John Pilger, “The Political Trial of a Caring Man and the End of Justice inAmerica,” Information Clearinghouse, November 7, 2012,http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article32967.htmElashmouny, Ahmed Abdulla. Elashmouny was the owner of S&AAviation and ran a flight academy in Farmington, New York. In July 2002,he pleaded guilty to misrepresenting himself as a U.S. citizen and as acertified flight instructor on forms submitted to the Federal AviationAdministration, as well as to engaging in insurance, wire, and credit cardfraud. He was sentenced to forty-four months in jail. There is no indicationthat he was considered to be involved in violence or terrorism.References:Robert E. Kessler, “Flight-School Owner in Custody,” Newsday, November 19,2001,http://www.zoominfo.com/CachedPage/?archive_id=0&page_id=227631567&page_url=//www.newsday.com/news/printedition/longisland/ny-lielas192470616nov19.story?coll=ny%2Dlinews%2Dprint&page_last_updated=2001-11-19T19:52:27&firstName=Ahmed&lastName=ElashmounyU.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General, “FlightSchool Owner Jailed for 4 Years for Wide-Ranging Fraud,” website, January 23, 2003,http://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/3080Fort Dix Five, The. In January 2006, a store clerk in South Jersey, NewJersey gave the FBI a videotape of some young men riding horseback,having a pillow fight, shooting guns at a firing range, and shouting Islamicphrases. The men––brothers Eljvir, Dritan, and Shain Duka, along withMohammed Shnewer and Serdar Tatar––had given the videotape of theirfamily vacation together in the Pocono Mountains to the clerk to duplicate.The FBI decided that the group looked suspicious and sent in twoagents provocateur to try to entrap the young men in criminal activity. Theagents showered attention on the young men and used money andB-14
manipulation to try to create an interest in jihad. They asked the men todownload jihadist videos, taunted them for their lack of resolve to takeaction, and followed them around with hidden tape recorders to recordevery word spoken. When the others were not present, one agent talked ingeneral terms with one of the targets, Mohammed Shnewer, about howsomeone could theoretically attack the Fort Dix army base. In response tothe agent’s repeated demands, another defendant, Serdar Tatar, gave theagent a map of the Fort Dix base, which his father used to deliver pizzathere. (Tatar thought that the agent was suspicious and reported him to thelocal police, who told him not to worry about it.) The other agent thenpersuaded the Duka brothers to buy some guns, supposedly for targetshooting in the Poconos, so they would not have to wait in line at publicshooting ranges.At this point, the whole group was arrested and charged withconspiracy to attack Fort Dix, even though no plans had been made toattack anything and most of the defendants had never had any conversationabout any plan to attack Fort Dix. The government claimed that the menhad formed a conspiracy to commit jihad, and so under the law eachmember of the conspiracy was responsible for the acts of every othermember, even if he knew nothing about the acts. The Dukas wereresponsible for Shnewer’s conversations with the agent about how totheoretically attack Fort Dix, although they knew nothing about it. And theDukas and Shnewer were responsible for the map of Fort Dix that Tatarhad obtained from his father. This illustrates a typical government strategy,which is to try and divide defendants by using them differently, in the hopethey will attack each other at trial. Since no one person knows the whole“plot,” anything bad becomes “foreseeable” and is therefore attributable toB-15
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INVENTING TERRORISTSThe Lawfare of
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About the Authors, Preparers, and S
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AppendicesA: Tactics Used in Prosec
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an immigration form, which is techn
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list, but which are found in the Pr
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Muslims or other targeted groups is
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were ideologically “predisposed
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Vildirim Beyozit Tumer. He was a Tu
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with bombs at the Boston Marathon,
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Material support:Preemptive prosecu
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Management Units or in solitary con
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Even worse, in some cases the gover
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social hospitality intended to help
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communities in places like Bosnia a
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and shame him or her into doing som
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in Bosnia that were under attack. B
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the government indicted him for mat
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1. After 9/11, the FBI began a hunt
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have no way of knowing whether the
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opportunity for an individual to su
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surveillance. To date, however, ver
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considered terrorism. And the enhan
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Post-conviction, terrorism defendan
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U.S. was fighting on the same side.
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trap has been pending for years and
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http://www.stopfbi.net/2012/6/5/vic
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Associated Press. “5 years later,
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Hanners, David. “Terrorist traine
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McFadden, David. “3 From NY Terro
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United States v. Viktor Bout. “Or
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[Aref-Hossain case] “Muslim Solid
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Accompanied by Appendix B: Chronolo
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Offices of the Inspectors General (