Struggles for Sustainable Urban Development in Cochabamba, Bolivia

POWER, POLITICS, AND FREE-MARKETS:
STRUGGLES FOR SUSTAINABLE URBAN
DEVELOPMENT IN COCHABAMBA,
BOLIVIA
Ville Peltovuori
A dissertation submitted to the School of Development Studies of the University of East
Anglia in part-fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science
August 2004

ABSTRACT
The growth of urban areas has brought increased social and environmental stress to the
cities of the developing world. Urban problems such as water pollution and traffic
congestion have resulted from the inability of governments to keep up with the expansion of
urban areas. Authorities with few resources are struggling to expand infrastructure and
services to meet the demands of the residents. However, technical plans aimed at solving
these problems have often failed to recognise the political and social context in which they
are being implemented.
This dissertation analyses sustainable urban development in the city of Cochabamba,
Bolivia by focusing on the recent developments and conflicts of the city’s transport and
water services. The political conflicts within these two sectors have undermined government
legitimacy and its attempts to improve current conditions. The weak government institutions
have struggled in the face of both the public and private entities, which have gained
considerable power on issues of urban planning. Popular protest movements are a common
form of opposing government policies and have often been successful in imposing their
demands. However, such movements are not a democratic form of governance and tend to
weaken the rule of law that is a base for economic development. The government has often
been forced to rely on short-term solutions to restore order and gain support for its
decisions. In the prevailing political context and an environment of distrust, the government
has to make compromises that please all stakeholders to gain legitimacy for its policies. This
could potentially water down the government’s policies.
The Bolivian government’s neo-liberal agenda, without social considerations has resulted in
an increasing public resistance towards privatisation programs. Although such programs
might potentially bring efficiency and environmental sustainability, the social costs of
achieving them might be too high. Nevertheless neo-liberal strategies can be a tool for
development when implemented with more broad considerations than just efficiency.
Although Bolivia has introduced environmental government agencies, their integration into
decision-making seems still weak, leaving environmental sustainability aspects with only a
marginal role. In Cochabamba the local government has made some improvements to urban
environmental sustainability but further action is needed to solve current and prevent future
problems. The environmental problems of important sectors, such as waste management and
transport have not yet been addressed. It is difficult to say if the government has the
willingness to make improvements in these sectors. In any case, the political and social
context in which planning must be made poses a serious challenge for implementing
sustainable urban development policies.
The author would like to thank Kate Brown, Andrew Scanlon, Emmanuel Santoyo Rio and
Samantha Ross for their valuable advice, and all the ‘garden people’ for inspiration and
support.
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Power, Politics, and Free-Markets: Struggles for
Sustainable Urban Development in Cochabamba,
Bolivia
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................................................................3
1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................4
2. WATER MANAGEMENT....................................................................................................................7
CITY OF WATER SHORTAGES..................................................................................................................................................7
THE WATER WAR...................................................................................................................................................................8
THE WATER CONCESSION CONTRACT ....................................................................................................................................9
PROTEST MOVEMENTS.........................................................................................................................................................10
NEO-LIBERAL STRATEGY ....................................................................................................................................................13
CHALLENGES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT..................................................................................................................15
3. URBAN TRANSPORT........................................................................................................................17
A GROWING PROBLEM.........................................................................................................................................................17
AIR POLLUTION...................................................................................................................................................................18
SOCIAL NECESSITY OF TRANSPORT.......................................................................................................................................19
POLITICAL CONFLICTS.........................................................................................................................................................20
DISTORTIONS IN SUPPLY AND DEMAND...............................................................................................................................22
RESISTANCE TO CHANGE.....................................................................................................................................................23
DEFENCE OF INTERESTS......................................................................................................................................................23
POWER RELATIONS..............................................................................................................................................................24
CHALLENGES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT..................................................................................................................25
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND LEGITIMACY..................................................................................................................26
4. GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT...............................................29
POPULAR MOVEMENTS........................................................................................................................................................29
INSTITUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT..................................................................................................................32
IMPORTANCE OF TRUST.......................................................................................................................................................34
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION AS A SOLUTION............................................................................................35
DOES COCHABAMBA HAVE A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA?..................................................................................37
5. CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................40
REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................44
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Here in the city the goods of civilization are multiplied and manifolded; here is
where human experience is transformed into viable signs, symbols, patterns of
conduct, systems of order. Here is where the issues of civilization are focused:
here, too, ritual passes on occasion into the active drama of a fully differentiated
and self-conscious society.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mumford (1938, page 3)
Cities in the developing world have come under increasing social and environmental
pressure. This has been the result of rapid population growth especially in Latin American
cities. Local governments and planners with limited resources are struggling with the many
problems of urban areas. Investment into public services such as water supply, transport,
waste management and housing has fallen far behind the rate of expansion of urban areas.
Failure to deliver these basic services has lead to environmental degradation such as air
pollution and water pollution resulting from traffic congestion, inadequate waste disposal and
improper wastewater treatment. Residents who are left outside water supply or transport
networks, or have to take up poor housing, suffer health and social consequences. Urban
development in many developing countries is far from being socially and environmentally
sustainable. Many states have turned to privatising public utilities in order to increase
investment into infrastructure and to meet the ever increasing demand. However, achieving
sustainable urban development is not just a question of good and innovative city planning.
Besides the technical solutions there are political and social dimensions that must be
understood for successful urban management. In Latin America urban governance often
seems to be dominated by small elites who allocate resources to stimulate economic
development for only a small section of the population. Economic efficiency comes before
4

