Editorial Board Contents - Bureau of Police Research and ...

The Indian Police JournalOctober - December, 2012 • Vol. LIX • No. 4Editorial BoardShri K.N. Sharma, IPSDG, BPR&DChairmanShri Radhakrishnan Kini, IPSADGMemberSmt. Nirmal Chaudhary, IPSIG/Director (SU)MemberSmt. Rina Mitra, IPSIG/Director (Adm.)MemberDr. Ish Kumar, IPSIG/Director (Trg.)MemberShri Sunil KapurDIG/DD (SU)MemberEditor's Note:This special issue, combining theissues of October, November andDecember, 2012 is dedicated to theIntelligence Bureau on completion of125 years of its existence.- EditorShri Gopal K.N. Chowdhary-Special EditorShri Sheel Vardhan Singh, IPSContents1. From the Chairman, Editorial Board ii2. From the Director’s Desk iii3. Introduction iv4. 23rd December, 1887: The Journey begins....... v5. Helmsmen of the IB during the Pre-Independence Period xi6. Directors, Intelligence Bureau, since 1947 xii7. "Sleeman sahib ki jai" 1Shri Vijai Shukul, IPS (Retd.)8. Growth of Intelligence Institutions in British India 10Shri Amiya K. Samanta, IPS (Retd.)9. Intelligence Bureau 22Shri K.C. Verma, IPS (Retd.)10. Reminiscences of an IB Officer 26Shri T.V. Rajeswar, IPS (Retd.)11. Dormers Building, Shimla 3112. Indian Intelligence — Imperatives for Change 32Shri Ajit Doval, IPS (Retd.)13. A Journey that turned my Destiny 38Shri Shyamal Datta, IPS (Retd.)14. Intelligence Agencies in Indian Democracy 43Dr Ajai Sahni, Executive Director, Institute for ConflictManagement, New Delhi15. Of Pistols and Pigs and the Old Tiddim Road 49Shri K.C. Verma, IPS (Retd.)16. Through the Eyes of an IB Officer 53Shri DC Pathak , IPS (Retd.)17. My J&K Experience 57Shri R.K. Kapoor, IPS (Retd.)18. Scaling Himalayan Heights with the Intelligence Bureau 61Capt. (Retd.) M.S. Kohli19. My Experience of life and work in lB 68Shri O.N. Shrivastava20. My Unforgettable Years in the North-East 73Shri Prakash Singh, IPS (Retd.)21. ITBF Ladakh: A Saga of Courage and Service 7822. Police — Intelligence Interface 79Shri Julio Ribeiro, IPS (Retd.)23. My Journey through the Intelligence Bureau 82Shri K.P. Singh, IPS (Retd.)24. Observations on India’s State and Central Intelligence Apparatus 87Shri K.P.S. Gill, IPS (Retd.)25. A House Named Blessington 9226. Technology in Intelligence-Future Scenario 95Dr. V K Saraswat, Secretary Department of Defence (R&D) andScientific Advisor to Raksha Mantri27. Window into the World of Intelligence 104Shri M.K. Rathindran, IPS (Retd.)

From the Chairman, Editorial BoardOne of the important departments of the government is the police force.In any civil society a sound and efficient police force is necessary for goodgovernance. In India the police forces have been functioning on the basis of thePolice Act of 1861 (Act V). Several provinces also enacted their own Police Acts,which have been modelled on the Central Police Act. The statute was createdagainst the backdrop of the uprising of 1857, and had as its main objective thepreservation of British rule in India.Before the advent of the British, the system of governance in India had itsgenesis in the interregnum of Sher Shah Suri, the Afghan chieftain who defeatedHumayun and ruled much of North India from 1539 to 1545. Sher Shah designatedgroups of villages as parganas, and these in turn formed larger units which werecalled sarkars, or revenue districts, each having a shiqqdar or revenue collector and a chief munsif, theleading judicial officer. Subsequently, the Mughals introduced some modifications in the titles, for instance‘nayabdiwan’ in place of ‘chief shiqqdar’, and superimposed over the whole system a military veneer,appointing an officer of a certain specified rank in the military hierarchy of ‘mansabdar’. Though this gavecohesiveness to the bureaucracy, during the inevitable reigns of weak rulers, the ties between the provincesand the imperial regime weakened.The physical presence of the British in India was not significant, yet for almost two centuries theBritish were able to rule two-thirds of the subcontinent directly and exercise considerable leverageover the princely states that accounted for the rest of the country. Madras Presidency enacted the firstProvincial Police Statute in 1859. Two years later, using the Madras legislation as a model, a central lawcalled the Police Act of 1861 was created. It was framed against the backdrop of the uprising of 1857and known as Act V, the police in the districts was placed under the control of the Collector and DistrictMagistrate. The efficiency of the police force was reckoned by the manner in which it protected Britishinterests, the zamindari, and the effectiveness with which it suppressed the aspirations of the people forself-governance.Very early, the British realised the importance of collecting intelligence in a structured and organizedmanner. Lord Dufferin, then Viceroy of India, in a communication addressed to the Secretary of State forIndia on 15th November, 1887, submitted a proposal regarding collection of secret and political intelligencein India.The secret internal note, since declassified, has been included in this issue and makes for interestingreading. It refers to a memorandum of 23 rd July, 1887 on the formation of an Intelligence Departmentby Col. Henderson and Mr. D. McCracken and goes on to describe a two-pronged strategy of collectingpolitical, social and religious intelligence through the police force deployed in the British India andthrough the instrument of the Political Officers assigned to native States. The approval to the Viceroy’sproposal arrived through a dispatch dated 23 rd December, 1887 and thus, was born the IntelligenceBureau.Since independence, the Bureau has safeguarded the nation’s interest effectively in a low profilemanner befitting the nature of its assignment. While most on the outside will never know the achievementsof this organisation, it should be possible for all to discern that the safety and the security of the countryhas indeed been well served by this important organ of the Government.On the occasion of the 125 th anniversary, the Bureau of Police Research and Development considersit a privilege to dedicate the current issue of the Indian Police Journal to the Intelligence Bureau.(Kuldip Sharma)Director GeneralBPR&DiiThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

From the Director’s DeskNew Delhi, December 10, 2012Over its 125 year history, the Intelligence Bureau has witnessedsignificant changes in the security landscape. There has been amultiplication of challenges and diversification of the quarters from whichthose emanate. Ability of subversive and disruptive elements to adopttechnologies has added an edge to the threats that they pose. Amidst thischanging scenario, the Intelligence Bureau has striven to live upto itscharter, that of protecting the Constitution and ensuring national security.Besides, it continued to assist Government in policy formulation and indecision making processes.Acutely conscious of the difficult tasks before it, the IntelligenceBureau visualises, in the 125th anniversary, an opportunity forintrospection and reflection with the purpose of promoting higher levelsof professional excellence amidst its members.This would seem an appropriate juncture to acknowledge theunstinting support tendered so readily by members of Police Forces inthe States and Union Territories and by officers and personnel of theCentral Armed Police Forces. The togetherness that has been so realisedpromises to make for a more cohesive and comprehensive response tonational security challenges.I would like to express my gratitude to the Bureau of Police Researchand Development, particularly the Director General of the Bureau andthe Editor of the Indian Police Journal, for bringing out this Special Issueto mark the completion of 125 years of the Intelligence Bureau.(Nehchal Sandhu)DirectorThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issueiii

IntroductionWhen the Director, Intelligence Bureau asked me to take over the taskof bringing out the special issue of Indian Police Journal, on the occasionof completion of 125 years of Intelligence Bureau, I instantly felt that I havecome of age in the organization. The onerous task not only brought home theresponsibility associated with it, but also the pride of having been chosen todo this project.To bring together 125 years of an organization in itself is a mammoth task,and as I consulted my seniors and colleagues new insights and understandingsabout the organization gushed forth. Having decided to highlight the variousfacets of the organization through writings of those who have been, and are,an integral part of Intelligence Bureau and the National Security Architecture,the process became an opening of new doors to the world of Intelligence andSecurity. As I got more involved in the job at hand, I realized how much theOrganization has shaped my world. Over the years, I have been compelled toreflect, to understand, to grow and to adapt, and this is exactly what IntelligenceBureau is all about. Through vigorous professional analysis, operations andprognosis it has gently shaped the destiny of the Nation, protecting it andsteering it to safer harbours.This issue of Indian Police Journal is about professionalism, commitment,adventure and emotions related to the Intelligence Bureau. It is aboutthe mystique of the silent sentinels, and about the unknown and unsungbravehearts.Putting together this issue was a journey, in which I grew as a professionaland evolved as a human being.I am truly blessed to be an instrument to bring together various facetsof my Organization, and present them to all the stakeholders and readers forbetter understanding of the Intelligence Bureau and its history.SHEEL VARDHAN SINGHJoint Director, Intelligence BureauSpecial EditorivThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

23rd December, 1887: TheJourney begins.......The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issuev

viThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Courtesy - National Archives of IndiaThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issuevii

The IB insignia symbolises the quintessence of theorganisation. It depicts the whole, which is bigger thanthe parts.The outermost contour is octagonal in shape andsymbolises multiplicity of directions and stands forthe multi-dimentional responsibilities and tasks of theorganisation. Contained within the octagon is a squareresting on one of its corners, which is symbolic of thedynamic and progressive approach of the organisation.The wheel with 24 spokes, forming the inner core of thelogo, is a replica of the “Dharma Chakra”, and stands forintegrity and professionalism.The mottodepicts the longstanding traditionwithin the Intelligence Bureau, which causes its personnelto remain alert always and put in their all in protectingand serving the Nation.viiiThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

The Logo released on the completion of 125 years ofIntelligence Bureau’s existence, with sweeping coloursof the national flag depicts diverse and dynamic India.Central to the National Security Architecture, theIntelligence Bureau has striven over one and a quartercentury to protect the core values of this great Nation.The insignia of the Intelligence Bureau, cradled within thenational colours, signifies the organisation’s unwaveringcommitment to the preservation of the Constitution ofIndia, and the country’s security and integrity.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issueix

D. Pilditch ESQR, who was Director Intelligence Bureau between December 1939 toApril 1945, being accorded farewell in 1935, after handing over charge asSuperintendent of Police, EtawahxThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Helmsmen of the IB during thePre-Independence PeriodMr. D.E. McCracken January 1888 to April 1904Mr. H.A. Stuart April 1904 to April 1909Mr. Stevenson Moore May 1909 to January 1910Sir C.R. Cleveland February 1910 to September 1919Col. Sir C. Kaye, CSI, CIE, OBE October 1919 to October 1924Sir David Petrie October 1924 to March 1931Sir Horace Williamson April 1931 to March 1936Sir J.M. Ewart March 1936 to December 1939Sir D. Pilditch December 1939 to April 1945Sir N.P.A. Smith April 1945 to April 1947The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issuexi

DIRECTORS, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU,SINCE 1947SHRI T.G. SANJEEVI PILLAI, IP(APR 12, 1947 TO JULY 14, 1950)SHRI BHOLA NATH MULLICK, IP(JULY 15, 1950 TO OCT 09, 1964SHRI S.P. VERMA, IP(OCT 1964 TO JAN 1968)SHRI M.M.L. HOOJA, IP(JAN 1968 TO NOV 1971)SHRI ATMA JAYARAM, IPS(NOV 1971 TO AUG 1975)SHRI S.N. MATHUR, IPS(AUG 1975 TO FEB 1980)SHRI T.V. RAJESWAR, IPS(FEB 1980 TO AUG 1983)SHRI R.K. KAPOOR, IPS(AUG 1983 TO NOV 1984)SHRI H.A. BARARI, IPS(NOV 1984 TO MAR 1987)SHRI M.K. NARAYANAN, IPS(APR 1987 TO DEC 1989)(JAN 1991 TO FEB 1992)SHRI R.P. JOSHI, IPS(DEC 1989 TO DEC 1990)xiiThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

