Struggles for Sustainable Urban Development in Cochabamba, Bolivia

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Protest movements The mobilisation of people took a new pattern during the water war. This time, unlike in the past, the protests were only marginally based on the trade-unions. The main drivers of protest were territorial organisations such as neighbourhood associations (Assies 2003). People from different backgrounds united to form a massive pressure group against the government. The sheer numbers mobilised made the government back down and cancel the contract. However the protests were not just about water. Nickson & Vargas (2002) point out that ‘the conflict coincided with a situation of social unrest in the country at large’. They explain that at the time there was a growing resistance to the government’s neo-liberal economic strategy. The country was in economic crisis with teachers and police demanding pay rises. An intense coca plantation eradication program caused a lot of former coca farmers (cocaleros) to migrate to Cochabamba. These together with a long tradition of ‘anti- imperialistic’ rhetoric were, according to them, important reasons behind the conflict, proven by the participation of peasants and coca farmers in the protests. In addition to the water conflict, other mobilisations such as the nationwide protests in February 2003, brought together several different issues. It appears that one government decision can trigger protests which reawaken unresolved conflicts from the past. In this way different groups initiate collective action which gives more power to their individual demands. ‘Marginal groups…can combine to use their numbers in seeking power’ (Blair 2000). According to Olson (1965) collective defiance is only likely to occur when actors receive rewards for anti-status quo movements and non-participants are penalised. In addition to gaining more attention to their demands by collective action, the increased water tariffs provided a concrete incentive for the citizens of Cochabamba to participate in the demonstrations. According to Assies (2003) several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 10
predicted higher tariff increases than officially announced by representatives of the government and Aguas del Tunari. Eventually this became true, driving most citizens to refuse paying their bills. However, Nickson & Vargas (2002) explain that such high increments were not intentional but results of the new progressive tariff structure, re- categorisation of customers and a reduction in leakages which lead to more consumption. They say that, in fact, the tariff before privatisation was lower than in La Paz, Santa Cruz de la Sierra or Sucre and investment into water services in Bolivia had been very low because the tariffs barely covered operating costs. It seems that if the network was to be expanded, tariff increases would have been necessary to finance it, with or without privatisation. This brings up the question of ‘low-level equilibrium’ 3 . Private sector participation is seen, by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), World Bank and other practitioners, as a solution to low-level equilibrium and to achieve high-efficiency, service quality and willingness to pay (Anwandter & Ozuna 2002). Still it needs to be considered to what extent people are willing and able to pay for higher service quality. Estache et al. (2002) call for a balance between service quality, technology and operating costs that helps the poor afford the service. For example in El Alto voluntary community work was used to install the sewerage and water network (Ibid.). Determining the right balance can be difficult, however. Ideally the customers should have a choice for the quality and pay accordingly (Waddams Price et al. 2002). On the other hand a low-level equilibrium might not be an environmentally sustainable option since it could mean resource losses due to leakages and poor wastewater treatment. Subsidies and price distortions can also encourage waste (Mac Donald et al. 1998). 3 low operational efficiency, low service quality and low willingness to pay (see Spiller & Savedoff 1999). 11
Page 1 and 2: POWER, POLITICS, AND FREE-MARKETS:
Page 3 and 4: Power, Politics, and Free-Markets:
Page 5 and 6: equity and environmental considerat
Page 7 and 8: 2. WATER MANAGEMENT City of water s
Page 9: The water concession contract Some
Page 13 and 14: Neo-liberal strategy Privatisation
Page 15 and 16: is a serious shortcoming. This is s
Page 17 and 18: 3. URBAN TRANSPORT A growing proble
Page 19 and 20: photochemical smog is common. Among
Page 21 and 22: transport since drivers are require
Page 23 and 24: has driven increases in the supply
Page 25 and 26: So what do we make of this complex
Page 27 and 28: Cochabamba. He also deployed a temp
Page 29 and 30: 4. GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE URBAN
Page 31 and 32: eject clientilism and subordinate r
Page 33 and 34: advantage, though climate change an
Page 35 and 36: Deepening democracy and participati
Page 37 and 38: Nevertheless, even if such instrume
Page 39 and 40: still short of the next phase of a
Page 41 and 42: Building solutions on cooperation b
Page 43 and 44: areas. Different dimensions of sust
Page 45 and 46: CHANDA, Rupa. Social Services and T
Page 47 and 48: LA RAZÓN. EL Plan Vial quiere redu
Page 49 and 50: RAMÍREZ SAINZ, Juan Manuel. Urban

Struggles for Sustainable Urban Development in Cochabamba, Bolivia

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