equity and environmental considerations. Decision-making is also often centralised on a
state-scale, leaving local residents with few opportunities to influence decisions affecting
their lives. Governments with poor track records in solving social problems have lost
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens, who have organised themselves to oppose the
governments they have elected. In this setting, finding ways to achieve sustainable urban
development is truly a challenge.
The fourth biggest city in Bolivia, Cochabamba is situated in a province (departamento) of
the same name in the heart of the country. Cochabamba has a population of 517 000, but
together with Quillacollo, Colcapirhua, Sacaba, Tiquipaya and Vinto forms a conglomeration
of 767 000 inhabitants, which is more than threefold the population in 1976 (INE 2001).
Although the growth rate of Latin American urban populations has dropped (Mac Donald et
al. 1998), the Ministry of Capitalisation has projected a population of 2.3 million for
Cochabamba in 2025 (Marvin & Laurie 1999).
This dissertation examines urban politics, conflicts and governance in Cochabamba and
how they shape the city’s development from sustainability point of view. It focuses on the
city’s transport and water management issues, in
a region with probably the greatest level of disparities in the provision of basic
public services in the world (Nickson 1998).
Both Batty (2001) and Connelly and Smith (2003) point out that the concept of sustainable
development has different interpretations and can be used in different and competing ways.
From the point of view of this dissertation sustainable urban development means generating
an urban environment with less social, economic and environmental problems and where the
potential for occurrence of such problems in the future is minimised. The weight given to
each dimension of sustainable development can be debated and is subject to the values of
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individuals. Sustainable development is also often understood as an environmental
conservation initiative. For example Local Agenda 21 is usually implemented with
environmental bias (Connelly & Smith 2003). However, this work attempts to approach
sustainable development in a holistic manner without putting too much emphasis on any of
the three dimensions.
The first part discusses water management in Cochabamba and the infamous ‘water war’, a
series of protests resulting from the privatisation of the water utility. It examines the protest
movements and the dynamics of the conflict along with the neo-liberal strategy adopted by
the government. The challenge of finding a sustainable water service solution is then
discussed. The second part discusses the conflicts related to the city’s urban transport, giving
special emphasis to the power relations between different stakeholders and the impacts of
free-market. The governance and legitimacy issues for sustainable urban transport are then
discussed. The fourth part takes these issues into a broader theoretical discussion to see what
kind of implications and challenges they pose for urban governance. It also briefly examines
Cochabamba’s sustainable development agenda in the context set by the previous parts. The
final part concludes with a summary of the revealed issues and how they affect attainment of
sustainable urban development.
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2. WATER MANAGEMENT
City of water shortages
Cochabamba is located in a temperate and mountainous region. Summers are wet and rainy
and winters mostly dry. A month or two can pass without a single drop of water from the
skies. Nevertheless the valley is an important agricultural centre utilising great amounts of
irrigation water. Lagoons on the mountains north of the city are used for the city’s water
supply, but most of the water is groundwater from the Cochabamba Valley itself.
Overexploitation of these groundwater resources has caused land to sink near El Paso
(Montes de Oca 1997). Still, only 57 per cent of the population was served by the municipal
water utility Servicio Municipal de Agua potable y Alcantarillado (SEMAPA) in 1999, with 48 per
cent connected to the sewerage network (Assies 2003). Even the connected areas receive
poor service – some have water only for a few hours once or twice a week (Nickson &
Vargas 2002). According to Montes de Oca (1997) the population connected to the network
demanded 900 million litres of water per second in 1996 1 , but the supply covered only 678
litres. People outside the network use private dealers, self-help organisations or privately
constructed wells for their water supply. According to a 1996 report by the government
auditing department (Contraloría General de la República) the potable water quality in
Cochabamba did not comply with World Health Organization (WHO) standards (Nickson &
Vargas 2002).
The service efficiency of SEMAPA before 1997 was rather poor. Half of the water supply
was lost due to leakages (Nickson & Vargas 2002). In addition part of the population had
1 The rainfall in 1996 was less than the annual mean. As a result the volume of the lagoons used for water
supply was considerably lower. (Montes de Oca 1997)
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illegal connections. Those completely outside of the network, who were mostly poor, ended
up paying more to private suppliers (Ibid.). It became clear that something needed to be
done to improve the city’s water management. One of the proposed solutions has been the
MISICUNI, a multipurpose project intended to supply water and electricity to Cochabamba.
Although conceived 50 years ago, the project has not yet been implemented (Assies 2003).
The water war
Attempts to meet Cochabamba’s demand for water have led to many conflicts (see Assies
2003 and Nickson & Vargas 2002). The government of Bolivia had been pursuing short-term
solutions to the problem by pumping water from the groundwater reservoirs of the
neighbouring Quillacollo. This caused tensions between the municipalities of Cochabamba
and Quillacollo. Concerns were expressed about ecological aspects and rural-urban
distribution of resources. Eventually the government realised that another solution was
required and drew up plans for privatising the Cochabamba water utility. SEMAPA and
MISICUNI were offered as a package deal to interested parties that would finally realise the
multipurpose project. However the World Bank conducted a study on the MISICUNI
project and concluded that it was not viable due to high cost. Potential investors also
expressed doubts and in the end no one made a bid for the deal. The government had to
make the terms of the contract more flexible until one company, Aguas del Tunari 2 , agreed
to sign it. Marvin & Laurie (1999) praised the plan as an emerging new agenda of water
management that would be environmentally sustainable, meet the needs of the urban poor,
emphasise community management and focus on demand management techniques. However
a series of violent riots broke out in late 1999 and early 2000. Public protests against the
newly signed concession agreement ultimately lead to the cancellation of the contract.
2 A consortium owned 50 % by British, 25 % Spanish and 25 % Bolivian enterprises.
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The water concession contract
Some points in the concession contract deserve closer attention. The process of
privatisation was initiated and controlled by the central government in a quite authoritarian
manner, suggesting incompleteness of the decentralisation process in Bolivia. As it appeared
that the MISICUNI project idea was not economically feasible, the government found it
difficult to find private investors to undertake the project. However the government still
desperately wanted to solve the water supply problem. Implementation of the MISICUNI
project was also an attractive political goal that would win many supporters for the
government. Therefore Aguas del Tunari was in a position to make demands to the
government over the terms of the contract. Bolivian law had a clause preventing giving such
political power to private entities. It stated that three bids are necessary before a contract can
be given, but was ignored by the government (Nickson & Vargas 2002). The company was
granted exclusivity over water resources in Cochabamba. Nickson & Vargas explain that
exclusivity is a common procedure to reduce risk and would not matter in a natural
monopoly. However, as they point out, there was no natural monopoly of water in
Cochabamba. A lot of private wells had been set up by individuals to secure water supply.
Exclusivity gave Aguas del Tunari control over these wells and also threatened the
livelihoods of the informal water supply sector (Ibid.). Marvin & Laurie (1999) described
how ‘the Bolivian government has developed a privatisation programme that includes wider
social equity considerations’. Indeed the contract did have a new socially progressive tariff
structure (Nickson & Vargas 2002).
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Protest movements
The mobilisation of people took a new pattern during the water war. This time, unlike in
the past, the protests were only marginally based on the trade-unions. The main drivers of
protest were territorial organisations such as neighbourhood associations (Assies 2003).
People from different backgrounds united to form a massive pressure group against the
government. The sheer numbers mobilised made the government back down and cancel the
contract. However the protests were not just about water. Nickson & Vargas (2002) point
out that ‘the conflict coincided with a situation of social unrest in the country at large’. They
explain that at the time there was a growing resistance to the government’s neo-liberal
economic strategy. The country was in economic crisis with teachers and police demanding
pay rises. An intense coca plantation eradication program caused a lot of former coca
farmers (cocaleros) to migrate to Cochabamba. These together with a long tradition of ‘anti-
imperialistic’ rhetoric were, according to them, important reasons behind the conflict, proven
by the participation of peasants and coca farmers in the protests. In addition to the water
conflict, other mobilisations such as the nationwide protests in February 2003, brought
together several different issues. It appears that one government decision can trigger protests
which reawaken unresolved conflicts from the past. In this way different groups initiate
collective action which gives more power to their individual demands. ‘Marginal groups…can
combine to use their numbers in seeking power’ (Blair 2000).
According to Olson (1965) collective defiance is only likely to occur when actors receive
rewards for anti-status quo movements and non-participants are penalised. In addition to
gaining more attention to their demands by collective action, the increased water tariffs
provided a concrete incentive for the citizens of Cochabamba to participate in the
demonstrations. According to Assies (2003) several non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
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predicted higher tariff increases than officially announced by representatives of the
government and Aguas del Tunari. Eventually this became true, driving most citizens to
refuse paying their bills. However, Nickson & Vargas (2002) explain that such high
increments were not intentional but results of the new progressive tariff structure, re-
categorisation of customers and a reduction in leakages which lead to more consumption.
They say that, in fact, the tariff before privatisation was lower than in La Paz, Santa Cruz de
la Sierra or Sucre and investment into water services in Bolivia had been very low because
the tariffs barely covered operating costs.
It seems that if the network was to be expanded, tariff increases would have been necessary
to finance it, with or without privatisation. This brings up the question of ‘low-level
equilibrium’ 3 . Private sector participation is seen, by the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), World Bank and other practitioners, as a solution to low-level equilibrium and to
achieve high-efficiency, service quality and willingness to pay (Anwandter & Ozuna 2002).
Still it needs to be considered to what extent people are willing and able to pay for higher
service quality. Estache et al. (2002) call for a balance between service quality, technology and
operating costs that helps the poor afford the service. For example in El Alto voluntary
community work was used to install the sewerage and water network (Ibid.). Determining the
right balance can be difficult, however. Ideally the customers should have a choice for the
quality and pay accordingly (Waddams Price et al. 2002). On the other hand a low-level
equilibrium might not be an environmentally sustainable option since it could mean resource
losses due to leakages and poor wastewater treatment. Subsidies and price distortions can
also encourage waste (Mac Donald et al. 1998).
3 low operational efficiency, low service quality and low willingness to pay (see Spiller & Savedoff 1999).
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The conflict saw the birth of a new local political force, an organisation called the
Coordinadora por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida (Coordination for the Defence of Water and Life)
to represent the civil society. However its legitimacy was initially denied, as the government
saw the existing civic committees as a legitimate representative of the civil society (Assies
2003). According to Assies the civic committees were largely controlled by local businesses
and represented only a small sector of the population during the water war. The credibility of
the municipal government lead by Manfred Reyes Villa was undermined by their decisions
during the conflict (Nickson & Vargas 2002). First they approved the tariff increases but
then joined the opposition. It became an attractive political argument to support the public
in their opposition towards the concession contract.
During the crisis, it seems that the original problem of water supply was forgotten by the
government as it concentrated on the riots and restoring order. The government decision-
making became dominated by attempts to solve the conflict and not the problems of water
management. This was evidently a result of the heavy pressure by civil society under which
the government had to operate. Nevertheless it also reflects a conflict management style by
the Bolivian government. Assies (2003) comments, that the government typically ignores and
trivialises popular mobilisations and then uses increasing violence to repress them. He sees
that such measures only escalate the conflict and:
finally the government gives in to social pressure and ends up signing last-minute
agreements in which it does not believe and that it will not carry out, and this
sets the stage for a new round of protest.
This appears to be a valid observation about Bolivian political conflicts where the same
issues, such as coca and neo-liberalism, seem to come up over and over again. After failing to
secure legitimacy by other means, the government might see violence as the only way to
maintain the legitimacy of its decisions or to simply stay in power. There is less need for this
type of strategy in countries where governments have been more effective.
12