SHRI V.G. VAIDYA, IPS(MAR 1992 TO JULY 1994)SHRI D.C. PATHAK, IPS(AUG 1994 TO AUG 1996)SHRI ABHIJIT MITRA, IPS(AUG 1996 TO SEP 1996)SHRI ARUN BHAGAT, IPS(SEP 1996 TO APR 1998)SHRI SHAYAMAL DUTTA, IPS(APR 1998 TO MAY 2001)SHRI K.P. SINGH, IPS(MAY 2001 TO JULY 2004)SHRI A.K. DOVAL, IPS(JULY 2004 TO JAN 2005)SHRI E.S.L. NARASIMHAN, IPS(FEB 2005 TO DEC 2006)SHRI P.C. HALDAR, IPS(JAN 2007 TO DEC 2008)SHRI RAJIV MATHUR, IPS(JAN 2009 TO DEC 2010)The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issuexiii

Line Drawings depicting the infamousThugs of IndiaxivThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

“Sleeman sahib ki jai”“No Crime has been without a precedent”- SenecaShri Vijai Shukul, IPS (Retd.)No, this is not from ‘Jai ho’ of A.R. Rehman, buta charming and entirely spontaneous expressionof joy and affection coming from the villagers ofSaleemnabad, a town 70 kms from Jabalpur onhighway no. 7 towards Benaras. The occasionwas visit of the grandson of Sir W.H. Sleeman,Col. James Lewis Sleeman, along with his son,on 6 th February 1937. Col. J.L. Sleeman wasaccompanied by G.W. Benton, IP (Suptd Police,Jabalpur). In the year 1836-37, Sir WilliamSleeman, while touring Jabalpur district, hadcome across a village named Khoka, where hesettled landless labourers by taking 96 acres ofland from the Government as Maufi-land. In1839, the village was named Saleemnabad afterthe name of its benefactor and a railway stationof the same name stands close by. About half amile from the village, there was a tiny hamlet,where, a holy man of Krishna order, namedBaba Haridas lived. Sleeman had already beenmarried for four years and had no children.While passing Khoka, Baba Haridas remarkedthat it was a holy place and all who came herewould be blessed with a son. Sleeman jokinglypromised, that if his prophecy came true, hewould present the village with a large sum ofmoney. The prophecy did come true, as Sleemana year later, while camping at a village in Sagar,was blessed with a son. Sleeman, not forgettinghis promise, donated a large sum of money tothe village. Haridas by that time had died and ashrine was made in his memory. To perpetuatethe memory of the founder and the benefactorof the village, a brass lamp was placed in thememory of Sleeman, which continues to remainlit since last 150 years. Two ladies of the Sleemanfamily, out of curiosity, visited Khoka in recentyears and were also blessed with sons within ayear. The Sleeman family has, thus, continuedits association with Saleemnabad.During his visit Col. James Sleeman was takenout in a procession through triumphal arches andstreets lined with buntings. Village ladies withshining bright brass ‘Lotas’, followed singing.The affection showered was for a man whomthey revered as ‘Baba Sleeman’. Under a hugeshamiana, the village elders presented Col. JamesSleeman with two memoranda. In the words ofCol. James Sleeman, “for where else in the worldtoday would one find such generous expressionof gratitude for services rendered over a centuryago”. Col. James L. Sleeman also visited theshrine of Baba Haridas to pay his obeisance, andthe old police station building, designed by hisgrand father and constructed under his directionin 1843. The whole visit to Saleemnabad waslike a page from the Arabian Nights, so wroteCol. James Lewis Sleeman.On 8 th February 1937, Col. James Sleeman visitedthe Court House at Jabalpur, where Sleemansenior had tried more than 2000 Thugs. He wasintrigued by the stone pedestal upon which theThugs were made to sit during his grandfather'ssearching interrogations, with lights of threewindows directly upon them. He also met a 92yrs old Thug, a Kanjar, whom Sleeman had triedand was liberated at the age of 74. An acre ofland was given to settle the descendants of theThugs, which is today called the Kanjar mohalla,it is also called ‘Gurandi’ from the Persian word‘Goyanda’, which means, one who speaks, thatis an approver.Col. James Sleeman also visited the site of the oldjail, which no longer exists and the reformatoryschool called the Darikhana or the School ofIndustry, presently with the Home Guards,Jabalpur. There he met the descendants of theThugs. A plaque is still embedded on the wallof the building to commemorate the founding ofThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 1

the Jabalpur School of Industry in 1836, whichSleeman had started from his own funds, inanticipation of government sanction.Plaque showing inauguration of Jabalpur School ofIndustry, founded by Sir W H SleemanTo write about Sir William Sleeman would be towrite about the Old Central Provinces, or today’sMadhya Pradesh, and earlier Sagour and Nerbuddaterritories, which had became the ‘Karam-bhoomi’of Sleeman. It would be appropriate to writeabout ‘Thuggee Sleeman’ and the Thuggee lore,by mentioning the romantic side of Sleeman’sexploits with the Thugs and their sinister style ofmurder, besides writing about the titanic task ofsuppression of the centuries old evil of Thuggeeand Dacaities. These were very systematicallyand painstakingly penned by Sleeman in his ownhand through innumerable reports and letters tothe Government of East India Company.As a Policeman, Sir Sleeman was the greatest theworld has ever seen. A Police officer who, in wordsof Sir Francis Tuker, had done:Quote “more than any man had ever done beforeand more than any man was likely to do forgenerations after he had gone.” UnquoteThough Sleeman had many feathers in his capasa soldier, a linguist, an administrator, anagriculturist, but he will be remembered mostas a police man. In hours of crisis, Sleemanwas sent by providence, not only to give a neworientation to police work, but also to foreseeand lay the foundation of the police force to meetfuture needs of the country. He, as a leader, hadexceptional qualities like the ability to gatherevidence and to educate the people, especiallythose wielding legal and political authority, toenlist the aid of good men to uproot and destroythe conspiratorial organization. He had the fullbacking of the Governor General Bentick, andloyalty of valiant sepoys and nujeebs in hisemploy, whose courage Sleeman often praised.In order to understand the full impact of Sleeman’scontribution in building and laying the foundationof the present police force in India, it is necessaryto mention, in brief, his life and career in India.His faith in prevention, detection and successfulprosecution became the hallmark of policingin India. Analytical reports of great depth, as aresult of interrogation of the Thugs and Dacoits,informers and approvers, highlighted the modusoperandi, their origin and field of operation. Thiswas the beginning of the modus operandi system,later adopted by the Police forces to detect crimes.As a result of painstaking touring of villages andinteraction with the villagers about their society,culture and problems and immediate redressalof their grievances, he created an atmosphere oftrust and confidence. The above not only showedthe way to the Reforms Commissions of 1861 and1904, but also paved the way for the creation ofa separate department to deal with special typesof organized crime. Sleeman believed that extraordinary crimes needed extra ordinary measures,and provoked the government to enact speciallaws to deal with them. His reports on the Badhakdacoits led to the enactment of Act XXX 1836and later the Criminal Tribes Act of 1878.Born in Cornwal in 1778, Sleeman had preparedhimself to become a soldier but destiny finallymade him a civil servant and a police officer. Helearnt French, German, Latin and Greek literature.He studied the campaigns of Greek and RomanEmperors and political and economic history ofthe world. Unable to acquire a Commission, hejoined the Bengal Army, in 1808, at the age of 20years. He also learned Arabic, Persian, Urdu andHindustani, and in October 1809, landed at theHoogly Harbour.Sleeman was a good shot and a good rider andon his Colonel's advice, kept away from womenand drinks. While in the Army, Sleeman missedno opportunity to mix with the villagers to know2The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

their life and their problems related to agricultureand the revenue system. He could freely conversewith the villagers in Hindustani, and had a greatpassion for history and old records and documents.Going through the old records, he came across theaccounts of Thugs, as mentioned by Ziya-uddinBarni’s history of Ferozshah, written in 1356 andthe French traveler Thevenot, in the 14 th Century.With this, his thirst to know about these typesof criminals, their origin, field of operation andtheir modus operandi, increased. He noticed thatmany of the sepoys going on leave did not returnfor duty. This aroused his suspicion. One RobertC. Sherwood of the Madras Medical Corps, hadwritten an article in the Madras Literary Gazette onthe Phansigars (the stranglers), operating in SouthIndia, which confirmed Sleeman’s suspicion ofthe existence of Thuggee all over India. He couldconnect Thevenot’s criminals of north to thePhansigars mentioned by Sherwood. Yet the Armyofficers dismissed the disappearance of sepoys,as routine happenings and were not interested inresearch, calling it as Sleeman’s obsession.At Allahabad, Sleeman was totally disillusionedwith the Army life and applied for the post ofa language teacher but was advised to join thePolitical Service. In December 1819, Sleeman gota chance of his lifetime when he was appointedas Assistant to the political agent of the GovernorGeneral at Sagar. He felt that it was God’s willthat he use all his energies to promote the goodof those who would come under him. Sleemanhad finally come to his ‘Karam-bhoomi’ where hespent three-fourth of his career of 47 years, withbrief spells at Jhansi, Moradabad and Lucknow.In March 1820, Sleeman was attached to theoffice of the Political Agent at Jabalpur to learnrevenue and police work. While at Jabalpur,Sleeman doggedly continued his investigationsabout the Thugs. Between 1820 and 1830, thechips were in favour of the Thugs. The biggesthurdle was the laissez-faire policy of the EastIndia Company, to keep away from all mattersof religious, social and cultural practices in India.Though Thuggee had been exposed by Sherwoodin a detailed article in the Madras LiteraryGazette in 1815, the existence of Thuggee wasnot officially acknowledged. Magistrates invarious areas under the company had caughtThugs before 1810, but they went unpunisheddue to the judges mistaken idea of transplantingprinciples of criminial jurisprudence of Englandto India, which were not suitable to deal withorganized crime like Thuggee. The connivanceof native states and the zamindars, distancesbetween the scenes of crime, places of arrestand places of trials, security of the witnessesand discouragement to informers, who wereoften charged with perjury by the judges, werethe main hurdles. Despite these shortcomings,Sleeman continued to investigate Thuggee casesto find out the areas of operation, their origin,hereditary ties and modus operandi. He startedbuilding up his own records of the criminals.He found the police system thoroughly corrupt,inefficient and inadequate.About the Thanedars he wrote, "who cansuppose that men so inadequately paid, whohave no promotion to look forward to, andfeel no security in their tenure of office, andconsequently, no hope of provision for old age,will be zealous and honest in the discharge oftheir duties?" He felt that if the government keptthe above considerations in mind for Europeanpublic servants, why were the same principlesnot applied to native police officers. He furtherwrote that "the magistrate of the district gets asalary from 2000 to 2500 rupees a month, thenative officer, next under him is the Thanedaror the head native police of the sub division ofhis district, containing many towns and villages,with a population of a 100 thousand souls. Thisofficer gets a salary of 25 rupees a month andthe people, seeing how much is expected fromthe Thanedars and how little is given to them,submit to his demands for contributions withouta murmur and consider favourably almost anydemand coming from a man so employed and sopaid". He also suggested, in much detail, waysto remove obstacles in the way of prosecutionof cases, conviction of offenders and delay injustice. Sleeman was in favour of bringing theun-covenanted services at par with covenantedservices. His emphasis was on supervision andtouring.In 1822, Sleeman was given independent charge ofNarsinghpur district, about 70 kms from Jabalpur.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 3

