Struggles for Sustainable Urban Development in Cochabamba, Bolivia

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October 2003. However, when Sánchez de Lozada’s successor Carlos Mesa announced that he will hold a referendum on the export plan, areas near Chile protested in turn (Singer & Morrison 2004). Bolivian authorities and politicians have to constantly avoid making decisions against some stakeholders’ interests. Because the legitimacy of government institutions is weak they have to make a lot of compromises to please everyone. Such compromises might water down the effectiveness of government policies. This might be especially the case with environmental protection, since most protests are related to protecting people’s livelihoods and income generation rather than the level of environmental sustainability. In some cases protests can lead to more equal policies by forcing the government to balance between popular and elite interests. Even though marginal groups can join forces in protests to pressurise the government in this way, Blair (2000) remains pessimistic about them joining forces to oppose the power of long dominated local elites. He explains that: Far more likely is the prospect that new elites may find themselves quarreling with old elites and in need of allies who are willing to give support for a political price. This happened, for example, when Bolivian miners supported revolutionary movements and populist military groups only to find that the government they had created turned on them (Nash 2001). Escobar and Vasquéz (2002) list three main sources for social conflict in Bolivia: a) policies which have forgotten most vulnerable groups in the name of the free- market, b) government inefficiencies and corruption, and c) the historical legacy of a paternalistic state accompanied by certain cultural patrons. The defiance of government policies exhibited by different stakeholders inflicts considerable pressure for local governance in Cochabamba. Ramírez (1990), in his studies on urban popular movements in Mexico, commented that they: 30
eject clientilism and subordinate relationships with the government, but they still expect government to be responsive to their demands. Similar patterns can be found it Cochabamba. The residents don’t always respect the government’s decisions but still expect the government to respect their own interests. This creates a dilemma where undermining of the government’s legitimacy results in its inability to effectively address citizens’ demands. People don’t have to participate in demonstrations to defy the government. There are other, more passive ways of doing it. Eckstein (2001) refers to Scott’s definition of such forms of resistance 12 in arguing that: While such quiet forms of defiance rarely result in major change, they can, on occasion, undermine government legitimacy… To avoid facing resistance and loss of legitimacy the government can have an incremental approach to policy. When the policy is implemented little by little, changes are easy to make if things go wrong (Connelly & Smith 2003). However, the way things stand with transport and water management in Cochabamba; it might be too risky to rely on such an approach given the urgency of the problems. In Latin America bringing change and a better future is an attractive argument for popular politicians. However, at the same time the experiences discussed above highlight that the residents of Cochabamba tend to resist change and make it difficult for decision makers to achieve changes. The success in the water war gave new strength and confidence to the popular movements. In 2003 such nationwide movements lead to the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada. These showed the Bolivians the possibility of successfully opposing government policies when united. Thus it can act as an incentive for further demonstrations or defiance. This is a threat to rule of law in Bolivia, the grounds for economic development. Although the success 12 For example foot-dragging, passive non-compliance, feigned ignorance, pilfering, slander, sabotage, and arson (see Scott 1985). 31
Page 1 and 2: POWER, POLITICS, AND FREE-MARKETS:
Page 3 and 4: Power, Politics, and Free-Markets:
Page 5 and 6: equity and environmental considerat
Page 7 and 8: 2. WATER MANAGEMENT City of water s
Page 9 and 10: The water concession contract Some
Page 11 and 12: predicted higher tariff increases t
Page 13 and 14: Neo-liberal strategy Privatisation
Page 15 and 16: is a serious shortcoming. This is s
Page 17 and 18: 3. URBAN TRANSPORT A growing proble
Page 19 and 20: photochemical smog is common. Among
Page 21 and 22: transport since drivers are require
Page 23 and 24: has driven increases in the supply
Page 25 and 26: So what do we make of this complex
Page 27 and 28: Cochabamba. He also deployed a temp
Page 29: 4. GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE URBAN
Page 33 and 34: advantage, though climate change an
Page 35 and 36: Deepening democracy and participati
Page 37 and 38: Nevertheless, even if such instrume
Page 39 and 40: still short of the next phase of a
Page 41 and 42: Building solutions on cooperation b
Page 43 and 44: areas. Different dimensions of sust
Page 45 and 46: CHANDA, Rupa. Social Services and T
Page 47 and 48: LA RAZÓN. EL Plan Vial quiere redu
Page 49 and 50: RAMÍREZ SAINZ, Juan Manuel. Urban

Struggles for Sustainable Urban Development in Cochabamba, Bolivia

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