Neo-liberal strategy
Privatisation of public utilities is often justified by the benefits brought by the market
forces and competition. However when a company is given monopoly over the market, like
in the case of Aguas del Tunari, it is not subject to competition. Leibenstein (1996) noticed
that in a monopoly a private operator might choose to be inefficient and maximise his leisure
time. Regulatory mechanisms have been developed to overcome this shortcoming and to
introduce ‘virtual’ competition. Still, regulation often falls behind this intended target as a few
individuals are intended to replace complex market forces. Institutional capacity for
conducting regulation, a feature that is often weak in developing countries, becomes very
important for the success of privatisation. Ugaz (1999) observed that in practice unregulated
utility operators have produced less output and imposed higher prices on consumers. The
way the Bolivian government pushed the contract offer forwards, restricted the competitive
pressure that the bidding process should have imposed. After the contract was signed, the
authorities failed to introduce competitive pressure through regulation. According to
Nickson & Vargas (2002) the performance of the regulatory authority, Superintendencia Sectoral
de Saneamiento Básico was weak. Parker (2002) argues that one of the prerequisites for
economically efficient and effective regulation is a political system that has been able to set
up independent regulatory agencies. Nickson & Vargas (2002) also reported that the
regulators were under heavy political pressure from the government during the conflict.
Anwandter & Ozuna (2002) reviewed 12 empirical efficiency studies on privatised water
utilities. There was no clear indication of privatisation leading to better efficiency. In fact
four of the studies showed that public ownership was more efficient. There are also
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numerous examples of efficient publicly owned water utilities in developing countries such as
Ecuador, Chile, Zimbabwe and Botswana (Johnstone et al. 1999). The successful examples
have a certain degree of autonomy and incentives for the staff. Nickson & Vargas (2002) tell
of another such example, a publicly owned water utility praised by the World Bank in Santa
Cruz de la Sierra. Although international finance institutions have started to promote private
sector participation within the structural adjustment framework, the public water utility in
Santa Cruz de la Sierra was still granted a loan for network improvement by the World Bank.
However the Bolivian government refused to guarantee the loan, demanding that investment
into urban water supply should be carried out by private sector only. This reflects how
narrow minded the central government has become with its neo-liberal agenda, conducted
since 1985. Paul Hirst (1997) believed that:
The danger of recklessly pursued internationalization without sufficient regard to
its social effects is that there will be revolts against an open international
economy in both the advanced and the developed world.
If the Bolivian government had considered this, perhaps the bloodshed over water would
have been avoided. On the other hand it might be unjustified to popularly blame neo-liberal
strategies. Perhaps it was not neo-liberalism itself that caused the problems, but the way it
was implemented without adequate social considerations. Privatisation has come to be
considered by the majority of Bolivians as intrinsically bad, although it might, when carefully
implemented, prove a useful development tool.
In line with neo-liberal economic strategy Chanda (2003) argues that:
Trade liberalization in services can result in increased competition, lower prices,
more innovation, technology transfer, employment creation, and greater
transparency and predictability in trade and investment flows’.
Actually service efficiency improved under Aguas del Tunari (see Nickson & Vargas 2002).
Besides the efficiency, however, the equity and government legitimacy gains were far below
expected. Economic literature often ignores social or political aspects of privatisation which
14

is a serious shortcoming. This is stressed by Crew & Kleindorfer (1986) who argue that
among economists ‘Equity and distribution issues are either suppressed or purposefully
ignored’. Similarly Adger et al. (2003) see that in environmental decision-making efficiency
receives most attention. Incorporating wider considerations into decision-making is probably
the most important lesson to be learnt from the Cochabamba water wars.
Challenges for sustainable development
On the social side the needs of the present generation are not being perfectly met. The
water supply network still does not cover all the households of the city. The ones who are
connected to the network have varying levels of water supply. Thus the equity aspect is not
fulfilled. Poorer households may also pay more for their water supply. More effective supply
is required to aid poverty alleviation as well as to encourage economic development. Larger
businesses, whether service or industry, have a disincentive to operate in Cochabamba and
may choose to operate in Santa Cruz de la Sierra or La Paz instead. It’s difficult to say just
how important a factor for investment decisions the quality of water supply is. In terms of
environmental sustainability the resources currently under utilisation, particularly
groundwater, are being overexploited. Pumping the groundwater reservoir provides only a
short-term solution and new sources are urgently needed to lift the pressure away from the
valley’s own groundwater. Although some of the aquifers are quite deep, failure to find new
sources will lead to intensification of the problem, causing trouble in the valley’s important
agricultural sector. Inadequate water supply and wastewater treatment can also bring about
environmental degradation and health risks. Cochabamba is in a difficult situation. Viable
alternatives to the MISICUNI project have not been found 4 . It appears that Cochabamba
4 A less costly alternative to the MISICUNI project, the Corani project, was considered during the privatisation
process but aborted. (see Nickson & Vargas 2002)
15