There, through intensive touring and interactionwith the villagers, he protected them from the‘Zulum’ of the administration, by prompt redressalof grievances and thereby earned the good willof the people. His report to the government onagriculture, horticulture, administration and tradewere favourably commented upon by the Boardof Directors. He showed how dangerous it wasto run the show, sitting at the district and subdivisionheadquarters and thus laid the foundationof ‘tent-touring’ and its benefits for the future civiland the police officers. Humane treatment ofprisoners and their families earned him the trustand good will which helped him in later yearsin his battle against the Thugs and dacoits andalso set an example for jail reforms. It was againat Narsinghpur that he came to know, in 1831,that a gang of Thugs lived not even 400 yardsfrom his Cutchery (Court), and that the groves ofMundesur, some 12 miles off Narsinghpur, wasone of the greatest ‘Beles’ or places of slaughterin India. While at Narsinghpur, he also got ataste of the Badhak dacoits after they successfullycommitted a bold dacoity, hardly a few pacesfrom the police chowki, after very cleverlyduping the check-post staff and disappearing inthin air. Sleeman did not sit quiet after this affairand started investigations regarding the Badhakdacoits. In later years, when he was appointed todeal with them, Sleeman already had collectedample record.In 1824, Sleeman was promoted as Captain, anddue to ill-health went on leave to the South seasand the Mauritius island. On coming back in1825, he was temporarily attached to Jabalpurto help Molonny, his senior who gave him somecourt work to do. It was at Jabalpur that Sleemanmade a thorough study of the Thugs, with thehelp of one Kalyan Singh, an ex-convict, whomhe had once helped. Kalyan Singh, of his ownaccord informed and exposed a gang of thirtyThugs, who had been released, as the huge stolenproperty could not be traced to their owners.Moti, Kalyan’s brother turned an approver andon his information, 27 bodies were recovered,just a few miles from Jabalpur town. Moti wasspared and others were tried and convicted. Tillthat time, no special laws had been made toconvict the accused on the basis of informationof the approvers. Act XXX 1836 had not beenenacted and Sleeman taking advantage of thenon-regulatory territory, applied its laws freely.Moti taught Sleeman the secret language of theThugs, the ‘Ramasee’. Documents related toThug dialect were circulated through out CentralIndia, which were of great help in investigations.At Jabalpur, Sleeman personally interrogated,and cross-examined Thugs and recordedtheir statements in his own hand. He createdinformers and approvers by releasing them onthe condition that they help him in catchingother criminals. By that time he had collectedenough information and material for his book“Ramaseena”, giving graphic description of theorigin of and the language of the Thugs. Till thenno officer had attempted such an independentstudy. Sleeman continued to send reports to thegovernment along with suggestions and steps tocombat this form of crime. By this time Sleemanhad come to the conclusion that Thuggee waslike a big tree with branches, trunk and roots andthat with patience and creation of genealogicaltree of the Thugs, the root could be cut, by whichthe whole tree trunk and branches would comedown. He also learnt about the revenge of Thugsagainst informers and approvers. It was Moti, theThug, who suggested setting up of reformatoriesfor the Thug approvers and informers and theirfamilies, thereby providing them with usefulemployment, security and prevent recidivism.Open settlements were created at Sagar andJabalpur which grew into big villages. The Kanjarmohalla called Gurandi is still there in Jabalpur.It was at Jabalpur that Sleeman took a bolddecision to open a reformatory out of his ownfunds. ‘The School of Industry’, as it was called,did good work in making various arts and craftslike blankets, cotton durees, niwars, woollencarpets, bricks, baskets, etc. They were marketedlocally and to the government offices. Goodmoney was earned by this honest profession bythe Thugs. On a request by Queen Victoria, acarpet measuring 40’x80’, weighing 2 tons, wassuccessfully made for use in the Windsor Castle.The above experiment was in later years followedin various ways. The salvation army started itscamp at Moradabad for the Bhatu criminal tribesto which the notorious dacoit, Sultana belonged.4The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Settling down of criminal tribes was taken up bythe native States and a Mogia department wascreated in the old Holkar, Scindia and Bhopalstates of Madhya Bharat. Recently, open jail wascreated for the surrendered dacoits of Chambaland Bundelkhand regions at Mugawali in districtAshoknagar. Today, jails all over the country arerunning artisan workshops of all kinds and aretermed as correctional institutions, a principleput in practice nearly 175 years earlier bySleeman.In 1928, while holding civil and executive chargeat Jabalpur, Sleeman was given a residence nearthe parade ground. The house and the park wasdestroyed in 1870 when a railway line was laidat the site. As Commissioner Jabalpur, Sleemanstayed and lived in style, in a huge mansion builtin 1821, called the Commissioner’s Residency,which today is the residence of the RevenueCommissioner, Jabalpur. It was here he wrote‘Rambles and the Recollections of an IndianOfficer’. Under the main hall, there still exists ahuge cellar which has not been opened since along time.In 1828, Sleeman found his life companion AmelieJosephine, a French nobleman’s daughter, whoGeneral William Henry Sleemanhad escaped the French revolution and settled inMauritius. But it was at Jabalpur that he met her,and was married on 21 st June, 1829, by licence,at the political residency by T. H. Maddock, agentto the Governor General. To commemorate hismarriage Sleeman got an impressive 86 mile longavenue planted on the Jabalpur-Benaras road andon the Jabalpur-Narsinghpur road. The road sidetrees lasted for more than 100 years. One can stillsee some old trees on these roads.The year 1828 was lucky for Sleeman as ‘DoNothing’ Lord Amherst was replaced by ‘GoForward’ Lord Bentinck. Earlier, in 1826, Sleemanhad already been given the additional charge oftackling and coordinating Thuggee crimes over alarge area. Bentinck was impressed with the reportsof Sleeman and opposition by his brother officerswithered. Those who had scoffed at Sleeman'ssingle-handed operation, started co-operating. Ifthe Thugs considered it a duty ordained by ‘kali’to kill, so Sleeman thought it his duty ordainedby God to exterminate the Thugs. Sleeman wastrying to reach to the roots of the Thuggee treeand cut it. More than half a century before Frazercommission recommended a number registerfor the police station, as a part of police recordsAmelie JosephineThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 5

of the criminals, Sleeman had already created amethodology based on history sheets, gang historysheets, village crime note books, convictionregister, etc. and used them against the Thugs andDacoits. In 1829, Sleeman sent a report to CurweenSmith, agent to Governor General at Sagar, to beforwarded to the Government. It proposed a needfor a more efficient police establishment, and thecreation of out-posts along roads. Besides physicalmeasures, he mentioned that the existing judicialsystem was inadequate to deal with the challenge,and that only with the evidence of the approversand informers, was conviction possible. As Thugsliving in native states enjoyed immunity, herecommended their trials at one place. In August1830, Bentinck accepted the recommendations,ordering liberal rewards to informers and brandingof convicted Thugs on their back. The finger printsystem had not come in vogue. The practice toemploy spies as an extra ordinary measure todeal with extra ordinary crimes like Thuggee,was suggested in 1810 by O. W. Steer, whowas Assistant to the Magistrate of Etawah. TheGovernment approved of the use of spies assuggested by Steer, acknowledging that it was anecessity in Police work. The expenses for thepay of spies was to be listed under the heading‘Secret Service’. Bentinck impressed by the reportasked for a master plan. Sleeman prepared a blueprint, namely, a ‘Plan’ for the eventual destructionof the association of Thugs infesting centralIndia. For some reason Smith, the agent to theGovernor General delayed forwarding the Planto Bentinck. Sleeman resorted to an un-orthodoxmethod to expose Thuggee to the public eye. On3 rd October, 1830, Calcutta Gazette published anarticle anonymously sent by Sleeman, exposingthe gruesome deeds of Thugs. People in Calcuttawere shocked. Bentinck immediately agreedfor the creation of a separate department withSleeman as its first Superintendent. After 10 yrs ofhard labour, Sleeman’s course was set, with extrapowers and resources at his disposal to destroythe secret societies of the Thugs.Act XXX of 1836 made convictions possible,even for association with the Thug gangs. Thislegal carte-blanche was extended to all the Britishprovinces. In the meantime, Sleeman worked ontwo projects, one to complete genealogical tableby removing discrepancies, by cross checkingwith police and revenue records. With it, the entirehereditary tree of the Thugs was completed. Thesecond project was the completion of his book,the secret language of the Thugs ‘Ramaseena’, forthe benefit of the investigating officers to identifythe Thugs in public places.In 1835, to coordinate and collate recordsof over a dozen offices of superintendents,working all over the country, a post of GeneralSuperintendent was created and Sleeman wasthe first choice. By then he had been promotedas a Major with Headquarters at Jabalpur, toconcentrate solely on Thuggee operations. Thiswas the first attempt by a Central authority tocollate and disseminate Intelligence to all fieldofficers. It goes to the credit of Sleeman that helaid the foundation of the present IntelligenceBureau, as a constitutional body, as per VIIschedule of Indian Constitution. A small cell fora "Special Branch" was established in 1887, as bythat time the Thuggee and Dacoity department hadmore or less ceased to exist. In 1904, on FrazerCommission’s recommendations, a CentralCriminal Intelligence Department, under an IGwas created, in line with the provincial CID tocollect, collate and communicate information,under condition of frank and cordial cooperation,between the Centre and the provinces, withouttaking away the responsibilities of the localGovernment. Later the word criminal wasdeleted and thereafter the bulk of the Intelligencecollected was no longer related to criminalactivities only.In 1835, due to deterioration of his health,Sleeman was releuctantly granted leave but wasreappointed as General Superintendent in 1836.After dealing with the river Thugs of Bengal,Sleeman, in 1838 would proudly report thatfrom 1829 to 1837, the total number of Thugstried were 3266. The massive conviction bearstestimony to the high standard of evidencecollected by Sleeman before he sent any personfor trial. Though subdued activities continued inthe native states and the Punjab, the trunk of theThug fraternity had been destroyed. It was only aquestion of time before the branches would also6The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

