cap to drive carboncredit demand, and no regulatory body attempts to unify VERs across project types,standards, prices, or transaction vo<strong>lumes</strong>. The voluntary market governance system ismore horizontal and networked; with no central formalized regulation. The lack ofstandards, deficit of uniformity and transparency in the voluntary market has led toskepticism regarding credibility of the offsets produced under the voluntary offsettingschemes (Harris, 2007; Taiyab, 2006). In order to address the criticism and ‘to makemarket more investor-friendly’ (Bayon et al., 2008) stakeholders involved in thesector introduced over a dozen of voluntary offset standards in the past few years,designed registries and attempted to document the size of the market. There areseveral voluntary standards adopted so far, including the Gold Standard, whichprovides guidelines on sustainable development among other aspects for the CDMunder Kyoto Protocol and has a parallel scheme for the voluntary market.Implementation of self-imposed standards represents a form of self-regulation asopposed to compliance market and is under development at the moment. Severalstudies that cover various features of standards are available (Kolmuss et al., 2008a;Kolmuss et al., 2008b; Merger, 2008). This study only considers standards applied foridentified projects in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa.3.3.2 SUPPLY, DEMAND AND ACTORSThe voluntary segment of the market is currently operated by a number ofbusiness companies and non-profit organizations in North America and Europe(Harris, 2007; Sterk & Bunse 2004). Those companies invest in carbon-reductionprojects both in industrialized and developing countries and sell the emissions creditsto buyers and final consumers in the industrialized ones. The voluntary marketrepresents purchases of carbon credits by organizations or individuals who are notlegally obliged to generate any emissions reductions, or those, willing to haveemission reductions above what is legally required. Therefore, being under no legalconstraints governing the kind of emission offsets that they purchase, they can beflexible in deciding on the type of carbon credits they buy, source of credits oramount of credits. VCM, which is not limited by 2012 timeframe, when the Kyotoprotocol expires, might be more appealing to private funds that try to avoiduncertainty of post-Kyoto regime.Generally, the VCM is driven by consumer demand (Bayon et. al., 2008;Harris, 2007; Ecosystem Marketplace, 2007, Taiyab, 2006). Nature of the demand onVCM differs from compliance market, as purchasers are interested in projects thatrespond to the goals of their CSR programs or individual values (EcosystemMarketplace, 2007). Consequently, the offsets provided through the voluntaryschemes are rather driven by CSR concerns or individual intentions to reducepersonal footprint, rather than necessity driven and highly dependent on consumer19
preferences. This aspect of VCM projects is an interesting counterpart to CDMprojects. Investors committing to the emission reduction with the goal of benefitingtheir CSR programs tend to avoid large projects involving questionable technologies,like large dams or HCF-23 destruction projects and require more qualitative emissionreduction credits (WB, 2008). The World Bank (2008) reports that sustainabledevelopment concerns and demand for emission credits with stronger co-benefitoutcomes are greater amongst private sector investors than public sector entities.Private sector investment is driven by the need to demonstrate to shareholders andfinal consumers stronger sustainability outcomes. Another interesting aspect is thatagainst the common opinion that the very nature of the voluntary markets stimulatesinvestment in innovative and uncommon for compliance mechanisms approaches(Harris, 2007), voluntary credits buyers tend to purchase offsets that most closelyresemble those of the compliance market (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2008).Carbon offsets generated by voluntary projects are referred to as VERs 3 andare eligible for carbon credits in voluntary markets. Due to the unregulated andfragmented nature of the VCM, VERs sources are diverse and embrace a vast array ofproject types, including renewable energy, energy efficiency, agriculture, forestry andother land use (AFOLU) activities, methane capture, and geological sequestration. Amajor difference between the Kyoto market and the voluntary carbon market is thatex-ante credits can be generated in the voluntary market. In contrast to ex-post credits,ex-ante credits account for the future biological CO 2 -fixation.On the demand side, the majority of buyers are businesses in the USA and the EU(including final purchasers, intermediaries, aggregators and investors), with additionaldemand from the public and NGO sectors, and from individuals (Bayon et al., 2008).VCM creates opportunities for wider engagement of various actors into carbonmarket. On the supply side VCM can reach project types and regions that are at themoment outside the scope of compliance market. It also allows private sector to pursemore diverse projects, creating room for innovation and is attractive in the areaswhere high transaction costs or other factors impede project development (Bayon etal., 2008).With respect to the opportunities VCM market offers to Sub-Saharan Africa, aslightly higher proportion of credits sourced from Africa has been recorded: 6% vs.3% for CDM projects (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2007). In 2007 if compared to 2006,the percentage of projects sourced in Africa declined both in market share (6% to 2%)and, which is more important, in absolute terms (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2007).However, the advantages offered by VCM can similarly turn into thedrawbacks. Lack of transparency, absence of unified standard procedures, unclear3 The use of professional jargon can make understanding of voluntary market principles a tricky exercise.Therefore, it is important to clarify terms and definitions used in the paper. Terms such as ‘emission reductions’,‘voluntary emission reductions’, ‘verified emission reductions’, ‘offsets’, ‘offset credits’, ‘voluntary carbon units’and ‘verified carbon units’ are used almost synonymously in the literature. However, there are differences in theapplication and meaning of these terms. The term VER is used for the purpose o this study. Verified EmissionReductions (VERs): A unit of GHG emission reduction that has been verified by an independent auditor. Thisdesignates emission reductions units that are traded on the voluntary market (Bayon et al., 2008).20
- Page 5 and 6: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSAFOLU Agricult
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- Page 23 and 24: are permitted to release is defined
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- Page 31 and 32: size, was mentioned as major factor
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- Page 37 and 38: approach’ 10 (PC, 2009b). This in
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- Page 45 and 46: voluntary markets enable more direc
- Page 47 and 48: therefore, there I have little grou
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- Page 51 and 52: Ellis, J., Winklerb, H., Corfee-Mor
- Page 53 and 54: Olsen, K., H. (2007). The Clean Dev
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