either suffers the costs 5 of the economically unfeasible MISICUNI project or the
environmental and social costs of continuing with current sources.
5 These costs, although mainly economic, can cause budget deficit leading to environmental and/or social
damage. The excess costs could be transferred to the society or the environment, in terms of e.g. higher tariffs,
impacts from inability to invest in network improvements or wastewater management, as well as leakages due to
lack of maintenance. It is also possible that the project could not be properly financed leading to degradation of
facilities in the long-term. In addition construction of the project might have important social and
environmental impacts.
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3. URBAN TRANSPORT
A growing problem
The growth of motorised urban transport in Cochabamba has been as impressive as the
expansion of population. Significant growth started in the late 1980s, tripling to around
120 000 vehicles by the end of the century (see figure 1). Around 50 000 of these vehicles are
classified as public transport (Cochabamba 2000). Just like population growth, the rapid
growth of vehicles has brought with it a number of problems 6 . Between 1982 and 1998 the
number of private vehicles grew at an average of 3.8 per cent per year (Cochabamba 1999).
At the same time the number of vehicles belonging to public transport expanded rapidly at
an average of 14.7 per cent a year (Ibid.). This has made the privately operated public
transport the most important sector of urban transport in Cochabamba. Taxis are a
particularly important sub-group of public transport. Around the city centre they contribute
to over 40 per cent of the traffic composition. There is roughly one motor vehicle per five
inhabitants, which is still considerably less than the number in developed countries 7 . The
growth in motor vehicle use continues as more and more people obtain a private car or start
operating a public service. Population growth itself is enough to sustain growth in the
number of vehicles but the possibility of economic growth would enable more people to
afford their own vehicles. This poses a serious challenge to the sustainability of the city, as
signs indicate that transport already seems to operate on the carrying limits of the urban area.
6 See Peltovuori 2003 for a detailed account on the state of urban transport in the city of Cochabamba.
7 For comparison Finland has a motor vehicle per every 2,1 inhabitants (Tiehallinto 2003).
17

1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1
Year
1 4 0 0 0 0
1 2 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
Figure 1. Growth in the number of motor vehicles in Cochabamba. Source: Cochabamba
2000.
Traffic congestion has been for sometime a major concern for the citizens of Cochabamba.
It is especially severe in the central market area of La Cancha where serious congestion of
transport occurs. La Cancha is the focal point of the city’s mass transit network and most
routes go through the area. As 95 per cent of the population shops at La Cancha the flow of
people to and from the area is tremendous (Cochabamba 2002). Average speeds of vehicles
drop to a few kilometres per hour; although generally only mass transit vehicles enter the
area. Congestion can be a problem in other parts of the city as well, though not with the
same magnitude as La Cancha.
Air pollution
Motor vehicles are the main contributor to the city’s ambient air quality problem which is
intensified by the geographical features of the valley where the city is located. Formation of
0
V ehicles
18

photochemical smog is common. Among the pollutants particulate matter (pm10) 8 , ozone
(O3) and, especially nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide (NOx) cause serious threats to human
health. Further studies are required to determine the importance of carbon monoxide (CO)
and lead (Pb), while sulphur dioxide (SO2) concentrations are low. Noise pollution is not as
severe as air pollution, but nevertheless reaches high levels in some central parts of the city.
Social necessity of transport
Because the role of public service in the city’s transportation system is so significant, it also
has important implications for city’s social development. Since most people can’t afford cars
of their own, do not cycle and live outside walking distance of the city centre, they require
public transport to conduct their daily business. Approximately 450 000 people, 90 per cent
of the population, use some form of public transport (Cochabamba 2002). An average family
makes nine trips per day and spends 19 per cent of their income 9 on public transport (Ibid.).
Therefore an adequate public transportation system is an important component of the city
but also implies significant costs for its residents, especially the poorer ones. Without such a
service people might not be able to get to work or do important purchases at La Cancha. On
the other hand the highly centralised structure of the city creates additional demand for
efficient transport. If there wasn’t such a supply of public transport or if it were organised
differently, the city itself might have a more multi-polar nature, which would decrease the
need for transport.
A website dedicated to Cochabamba’s public transport claims that:
8 Particles with a diameter of less or equal to 10 µm.
9 Average family income is 1 473 Bolivianos (approximately 150 €) per month, i.e. an average family spends 281
Bolivianos (approximately 30 €) per month on public transport (Cochabamba 2002).
19

whatever the system’s failings, we believe it works better than any other “Metro”
system in the world (http://www.trufi.com, accessed July 2, 2004).
This is true in some senses. Even with its shortcomings the system provides very high service
frequencies and is easy to use. Most of the vehicles are old and in poor condition which
exacerbates their fuel consumption and air pollutant emissions but as such it is available to
most of the population and keeps the city running. In a privately operated service, issues
such as stricter emission standards or modernisation of vehicles would eventually be paid by
the customers. It should be carefully considered whether or not the citizens of Cochabamba
could afford them. Another social issue is the taxi traffic which is an unnecessary burden for
the city’s environment. The number of taxis far exceeds demand, meaning that most taxis
drive around the city empty, searching for customers. However, driving a taxi is also a means
of making a living for thousands of the city’s inhabitants. It is a popular way of avoiding
unemployment.
Political conflicts
The urban transport sector is a complex network of environmental, economic and social
issues. The present system is chaotic in many ways and environmentally unsustainable. Due
to growth in the number of vehicles the present problems are in danger of escalating further.
The problems call for changes and innovative planning. However, making such changes is
not a simple task since one needs to understand the politics behind Cochabamba’s urban
transport.
The biggest political conflicts in the sector have been between public transport drivers
belonging to transport federations and the so called ‘free’ drivers i.e. ones who have started
transport services of their own. The free transport has grown apart from the federated
20

transport since drivers are required to pay high fees to join the federations, which many
drivers cannot or will not pay 10 . The federations, in practice, own the mass transit routes and
can therefore decide who gets to operate on them. According to Marco Carillo (2002) the
root of the conflict is the economic situation in Bolivia that has driven many unemployed
people to acquire their own vehicles and become free drivers. There is a constant struggle
between the two. In addition to them, only minority traders and some city districts are
permanently mobilised to advance their demands (Los Tiempos October 11, 2002).
Municipal authorities, the transport federations and the free sector are the main agents in
transport politics. Each of them has their own view on the current state of urban transport.
Manuel Prado, of the city’s planning department blames the rural mass transport for actually
operating more in urban areas than they are entitled to. He also points out that the transport
police do not have the necessary resources to enforce the municipality’s transportation
arrangements. The federated and free transport sectors seem to focus on accusing each
other. Pedro Cardozo of the federated transport says that the transport chaos is due to the
free transport, operating at the edge of law and creating new service routes where traffic is
already saturated. He also accuses the free transport for being responsible for the
environmental damage and assures that the federated drivers follow the routes assigned to
them by the municipality, with only small unimportant changes. The free drivers and Roberto
Hinojosa respond by saying that they do not interfere with the established routes of the
federations. He adds that they have a right to work as the federated service cannot have
monopoly over urban mass transit. (Carillo 2002)
According to Opinión (September 18, 2002) altering the routes is actually quite common.
Half of the mass transit lines are altering the routes assigned to them. This along with the
10 According to Opinión (June 18, 2002) between two and ten thousand US dollars depending on the type of
vehicle the driver wants to use.
21

