control and sexuality

Pakistanbetween an ideological Muslim apparatus and the increasing demands for social justice.It seems, however, that the gradual abandonment of Zia’s ‘Islamisation’ route, as well asthe strategic adoption of human rights language and base-line institutional reform, is stillsignificantly conditioned by the political and military elite’s power games. For example,the most recent Eighteenth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, promulgated in April2010 by the Parliament, remedied an important part of the dictatorial legacy of Zia’s (and,later on, Musharraf’s) regime by returning a number of the excessive presidential powersto Parliament. Parliament is, however, still reluctant to review the Hudood Ordinances, asthey are, supposedly, too contentious an issue for the time being. Seemingly, the interestbehind the new reforms is in regaining sizeable political power, rather than in amelioratingthe state’s revolting human rights record.The constitutional provisions of particular significance to gender justice and women’shuman rights are the equality clause, right to employment, right to political participation,right to access to public space and the forbidding of human trafficking (Shah 2006: 109).In particular, Article 25 of the current Constitution is regularly cited by the women’s rightsgroups in their advocacy and litigation efforts. It consists of the famed equality clause“All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law”; an explicitassurance that “no discrimination on the basis of sex” shall be permitted; and a statementthat encourages the state to make “special provision[s] for the protection of women andchildren”. The case law of the Supreme Court, for instance, confirms that the same articlewas also regularly interpreted and applied by the top domestic judicial bodies in defenceof women’s fundamental human rights. 7 Finally, for the specific cases of zina, Article 14 mayalso be relevant, as it stipulates that the “dignity of man and, subject to law, the privacyof home, shall be inviolable”. It goes on to proclaim that “[n]o person shall be subjectedto torture for the purpose of extracting evidence”. These fundamental guarantees are,however, already predicated on the oscillating, politically motivated interpretations ofthe ostensibly ‘Islamic’ character of the Constitution. So far, whenever the constitutionallystipulated human rights have been neglected for the purposes of the ruling elite, itsmilitary or political opponents, women have invariably suffered worse consequencesthan men. 8 An inherently gendered face of such derogations underlines the need for anastute feminist interrogation of Pakistan’s constitutional law and its inability to meet theexigencies of all of its constituencies, irrespective of their gender. For instance, only if theequality clause is interpreted and implemented beyond the superficial and formalisticspace it currently occupies (Khan 2004) can one hope that the women of Pakistan will beconstitutionally safeguarded against state and non-state patriarchy disguised in Muslimoutfits.7 See, for example, the cases of Shirin Munir, PLD 1990 SC 295; Azizullah Memon, PLD 1993 SC 341;and Ghulam Mustafa Ansari, PLD 2004 SC 1903. For an analysis of these and other relevant cases,see Shah 2006: 110−114.8 For a good example, see Amnesty International, ‘As if Hell Fell on Me’: The Human Rights Crisis inNorthwest Pakistan (Amnesty International Publications, London 2010).165