perish. Between 1841 and 1848, another 514Thugs had been convicted. Thuggee ceased toexist after 1848. In the Central provinces Thugsremained a column in the annual crime statisticsupto the year 1900. In 1904, only 2 cases werereported in India.Though Sleeman was nicknamed ‘ThuggeeSleeman’, it would also be more appropriate tocall him ‘Thuggee and Dacoity Sleeman’. Forin the year 1839, another feather was addedto his cap. He was to face another challengefor which he was well prepared. Sleeman wasnow made Commissioner, in addition to his jobas Superintendent of the Thuggee Department.The new department came to be known as the"Department for the suppression of Thuggee andDakaity". Sleeman shifted his headquarters fromJabalpur to Moradabad. In the year 1839, therewere wide spread depredation by Badhak dacoitsin Northern India, from Jamuna to Kosi, and fromHimalayas to Narmada. There was terror and fearamongst the people, ‘no one seemed to knowfrom whence they came and whence they fled’.Treasuries of native Collectors had to be fortified.The Badhaks were well organized, numberingupto 10,000 dacoits in the region. Sleeman hadalready had a taste of Badhaks at Narsinghpurin 1824, and since then, besides investigatingThugs, he was also investigating the Badhakdacoits. Sleeman immediately went into actionagainst the dacoits and adopted the same tactics,as he had done against the Thugs, includingreformatory measures. He set up a colony forthe dacoits named Badhakpura at Moradabad.Sleeman had to adopt harsh measures against thedacoits due to the organized and deceptive waysof the Badhaks. Army was called out againstthem. One Mangal Singh in Oudh area and GajrajSingh in Chambal area of Gwalior, Dholpur andAlwar had created a reign of terror. The Sarafaof Jhansi, Peshwas palace at Bhithur, Kanpurand several other big and small towns werelooted and ransacked. In the Central Province,the towns of Narsinghpur, Hoshangabad andSohagpur were also looted. Enroute, no treasurywas safe from these dacoits. Sleeman fell on theBadhaks like a tornado and by 1842, all majorgangs and their members were either arrested,killed or had surrendered. By comparison, it isrealized that in the same Chambal region, twelveto thirteen Batallions of Special Armed forcesof MP, UP and Rajasthan had been engaged forover twenty years since 1951, till the surrender ofthe 23 listed gangs of Madhya Pradesh, in 1972.In fighting the descendants of the Badhak gangs,Sleeman’s achievement in two years stands outin bold contrast. Sleeman’s strength lay in theintelligence collected with meticulous care andof very high standard of accuracy, before hestruck against the gangs.It was at district Sagar in the year 1973, whileinvestigating a case of dacoity, I came across areport on 'Budhuk @ Bagree Decoits and OtherGang Robbers' and on the measures adopted bythe Government of India for their suppression byLt. Col. W H Sleeman. Although the report wassent to the press in 1840, the Governor General,Lord Auckland felt that the proper time for itspublication had not arrived. It is believed thatthe report, which highlighted the existence ofhereditary gangs of robbers and dacoits and theirdepredations would show the East-India companyin a bad light before the English Parliament andthe Crown. It was finally published in 1849.Sleeman, in a forwarding letter to H. M. Elliot,Secretary to the Goverment of India, had opinedthat this was the last elaborate report on crimein India. Sleeman was correct, because afterSleeman, to this day, no person or organizationin India, connected to crime, has ever come outwith such a report. It goes to the credit of theIntelligence Bureau that after Independence, itpublished a “Report on the Criminal Activities onInter –State Gangs of Bawarias”. Sleeman had theadvantage of being familiar with acts, thoughtsand feelings of persons involved in crime. Hehad foresight, and he expressed his apprehensionthat though Thuggee had been suppressed, it wassure to rise again, if the police was negligent.The report was an eye opener for me, which setme on my course in Police career to study theCriminal Tribes.As a reward, Sleeman was first given an additionalcharge to look into the affairs of GwaliorState, which was in bad shape. He supersededCavindich, the Resident at Gwalior who was afriend of Bentinck. Sleeman made Jhansi hisThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 7

headquarters where he built a house. He hadbecome Lt. Colonel by now. His next promotionwas that of Resident of Oudh at Lucknow, in theyear 1849. Sleeman had found both Gwalior andOudh badly governed and found King Wajid Aliof Oudh, an incorrigible ruler. He took strongmeasures to clean the augean stables. Sleeman,from day one, was never in favour of annexingGwalior or Oudh. Lord Hardings, and laterBentinck had already made up their mind to doso. All the pleadings of Sleeman fell on deaf ears.His strong views on the annexation policy showwhat diplomatic and administrative foresightand acumen Sleeman was gifted with. He hadwarned that since in the Bengal Army most ofthe recruits belonged to the Oudh area, theywould rebel in case of annexation. Sleeman wasof the view of not adding areas of native States, as“they were back waters, with clan loyalty. Peopledid not want the ruler to be disposed off by analien power, even though he was a bad ruler”.Sleeman was apprehensive that with the IndianStates gone, mal-administration would go to thecompany’s credit and would result in full scalerebellion, leading to blood shed and sufferings.Sleeman’s principle in dealing with Indian stateswas to do all the good he could, but allow it toappear as if the initiative came from the Darbar.They were sound principles, which were notaccepted. He wrote, “to confiscate would bedishonest and dishonorable. To annex would beto give people, a government almost as bad astheir own”.Sleeman was a public servant in the true senseof the word. He was accessible to all and sundryand provided immediate relief to grievances.Subordinate officers were proud of their boss,who by now had acquired the reputation ofbeing one of the ablest administrator and policeofficer in the whole country. In 1851, Sleemanwas made a full Colonel and in 1852, a MajorGeneral. By 1855, Sleeman was almost crippleddue to rheumatic and malarial fever and foundit difficult to carry on. He wanted to go back toEngland and retire. On Jan 24, 1856 Sleemanalong with his wife Amelie boarded the boat atHoogly. He was informed at Calcutta that hewas being recommended for the “Civil Cross ofKnight Commander of Bath”. On 5 th February1856, Queen Victoria appointed Major GeneralSleeman to the most Honorable order of Bath.However, this news did not reach him at sea.His end came on 10 th February 1856, on board,and Sleeman was buried at sea off the Coast ofCeylon.It would be unfair on my part, not to mention asto how Sleeman had become a hero in the late19 th century and beyond. After the publicationof Col. Philip Meadow Taylors “Confessions of aThug”, the Thuggee lore became a literary subjectin the West. The Thugs captured the Victorianromantic imagination. Books like Eugene Sue’s“The Wandering Jew” became the best sellingbook of the century. Pictorial and sculpturaldepiction of Thugs in action also becamepopular souvenirs and old Thug prisoners wereparaded and made to stage their former deedsin front of thrilled tourists, including the Princeof Wales, who in 1877, allowed an old Thug to‘strangle’ his arms in order to feel the methodof strangulation himself. Besides, popular workslike Francis Tuker’s “The Yellow Scarf” (1963)and George Bruce’s “The Straglers” (1966)made Sleeman a hero. Also, writers like Russels,Hiralal, Mike Dash, Robert Johnson and KimWagner came out with excellent material onSleeman.If such was the popularity of Sleeman after morethan 150 years, how could the Police officers allover the country and especially those of CentralProvinces, present Madhya Pradesh, whoseproximity to Sleeman’s ‘Karam Bhoomi’ in thedistricts of Jabalpur, Sagar and Narsinghpur,remain unaffected. They were very close toSleemans Thuggee and Dacoity legends andalso to the first and second generation of theThug descendants living in Jabalpur. No doubtSleeman became a role model for Policeofficers, who contributed in no small measuretowards Intelligence based investigation;analytical reports based on crime records andfield touring; building of records of criminal ‘denotifiedTribes’; publication and disseminationof criminal gazette; and above all leadership ofa very high order.8The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

In conclusion, I would like to recommend thatyoung officers and new entrants to police servicedevote sometime to the voluminous reports andrecords penned by Sleeman in his own hand,and that Sleeman is made a subject of researchand studies at police acadamies all over thecountry. The Sleeman Library, which wasshifted from Shivpuri to Delhi, should not onlybe a repository of old books and records, butalso a centre of study for young police officers.This will go a long way to create a culture of realpolicing and provide the much needed uprightand moral leadership to the Police force, to takeit forward.Drawing of Thugs by Capt. Patton, who served under Sleeman in Lucknow.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 9

Growth of Intelligence Institutionsin British IndiaShri Amiya K. Samanta, IPS (Retd.)Intelligence gathering is an ancient professionwhich can claim scriptural authority from theearliest literature – the Rig-Veda, which records:“As the wind moves everywhere and penetrates allcreated beings, so also should the king penetrateeverywhere, by the means of his mysteriousagents.” 1 In the West too, engagement of spies hasscriptural sanction. The Lord instructed Moses tosend secret agents “to spy out the land of Cannanand give him valuable advice on the intelligencerecruitment.” 2 In the ancient and medievalperiods, the engagement and deployment of spiesand informers was by and large personalised; aninstitutionalised intelligence system grew up onlywith the growth of the apparatus of a modernstate.1. POLITICAL SETTING ANDADMINISTRATIVE NEEDSIn the first half of the 19th century, the Company’sGovernment in India came to possess immense“power-knowledge” from the reports and writeupson trade and commerce, socio-economicand religious practices and various other matters.Such ‘power-knowledge’ became useful informulating policies on education, social reform,land revenue etc., but had little to do withsecurity. Since army was the mainstay of Britishrule, threat to security, both internal and externalwas largely taken care of by it. After the First Warof Indian Independence in 1857, the Governmenthad realized that India could not be ruled bythe sword alone. Though the administrationcontinued to suffer from the “Mutiny Complex”for several decades, the institution of a modernstate, with justice and individual liberty as acornerstone, started emerging after the Queen’sProclamation of 1858.1 S.D. Trivedi : Secret Services in Ancient India: Techniquesand Operations. New Delhi, 1988, P.232 Christopher Andrews: Her Majesty’s Secret Service, P.1While the Indian Council Act of 1861 containedthe ideas of representative government andprovincial autonomy in seminal form, the newPenal Code (1861), Criminal Procedure Code(1868), Evidence Act (1872) and the Police Act(1861), set up a criminal justice system in whichthe ideas of justice and equality were ingrained.Thus, under the direct rule of the British Crownwith ultimate authority vested in the Parliament,India started emerging as a modern state.In the 1860s, when the Wahabi movement brokeout, followed by the Hindu revivalist movement,the Government’s anxiety about a possibleconnection between religious revivalism andpolitical unrest increased. The British rulers,infected by “Mutiny Complex” suspected everyreligious movement as preparation for politicaluprising. Though the Wahabi movement inIndia, created little more than some low-keydisturbances in Bengal, 3 Bihar, Punjab and theNorth West Frontier Province, yet the bogeyof Muslim uprising in India, or the rebellion ofthe fiercely independent frontier tribes underWahabi influence, haunted the British. In dealingwith the Wahabis, the concept of ‘sedition’ wasintroduced in criminal jurisprudence by addingsection 124A to the Indian Penal Code.But the Indian nationalism, which eventuallyended the British rule, was slowly gatheringstrength. Hollowness of the British claim to theintroduction of a system of justice, equity andindividual liberty in India, was exposed whenthe Arms Act of 1876, dispossessed Indians of firearms for self-defense, the Vernacular Press Act of1878, restricted publication of newspapers inIndian languages, the Ilbert Bill of 1883, seeking toabolish the trial of Anglo-Indian by judges of their3 In Bengal the rebellion of Titu Mir was a Wahabi upsurge. Hedefied the British authority, but was eventually defeated bythe army.10The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