illegal increments in mass transit is indeed a major reason behind transport problems in the
city. The situation is similar to other Bolivian cities. In La Paz, public transport has illegally
increased 70 per cent, says the newspaper La Razón (February 19, 2002).
Distortions in supply and demand
Often there has been demand for increasing the number of public transport vehicles or
altering the routes. City neighbourhoods have sometimes expressed demands for a better
transport service. For example, in May 2002 a conflict emerged between public transport
drivers and the Pampa Grande neighbourhood. Residents of the neighbourhood had asked
one of the mass transit routes to extend its service to their area. It was not because they
weren’t served by mass transit, but because the current routes visiting their area provided
poor service and didn’t pick up school children because of their discounted tariff. This
ultimately led into a conflict where drivers of the ‘official’ routes blocked the extended route
and started throwing rocks at the vehicles that had extended their route. The people of the
neighbourhood came out on the streets to deter the rock-throwing drivers. (Los Tiempos
May 9, 2002)
Although it would be easy to criticise the drivers for breaking the rules and being
responsible for the chaos, there are grounds for criticism towards the planning authorities as
well. Perhaps the municipal government has not kept up with transport demand by assigning
new routes and vehicles. As Armstrong-Wright (1993) explains, excessive bus operation
licensing conditions result in inhibition of necessary expansion of the service or regulations
being disregarded under market pressure. The latter is what seems to be occurring in
Cochabamba. However it is also important to keep in mind that the dire economic situation
22

has driven increases in the supply of transport. In some aspects of the transport system, like
the taxis, there is clearly excess supply.
Resistance to change
No matter whether the authorities get the demand/supply ratio right or design well
functioning mass transit routes, there are parties that are happy with the status quo. It is not
uncommon to see newspaper headlines such as the one in Los Tiempos (October 5, 2002)
saying:
The transporters threaten to realise a general strike for indefinite period starting
on Monday if the city continues with its intensions of making great chances
[translated from Spanish].
In La Paz plans for vehicular restrictions in the city centre based on licence plates, incurred a
protest march and plans of boycotting the restriction by the professional drivers (El Diario
August 29, 2002). The drivers also used the opportunity for political leverage by declaring,
according to La Prensa (September 30, 2002), that they would comply with the restriction if
the government improved traffic lights, bus stop signals, and made other street
improvements. Nevertheless, the plan was implemented and according to El Diario (August
29, 2002), was supported by the general public and proved successful 11 . In fact some of the
public transport drivers were quoted saying that during the first day of the restriction,
transport became less congested and that the ‘municipal government wasn’t that mistaken
[translated from Spanish]’ (Ibid.).
Defence of interests
11 This refers to the first phase of the plan when it did not yet concern public transport.
23

Sometimes the drivers are very keen to get their demands satisfied. In July 2002 some free
drivers had a hunger strike, supported by protest marches, demanding that the municipality
would guarantee their right to work in the city (Los Tiempos July 23, 2002). At the same time
Los Tiempos reported of an alliance between the federated transport and a major political
party Nueva Fuerza Repúblicana (NFR), while the free transport lowered their mass transit fees
as a way to combat the federated transport. Later, these developments lead to the legalisation
of some of the free transport’s routes, which in turn, was heavily criticised by the federated
transport (Los Tiempos July 30, 2002).
A distinct characteristic of urban politics in Cochabamba is the way different stakeholders
fiercely defend their interests. Different parties, especially the public transport drivers, seem
short-sighted and selfish with their demands. Fanny Suarez from the city council calls both,
the free and federated sectors of transports, to prioritise the demands of the population and
not just think of their own economic benefits (Los Tiempos July 25, 2002) On the other
hand with the background of Bolivian economic reality the drivers’ self-interest is easy to
understand. The livelihoods of a lot of people depend on decisions concerning urban
transport, and they are ready to fight to be able to sustain their families. Still, the editorial of
El Deber (March 25, 2002) makes a point about urban public transport in Santa Cruz de la
Sierra that should be considered by all stakeholders in Cochabamba as well: no one, including
the authorities, transport companies, drivers or general public, wants to understand that
chaos of transport will, in the short and long run, hurt everyone. It tries to send a message
that cooperation would lead to improved quality of life for all.
Power relations
24

So what do we make of this complex situation? Private transport companies and the
drivers, whether federated or free, seem to possess significant power. The municipality
appears weak in the face of these groups. Since the authorities lack the necessary capacity for
enforcing regulations the transport sector seems out of control. The municipality needs the
transport sector’s willingness to comply with its decisions to make them legitimate. This
gives the transport sector significant political power.
Ramírez (1990) studied urban popular movements in Mexico. He said that increasingly
these movements started to demand respect for their rights and not only certain concessions
or responses to their needs. This is also visible in Cochabamba where the drivers, particularly
the free ones, often demand that their right to work be respected. He also noted that these
movements have created their own services such as schools, pharmacies and stores that
reduce government power and social control. In Cochabamba the federated transport have
also schools of their own. Ramírez concludes that:
as a result of the MUP’s [Urban Popular Movements in Mexico] successes in
showing the limitations of official urban planning, and in blocking some plans
and forcing substantial changes in others, this planning is losing both power and
legitimacy.
In Cochabamba anyone can enter the public transport business. This undermines efforts to
find unity or cooperation within the sector. Portes and Johns reported that low income
groups in Brazil, Chile and Mexico began to collectively purchase and prepare food, improve
houses, and facilitate child care (Eckstein 2001). Similarly neighbourhoods in Cochabamba
could in principle organise their own transport services.
Challenges for sustainable development
25

The way things stand severely hinders the possibility of bringing sustainable economic,
social, and environmental development to the whole population. It appears that a self-
interested minority holds considerable power in the transport policy process. Making the
different parties work for common objectives appears a distant possibility. Although the
defiance of public transport drivers has contributed to the chaotic state of transport and lack
of legitimacy of regulations, this has certainly not been their intent. Surely they would wish
for a well functioning urban transport system as well. According to Eckstein (2001)
acknowledging the difference between the outcome and intent of defiance is a serious
shortcoming in the literature. She also points out that:
…the subordinate position of the politically and economically weak limits their
ability both to understand the full ramifications of their actions and to counter
the power of superordinate groups, including groups they had not envisioned
would be of consequence.
In this sense, the drivers who operate public transport in order to avoid unemployment
might not see (or be willing to see) the full consequences of their actions. Of course,
according to this analysis they are not politically weak, although they might feel so as
individuals.
Government performance and legitimacy
A lot of the urban transport problems can be contributed to the inability of the
government to efficiently control the system. This again can be traced back to the
performance of government institutions. The general view within the World Bank and other
aid agencies is that weak institutions are the primary reason behind poor transport
performance (Armstrong-Wright 1993). According to Los Tiempos (October 11, 2002), the
head of the provincial government (Prefecto) Gustavo Vargas argued that the incapacity and
negligence of municipal authorities are behind 60 per cent of social problems in
26

