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Struggles for Sustainable Urban Development in Cochabamba, Bolivia

Struggles for Sustainable Urban Development in Cochabamba, Bolivia

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The conflict saw the birth of a new local political <strong>for</strong>ce, an organisation called the<br />

Coord<strong>in</strong>adora por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida (Coord<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>for</strong> the Defence of Water and Life)<br />

to represent the civil society. However its legitimacy was <strong>in</strong>itially denied, as the government<br />

saw the exist<strong>in</strong>g civic committees as a legitimate representative of the civil society (Assies<br />

2003). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Assies the civic committees were largely controlled by local bus<strong>in</strong>esses<br />

and represented only a small sector of the population dur<strong>in</strong>g the water war. The credibility of<br />

the municipal government lead by Manfred Reyes Villa was underm<strong>in</strong>ed by their decisions<br />

dur<strong>in</strong>g the conflict (Nickson & Vargas 2002). First they approved the tariff <strong>in</strong>creases but<br />

then jo<strong>in</strong>ed the opposition. It became an attractive political argument to support the public<br />

<strong>in</strong> their opposition towards the concession contract.<br />

Dur<strong>in</strong>g the crisis, it seems that the orig<strong>in</strong>al problem of water supply was <strong>for</strong>gotten by the<br />

government as it concentrated on the riots and restor<strong>in</strong>g order. The government decision-<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g became dom<strong>in</strong>ated by attempts to solve the conflict and not the problems of water<br />

management. This was evidently a result of the heavy pressure by civil society under which<br />

the government had to operate. Nevertheless it also reflects a conflict management style by<br />

the <strong>Bolivia</strong>n government. Assies (2003) comments, that the government typically ignores and<br />

trivialises popular mobilisations and then uses <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g violence to repress them. He sees<br />

that such measures only escalate the conflict and:<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ally the government gives <strong>in</strong> to social pressure and ends up sign<strong>in</strong>g last-m<strong>in</strong>ute<br />

agreements <strong>in</strong> which it does not believe and that it will not carry out, and this<br />

sets the stage <strong>for</strong> a new round of protest.<br />

This appears to be a valid observation about <strong>Bolivia</strong>n political conflicts where the same<br />

issues, such as coca and neo-liberalism, seem to come up over and over aga<strong>in</strong>. After fail<strong>in</strong>g to<br />

secure legitimacy by other means, the government might see violence as the only way to<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the legitimacy of its decisions or to simply stay <strong>in</strong> power. There is less need <strong>for</strong> this<br />

type of strategy <strong>in</strong> countries where governments have been more effective.<br />

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