Like the Virginia Paintball Network convictions, the governmentfastened on an innocent activity––in Shah’s case, his practice of the martialarts––and said it was evidence of terrorist activity. But any such terroristrelatedactivity was suggested and facilitated only by the FBI provocateursand agents, not Shah. The New York Times wrote that “[t]he governmenthas acknowledged that neither Mr. Shah, nor the three others accused in thecase…were on the verge of any violent act.”References:Andrea Elliott and William K. Rashbaum, “Anti-Muslim Bias Seen in ChargesAgainst Man Linked to Al Qaeda,” New York Times, June 1, 2005,http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/01/nyregion/01terror.htmlAlan Feuer, “Bronx Man Pleads Guilty in Terror Case,” New York Times, April5, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/05/nyregion/05terror.htmlAlan Feuer, “Tapes Capture Bold Claims of Bronx Man in Terror Plot,” NewYork Times, May 8, 2007,http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/nyregion/08terror.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0Graham Rayman, “FBI Agent on Synagogue Case Has Questionable Record,”Village Voice blogs, May 21, 2009,http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2009/05/index.php?page=11Stewart, Lynne. Known as “the people’s lawyer” because of hercommitment to represent her clients zealously, especially those who werebeing prosecuted for their politics, Lynne Stewart was one of the lawyers in1993 for Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (the “Blind Sheikh”) and ten otherco-defendants who were charged with conspiracy to bomb New York Citylandmarks, including two tunnels, the UN, and FBI headquarters. Duringthe time he was incarcerated, Abdel Rahman was placed under SpecialAdministrative Measures (SAMs), which curtailed his ability tocommunicate with the outside world. All of his visits and othercommunications, including those with his lawyers, were monitored by thegovernment. Stewart correctly saw the SAMs as an assault on a lawyer’stime-honored ability to zealously represent a client. If the governmentB-40
monitored all of her communications with her client, how was attorney–client confidentiality to be maintained? Moreover, SAMs made itimpossible to establish a relationship of trust with a client.In 1999, Abdel Rahman wanted to make a statement to hissupporters in Egypt. Stewart announced the statement at a pressconference. Similar statements from the sheikh had been announced atpress conferences in the past by other defense lawyers, and the prosecutionhad not objected. Indeed, the prosecution did not immediately object to thisannouncement, either.Three years later, after 9/11, the government looked back at theincident, and in an apparent effort to intimidate lawyers who did not takeSAMs seriously enough indicted Stewart and two other co-defendants forconspiracy and for violating the SAMs. They were convicted of conspiracyand providing material support to terrorists in 2005. Stewart was disbarred.She was originally sentenced to twenty-eight months in prison, but becausethe prosecutor claimed that she had been under-sentenced in light ofperjury at her trial, she was resentenced on July 15, 2010 to ten years. Thesentence reflects an unprecedented attack on the legal profession by thegovernment that makes it almost impossible to give zealous representationto clients in terrorist cases.In prison, Stewart’s breast cancer, which had been in remission,returned, and her prognosis is grave. After one unsuccessful request forcompassionate release in 2013, which was blocked by the director of theBureau of Prisons on grounds that her “health was improving,” Stewart wasgiven compassionate release from prison on December 31, 2013 by orderof the district judge who had resentenced her.References:“Justice for Lynne Stewart,” website, various dates, http://lynnestewart.org/B-41
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INVENTING TERRORISTSThe Lawfare of
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About the Authors, Preparers, and S
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AppendicesA: Tactics Used in Prosec
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an immigration form, which is techn
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list, but which are found in the Pr
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Muslims or other targeted groups is
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were ideologically “predisposed
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Vildirim Beyozit Tumer. He was a Tu
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with bombs at the Boston Marathon,
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Material support:Preemptive prosecu
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Management Units or in solitary con
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Even worse, in some cases the gover
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social hospitality intended to help
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communities in places like Bosnia a
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and shame him or her into doing som
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in Bosnia that were under attack. B
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the government indicted him for mat
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1. After 9/11, the FBI began a hunt
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have no way of knowing whether the
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opportunity for an individual to su
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surveillance. To date, however, ver
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considered terrorism. And the enhan
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Post-conviction, terrorism defendan
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U.S. was fighting on the same side.
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trap has been pending for years and
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http://www.stopfbi.net/2012/6/5/vic
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50 See Graham Rayman, “Were the N
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62 For example, Viktor Bout, a Russ
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- Page 156 and 157: -----. “The FBI’s anticipatory
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- Page 160 and 161: Silver, Charlotte. “Stateless in
- Page 162 and 163: Associated Press. “5 years later,
- Page 164 and 165: Hanners, David. “Terrorist traine
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