Control <strong>and</strong> Sexuality: The Revival of Zina Laws in Muslim Contexts16). The new state was curiously composed of two territorial units – East Pakistan (nowBangladesh) <strong>and</strong> West Pakistan (now Pakistan) – physically separated by over 1,000 miles,with distinct cultural <strong>and</strong> linguistic differences. Pakistan was envisaged by its founders asa Muslim democracy, wherein religion was the key ‘cohesive factor’ among culturally <strong>and</strong>politically variant Muslim groups. A liberal bourgeois ideology (Rouse 1988), with largelysymbolic Muslim elements, was thus developed to galvanise the support of various elementswithin Muslim communities, as well as to appeal, to some extent, to both Indian <strong>and</strong> Britishpolitical establishments. Facing continuous <strong>and</strong> grave challenges – first, an open-ended <strong>and</strong>seemingly insolvable armed conflict with India over the Kashmir border; <strong>and</strong> then, a civil warthat led to the partition of its eastern wing, which became, in 1971, a new independent statecalled Bangladesh – Pakistani ruling elites, both civilian <strong>and</strong> military, relied on the power ofa strong centralised state. Hence, social <strong>and</strong> religious discourses, including those of <strong>sexuality</strong><strong>and</strong> gender, were predominantly shaped in an effort to condone the particular visions ofthose in charge of an increasingly autocratic <strong>and</strong> militarised polity.Muslim communities that were brought together with the advent of Pakistan have retaineda strong bias in their construction <strong>and</strong> utterance of both class <strong>and</strong> gender. While upper classwomen have at least had a limited space in which to challenge the overall patriarchal system,which had relegated them to largely inferior social <strong>and</strong> familial roles, no such opportunitycould materialise within the lower classes’ milieux. Hence, “Pakistan may have had femaleprime ministers, ministers, ambassadors, <strong>and</strong> governors, but most Pakistani women […] arepreoccupied with issues of family survival” (Malik 2008: 14). Political instability, economiccrises, inter-ethnic divisions <strong>and</strong> class oppression, combined with an inherited patriarchalbias, made the Pakistani populace particularly vulnerable to the indoctrination of right-wingreligious <strong>and</strong> political groups, such as Jamaat-e-Islami. The head of this radical faction until hisdeath in 1979, Sayyid Abul A’la Maudoodi, realised very early that he could secure popularity<strong>and</strong> support for his political aspirations through the discourse of Muslim patriarchal morality,grounded on <strong>control</strong> over female bodies <strong>and</strong> sexualities. In 1939, he published a book calledPurdah, which has since gone through numerous reprints <strong>and</strong> minor revisions (Pal 1990:450, 462−463; Maudoodi 1967). Purdah, literally meaning a veil or a curtain, has come tomean an entire code of conduct for Muslim women, <strong>and</strong> in South Asia is usually a by-wordfor seclusion in general. In sum, Maudoodi advanced four key positions as to the roles <strong>and</strong>responsibilities of the woman: (1) she is solely responsible to make domestic life ‘a paradiseof peace <strong>and</strong> joy’; (2) she is inferior to men; (3) she is unable to perform most outdoor work,including any economic, political or administrative duties; <strong>and</strong> (4) “[s]he is a tragic being, withall those bodily <strong>and</strong> reproductive functions to perform; the domestic role is ordained for herby nature” (Pal 1990: 453; Maudoodi 1967: 193, 199).When General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq assumed power through a military coup d’état, in1977, <strong>and</strong> imposed martial law, Maudoodi’s vision of purdah in Pakistani society was quicklyadopted by the state. In alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami <strong>and</strong> other right-wing factions, GeneralZia began the process of ‘Islamisation’ through martial law ordinances <strong>and</strong> discriminatory158