own race alone, had to be withdrawn in the faceof strong opposition from the racist Europeans.In this context, in 1877, Surendra Nath Banerji’sstirring “lectures in English, in upper Indiaassumed the character of a triumphant progress”and they “excited as much enthusiasm amongthe rising generation in Multan as in Delhi.” 4 Thetop level of the Government did not have muchclue about the depth of resentment amongst theeducated section of the society.When one Wahabi convict assassinated ViceroyMayo in the Andaman jail in 1872, ViceroyNorthbrook (1872-1876) felt the need for “adetective police for political purposes” and askedthe Thugee and Dakaity Department to take upthe job.Viceroy Lytton (1876-1880), aware of theinadequacies of Indian intelligence, felt that hehad, “no Special Officer whose duty requireshim to receive and to submit to the head of theGovernment, confidential and secret informationof political and military importance. 5 ”Northbrook’s experiment evidently had failed.Lytton’s advice to the Local Governments, toadopt the experiment of 'Special Branch', set upin 1876 in Punjab 6 , was not followed. ViceroyRipon (1880-1884) had a consensual approach tothe problems of administration. “We cannot nowrely on military force alone; policy as well as justiceought to prompt our endeavour to govern moreand more by means of, and in accordance with,the growing public opinion, which is beginningto show itself throughout the country.” 7 EvidentlyRipon implied that the Government should keeptrack of the public opinion in India through analternative method.2. AN INSTITUTION FORINTELLIGENCE COLLECTIONEventually, after the formation of the IndianNational Congress in December 1885, theSecretary of State addressed his secret despatch4 Henry Cotton wrote this in his book” New India” referred tothis tour. See S.N.Banerji’s “A Nation in Maling,” Pp59-605 Amiya K. Samanta: History of Intelligence in Modern India,(Restricted circulation) P.356 This was mentioned in an enclosure to Dufferin’s letter toLord Cross dated 15th November,1887.7 Judith M. Brown: Modern India: The Origins of an AsianDemocracy, P. 100.No.11, dated 25th March, 1887, on the subjectof ‘collection of secret and political intelligencein India’. After consulting the Governors and topofficials of the Presidencies, Viceroy Dufferin(1884-1888) wrote to the Secretary of State:“I desire to utilise in British India, the services ofthe Police force, and in Native States, the existingmeans at the disposal of Political Officers, forcollection of intelligence on political, social andreligious movements.” Dufferin then gave out thedetails of his scheme. “Being of opinion that theformation of a large detective staff would be opento very serious objections, I propose to work asfar as possible, through the Local Governments,imposing on them the responsibility of collectingsuch intelligence as may be necessary for theirown purposes and of reporting to Governmentof India, whatever may be desirable for the latterto know. At the headquarters of the Governmentof India and the Local Governments, I desire toemploy special agencies of the lowest possiblestrength, consistent with the work of collectingand recording intelligence received, and ofinitiating and conducting at the instance ofthe Government of India, such enquiries asmay be necessary in special cases.” Dufferin’ssecret despatch had, thus, broadly divided theresponsibilities of the proposed Central andthe Provincial Special Branches, and also laiddown the roles of the Central and the LocalGovernments, with regard to the Central and theLocal outfits. The provincial Special Brancheswould remain under the control of the LocalGovernment but it would be obligatory on theirpart to share all relevant intelligence with theCentral Special Branch.To curtail the cost, Dufferin suggested the useof the office and the manpower of the Thugeeand Dakaiti Department as a launching pad.“The privileges and facilities that the Departmenthad acquired over the years should be shared.”The General Superintendent of the Departmentwas entrusted with “the supervision of the newlyconstituted “Special Branch.” 8The financial commitment of the Governmentwould be Rs 46,800 per annum. Dufferinselected D McCracken, an officer of the PunjabCadre, to head the Central Special Branch,8 The name was apparently taken from the Special Branch ofMetropolitan Police, London.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 11

and he ”will be called on to be present at theheadquarters of the Government at Calcutta orSimla, and that during the absence of the GeneralSuperintendent of the Thugee Departmenton tour, he will be obliged to conduct theresponsibilities and confidentialities of theSpecial Branch”. Its headquarters would be atSimla, but the Chief of the Special Branch wasto remain present at Calcutta, when required.Thus, the premier intelligence agency of thesub-continent 9 came into existence officially on23 rd December, 1887, when the Secretary ofState approved the proposal “for improvingthe means of obtaining secret and politicalintelligence” 10 .Two pertinent questions, related to the settingup of the institution for collection of secretpolitical intelligence, may be briefly touchedupon here. It has often been contended that“Victorian statesmen held espionage in absoluteabhorrence,” 11 and so the people at the topechelons of the administration in England, asalso in India, were not in favour of setting upan institutionalised intelligence system, lest theGovernment of India should earn the opprobriumof being despotic. But such scruples were not inevidence in the accounts of the Crimean War(1856), the annexation of Oudh, and the first warof Indian independence, 1857, when spies wererecruited and used rampantly by the regimentsand administrative officers. 12Thus, the so-called Victorian aversion to secretpolice or spy system appears to be a myth. Therewas, however, genuine apprehension in theGovernment, that the liberal democratic systemmight be stigmatised for too much reliance onsecret service and the administration might bebranded as despotic. Writing to Lord Cross on15th November,1887, Dufferin underscored thesecrecy of the communications, as “it would not9 Two other countries which emerged from the Indian Empire,namely Pakistan and Bangladesh have an unbroken continuityof the Intelligence Bureau (IB) for domestic intelligence.10 See Viceroy Dufferin’s Secret Dispatch No. 179 dated15.11.1887 and the Secretary of State/ Viscount Cross’sSecret Despatch No.31dated 23rd December, 188711 RichardJ.Popplewell: Intelligence and Imperial Defence;London, 1997,; P33-35. Patrick French in his ‘Liberty orDeath’ has endoesed the views of Popplewell.12 C.A.Baily: Information and the Empire;do for the native press to get it into their heads,that we were about to establish a Third Sectionafter the Russian pattern.” 13The second issue is, whether the establishmentof a permanent institution for collection of secretpolitical intelligence, in December 1887, wasrelated to the foundation of the Indian NationalCongress in December, 1885. The Congress wasclaimed to have been founded by an Englishman,named Allan Octavian Hume (1829-1912) 14 ,in consultation with high British officials,including Lord Dufferin. It was later on allegedthat Hume, though a founder of the Congress,was undoubtedly pro-empire in his attitudeand therefore sought the support of the Britishbureaucracy for the Congress. But, the fact isthat Hume was elected General Secretary of theCongress till 1908, and spared no pains to makeit a truly national party, capable of giving voice tonational aspirations, by inducting representativesfrom all communities and all province. Yet it is alsotrue, that “Before issuing the Congress Manifesto,Hume had consulted the Viceroy, Lord Dufferinand that it was on his suggestion that Hume hadgiven the organisation a political character.” 15That, perhaps, provoked Lajpat Rai to write thatthe British bureaucracy and Hume wanted theCongress to act as a “safety valve, for the escapeof the great and growing forces generated byBritish connection.” Thereafter, many authorshave harped on this theme, and R. Palme Duttgave wide currency to it, as it became handy forthe communists to prove that the Congress wasan ally of British imperialism.Historians 16 have proved, after painstakingsearch, that there is no evidence of ‘great andgrowing forces’ sweeping across India. Dufferin’sopinion about Hume, that he “seems to have got13 Dufferin to Lord Cross, dated 17 April, 1887. Third Sectionwas the notorious secret Russian Police and it was replacedby Okhrana in 1881.14 Hume retired as secretary of Agriculture and as such hadknowledge about the condition of the Indian peasantry. Inhis official capacity he tried to reform Indian agriculture andwas known as a kind-hearted officer.15 L.S.Rathore”A.O.Hume” The Origin of the new NationalMovement,P21-2216 Bipan Chandra, Aditya Mukherjee, K.N.Panikkar and SuchetaMahajan: India’s Struggle for Independence,1989. Theirsearch for materials to substantiate the “the great growingforces” has been noted in this book. Pp 60-6812The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

a bee in his bonnet” 17 , and about the Congress,that it represented no more than a “macroscopicminority”, do not suggest that the Congress wasenjoying official patronage. On the contrary, thedespatch dated 25th March, 1887 of Lord Cross,Secretary of State, on “the collection of secretand political intelligence in India”, suggests thatthe birth of the Congress, specially its secondwell-attended session in Calcutta, in 1886, didnot go unnoticed in London. Thereafter, LordCross suggested the creation of an institution forcollection of “secret political intelligence”, andapproved the proposal for the Central SpecialBranch and the Provincial Special Branches, assoon as it reached him. The birth and growth ofthe Congress, being the only political event ofsignificance during 1885-1887, the intelligenceorganisation that came into existence in 1887,was evidently in response to the new politicaldevelopment. In this context, it is not rationalto think that the British created the Congress asa ‘safety valve’ for the Empire; on the contrary,the Government having foreseen the threat fromthe Congress, set up the institution for politicalintelligence, as a protective measure.3. FROM CENTRAL SPECIAL BRANCHTO INTELLIGENCE BUREAUMcCracken, ensconced at Simla and aided bythe old staff of the Thugee Department, failedto produce much intelligence; though the fewreports he produced, did carry more weight,because of the very nature of informationcollection. The Provincial Special Branches (SB)were attached to the offices of either InspectorGeneral of Police or of Chief Secretary of theprovince. The staff was so meagre and so inept inintelligence collection, that the Government ofBengal described its Special Branch as ‘a farce’.In Bombay Presidency, however, on accountof political murders and Tilak’s prosecution forsedition in 1897-98, the Special Branch becamea little active. At the turn of the century, whensecret societies started proliferating in WesternIndia and Bengal, the Special Branches increasedthe staff strength and improved the techniques ofintelligence collection.The Police Commission (1901-1902) underAndrew Fraser recommended, inter alia, the setting17 Sumit Sarkar” Modern India, P.2up of Criminal Investigation Department(CID)in each province, under a Deputy Inspector,General of Police, for “collating and distributinginformation regarding organized crime and toassist in investigation of crimes when they are ofspecial character.” 18The Commission further recommended:(i)“There should be a similar Department forthe whole of India, presided over by anofficer of the standing and experience ofInspector General.”(ii) “That the functions of the CentralDepartment should be to collect, collateand communicate information, obtainedfrom the Provincial CID or otherwise.”(iii) “That its intervention in the investigationof offences should be confined to suchtechnical crimes as note forgery, etc.” 19The Commission’s recommendation for a separateCriminal Investigation Department (CID) in eachProvince was, in fact, a long-felt need; but therecommendation to set up a Central CID, withthe powers of investigation and supervisionover the Provincial CIDs, was resented asinfringement on Provincial autonomy. Neither inthe terms of reference, nor in the Report of theCommission, mention was made of the Centralor Provincial Special Branches, or anythingrelating to collection of political intelligence.The Commission also appropriately made nocomments on them. It was also silent on the fateof the Thugee Department.The Government of India intervened to rectifythe lacunae and anomalies in the Commission’srecommendations. It abolished the ThugeeDepartment and merged the Central SpecialBranch with the proposed Central CID, renamingit as Central Criminal Intelligence Department(DCI). The power of supervision over theProvincial CIDs was scrapped on the ground ofProvincial autonomy. Its power of investigationof cases was greatly circumscribed, and it wastasked, “to collect and communicate informationwith regard to special forms of crime, some18 Report of the of the First Police Commission, 1901-1903,P4919 Recommendations of the First Police Commission, P 52-53The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 13