Cochabamba. He also deployed a temporary emergency team to assist the municipal
authorities in solving the social conflicts between the federated and free transport. The
previous day Los Tiempos (October 10, 2002) reported that the Mayor of Cochabamba had,
in a letter send to Vargas, appealed for better cooperation between different authorities.
Although urban transport comprises elements that need to cooperate and integrate,
Armstrong-Wright (1993) said that it is not unusual to have different agencies acting in
isolation or even in opposition. He explained that there can typically be several agencies with
responsibilities for urban transport. In cities like Calcutta, where at least 18 different agencies
are responsible for urban transport, conflicts, jealousness, confusion and overlappings
between agencies are common (Ibid.). Such overlapping seem to be present in Cochabamba
as well, possibly even to the extent of conflicts between different agencies and their interests.
Also the transport sector complains that the responsibilities between municipal and
provincial authorities are not clear (Los Tiempos May 30, 2002).
Overlap, conflicts and misunderstandings can occur between municipal, provincial and
national authorities but also between different agencies within the municipal government.
Traditionally, the relatively new agencies responsible for environmental issues tend to have
less power than their counterparts in other sectors. Serôa da Motta et al. (1999) stress this
aspect of conflicting jurisdictions and weak integration between different agencies. They
argue that sectoral incentives can often be harmful to the environment since environmental
input tends to be excluded. Even if legislation obliges to take environmental aspects into
account it does not guarantee that they are integrated into decision-making. In Taipei all
transportation infrastructure projects have conducted the necessary Environmental Impact
Assessment but not one of them was turned down (Hsiao & Liu 2004). When transport
issues in Cochabamba are debated in local media, environmental concerns are often present.
27

Antúnez and Galilea (2003) see that nowadays everyone planning for sustainable urban
development would place public transport in a central role. However, it is unclear how much
weight environmental considerations have in actual decision-making. Serôa da Motta et al.
conclude that institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean are still weak and the fragility
threatens environmental management in those countries.
Local government’s poor regulative power over transport issues in Cochabamba raises a
common debate between market and regulative forces. Many have suggested that the
‘invisible hand’ of market forces is more capable of achieving efficiency and effectiveness
than regulation in public utility management. However the severe problems encountered by
the, largely unregulated, urban public transport in Cochabamba suggests that market forces
alone cannot be a basis for sustainable transport. On the other hand there is no guarantee
that a strongly regulated or publicly operated system would fare any better. In fact the
Cochabamba case study points out that the government does not have the capacity to
manage an effective transport system. Whether regulation is more effective than market
forces alone is therefore dependent on the authorities’ regulatory capacities.
28

4. GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE URBAN
DEVELOPMENT
Popular movements
Internal conflicts in general, not just related to water and transportation are common in
Bolivia. According to Escobar and Vasquéz (2002), social conflicts were encountered in
Bolivia, and mostly La Paz, during more than half of the working days in 2000. They
identified 15 principal interest groups behind the conflicts. Transport workers caused
conflicts on 11 days and water issues initiated 7 days of conflict. Demonstrations, hunger
strikes and strikes were the most common means of pressure. Perhaps the most visible form
of protest in Bolivia, road blocks, accounted only for 7 per cent of the protest actions taken.
As Escobar and Vasquéz point out this reflects the misery of the population, but also the
established means of pressing demands. Perhaps the citizens must resort to demonstrations
and hunger strikes because they have no alternative channels to influence decision-making.
Eckstein (2001) says:
When the poor and working class rebel, it is not because they are intrinsically
troublemakers. They rebel because they have limited alternative means to voice
their views and press for change.
However popular protests are not a form of democracy and cannot compensate for the lack
of more inclusive channels such as participatory planning. Sometimes they can represent the
opinion of the nation but at worst they advance the agenda of extremist groups. Nevertheless
they do influence decisions and government policies.
The plans of former Bolivian president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to export gas through
Chile were violently opposed by the Bolivians and eventually lead to his resignation in
29

October 2003. However, when Sánchez de Lozada’s successor Carlos Mesa announced that
he will hold a referendum on the export plan, areas near Chile protested in turn (Singer &
Morrison 2004). Bolivian authorities and politicians have to constantly avoid making
decisions against some stakeholders’ interests. Because the legitimacy of government
institutions is weak they have to make a lot of compromises to please everyone. Such
compromises might water down the effectiveness of government policies. This might be
especially the case with environmental protection, since most protests are related to
protecting people’s livelihoods and income generation rather than the level of environmental
sustainability.
In some cases protests can lead to more equal policies by forcing the government to
balance between popular and elite interests. Even though marginal groups can join forces in
protests to pressurise the government in this way, Blair (2000) remains pessimistic about
them joining forces to oppose the power of long dominated local elites. He explains that:
Far more likely is the prospect that new elites may find themselves quarreling
with old elites and in need of allies who are willing to give support for a political
price.
This happened, for example, when Bolivian miners supported revolutionary movements and
populist military groups only to find that the government they had created turned on them
(Nash 2001). Escobar and Vasquéz (2002) list three main sources for social conflict in
Bolivia: a) policies which have forgotten most vulnerable groups in the name of the free-
market, b) government inefficiencies and corruption, and c) the historical legacy of a
paternalistic state accompanied by certain cultural patrons.
The defiance of government policies exhibited by different stakeholders inflicts
considerable pressure for local governance in Cochabamba. Ramírez (1990), in his studies on
urban popular movements in Mexico, commented that they:
30

eject clientilism and subordinate relationships with the government, but they
still expect government to be responsive to their demands.
Similar patterns can be found it Cochabamba. The residents don’t always respect the
government’s decisions but still expect the government to respect their own interests. This
creates a dilemma where undermining of the government’s legitimacy results in its inability to
effectively address citizens’ demands.
People don’t have to participate in demonstrations to defy the government. There are
other, more passive ways of doing it. Eckstein (2001) refers to Scott’s definition of such
forms of resistance 12 in arguing that:
While such quiet forms of defiance rarely result in major change, they can, on
occasion, undermine government legitimacy…
To avoid facing resistance and loss of legitimacy the government can have an incremental
approach to policy. When the policy is implemented little by little, changes are easy to make
if things go wrong (Connelly & Smith 2003). However, the way things stand with transport
and water management in Cochabamba; it might be too risky to rely on such an approach
given the urgency of the problems. In Latin America bringing change and a better future is
an attractive argument for popular politicians. However, at the same time the experiences
discussed above highlight that the residents of Cochabamba tend to resist change and make
it difficult for decision makers to achieve changes.
The success in the water war gave new strength and confidence to the popular movements.
In 2003 such nationwide movements lead to the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada.
These showed the Bolivians the possibility of successfully opposing government policies
when united. Thus it can act as an incentive for further demonstrations or defiance. This is a
threat to rule of law in Bolivia, the grounds for economic development. Although the success
12 For example foot-dragging, passive non-compliance, feigned ignorance, pilfering, slander, sabotage, and arson
(see Scott 1985).
31

of the water war is viewed as a triumph for the people of Bolivia, a society where decisions
are made through ‘acclamation’ is far from ideal. This is not to dismiss the ideas behind
Bolivian popular movements, but
To praise all community protests as heroic and progressive is as problematic as
to blame them for being insular and self-serving (Hsiao & Liu 2004).
Escobar and Vásquez (2002) argue that because of the high amount of demonstrations,
people make irrational demands, which result in short-term and short-sighted decisions by
the government. Bolivia urgently needs to build alternative - legitimate and democratic -
means for the whole population to participate in decision-making to avoid further
deterioration in the rule of law.
Institutions for sustainable development
As the above experiences from water and transport management show, the features of
government institutions are a significant factor in policy processes. Institutions, regulations
and instruments for sustainable development have serious problems of relative institutional
weakness in Latin America (Ocampo 1999). There:
the failure of democratic institutions to function properly weakens their
legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens (Karl 2000).
In Bolivia the weak government agencies are struggling to gain legitimacy. According to
Connelly & Smith (2003) international agreements and programmes provide a legitimate
basis for local sustainability policies. However such agreements have mainly focused on
environmental threats perceived by the industrialised countries and the international
community (such as deforestation and climate change) and not local environmental
problems. Therefore the municipal government of Cochabamba has been left without this
32

