Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

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Response/Mercier & Sperber: Why do humans reason?implementation of reasoning, but this was not the subjectmatter of our article, and, to be candid, we are still in theprocess of working out these implications satisfactorily. Atfirst blush, moreover, the argumentative approach doesnot imply a single, narrow characterization of thisimplementation. We therefore acknowledge this presentlimitation of our contribution that in particular Khlentzos& Stevenson have underscored, and we are grateful forthe positive suggestions of several commentators.Oaksford’s Bayesian probabilistic approach (para. 4)allows for a fine-grained analysis of argument strengthand of the changes in degree of beliefs they warrant.Like ours, this a computational theory, but it specifies aproximal function – how to change our beliefs in responseto arguments – rather than an ultimate one. As a consequence,it has the potential of taking us one step furtherin the direction of an algorithmic theory.Dessalles points out the sequential nature of reasoning,and asks how the argumentative theory can account forthis feature. First, it is important to mention that even ifthe explicit part of reasoning is sequential – we makeonly one argument step at a time – other processeswithin reasoning (such as argument search) may wellwork in a parallel fashion. The sequential nature of explicitreasoning can be explained by its linguistic character (thatmight not be necessary for pure solitary reasoning if itexists, but that cannot be bypassed in argumentation),language itself being sequential, for several reasons unrelatedto reasoning or argumentation (Pinker & Bloom1990; see also Carruthers 1996).Wiles mentions abduction as a plausible mechanismthrough which reasoning could find arguments. Shepoints to other psychological mechanisms that also relyon abduction, such as spatial navigation, suggesting thatreasoning might have been exapted from these mechanisms.However, given that reasoning deals with inputsand outputs that are very different from those of theseother systems, the possibility of an evolutionary exaptationscenario remains very speculative. This does not mean thatthese other mechanisms have nothing to teach students ofreasoning. To the extent that the problems solved by, forexample, mechanisms of spatial navigation are similar tothe problem facing reasoning – finding an acceptableargument within a large set of potentially relevant propositions– then, as suggested by Wiles’s commentary, wecan expect commonalities in the solutions used in bothcases (for further elaboration on this point, see Mercier,submitted a).Uleman et al. present interesting evidence and argumentson intuitive (or “spontaneous”) inferences. Weagree that these inferences constitute most of cognition,and that they influence which arguments are used andhow they are evaluated. We agree moreover that muchmore must be done on the relationship between intuitiveinference and reasoning, even if much relevant work hasalready been done in the framework of dual-systemapproaches to reasoning.Finally, Weber & Johnson offer a process-level specificationof how reasoning works in decision making. Accordingto their theory – query theory – participants facing adecision query their memory for relevant information orexperiences. Two features of this theory are particularlyrelevant in the context of the argumentative theory.First, as a result of this process, “choice follows from theresulting balance of evidence,” so that this theory predictsreason-based choice. The second important point is that“the first query produces richer representations becauseof output interference” (para. 5). To the extent thatfurther queries might represent perspective that are lesscongenial to the individual – for instance, trying to seethe problem from someone else’s perspective – a mechanismthat favors the first query can create a form of confirmationbias. Given that query theory predicts reasonbasedchoice and that it might also explain some formsof confirmation bias, it is quite congenial to the argumentativeapproach. However, rather than being a question of“intrapsychic and interpersonal argumentation” (para. 8),as Weber & Johnson suggest, the question can perhapsbe more usefully framed as a difference in level of analysis.We believe that query theory could also help explainaspects of interpersonal argumentation – how we findarguments – whereas the argumentative theory alsomakes predictions regarding intrapsychic phenomena –such as reason-based choice. The difference is thatquery theory offers predictions based on the workings ofreasoning, whereas the argumentative theory offers predictionsbased on the function of reasoning. Given thatthey are not at the same level, these explanations do notcompete. Assume, for instance, that reason-based choiceis entirely due to the processes delineated in querytheory. We would still need to understand why thisprocess is there in the first place, and why the outcomesof such a process are generally adaptive – questions thatthe argumentative theory aims at answering.Another way to better understand the processes ofreasoning is through modeling. Fox’s Logic of Argumentis a possible solution that is congenial to our proposalbecause it distances itself from formal logic to encompassthe subtleties of argument structure. The fields of AI andinformal logic are now teeming with models of argumentsthat can be conveniently simulated on computers, and thisis certainly an interesting way to develop for any theory ofreasoning or argumentation.R4.2. Reasoning outside the labThe target article focused its review on experimentscarried out in the laboratory, mostly with Westerncollege students. Narvaez rightly points out the limitationsof such a narrow focus. In their review of cross-culturalpsychology work, Henrich et al. (2010) have shownthat in many domains WEIRD people – people fromwestern educated industrialized rich democraticcountries – behave in ways that are different from therest of the world (para. 9). In the case of reasoning andargumentation, scholars have hypothesized that suchskills are a mostly Western tradition, born in classicalGreece and nurtured in the Enlightenment. It wouldindeed by a deadly blow to the theory if some cultureswere unwilling to argue or unable to reason. Happily forus (and for these cultures), the available data do notpoint in that direction. While there certainly are differencesin reasoning and argumentative style (e.g., seeNorenzayan et al. 2002), there is no report of a culturethat would be deprived of these skills. The two most frequentlyalleged cases are illiterate societies – which aresupposed to be unable to reason – and Eastern cultures –which are supposed to be unwilling to argue. Yet members100 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2