of which have been rendered more difficultfor suppression, by the recent expansion ofrailways and the increased use of Post Officesand the Telegraph by the natives”. Under thishead, the Department could “organize andsupervise operations directed against criminaltribes, organized dacoits working over largeareas, wandering gangs of criminals, noteforgers,coiners, and professional poisoners etc.Besides, “collecting and testing intelligence uponmatters, including social, religious and politicalmovements, not necessarily of criminal nature,should also be the duty of the Central CriminalIntelligence Department.”But the proposal of the Government of India wasconsiderably modified by the Home Government,as they could view situations in India in muchclearer political and administrative perspectivethan the local administrators, who were tooinvolved in personal and inter-departmentalrivalries, to take an objective view of the situation.While the Government of India sought to makeit a department for criminal intelligence andmarginally, for political intelligence, the HomeGovernment made political intelligence its primaryresponsibility. The Secretary of State scrappedthe power of investigation of certain criminalcases bestowed on the Central Intelligence, onthe ground of provincial autonomy. Further, inthe context of the political unrest then brewingin several provinces, the Central Intelligencewas to collect political intelligence alone. In hisDespatch No.70, dated 22nd April, 1904, theSecretary of State asserted that the provincialautonomy had been working satisfactorily, andtherefore, nothing should be done to disturb it. Hewarned that he “would not regard with approvalany attempt to share for the Supreme Governmentby means of an establishment, working undertheir direct order, the duty of investigatingcrime”. Thus, shorn off the investigation duties,the Central Criminal Intelligence Departmentwas left with the responsibility of “collectingand testing intelligence upon matters includingsocial, religious and political movements, notnecessarily of criminal nature.” 20 The Secretary ofState, through his judicious intervention, made itessentially an agency for collection of politicalintelligence, while Curzon’s administration20 Amiya K.Samanta: op.cit, Pp 49-54wanted to make it a central authority, forcoordinating the activities of the Provincial policeforces. The name suggested by the Government ofIndia, however, remained unchanged, though theterm ‘criminal’ 21 in the nomenclature, evidentlybecame anomalous.The Police Commission proposed theappointment of “an officer of standing andexperience of the Inspector General”, andaccordingly the appointment of Harold A.Stuart, ICS, Inspector General of Police, MadrasPresidency, as Director of the Central CriminalIntelligence, was approved. Stuart joined asDirector on 19th April, 1904, and McCrackenjoined as Deputy Director. The Secretary of Statedeclined to communalize the Department byappointing one Hindu and one Muslim AssistantDirector, on the ground that the Head of theDepartment “ought himself to be qualified ingauging native feeling and opinion.” The existingstaff of the Thugee Department was absorbed inthe DCI. Though, Home Secretary Risley statedthat the DCI “would be located at the headquartersof the Government of India,” 22 Stuart, however,continued the practice of going to Calcutta incold weather, while the headquarters of theDepartment remained at Simla.In the initial years of the DCI, the total expenditurefor the DCI was only Rs 25,000 more than theexpenditure for the Central SB, but gradually itsexpenditure went on increasing. The DCI, likethe Central SB, used to get a paltry amount assecret service fund till 1907, when it was raisedto rupees fifty thousand, and after the bomb attackon Hardinge, in 1912, it was raised to one lakhrupees annually.Some apologists for the Empire, like RichardPopplewell have claimed that there was ageneral aversion in the British administration forspy system and “The reform of police intelligenceunder Curzon, was in no way stimulated by theexistence of Indian nationalism, either of themoderate variety, represented by the majority ofCongress politicians, or of the more extreme type,21 The telegraphic address of the Department as “criminaire”is derived from “Criminal Intelligence” and the addressstill continues although the name has been changed toIntelligence Bureau in 1920.22 Home Department No. 594/603 dated Simla,the 30th June,1904. Also see Amiya K.Samanta:op.cit, Appendix-B14The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

epresented by Tilak and his followers.” 23 Thisis not borne out by the plethora of intelligencerecords 24 , which show that, not to speak ofpolitical leaders, non-political personalities likeRabindranath Tagore, were under surveillance ofthe Special Branch. On the same issue, anotherBritish author, Patrick French has written, “Forthe last three decades of British rule in India,intelligence gathering was extended massively,since with the rapid rise of Congress it was seento be the only way of retaining the upper hand.Covertly obtained information began to takeon an increasing importance in the formulationof policy and decision making…” 25 There isno doubt that in the post-Curzon period, thecolonial regime depended more and more onsecret intelligence. But it may be noted herethat both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State,discouraged the DCI to have an independent networkof sources or separate units in the provincesunder its control, without the knowledge of theProvincial Governments.With the bomb making its appearance onthe political scene in India, DCI became,exclusively, an agency for collection and analysisof political intelligence. The term ‘criminal‘in the nomenclature became more and moreincongruous. In the Government of India Act,1919, the change of name was first indicated insection 40(2) which enjoined, inter alia, that theIntelligence Bureau should keep the Governmentposted with matters relating to the security ofthe Indian Empire. Even before the Act cameinto force in 1921, the name was changed toIntelligence Bureau in 1920.4. PROVINCIAL SPECIAL BRANCHESThe Provincial Special Branches were ignored tillthe anti-Partition swadeshi movement broke outin 1905 and the underground terrorist activitiescame to the surface in 1907-1908, in Bengalpresidency. When in April, 1906, the CriminalInvestigation Department (CID) was set up inBengal, as also in other provinces, the SpecialBranches were made a part of the ProvincialCIDs under one DIG. Later on, with the increasein the work-load of the Special Branches and due23 Richard Popplewell: op.cit. P4524 Circulars of Intelligence (Special) Branch, No 6SB dated 27July 1909.25 Patrick French: Liberty or Death, 1997, Pp 98-99to growing political unrest, in the big provinces,the Special Branches were delinked from CIDand brought under officers of a suitable rank.Bengal’s Special Branch had a faster growth,both in size as also in quality of intelligenceoutput, due to strident political movement,both surface and underground. In September,1907, Stevenson-Moore 26 , Director, CriminalIntelligence Department, predicted in his reportthat the Bengalis ‘had no capacity for violence’.One district magistrate of Dacca, who held theview that bhadralok Bengalis were incapableof physical aggression, was shot at the station 27 ,while he was leaving Dacca on transfer. In thiscontext, the discovery of arms and explosives inMuraripukur Garden at Calcutta, and the arrestof Aurobindo Ghose along with 40 educatedbhadralok youths, made them change theirideas. Home Secretary, Harold Stuart wrote, “therevolutionary movement will gain in influenceand strength until, at no distant date, it willbecome a serious menace to law and order.”But the Government was of the consideredview that “while a revolutionary rising is outof the question”, an efficient secret service wasessential” to contain any widespread disturbancein the province.The Bengal Special Branch, like Special Branchesin other provinces, was placed as a separate unitunder a Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID.An officer of the rank of SP, named Denham 28 ,was appointed as Special Officer of the SpecialBranch, which was strengthened by posting agood number of officers.There was one Special Branch and one CID forthe whole of Bengal, including Calcutta, bothdrawing officers from Bengal and Calcutta policeforces because they were statutorily separateentities. This led to mutual recrimination, in whichhigher officers like DIG, CID and Commissionerof Police were involved. Eventually to resolve the26 Sir Charles Stevenson-Moore succeeded H.A. Stuart whobecame Home Secretary.27 B.C.Allen had praised the social service and discipline of themembers of the Dacca Anushilan Samiti, a member of whichshot him. The assailant was never caught.28 Godfrey Denham was a fine intelligence officer and some ofhis reports are valuable source materials of the revolutionaryterrorist movement in India. An unsuccessful attempt wasmade on his life in 1911 in Calcutta and in 1912 he joinedthe Central Intelligence and played a key role in unravelingthe plot to kill the Viceroy. In 1917 he was with the MI5helping the prosecution in San Francisco Conspiracy case.He did not return to the service in India.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 15

unseemly rivalry, separate Detective Departmentfor Calcutta Police was created in 1909, and aseparate Special Branch, in 1911. To differentiatethe Bengal Special Branch from its Calcuttacounterpart, it was named as IntelligenceBranch.The Provincial Special Branches had to improvetheir collection and processing of intelligence inthe face of growing terrorist activities. Though,both the Central and Provincial intelligence usedto work together, often the Central Intelligenceworked as an umbrella agency for the ProvincialBranches. Between 1908 and 1916, there was aspate of dacoities and assassination of lower levelintelligence and CID officers in Bengal, leadingto a crisis of morale and efficiency, as the Indianofficer declined to work in these organisations.Both, Home Member, Reginald Craddock andDirector of Central Intelligence (DCI), CharlesCleveland, were seriously concerned andextended full support to the Indian officers“who have been murdered, ostracized andthreatened.” 29Reginald Craddock expressed similar concernsand condemned the terrorists for “murderinginformers and zealous Criminal InvestigationDepartment officers, supplemented by murderof school masters who have faithfully done theirbest to suppress sedition under their charge.” 30With the moral support and material assistanceof the Central Intelligence, and under theinspiring leadership of Charles Tegart, DIG of theIntelligence Branch, the morale and efficiency ofthe organization was restored.When the Central Intelligence was under severestress, the Special Branches and the CIDsacted in a body to face the situation. On 23rdDecember,1912 Viceroy Hardinge narrowlyescaped death in the bomb attack in Delhi.The intelligence had no information about theexistence of any secret society in North India. TheCentral Intelligence and its Director, Cleveland,came under severe attack for failure to prevent29 Notes in the CIB, dated 4 February, 1916. Quoted by RichardPopplewell, in Intelligence and Imperial Defence, P20930 Memorandum of R.H.Craddock dated 26 February, 1916..Quoted by Popplewell, op..cit. P 208 Craddock referred tothe murder of the Headmaster of Comilla High School onMarch,4,1915 and the Murder of Headmaster Maldah ZillaSchool on January25,1916 by the revolutionary terrorists.the outrage. As the normal investigation failed toproduce any result and the pressure on Clevelandincreased, a special team was formed under DavidPetrie, with 34 Intelligence and CID officersfrom Punjab, UP, Bengal, Bombay and CentralProvinces. Petrie claimed that by March 1913,there was “scarcely a single person all over Indiacapable of being considered as a potential factorin the bomb conspiracy, whose doings have notbeen subjected to careful scrutiny.” 31 When thisteam also failed to show any positive result, evenafter ten months, the Viceroy’s Executive Councilpassed a formal vote of censure on Cleveland.On Harcourt Butler’s advice, Clevelandconsulted Sir Edward Henry 32 , Commissioner,Metropolitan Police, London for lending Englishand French detectives. But Henry, pointingout the constraints of geography, language andpeople for foreign detectives, advised that thelocal detective talents in India were superior toEnglish detectives. It was really embarrassing thatone of the most comprehensive investigationsever launched in India, failed to trace the culprit.Then, after about 14 months, Denham of theSpecial Team and Tegart of Bengal Intelligencesucceeded in identifying the revolutionary groupfrom the remnants of the bombs which explodedin Sylhet, Calcutta, Lahore and Delhi and froma revolutionary leaflet printed in Calcutta andcirculated in the Punjab and UP. All the culpritswere brought to book, except Rash Behari Bose,who could never be arrested. Thereafter, theSecret Service grant of the DCI was doubled from50 thousand rupees to one lakh rupees.The Government having appreciated theusefulness of the intelligence agencies incontaining revolutionary terrorism, especially inBengal, readily sanctioned the creation of DistrictIntelligence Branches in every district of Bengalin 1917, bringing all important localities andendemic areas under intelligence scanner.31 D.Petrie’s note on the investigation of the Delhi Bomb Case.32 Sir Edward Henry was Inspector General of Police, Bengal.While he was district magistrate, Hooghly in the last decadeof the 19th century, two of his subordinate officer namelyHem Chandra Basu and developed the system of study offinger print for identification. The system was tested andfound to be scientific and has since been adopted all overthe world as the most scientific method of identification.Though developed by an Indian, the system has been namedas Henry’s System.16The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