advantage, though climate change and the Kyoto process could, to some extent, be used as a
justification for reducing motor vehicle traffic.
Because the democratic government in Bolivia has to search for consensus that can water
down the policies in hope for legitimacy, it can be argued that democratic governance is not
capable of achieving the necessary changes for sustainable development. Indeed, Batty (2001)
points out that there are historical and geographical examples of arguments favouring
authoritarian government as an appropriate form to provide a sustainable environmental
future. However, authoritarian governments tend to have other negative impacts and seem
unlikely to provide long-term stability in Latin America. Although progress has been made,
the Bolivian democracy is still weak. This needs to be acknowledged when discussing the role
of democratic institutions in the country. William Ophuls and Robert Heibroner have
actually argued that democratic institutions need a certain amount of prosperity and are
vulnerable to situations of scarce resources (Batty 2001). Bolivia is certainly short of this
prosperity. Later in this document an attempt is made to see whether deepening democracy
can actually boost the government’s authority in bringing in stronger policies and plans for
sustainable development.
According to Ocampo (1999) environmental issues have become part of Latin American
politics. He explains that this is evident in the development of government institutions and
strategies for environmental protection. The Bolivian government has also established such
institutions at the local level. Even so, the question is how much they can influence
government policies and do they have any real power? Ocampo concludes that
environmental deterioration in Latin America is, above all, due to lack of strong
environmental institutions. He says that the insufficient power of these institutions is a
disadvantage in allocation of fiscal resource and when negotiation with economic authorities,
33

leaving the theme merely cosmetic in the operation of the government. In Cochabamba there
is little evidence that the environmental authorities would possess any real power. Making
provincial decentralisation compatible with municipal development is also a challenge for
institutional development in Bolivia (Blanes 2003).
Importance of trust
The importance of trust between different stakeholders in the policy process cannot be
overemphasised. Sabel & Zeitlin (1997) highlight the importance of trust describing it as a
cement of society that makes a contractual regime possible. They argue that trust cannot arise
spontaneously but is constructed during the course of history. In a jointly prepared urban
governance toolkit Transparency International and the United Nations Human Settlements
Program declare:
The level of trust in local government and public agencies is a key factor that
determines the extent and quality of civic engagement (UN-HABITAT &
Transparency International 2004).
They explain that loss of trust can discourage the participation of different parties, including
the private sector, in public service delivery or democratic processes. In Cochabamba one of
the principal reasons for the conflicts and difficulties in finding consensus is the lack of trust.
Different stakeholders don’t trust each other and fear that the other parties only seek to
maximise personal gain. Without trust there is fierce competition of resources and only with
trust can there be cooperation. The lack of trust is particularly eminent on people’s dealing
with the government. Perhaps it’s the legacy of populism and unfulfilled promises that has
weakened the trust toward politicians and government authorities.
34

Deepening democracy and participation as a solution
Could participation in decision-making provide the alternative means for different
stakeholders to influence decisions? Although the municipal council is elected through
democratic elections it is not enough. ‘Elections are crude instruments of popular control’
and while important, operate only at set intervals whereas the civil society and parties operate
continuously (Blair 2000). Rydin (1999) argues that the compromise or balance between
different parties is potentially easier to achieve through the participation of all stakeholders in
making decisions. In an environment of participation and trust, different parties would most
likely be more tolerant of each others and ready to compromise over their demands to reach
common goals. Participation, transparency and trust are also mutually enforcing. Weak
government institutions can use participation to enhance their knowledge of local issues
since, according to Pierre and Peters (2000), programmes for consultation and citizen
involvement mean that the government has increased chances of learning from the public.
However the success of participation should not be taken for granted, since it requires
skills from the participating population itself, which require time to develop (Rydin 1999).
Participation can easily lead to NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) attitudes where different
parties selfishly pursue their own interests. On the other hand that wouldn’t be new to
Cochabamba and it’s hard to see that things could turn worse. Ramírez (1990) sees that in
Mexico participation is more a way for the government to seek legitimacy than strengthen
democracy. To reap the legitimacy benefits of participation the government should take the
demands of the stakeholders into account which might result in further weakening of the
government. During the water conflict, the content of the concession contact was only given
to the public after it was signed and delay and cancellation of promised public hearings
questioned the legitimacy of regulatory decisions (Nickson & Vargas 2002). Pennington and
35

Rydin (2000) comment that experience of participation in practice, shows a tendency towards
special interest capture and bureaucratisation. Participation can continue to reflect the same
self-interested patterns of influencing decision-making and the inability to find consensus
that are visible in Bolivia today. In a sense the residents would need similar governance skills
to the elected officials. Thus, this discussion eventually leads to Rydin’s, still unanswered,
question: How can we generate the populations’ skills to govern?
Although Ocampo (1999) states that environmental issues have become part of Latin
American politics, they have not yet become an integral part of the civil society. He calls for
more education and other forms of communication to further integrate the issues into the
societies of the region and a channel where citizens can clearly voice their environmental
concerns. Connelly & Smith (2003) see that the green movement has always supported
public participation at a local level because they view it as essential for achieving
environmental sustainability. However, they go on to say that there exists a tension between
participatory local governance and economic efficiency. Especially in the United Kingdom,
search for economic efficiency has lead to local fragmentation of responsibilities that is a
serious barrier to sustainable development.
Bolivia has made some institutional restructuring to strengthen democracy. Vigilance
committees have been established to provide a formal procedure for the citizens to complain
about elected officials. The committees make plans for local infrastructure investment;
monitor municipal budgets and can make an initiative to suspend central government
funding to the particular municipal council. Blair (2000) describes the procedure as ‘especially
ambitious’. In his comparative study of participation and accountability at the local level in
six countries 13 Blair argues that Bolivia has the most accountability instruments running.
13 Bolivia, Honduras, India, Mali, the Philippines and Ukraine.
36