Pakistanpolicies, which effectively (if not always overtly) followed the maxim of chador aur chardiwari (literally “veil <strong>and</strong> four walls”; i.e. women veiled <strong>and</strong> within the confines of the home)(Mullally 2006: 170). For instance, in 1980, one state policy required all female governmentemployees to wear chador over their other clothes (Pal 1990: 452). Similar requirementswere also imposed on women in certain public offices – such as news broadcasters <strong>and</strong>airline stewardesses. However, under these imposed reforms, the women’s movementmanaged to overcome some of its internal ideological <strong>and</strong> class-based differences <strong>and</strong>organise a widespread resistance. In 1981, a grassroots-based popular front called theWomen’s Action Forum (WAF) was born, which brought together seven strong women’sgroups <strong>and</strong> individual supporters under the initial leadership of professional, middle-classwomen (Rouse 1988: 12). It still serves as a catalyst for other women’s groups of variouspolitical <strong>and</strong> religious convictions to publicly <strong>and</strong> collectively st<strong>and</strong> up against genderinjustice (Rouse 1988: 12), as well as for mounting international solidarity.Although General Zia’s dictatorship ended in 1988 with his death in a plane crash, theproblematic legacy of his ‘Islamisation’ policies is still deeply felt in Pakistani society. It tookanother military leader’s dem<strong>and</strong> for public legitimacy, General Pervez Musharraf, after hisown coup d’état in 1999, before some of the most detrimental instances of Zia’s reformscould be reversed. Musharraf termed his policy orientation ‘enlightened moderation’,whereby extremist stances on any issue – including the role <strong>and</strong> interpretation of religionin the state of Pakistan – were to be ‘rationally opposed’. In 2000, after years of lobbying bywomen’s groups, the National Commission on the Status of Women was finally formed. In2004 <strong>and</strong> 2006, important amendments to domestic criminal law were introduced. The 2004Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill (referred to as Act I of 2005) introduced section 156B into the1898 Code of Criminal Procedure, which barred the arrest of women accused of zina withouta court’s permission. This section also required that the investigation of a zina case beconducted by an officer with the rank of Superintendent of Police. The 2006 Code of CriminalProcedure (Second Amendment) Ordinance (Act XXXV of 2006) made the offences underGeneral Zia’s 1979 Zina Ordinance bailable, resulting in the release of hundreds of womenaccused of zina from jails all over the country. Another set of amendments, known as the2006 Protection of Women Act, removed rape from the Zina Ordinance <strong>and</strong>, in procedurallaw, barred the conversion of any complaint of rape into a charge of adultery or fornicationagainst the complainant. The legislative changes, however, remain partial <strong>and</strong> insufficientto significantly challenge the patriarchal ethos permeating much of Pakistan’s tumultuousinter-Muslim <strong>and</strong> gender-based relations. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitutionof Pakistan, passed in April 2010 by Parliament, turned Pakistan from a ‘semi-presidential’into a parliamentary republic. The Amendment reversed a number of the infringements onthe Constitution made over several decades by its military rulers, in particular by transferringmany of the presidential powers to Parliament <strong>and</strong> the prime minister’s office. If Pakistan isindeed to embark on reforms towards a decentralised parliamentary democracy, perhaps itsvital institutions in the judicial <strong>and</strong> executive sectors, along with civil society organisations,will finally have a chance to address gender injustice in a more substantive way.159
- Page 3 and 4:
Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Vanja Hamzić
- Page 5:
ContentsvviiAcknowledgementsGlossar
- Page 9 and 10:
GlossaryAcross Muslim countries and
- Page 11 and 12:
GlossaryDarul Islam: ‘Abode of Is
- Page 13 and 14:
GlossaryIjab & Qabul: Lit. ‘offer
- Page 15 and 16:
Lawat/Liwat: Penetrative sex betwee
- Page 18:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 27:
Introduction
- Page 30:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 35:
Introductionbe sought both in ‘tr
- Page 40 and 41:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 43 and 44:
Criminalising Sexuality: Zina Laws
- Page 45 and 46:
Criminalising Sexuality: Zina Laws
- Page 48 and 49:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 50 and 51:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 52 and 53:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 54 and 55:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 56 and 57:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 58 and 59:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 60 and 61:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 62 and 63:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 64 and 65:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 66 and 67:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 68 and 69:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 70 and 71:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 73 and 74:
