all members. Thus the “plot” becomes a “conspiracy” and ramps up thecharges against all of them.All were convicted on conspiracy charges, as well as for materialsupport, and the Duka brothers were sentenced to life plus thirty years (i.e.,their sentences will expire thirty years after they have died.)References:Shoshona Guy, “The Fort Dix Five” (video), PBS, September 10, 2010,http://video.pbs.org/video/1588640291/Paul Harris, “Fort Dix Five: ‘If they did something, punish them. But they’reinnocent kids,’” The Guardian, November 16, 2011,http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/16/fbi-fort-dix-fivePaul Harris, “Fort Dix Five: ‘They don't want our side, our view, our words,’”The Guardian, February 13, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/13/fortdix-five-fbi-terrorism-caseHashmi, Syed Fahad. The case of Syed Fahad Hashmi illustrates the useof material support charges and guilt by association, as well as the use ofSAMs. On June 6, 2006, British police arrested Hashmi at London’sHeathrow Airport on a U.S. warrant for conspiracy to give material supportto terrorism, claiming that in 2004 a bag of clothing––waterproof socks andraincoats––that was subsequently delivered to a terrorist official byinformant Junaid Babar had been stored for two weeks in Hashmi’sapartment in London. There was apparently no evidence that Hashmi wasinvolved in terrorism or that he knew the bag of clothing was to go to aterrorist. Babar had been an acquaintance of Hashmi’s, and Hashmi hadsimply allowed Babar to store the bag. A main contention was that, exceptthrough the testimony of Junaid Babar––who was not the most credible ofwitnesses––the government had no evidence that the package of clothing inHashmi’s apartment had gone to terrorists.B-16
Hashmi was extradited to the U.S. in 2007, where he was placed insolitary confinement in the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) inNew York for nearly three years under extremely harsh pre-trial conditions,including Special Administrative Measures (SAMs), and essentially washeld incommunicado. Although he had been a model prisoner in London,the government justified imposing SAMs on Hashmi by citing his“proclivity for violence,” notwithstanding that he had no criminal record,had not been charged with a violent act, and had not tried to incite violenceinside or outside of the prison or at any other time. Other prisoners atMCC––murderers, rapists, and gang members with records of violence––were not subjected to SAMs. Why, then, was Hashmi? Since prisonerscharged with terrorism who were subjected to SAMs pre-trial were almostexclusively Muslim, it seemed clear that both the prosecutor and the courtswere following the theory that merely to be charged with a terror-relatedcrime was the equivalent of a conviction. Thus Muslim defendants wereguilty until proven innocent.Prosecutors hinted that what they really wanted was for Hashmi to“cooperate” with them, and that he would be tortured with solitaryconfinement until he did what the government wanted. Hashmi refused,and later said at his sentencing, “In all reality, I had nothing to cooperateabout.” That the government did this suggests that it had applied thesedraconian pre-trial measures not because it considered Hashmi a high-levelterrorist, but to induce his cooperation or conviction.By 2010, Hashmi was struggling to keep his sanity, and his lawyerswere concerned about their ability to communicate with him and about hisability to cooperate in his defense. The government then disclosed that ithad been following Hashmi for some time before his arrest, secretlyB-17
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INVENTING TERRORISTSThe Lawfare of
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About the Authors, Preparers, and S
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AppendicesA: Tactics Used in Prosec
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an immigration form, which is techn
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list, but which are found in the Pr
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Muslims or other targeted groups is
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were ideologically “predisposed
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Vildirim Beyozit Tumer. He was a Tu
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with bombs at the Boston Marathon,
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Material support:Preemptive prosecu
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Management Units or in solitary con
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Even worse, in some cases the gover
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social hospitality intended to help
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communities in places like Bosnia a
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and shame him or her into doing som
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in Bosnia that were under attack. B
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the government indicted him for mat
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1. After 9/11, the FBI began a hunt
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have no way of knowing whether the
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opportunity for an individual to su
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surveillance. To date, however, ver
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considered terrorism. And the enhan
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Post-conviction, terrorism defendan
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U.S. was fighting on the same side.
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trap has been pending for years and
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http://www.stopfbi.net/2012/6/5/vic
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50 See Graham Rayman, “Were the N
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Hanners, David. “Terrorist traine
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McFadden, David. “3 From NY Terro
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United States v. Viktor Bout. “Or
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[Aref-Hossain case] “Muslim Solid
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Accompanied by Appendix B: Chronolo
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Offices of the Inspectors General (