control and sexuality

Control and Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Laws in Muslim Contextsthe debate and featured a number of well-documented and informative articles aboutthe Ahmadinejad government’s policy and agenda. As the 2009 presidential electionapproached, various reformist groups and individuals formed a coalition to mobilisepeople to vote. Former President Khatami was persuaded to run again. Mehdi Karroubi,who had lost the 2005 election to Ahmadinejad, also announced his candidacy on behalfof the party he had formed in 2005. 31 Then in March, Mir-Hosseini Mousavi, who had servedas prime minister from 1980 to 1988, entered the presidential race after over 20 years ofpolitical silence; not long after, Khatami withdrew in Mousavi’s favour. Having enjoyed thebacking of Ayatollah Khomeini and a popular base due to his welfare polices, Mousavinow stood as an independent centrist candidate. His campaign, reminiscent in many waysof Khatami’s in 1997, was run by a group of young activists, who, lacking access to statecontrolledmedia – in particular television, which was heavily biased toward Ahmadinejad– skilfully used digital media to reach large numbers of people.The pre-election polls were ambiguous – and notoriously unreliable – but it was widelyexpected that either Mousavi would win or the election would go to a second round.The hardliners were anxious that Ahmadinejad might not win a second term, andmade preparations to ensure his victory. On election day, 12 June 2009, the turnoutthroughout the country was high, but the result was what many have interpreted as amilitary coup d’état. From the beginning, numerous serious irregularities were reported:the Revolutionary Guards and the Interior Ministry kept representatives of Ahmadinejad’sopponents out of both polling booths and counting stations; they attacked Mousavi’scampaign headquarters and arrested his aides and other prominent reformists andjournalists. The official result was announced on TV only two hours after polling ended;Ahmadinejad was declared the winner with 63 per cent of the votes, Mousavi second withless than half that, and the other two candidates (Karroubi and Mohsen Reza’i, a formerhead of the Revolutionary Guards) with single figures. There were indications that thepercentages, and even the actual numbers of votes, had been decided in advance of thepolling. Mousavi and Karroubi refused to accept the results and asked for a recount. On13 June, Ahmadinejad celebrated his victory, and in a provocative speech he referred tothose objecting to the poll as “dirt and dust” that would soon be washed away. On 15 June,an estimated 2 million protesters marched through the streets of Tehran with a singleslogan: ‘Where is my vote?’ This was the biggest protest march since the 1979 Revolution,and a direct challenge to the theocratic forces. It was followed by more protests, whichthe government met with violence. In a much-awaited Friday prayer speech on 19 June,Khamene’i, instead of finding a healing formula, threw oil on the fire. He blamed foreignmedia for “doubts over election results”, dismissed the protesters and warned them offurther government violence if they persisted. But the protests continued, leading tothe formation of the popular movement for change that became known as the Green31 Karroubi formed this party shortly after resigning from all his governmental posts in protest atwhat he described, in an open letter, as election-rigging by the Revolutionary Guards and one ofKhamene’i’s sons.110