IndonesiaCountry ProfileThe Republi
- Page 75 and 76:
Indonesiaon employing religion in t
- Page 77 and 78:
Indonesiamovement, however, unified
- Page 79 and 80:
IndonesiaAct also strengthened the
- Page 81 and 82:
IndonesiaCases of Human Rights Viol
- Page 83 and 84:
Indonesia2008 Law on PornographySin
- Page 85 and 86:
Indonesiathat “community [moral]
- Page 87 and 88:
Indonesiajustified as a pre-emptive
- Page 89 and 90:
Indonesiato leave their village and
- Page 91 and 92:
Indonesia(1) the right to an object
- Page 93 and 94:
Indonesiahas been difficult; Indone
- Page 95 and 96:
Indonesiaparticularly those of the
- Page 97 and 98:
IndonesiaIndonesian civil society,
- Page 99 and 100:
IndonesiaGeertz, Clifford (1971) [1
- Page 101:
IndonesiaVan Klinken, Gerry (2007),
- Page 105 and 106:
IranCountry Profile 1Iran is one of
- Page 107 and 108:
Iranpresident Khatami in 1997. Desp
- Page 109 and 110:
Iranwere retained only in the new C
- Page 111 and 112:
IranThe success of the Revolution w
- Page 113 and 114:
Iranelected bodies, which came to b
- Page 115 and 116:
IranMore importantly, it enables th
- Page 117 and 118:
IranThe clerics who took power afte
- Page 119 and 120:
Iranwoman who are forbidden (haram)
- Page 121 and 122:
IranThe notion of “his own knowle
- Page 123 and 124:
Iranconvicted women have already at
- Page 125 and 126:
Iranwhich, despite severe repressio
- Page 127 and 128:
Iranamended so as to curtail men’
- Page 129 and 130: Irangovernment. Despite the silenci
- Page 131 and 132: Iran- and in a few cases has obtain
- Page 133 and 134: IranMovement, under the joint - but
- Page 135 and 136: IranBibliographyAfary, Janet (2009)
- Page 137: Iran(2009), ‘Iran’, in Sanja Ke
- Page 141 and 142: NigeriaCountry ProfileThe Federal R
- Page 143 and 144: Nigeriaand international advocacy,
- Page 145 and 146: Nigerianorthern provinces, allows f
- Page 147 and 148: Nigeria‘Settlement’ and Dynamic
- Page 149 and 150: Nigeria“any other question” wit
- Page 151 and 152: Nigeriaset up by Muslims in the abs
- Page 153 and 154: Nigeriaappellate court of “any [s
- Page 155 and 156: Nigeriathat the ruling elite of 11
- Page 157 and 158: Nigeriaby-laws remain in force, zin
- Page 159 and 160: Nigeriaon first instance, and then
- Page 161 and 162: NigeriaUnder the 1999 Constitution
- Page 163 and 164: Nigeriaorganisation fighting for wo
- Page 165 and 166: NigeriaAs a result of these litigat
- Page 167 and 168: NigeriaDominant colonialist discour
- Page 169 and 170: NigeriaBibliographyAbdullah, Hussai
- Page 171 and 172: NigeriaJohnson-Odim, Cheryl and Nin
- Page 173: NigeriaTerman, Rochelle and Mufulia
- Page 177 and 178: PakistanCountry ProfileThe Islamic
- Page 179: Pakistanvote in the Bakhsh case - o
- Page 183 and 184: PakistanIn the closing years of Bri
- Page 185 and 186: Pakistanpredominantly Hanafi classi
- Page 187 and 188: Pakistanbetween an ideological Musl
- Page 189 and 190: PakistanThe 1979 Hudood Ordinances
- Page 191 and 192: Pakistanthe absence of medical evid
- Page 193 and 194: Pakistanacts, ranging from the subj
- Page 195 and 196: Pakistanparliamentary democratic sy
- Page 197 and 198: PakistanSeptember 1981, while worki
- Page 199 and 200: PakistanConclusionThe present chapt
- Page 201: PakistanSaigol, Rubina (2010), ‘D
- Page 205 and 206: TurkeyCountry ProfileThe Republic o
- Page 207 and 208: TurkeyIn theory, under this system,
- Page 209 and 210: Turkeyauthority in religious knowle
- Page 211 and 212: Turkeywhat ‘women are like’ and
- Page 213 and 214: Turkeynow turns to investigate how
- Page 215 and 216: TurkeyRescript’ - a programme of
- Page 217 and 218: Turkeyplease with ‘their’ women
- Page 219 and 220: Turkeycountry’s approximately 80,
- Page 221 and 222: Turkeyto and the grounds for divorc
- Page 223 and 224: Turkeythe technological advances wh
- Page 225 and 226: TurkeyIn September 2004, the Nation
- Page 227 and 228: Existing Activism for ChangeTurkeyT
- Page 229 and 230: Turkeyfrom the previous ones, as th
- Page 231 and 232:
TurkeyThe history of Turkey, includ
- Page 233 and 234:
TurkeyHirsch, Ernst (1968), ‘Vier
- Page 235 and 236:
TurkeyToprak, Metin and Nasuh Uslu
- Page 237:
Conclusion
- Page 240 and 241:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 242 and 243:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 244 and 245:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 246 and 247:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 248 and 249:
Control and Sexuality: The Revival
- Page 251 and 252:
IndexAAbbasgholizadeh, Mahboubeh 97
- Page 253 and 254:
Indexequality 3, 25, 36, 37, 51, 83
- Page 255 and 256:
IndexMinistry of Justice (Iran) 87,
- Page 257 and 258:
IndexWomen in Nigeria (WIN) 142Wome