control and sexuality

Turkeyauthority in religious knowledge (‘ilm) was ‘complemented’ with an administrativeresponsibility. Moreover, like all other key dignitaries of the state, the şeyhülislam wasdirectly appointed (and dismissed) by the sultan. The ruler’s supremacy in all matters ofgovernance, including religious law, was thus carefully ensured.In the first quarter of the 20 th century, struck by a series of military defeats and politicalupheavals, the Ottoman Empire shrunk much in its territorial size and ethnic diversity.Mustafa Kemal, a military officer belonging to a faction of the Young Turks, an intellectualnationalist movement driven by ‘scientific’ materialism and liberalism, emerged as theleader of the new republican movement. Eventually, their ideas prevailed over those infavour of a monarchic system. In 1922, the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish GrandNational Assembly) abolished the sultanate, and two years later the caliphate (Koçak 2010:241–242). In 1923, the Ottoman state ceased to exist and the Turkish Republic was born,with Mustafa Kemal – soon to be also known as Atatürk 2 – as its first President.The ideological conception of the new republic rested primarily on a peculiar combinationof nationalism 3 and liberalism, 4 which resulted in a centralist state with powerful militaryand judiciary sectors. Another salient feature of this system was laicism (laiklik) of the state,supposedly modelled after the French laïcité, although in Turkey it meant – and still means– the governmental control over religious affairs instead of the ‘mere’ absence of religiousinvolvement in government matters, and vice versa. Laiklik was zealously asserted in allpublic spheres deemed relevant for the production and corroboration of state authority,such as the education, civil and military bureaucracy, and, of course, law. This was radical,even for the state already ‘tendered’ by previous Ottoman reforms, given the society’sprofoundly religious foundations. The new system established a rather unique relationshipbetween the state and religion, which has since (arguably) evolved through five stages(Kanra 2009: 46). These are briefly summarised below.The first phase (1923−45) was characterised by a series of measures designed to relegatethe religious elements deep into the so-called ‘private sphere’ and to divorce them fromany political power (Koçak 2010: 244; Lapidus 2002: 502). Hence, for example, all Sufi orderswere banned and their possessions impounded; religious courts and titles were abolished;2 Atatürk means ‘the Father of the Turks’ and it was exclusively added to Mustafa Kemal’s name via alegal act (Law No 2622), passed by the National Assembly in 1934 (Cagaptay 2006: 62).3 Thus wrote, in 1923, Ziya Gökalp, one of the leading ideologues of the nationalist movement:“When a nation experiences a great disaster or when it is confronted with grave danger [...] in suchtimes it is only the national personality who lives in the soul of the individual” (quoted in Cagaptay2006: 4).4 Liberalist political thought ‘inspired’ by sociological positivism produced in the nascent Turkey anaccentuated, state-imbued fascination with science, modernisation and capitalism, all of whichwere thought to be the tenets of a ‘civilised’ and ‘rational’ society. The idea was hardly new, sinceit has been entertained, to various degrees, in the Ottoman state as well, through many decadesprior to the birth of the Republic. For the first time, however, it was able to thrive as an officialideology of the state.187