References/Mercier & Sperber: Why do humans reason?of illiterate populations can solve logical problems in theproper contexts, and the intellectual history of Eastern culturesis as fraught with debates as that of the West. Whileour theory could certainly be strengthened if the data fromnon-WEIRD cultures were richer, available data point tosimilar patterns the whole world over (Mercier, in press a).Narvaez also regrets the absence of developmentaldata from the target article, accusing us of “implicit biologicaldeterminism” (para 5). Our thesis is evolutionaryand pays attention to biological factors, but developmentitself is of obvious biological relevance. Again, languagecan be a useful analogy. Researchers who think thatlanguage is an adaptation do not deny that differentlanguages are acquired in cognitive development. Likewise,the argumentative theory does not need argumentativeskills to be just innate. The main reason so littlespace was devoted to an analysis of developmental evidenceis that there is so much of it that it warranted awhole other article (Mercier, in press b). In this otherarticle, it is shown that children can argue from veryearly on – long before they can do any abstract reasoning– that they are also prone to the confirmation bias,and that they reason better in groups – which is why collaborativelearning has proven to be so successful ineducation.Narvaez is joined by Wu in drawing attention toreasoning in the political sphere. The results discussedby Wu offer further support for the argumentativetheory. In particular, he refers to the development ofdeliberative democracy as illustrating the power of groupreasoning. Many arguments can be garnered in supportof an increased participation of citizens in policydebates: more legitimate and fairer outcomes, increasein trust and positive public behavior, etc. But Wu pointsto a more recent trend that emphasizes the epistemicvalue of deliberative democracy: Beyond all their otheradvantages, debates can also yield epistemically superioroutcomes (Cohen 1986; Estlund 2007; Landemore2007). Empirical results in political science support theclaim that groups can perform well, with deliberationsyielding more informed and more coherent opinions anddecisions (for review, see Mercier & Landemore, inpress). Incidentally, the argumentative theory is also in agood position to help explain some of the blatant failuresof political debates, whether it is polarization (Landemore& Mercier, submitted) or the dangers of widely publicizeddebates (Mercier, submitted b).Johnson correctly argues that the theory should apply toscientists and philosophers – including the authors of thistarget article – as well as to laypersons. Indeed, it is notunlikely that, despite genuine efforts to remain objective,we have been guilty of the confirmation bias, thereby illustratingour argumentative theory by the very manner inwhich we were arguing for it. Argumentation and debateshave always played a central role in philosophy, be it in classicalGreece, Akbar’s India, or the Warring States Period inChina. The lone philosopher always runs the risk of usingher great reasoning abilities to build a system of highinternal coherence on shaky intuitive foundations. Even ifscientists rely more on empirical evidence than do philosophersto correct their intuitions, their reasoning is stilldeeply argumentative. A scientific article or book is alwaysa “long argument” in Darwin’s famous words. Moreover –and contrary to popular representation of the lone genius –groups have always been the crucial place for scientificreasoning (e.g., see Dunbar 1995).Johnson also points out the importance of arguments inthe moral domain, suggesting that people might beespecially vulnerable to arguments that exploit moral“oughts.” Some moral psychologists would disagree andsuggest instead that people are rarely receptive to moralarguments, being more easily influenced by narratives oremotional appeals (Bloom 2010; Haidt & Bjorklund2007). The argumentative theory predicts an intermediarystate of affairs: People should be somewhat receptive tomoral arguments while evaluating them on the basis oftheir own moral intuitions (Mercier, in press c).R5. ConclusionWhile our target article may have unwittingly offered anillustration of the confirmation bias, we hope that this discussionhas, at least a little, exemplified the epistemic benefits ofreasoning in group. It has not led us to revise the theory inany major way. Still, several commentaries point to fascinatingdirections for future research. More needs to be done tolink our ultimate level theory with process theories of reasoning,and we are grateful for several very useful suggestions inthis respect. We agree that reasoning outside the laboratoryneeds to be investigated more thoroughly and hope that afocus on argumentation and reasoning in interaction canhelp push in this direction. Finally, other mechanismsbesides reasoning might benefit from being seen as havingasocialfunction.Oursisacontributiontothegrowingbody of research showing how, and how much, the humanmind is a social mind.References[The letters “a” and “r” before author’s initials stand for target article andresponse references, respectively]Abelson, J., Forest, P.-G., Eyles, J., Smith, P., Martin, E. & Gauvin, F.-P. (2003)Deliberation about deliberative methods: Issues in the design and evaluationof public participation processes. Social Science & Medicine 57:239–51.[KC-CW]Acker, F. (2008) New findings on unconscious versus conscious thought in decisionmaking: Additional empirical data and meta-analysis. Judgment and DecisionMaking 3(4):292–303. [aHM]Albrechtsen, J. S., Meissner, C. A. & Susa, K. J. (2009) Can intuition improvedeception detection performance? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology45(4):1052–55. [aHM]Allen, C., Bekoff, M. & Lauder, G., eds. (1998) Nature’s purposes. MIT Press. [aHM]Allport, F. (1924) Social psychology. Houghton Mifflin. [aHM]Ambady, N., Bernieri, F. J. & Richeson, J. A. (2000) Toward a histology of socialbehavior: Judgmental accuracy from thin slices of the behavioral stream. In:Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 32, ed. M. P. Zanna, pp.201–71. Academic Press. [aHM]Ambady, N. & Gray, H. (2002) On being sad and mistaken mood effects on theaccuracy of thin-slice judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology83:947–61. [aHM]Ames, G. J. & Murray, F. B. (1982) When two wrongs make a right: Promotingcognitive change by social conflict. Developmental Psychology 18:894–97.[JEO]Amir, O. & Ariely, D. (2003) Decision by rules: Disassociation between preferencesand willingness to act. Working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Cambridge. [aHM]Anderson, C. A., Lepper, M. R. & Ross, L. (1980) Perseverance of social theories:The role of explanation in the persistence of discredited information. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology 39(6):1037–49. [aHM]BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:2 101
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