The agency more and more fine-tuned theirtrade-craft by adopting still more rigorous systemof recruitment and screening of the sources andkeeping them under deep cover. 33 Armed withwide knowledge about the terrorists and theiroutfits, they acquired the ability to influence thegroups and even engineer a split in the group.Thus, the agencies emerged not only as the mostpowerful instruments against the undergroundmovement, but also as advisors to theGovernment in formulating the policy towardsthe revolutionary movement, in particular andthe political movement, in general.The growing influence of the Intelligence andthe Police on the formulation of the Governmentpolicy was criticized not only at the political levelin England but also in the bureaucratic circles, forturning India into a “Police state”. In January,1918,Secretary of State Montague wrote to ViceroyChelmsford, “I have an uneasy feeling that theCID is being used not merely as a great detectiveagency, but as an instrument of Government: thatits activities are too widespread; that it is growingtoo rapidly; that it is convenient but dangerousto govern by means of your police.” Among theIndians, the only significant voice of protest camefrom Rabindranath Tagore, who in 1917 madea scathing criticism of the Government, policeand intelligence in an article, “The Small and theGreat” 34 , read out to hundreds of people beforepublication.The Government’s decision to enact a newlegislation (Rowlatt Act), to take the place of theDefense of India Act,1915, which would lapseafter the World War, was the result of persistentprodding by the Central Intelligence and theIntelligence Branch, Bengal. Two intelligenceofficers namely J.C.Ker, Personal Assistant tothe Director of Central Criminal Intelligence33 Several European and Indian officers contributed significantlyto the development of the ‘craft of intelligence’ in BengalIntelligence Branch. Similarly in the central IntelligenceH.A.Stuart, Charles R. Cleveland, David Petrie, GodfreyDenham, Horace Williamson were some of the pioneers ablyassisted by the Indian officers.34 Tagore wrote,”What kind of statesmanship was this whichcan afford to hand over such youths and boys to the tendermercies of the secret service? And what makes the calamitygreater is that any tender shoot once bitten by the policethrives no longer, and will bear neither flower nor fruit, forthere is poison in their touch.”and Charles Tegart, DIG of Bengal IntelligenceBranch had assisted the Rowlatt Committee fromthe preliminary stage of their investigation tothe drafting of the Bill. The Report and the Billevidently reflected the attitude of the Police andIntelligence to the terrorist movement in thecountry. But, by 1919, public resentment wasso strong against repressive measures that theGovernment had to permanently shelve the Act.The intelligence failed to gauge the depth of publicresentment and the magnitude of the protest,which eventually resulted in the Jallianwalla BaghMassacre in April, 1919. The Indian nationalistmovement and the colonial government hadreached a point of no compromise.5. IN THE TRAIL OF THEREVOLUTIONARIES: INDIANINTELLIGENCE ABROADDuring the War years (1914-1918), the Indianintelligence operatives went to three continentsof Asia, Europe and America following therevolutionary terrorists. As early as in 1908,Stevenson-Moore, Director of Central Intelligencewrote to the Government, “it is quite impossiblefor a group of separate Provincial Secret Service todeal adequately with political conditions of suchextent and character that prevail in India. Thechief centres of the Indian political movementare Calcutta, Lahore, Poona, New York, Paris andperhaps Japan. The chief agitators in these placesare in close connection with each other and thenecessity of secret agents in America and Londonhas recently been brought to notice in lettersfrom London and Dublin.” 35 In pursuit of them,the Central Intelligence sent its operatives to allthese countries. The British had the advantageof unchallenged supremacy on the high seas,colonies in all parts of the globe and aboveall, their expertise in interception, in breakingcodes and recruiting sources and informers,in building up a network for information evenin the countries where they had little politicalauthority or influence. The Indian intelligence,however, aimed at monitoring the activities ofthe revolutionaries and subverting their plans inall the three continents of Europe, America andSouth East Asia.35 Note by Stevenson-Moore dated13th May 1908. Quoted byPopplewell:op. cit, P.70The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 17

However, long before the Indian intelligenceofficers reached London, the Special Branch 36 ofthe Metropolitan Police organized surveillanceon the Indians and collated systematic recordsof their activities in the first decade of the 20thcentury and sent them to Simla. These classifieddocuments, containing very useful informationabout Gandhiji, Dadabhai Naoroji, Surendra NathBanerji, Bipin Chandra Pal, Vinayak Savarkar,Madan Lal Dhingra and a host of others, withrare group-photographs, were printed at Simla as“Memorandum on the Anti-British Agitation amongthe Natives of India in England. 37 “ But the SpecialBranch had obvious limitations in intelligencecollection, as Secretary of State Morley stated ina communication to Viceroy Minto: “The wholeIndian field is unfamiliar in language, habits andeverything else”. Stevenson-Moore prepared aplan for an Indian Secret Service establishment forEurope, centered on the DCI in India and controlledby an officer based in the India Office in London.He wanted to have reliable agents in about half adozen centres in various countries of Europe, andtheir work would be coordinated by an ‘itenerantofficer’, based in India Office, London. TheDirector chose John Arnold Wallinger, an officerof the rank Superintendent of Police from BombayPolice, and in January, 1910 Wallinger took chargein London. In 1913, P.C.Vickery, an AssistantSuperintendent of Police of Punjab, was posted asdeputy to Wallinger and when in 1916, the MI5started functioning as a counter-intelligence unit,Vickory was put in charge of the Indian PoliticalIntelligence (IPI), which became a section of theMI5. Vickory had been an integral part of the IPI’sdevelopment for ten years and had also workedin undermining the Gadar movement in America,where he was sent following the San FranciscoConspiracy case in 1917-18. “Around 15 to 20people worked under him in the administration ofIPI in London, and he had an unknown numberof agents.” 38With the outbreak of the War, apart from the36 Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police was created in the1880s to assist the police in fighting the ‘Dynamic War’ of theIrish Republican terrorists. It gradually became an intelligenceunit with executive powers to prosecute.37 Amiya K.Samanta (ed): Terrorism in Bengal, Vol. V. All theavailable reports from 1908 to1910 containing very usefulinformation and with two rare photographs have beencompiled in this volume. Pp 243 to 455.38 Patrick French: op.cit, P98India Office based unit under Wallinger, the MI5,Britain’s domestic counter intelligence agency, 39was directly concerned with the monitoring of theIndian revolutionary movement in Europe. Thisparticular branch of the MI5 was reinforced byinduction of eight senior officers from the ICS andthe Indian Police, who raised valuable sourcesof information and scuttled the plans of the IndiaIndependence Committee in Berlin to subvert theloyalty of the Indian troops in Turkey, Egypt andalso in Europe. They broke the German Code andintercepted the communications of the Indianrevolutionaries with the German Foreign Officeand, thus, checkmated the rather ambitious plansof sending arms and ammunitions to India for anarmed uprising 40 , of engineering rebellions in theBritish colonies in the Middle East and South EastAsia. After Wallinger’s retirement in 1926, Vickorytook his place as head of the Indian intelligencein Europe, simultaneously continuing as head ofthe IPI. “Vickory’s network was very secret. Itsexistence was never acknowledged officially. Itscontact with the outside world was always throughindirect channel. All dealings with India went viaDirector, Intelligence Bureau, New Delhi, andwith India Office, through one or two assistantsunder the Secretary of State.” 41 It dealt with allmatters relating to security of the Empire. In 1920-21, IPI and the Intelligence Bureau of India were“at the centre of the anti-Bolshevik campaign.” 42All persons suspected to be associated with anymovement, secret or open, violent or non-violent,right wing or left wing, came within the ambit of theIPI’s surveillance, if it was suspected to underminethe British Empire in India. In actual practice,however, IPI used to maintain surveillance on alland sundry, without trying to ascertain whetherthe activities of the subject were prejudicial to theinterest of the empire. This continued till Indiagained independence.When discontentment among the Indianimmigrants in the west coast of Canada and39 In 1914 MI5 was created as Section MO5g in the War office.In 1916 it changed its name to MI5.40 The subverted plan of sending in a ship called S.S.Maverikand failed attempt to engineer a revolt in Burma may bereferred to.41 Patrick French. Op.cit. P 100-10142 Christopher Andrews: Her Majesty’s Secret Service, P277.Depatment of Criminal Intelligence was renamed asIntelligence Bureau and from 1919 to 1924 Cecil Kaye wasits Director.18The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

US was brewing, one William Hopkinson, anofficer who served in the Punjab and CalcuttaPolice, was posted to the Vancouver ImmigrationDepartment 43 , in1907. He was also designatedas a “Dominion Police Officer on Special Duty”at Vancouver, for conducting enquiry into theSikh unrest there. Hopkinson, besides reportingto his department, also reported to the CanadianMinister of Interior, to the Colonial Office andthe India Office in London and to the Directorof Central Criminal Intelligence Department atSimla. From 1907 to 1914, Hopkinson succeededin breaking the Gadar party, created a network ofinformers to monitor the activities of the leaderslike Tarak Nath Das, Har Dayal and many others.Hopkinson’s conspiratorial activities created somuch religious and racial discord in the immigrantcommunity that Hopkinson was killed by a Gadaractivist in 1914. The vacuum was filled up bydeputing MI5 officers like Nathan, AlexanderMarr and Denham, who all worked to launch theprosecution known as San Francisco Conspiracyor Hindu German Conspiracy case in 1917,against the Gadar and other revolutionaries. Thiswas, in fact, a supplementary to the three LahoreConspiracy Cases (1914-1916) against the Gadarrebels.As regards South East Asia, Director Clevelandwas aware of the plan of the revolutionaries toincite a mutiny in the Burmese Police and thepersistent efforts to send arms and ammunitions toIndia. His plan of organizing a Far Eastern Bureauin 1915, was rejected by the Home Government.David Petrie, however, opened up channelsof information through a network of agents invulnerable areas of the Far East.The Intelligence Bureau’s domestic counterintelligence unit was organized in 1939, on theeve of the Second World War, and an elaborate,watch and surveillance arrangement was put onthe ground.6. PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY ANDTHE INTELLIGENCE BUREAUThe Intelligence Bureau, till early 1930s, was43 William Hopkinson, Immigration Officer at Vancouver wasborn in India and served in the Punjab Police from the age of16. From 1901 to 1907 he was in Calcutta Police. He knewseveral Indian languages. In view of influx of the Indians tothe West Coast of North Africa at that time he was postedunder the cover of an Immigration officer.merely a compiling and collating agency, as it had,hardly any independent channel of intelligence.The idea of the Central Intelligence agencycollecting intelligence by sending agents andspies to the Provinces, without their knowledgewas considered as interference with the provincialautonomy and was rejected way back in 1909-1910. As a matter of fact, there was so muchhomogeneity in the functioning of the Centre andthe Provinces, that the provincial Special Branchesacted almost as subordinate offices of the CentralIntelligence, leaving no scope for an alternativesystem of intelligence collection by the CentralIntelligence.But, when in response to political agitation,introduction of the federal system became adistinct possibility, the control over the IntelligenceBureau and the Provincial Special Branchesposed a serious problem. In the early 1930s, theGovernment of India prepared a ‘White Paper’,wherein the issues of their status and control werereiterated. The first issue was, that the existing setup of the Intelligence Bureau was functionallyinadequate and structurally unsound in a federalsystem for effectively handling the subversivemovements, such as terrorism and communism.One of its weaknesses is its total dependence onthe Provincial Special Branches for intelligencecollection, which would be badly affected undera regime of provincial autonomy. A system ofintelligence collection, directly under the Bureau,was necessary.The second issue was the control of the intelligenceorganizations. The suggestion in the “WhitePaper” that the Intelligence Bureau should be atthe disposal of the federal minister in the proposedfederation, was turned down by the Secretary ofState and the Home Government, as “inappropriateand unworkable”. According to the Secretary ofState, “The authority in the last resort, responsiblefor the maintenance of the internal security, is theSecretary of State as the mouthpiece of the ImperialParliament, operating through the instrumentalityof the Governor General.” In fact, the BritishGovernment was unwilling to accept the situationin which the Indian representative body should bevested with the ultimate responsibility of securityof the country. Under no circumstances, therefore,sensitive institution like Intelligence Bureau, andmatters like internal security would be entrustedThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 19