Nevertheless, even if such instruments exist on paper it may take effort and time to truly
integrate them into the behaviour of citizens. Kohl (2002) tells of an incident where he
invited indigenous Bolivian women from rural areas to town hall meetings. The women
refused to come claiming that they weren’t let inside the hall and only after repeated
invitations started to understand their rights. Blair also warns that:
each of these mechanisms can serve for ill as well as good: Elections can be
fraudulent, parties can foment hostility and conflict, civil society can advocate
the destruction of the body politic.
Some of the political parties such as Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and Movimiento Indígena
Pachacuti (MIP), although giving important representation for marginalised groups, have also
been criticised for fomenting hostility and conflict. The leader of MIP, Felipe Quispe has
been strongly criticised by various NGOs for his seeming strategy of confrontations to block
negotiations for a new water law (Assies 2003). Evo Morales, the leader of MAS, has in turn
been participating in demonstrations against coca eradication programs that have sometimes
lead to violent confrontations.
Does Cochabamba have a sustainable development
agenda?
So far I have discussed the obstacles for sustainable development planning in urban
Cochabamba. It seems that there is a great deal of social and political barriers for the
implementation of local government policies. However, does the municipal government of
Cochabamba even pursue urban sustainability and are the attempts made just public relations
tricks without true intention? Some changes for sustainable development have been
undertaken. Most notable is the ambitious cycling path project initiated during the late 1990s.
The municipality’s promotional material also often refers to Cochabamba as the example for
37

sustainable development in Bolivia. In addition, Cochabamba has organised popular
‘pedestrian and bicycle’ days, where the city centre has been closed from traffic. Most of
these changes were initiated under Manfred Reyes Villa’s term as the Mayor of Cochabamba
(1993-2001). He implemented public works programs and innovative policies to increase
participation in policy making (Singer & Morrison 2004).
However the changes initiated so far have been mostly cosmetic. The most important
issues of air pollution, traffic congestion, and waste management have not received much
improvement attempts. Whether it’s because of the difficulties discussed above or because of
lack of commitment by the authorities is difficult to say, although there seems to be
increasing awareness of these problems. In their studies on Latin America and the Caribbean,
Mac Donald et al. (1998) argue that ‘As citizens have perceived these problems, management
of the urban environment has taken on great political importance’. The only concrete
initiative on these problems is the network of cycling routes, but if it is expected to seriously
combat traffic congestion then it’s ambitious indeed. It is also important to notice that
promoting cycling is a policy that is relatively easy to implement in Cochabamba and unlikely
to face opposition from any sector. Ison and Wall (2002) noticed that instead of ‘sticks’,
‘carrots’ such as walking and cycling routes are seen as most acceptable by the local
authorities in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the water sector, due to its urgency,
has been a target of relatively radical, though mainstream, solutions. The outcome - a total
disaster - certainly does not encourage the authorities to try major changes in other sectors.
Connelly & Smith (2003) discuss the stages that a local authority goes through while
developing its response to the principle of sustainability. Cochabamba seems to be on a
phase they call ‘superficial tokenism’ and where ‘The council will normally act on high-profile
issues such as cycle paths and wildlife protection, seeing these as vote winners’. The city is
38

still short of the next phase of a ‘holistic policy approach’ to sustainable development. Again,
this dissertation has highlighted some of the issues Cochabamba has to face to make the
transition to the next stage. The environmental concerns of middle- and upper classes can
also be incompatible with the equity demands of the poor population and creativity might be
required to satisfy both (Wheeler & Beatley 2004). For example, decisions to invest in the
city’s park network while a large part of the population lives in poverty (and usually outside
the areas where parks are well kept) could be debated. Dimitriou and Thompson (2001)
explain that because of the importance of institutional performance in promoting urban
sustainability, some urban institution might opt for a strategy of a few high-priority goals to
prove that they perform well. Events like the pedestrian and bicycle day serve to raise
acceptance for further environmental sustainability policies as well as to gain political support
for the elected officials.
39

5. CONCLUSION
Popular protest movements in Cochabamba do not occur for only one reason. Often they
are conjunctions of different ideas that open up past disputes, combined with the new ones.
It seems that special interest groups with old demands utilise any controversial new
government decision as an opportunity to launch demonstrations. Joining forces this way
gives more weight to the demands of the movement. In this way people who feel weak as
individuals and unable to influence the city’s development find a channel to address their
interests and make an impact. People might feel that it is a far more efficient way of
influencing government decisions than using the elections. The movements are often directly
related to people’s livelihoods and defence of them. From the government point of view,
new policies usually change the livelihood patterns of the city and are thus likely to face
opposition from one group or the other. Since these common confrontations tend to get
violent quite easily and also harm the government’s legitimacy, the planners need to find
solutions that are less likely to create civil unrest. This can severely undermine policy
initiatives and their effectiveness. If a decision brings social unrest the government is often
forced to back down on its decisions. In a conflict situation, solving the original problem
often gives way to solving the conflict in decision-making. This can lead to short-term
solutions that are far from sustainable and tend to postpone the problem, only to emerge
again sooner or later. The government legitimacy can also be weakened by public defiance
against the set regulations. Due to weak enforcement of regulations it is easy to defy them.
Thus the government needs people’s support for new regulations to have better hopes of
compliance.
40

Building solutions on cooperation between stakeholders seems difficult in Cochabamba.
There is a lack of trust between different stakeholders, especially between the residents and
the government, which creates a barrier for cooperation. Public participation in decision-
making could be a way to provide an alternative channel of voicing concerns, to increase
trust between stakeholders and to strengthen the local government’s legitimacy. It could
provide a discussion forum where finding consensus between stakeholders would be easier as
they would hopefully be more willing to consent. However, participation is not something
that will automatically work. People need skills for successful and meaningful participation in
planning and building up those skills takes time. In the Cochabamba context making
participation work would seem a challenge, but has, even when not functioning perfectly, a
potential to bring benefits to local governance.
In its pursuit of neo-liberal strategies the Bolivian government has failed to notice the
social impacts of its policies. Especially in the case of the Cochabamba water concession, it
blindly sought privatisation of the utility, even to the extent of ignoring its own legislation in
the process. This has strengthened support for movements against neo-liberalism in Bolivia,
although the economic strategy per se has not necessarily always been the problem, but the
way it has been implemented. The government needs to integrate wider considerations, than
just efficiency, into its decision-making. It is also important to realise that the increased
efficiency advocated by private sector participation does not come without costs. Those
costs would be heaped on to the customers, probably in the form of increased tariffs as the
experience with water privatisation in Cochabamba shows. It is not self-evident that people
are willing or able to pay the price. They might be happier with a low-level equilibrium which
is the current situation with both water service and urban transit in Cochabamba.
41

Conflicts also exist between government agencies and the decentralisation process has
created overlaps between provincial and municipal authorities. Government environmental
agencies are still too weak, and integrating them into a broader field of decision-making has
not yet been successful. Bolivia has created some accountability instruments, but it may take
time for them to function properly. The municipality of Cochabamba has undertaken some
environmental initiatives, but the results, so far, are merely cosmetic. It is difficult to say
whether the environmental agenda has been just for image building and voter support. There
are two potential reasons why an agenda of sustainable urban development has not yet
emerged with the most important sectors of the society: there is a lack of true interest in
sustainability issues and implementing such policies is difficult in the prevailing political
context as discussed above.
This dissertation has highlighted reasons why government legitimacy and institutional
effectiveness are important when planning for sustainable urban development. Implementing
technical solutions without regard to the social and political context in which they are being
implemented can lead to failure and can be even downright dangerous to local development.
Economic theories are also subject to these characteristics of the society and thus perfectly
free-markets, as found in the economic textbooks, do not materialise. In an environment
where different stakeholders do not trust each other they tend to use their power in self-
interested and conflicting ways. If the government has weak legitimacy it loses power to
other stakeholders and that power tends to be distributed unevenly, having the potential of
benefiting elite minorities. This pattern needs to be broken to create more equitable
development. Thus, attempts to promote sustainable urban development need to incorporate
governance aspects as well. Creating a solid foundation for sustainable urban development by
strengthening government institutions and local democracy, might be more efficient and
sustainable in the long-run than directly addressing the environmental problems of urban
42

areas. Different dimensions of sustainable development can also be conflicting. For example
promoting environmental protection can put limits on social development. A balance needs
to be achieved between economic, environmental and social aspects of development for truly
sustainable cities.
43

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