<strong>Indigenous</strong> <strong>Peoples</strong>, <strong>Poverty</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Self</strong>-<strong>Determ<strong>in</strong>ation</strong>• Capable govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stitutions. <strong>Indigenous</strong> peoples have to beable to exercise decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g power effectively. Do<strong>in</strong>g sorequires <strong>in</strong>stitutional stability, depoliticized dispute resolutionmechanisms such as tribal courts, depoliticized managementof resources <strong>and</strong> enterprises, skilled adm<strong>in</strong>istration, <strong>and</strong> otherprovisions. These create an environment of governmentalaction that is stable, fair, competent <strong>and</strong> reliable, shift<strong>in</strong>g thefocus of government towards nation-build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> away fromfactional battles over resources. 13• A congruence between formal govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong><strong>Indigenous</strong> political culture. There has to be a match betweenthe formal <strong>in</strong>stitutions of governance <strong>and</strong> prevail<strong>in</strong>g ideaswith<strong>in</strong> the community or nation about how authority shouldbe organized <strong>and</strong> exercised. This cultural match is the sourceof government’s legitimacy with those be<strong>in</strong>g governed, <strong>and</strong>therefore a source of its effectiveness (see Lipset 1963). Oneof the h<strong>and</strong>icaps fac<strong>in</strong>g American Indian nations has beenthe stark mismatch between <strong>Indigenous</strong> social <strong>and</strong> politicalorganization on the one h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong>, on the other, an imposedoverlay of govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stitutions designed largely by the U.S.government <strong>in</strong> the 1930s. This has tended to produce tribalgovernments that lack support with their own citizens, havedifficulty gett<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>gs done, <strong>and</strong> easily become objects ofpolitical opportunism <strong>and</strong> factional conflict.Where these three factors are <strong>in</strong> place, community assets—fromnatural resources to location to human capital—beg<strong>in</strong> to pay off.Where they are miss<strong>in</strong>g, such assets are typically squ<strong>and</strong>eredor fail to yield their potential. In short, it is the political factorswhich either limit or release the potential of economic <strong>and</strong> otherassets. 1413. The idea that govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stitutions matter to economic performance <strong>and</strong>societal well-be<strong>in</strong>g is well-established. See, for example, North (1990),;Oberschall(1990); Barro (1991); Ostrom (1992); Knack <strong>and</strong> Keefer (1995); Egnal(1996); <strong>and</strong> La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999).14. For these results, see <strong>in</strong> particular Cornell <strong>and</strong> Kalt (1992, 1995, 1997a,14
CornellThe mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> role of self-ruleThe first of these factors—sovereignty or self-rule—is of critical<strong>in</strong>terest to this discussion. Sovereignty or self-rule appears to be anecessary, but not sufficient, condition for susta<strong>in</strong>able developmenton <strong>Indigenous</strong> l<strong>and</strong>s.I say “sovereignty or self-rule” because of the ideas of exclusivity<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>divisibility often attached to the term “sovereignty.” Theprotection <strong>and</strong> expansion of “tribal sovereignty” have long beencentral political objectives of American Indian nations, but theterm has not necessarily implied separate statehood or absoluteauthority vested <strong>in</strong> Indian h<strong>and</strong>s. On the contrary, its commonusage <strong>in</strong> Indian politics has tended to accommodate the possibilityof a shared or limited sovereignty, a usage that has roots <strong>in</strong>, amongother places, the Marshall trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court decisions<strong>in</strong> the 1820s <strong>and</strong> early 1830s that described Indian societies asdomestic dependent nations that, nonetheless, rema<strong>in</strong>ed dist<strong>in</strong>ctpolitical communities <strong>and</strong> reta<strong>in</strong>ed exclusive authority with<strong>in</strong> theirterritories. 15 With<strong>in</strong> this usage, one can imag<strong>in</strong>e a sovereignty thatis flexible both <strong>in</strong> the degree <strong>and</strong> the scope of authority across<strong>in</strong>stitutional or policy doma<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> that is tailored to supporta particular relationship between peoples or nations. In somedoma<strong>in</strong>s it may be an exclusive sovereignty; <strong>in</strong> some, it may beshared. Sovereignty thus becomes a cont<strong>in</strong>uous as opposed to adichotomous variable. 161997b, 2000, 2003); also Krepps <strong>and</strong> Caves (1994); Jorgensen (2000a); Jorgensen<strong>and</strong> Taylor (2000); Jorgensen et al. (forthcom<strong>in</strong>g); <strong>and</strong> Harvard Projecton American Indian Economic Development (1999, 2000, 2003).15. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v.Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See the discussion of these decisions <strong>in</strong>Deloria <strong>and</strong> Lytle (1983).16. See the discussion of sovereignty <strong>in</strong> Maaka <strong>and</strong> Fleras (2000: 92-4) <strong>and</strong> ofdevolution <strong>in</strong> Smith (2002: 3-5).15
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- Page 35 and 36: CornellReferencesAnaya, S.J. 1996.
- Page 37 and 38: Cornell-----. 1995. ‘Where does e
- Page 39 and 40: CornellHarvard Project on American
- Page 41 and 42: CornellJorgensen, M., and J. Taylor
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- Page 45 and 46: CornellWakeling, S., M. Jorgensen,
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