to a person who was not directly responsible tothe British Crown.Having decided that the Governor General shouldcontrol the Intelligence Bureau, which was to be“so organized as to be in a position to obtain for theuse of the Governor General, full information asto the internal political situation and the activitiesin the Provinces, of forces likely to impair peaceand order, and the staff acting in liaison withthe corresponding staff of the Governors, wouldform the channel of communication betweenthe Governors and the Governor General in theperformance of this branch of their duties.” 44 Thesuggestion was to create a separate set up forintelligence collection, directly under the IBIn the early 1930s, when a new constitutionwas being considered, the thought of organizingprovincial set up of the Intelligence Bureau wasdiscussed. In the third annual conference 45 ofthe Inspectors General of Police at Simla, from23rd to 26th May, 1932, it was recommendedthat the IB should be placed directly under thecontrol of the Governor General, and that itshould employ a number of Indian Police Serviceofficers as intelligence officers in the Provinces,under IB’s direct control. These officers were tobe designated as Central Intelligence Officers(CIO) and also as Assistant Directors or DeputyDirectors, according to their ranks, and the unitsin the provinces should be known as “SubsidiaryIntelligence Bureau” (SIB).On June 30, 1933, in a high level meeting atSimla, presided over the Viceroy, it was decidedthat the Governor General should have at hisdisposal, a system of intelligence collectionthroughout India, along with an agency forprocessing such intelligence. The need forIB’s own intelligence collection network wasrecognized and recommended. The proposalwas tentatively approved by the Secretary ofState, pending the results of deliberations of the44 Government of India, Reform Despatch No. 6 of 1932 andcorrespondences dated September,30 and October 2 of 1932and of April 30 and November 7 of 1933.45 Annual conference of the police and intelligence chiefs ofthe provinces was conceived as a method of sustaining theunity of the police force and homogeneity in police action inthe country in the context of the threat of the introduction ofprovincial autonomy and federal constitution. The first suchconference was held in 1930 and it has been continuingsince then.Joint Select Committee of Parliament, under theChairmanship of Lord Linlithgo.The Director, IB, in a separate note dated October,2, 1933 reiterated that the Bureau should be takenout of the control of the Home Department andplaced directly under the control of the GovernorGeneral. This was strongly objected to by the HomeSecretary and the Home Member. The Secretaryof State, a protagonist of the independence ofthe Bureau, in a long note tried to convince theJoint Select Committee, by referring to the terroristthreat and the need for not divesting the GovernorGeneral of essential powers and the instruments ofmaintaining law and order in India. This note hadconsiderable impact on the recommendations ofthe Joint Committee.The Government of India, however, held that foreffective handling of the subversive movement,the Intelligence Bureau should be under a FederalMinister. They argued that “the implication of apersonal law and order staff, under the GovernorGeneral, are far-reaching. Provisions on thoselines would be deeply resented by the Indianpublic opinion, and this resentment would, weare convinced, to be a serious obstacle, withwhich the personal staff would be continuouslyconfronted.” What will then be the outcome ofsuch confrontation? The Intelligence Bureau“would fail to serve the purpose for which itwas set up.” 46 The difference of opinion was notaltogether altruistic and inspired by the concernfor true federalism, but it reflected an inter-servicerivalry.Linlithgo was of the view that a federal system wasunsuitable for administration of India. The JointCommittee understandably had dwelt at length onthe need for a strong executive as, “nowhere in theworld is there such frequent need for courageousand prompt action, as in India”. They underscoredthe need for “protection of the police frompolitical pressures”, as they apprehended, “IndianMinisters would interfere with police action”. Therecommendations of the Joint Committee on theIntelligence Bureau and the provincial SpecialBranches were as follows:Firstly, the Committee was much concerned withthe protection of the identity of the informers /agents, in case the Bureau and the Special Branches46 Letter to the Secretary of State, dated January 30, 1933.20The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

came under the control of Indian ministers. Theyrecommended that “the records of any suchintelligence department should be protectedfrom even the slightest danger of leakage.” Toobviate the possibility of the Indian ministerscoming to know the names of such agents, theCommittee recommended that “the instrumentsand instructions of the Government shouldspecifically require them to give directions that norecord relating to intelligence affecting terrorism,should be disclosed to anyone other than oneor two persons, who are directly dealing withthem.”Secondly, the Committee was of the view that nopurpose would be adequately served by placingthe Special Branch of the province under theGovernor. Instead, they recommended that theGovernor should be empowered to assume chargeof the department, if, according to him, the peaceand tranquility of the province is endangered, byovert or secret activities of persons who intend tooverthrow the Government.Thirdly, the Committee did not agree withthe suggestion that the IB should be under theexclusive control of the Governor General andthat the provincial Special Branches will becontrolled by the IB. There should, however,be close touch between the two, but to put theprovincial intelligence units under the IntelligenceBureau will tend “to break up the organic unity ofthe provincial police force.”Fourthly, on the question of exclusive controlof the Governor General over the IB, theCommittee stated that the IB “should, underthe new constitution, be assigned one of theGovernor General’s reserved departments, aspart of its normal activities.” The Committee,however, hoped that “the change in the formof Government, whether in the Centre or in theProvinces, should not involve any change in therelationship, which at present exists betweenthe Intelligence Bureau and the ProvincialIntelligence departments.”The Government of India Act, 1935 gave legalsanction to the suggestions. The IntelligenceBureau remained, by and large, under the directcontrol of the Governor General, though theHome Department of the Federal Governmentremained its immediate controlling authority.The fear that haunted the conscientiousIB officers, both at the Centre and in theProvinces, was that when the Provincial SpecialBranches would come under the Indian HomeMinisters, classified information about theNon-Cooperation and Civil Disobediencemovements, as well as some records of terroristactivities, might be leaked, resulting in exposureof sources, jeopardizing the safety of the agentsand informers. Thus, the credibility of entireorganization will be demolished.When the new ministers assumed office in theProvinces under the Government of India Act,1935, the mutual distrust between the intelligenceagencies and the people’s representatives wenton increasing. Many important secret and topsecret files, relating to the Non-cooperationand Civil Disobedience movements, were sentto the office of CIO of the Intelligence Bureau,which was statutorily secured from ministerialinterference, or to the Governor’s secretariat,either for destruction or for transfer to moresecured places. The Provincial Governmentsfrequently complained of spying on them by theCentral Intelligence.Control over the Intelligence organizationsremained a contentious issue till the outbreakof the Second World War, when under theDefence of India Act, ministerial authority overthe intelligence organizations was reduced.Again, on the eve of independence there wasgreat confusion about the sensitive records ofthe IB. Eventually, many records, especiallythose relating to the identity of the sources andinformers, were destroyed. Many sensitive fileswere removed to England. From many files,which are still in IB records, relevant papers havebeen removed, with a note in the notesheet.In the post-independence era, the IntelligenceBureau has expanded consequent upon themultiplicity of the problems that the nation hasbeen encountering. This great institution hasspawned several important security organizationslike Special Service Bureau, Special Security Force,Aviation Research Center, Indo-Tibetan BorderPolice Force, Research and Analysis Wing,Bureau of Aviation Security, Special ProtectionGroup, all for safeguarding the nation againstthe forces of disorder and destabilization.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 21

Intelligence BureauShri K.C. Verma, IPS (Retd.)The Intelligence Bureau was established in 1887as the Central Special Branch, primarily for thecollection of “secret and political intelligence”. Itwas renamed as the Central Criminal IntelligenceDepartment in 1904, and as the IntelligenceBureau in 1920. The Intelligence Bureau is thusmore than one hundred and twenty-five years old.It is possibly the only intelligence organisation inthe world to have been in continuous existencefor such a long period.Over the years, the Intelligence Bureau hasrepresented continuity and evolution. It hasresponded to the changing requirements ofthe times, maintaining the highest standards ofprofessional excellence. It has undergone structuralchanges without losing its essential character ofan intelligence agency, working to secure thenation against threats – external and internal. Thechanging nature of threats has made it imperativefor the Bureau to keep pace with the times, tohandle the ever growing responsibilities. It hasfashioned appropriate responses to new threats,creating additional capacities and providing thekernel for the formation of new security agencies,whenever required. It has always strived to bethe eyes and ears of the Government of India,even as it has never been assigned any executivefunctions.The Intelligence Bureau faced its severest test inthe immediate period after Independence. On theone hand, it suffered depletion in its strength dueto British officers leaving India and many otherofficers opting to go to the newly formed Pakistan,on the other hand, the new nation was besetwith a plethora of unprecedented threats. Theseranged from unrest fomented by Pak-sponsoredelements in Jammu and Kashmir to insurgenciesin the north eastern states. There were incipientdivisive movements in the new nation, yet to befully emotionally and politically integrated. Thepowerful cross currents within large sections ofthe population were required to be tracked andkept in the reckoning while formulating policiesaffecting the people.The Intelligence Bureau responded by evolvinga sound organisation, which met the intelligenceand security requirements of the nation andproved its worth in the tumultuous period of theintegration of princely states and the languagedisturbances in the nineteen fifties; and in the stillmore difficult decades that followed ahead.In the times of conflict, the Intelligence Bureaurepeatedly proved its capabilities. It served anearly warning of the evil designs of China, muchbefore the 1962 aggression. Again, in 1965,reports of the Intelligence Bureau providedvaluable inputs regarding Pakistani manoeuvres.The buildup to the war with Pakistan in 1971 andthe liberation of Bangladesh are well documentedtriumphs of the intelligence fraternity. After thedebacle of 1962, the Intelligence Bureau and it’sthen Director, Shri B.N.Mullick, were closelyassociated with the formation of the SpecialService Bureau (in 1963), the ARC and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police.With Independence, the Intelligence Bureauquickly developed capacities in the domain ofcounter-Intelligence and collection of foreignIntelligence. The foreign intelligence collectionarm of the Intelligence Bureau, which becamea major entity, was formally separated from theIntelligence Bureau in September, 1968 and giventhe name Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW).After the formation of the R&AW, the twoorganisations have continued to enjoy acoordinated working relationship, with eachcomplementing the other, and ensuring thesecurity of the nation against all threats.In the domain of counter-intelligence, theIntelligence Bureau has honed its skills over theyears to emerge as an effective instrument to guardthe nation against espionage and subversion. It has22The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

neutralised many efforts by inimical forces to spyon the country. It has also reduced the threat ofsabotage and espionage through preventive steps,including implementation of stringent verificationprocedures in respect of vulnerable personnel. TheBureau remains the primary agency for ensuringdocument and personnel security, in order tosafeguard the secrets of the nation.An area in which the Intelligence Bureauconsistently delivered excellent results, was thesteady flow of high grade intelligence pertainingto the insurgent movements, especially in theNorth East. The outstanding work done by theIntelligence Bureau officials in these states madeit possible for the security forces to contain theseparatist elements. A much more significantcontribution of the Intelligence Bureau, andseveral individual officers ensured that theorganisation always enjoyed a very high degreeof credibility with many leaders of undergroundmovements. This was undoubtedly the resultof professionalism of the highest order and acommendable empathy. This was, and continuesto remain the strength of the organisation, whichhas helped bridge the gap between nationalistelements and misguided organisations. TheBureau has often been tasked to act on behalf ofthe Government to establish contact or enter intoa dialogue with misguided sections or agitatinggroups. Such tasks have been executed not justwith finesse, but have created goodwill for theGovernment amongst disaffected sections. Thefact that several such agreements have stoodthe test of time and have been instrumental inintegrating self-professed militant groups intothe national mainstream, is cause for muchsatisfaction.The symbiotic relationship of the IntelligenceBureau and the state police forces in general,and the state special branches in particular,provides for a seamless sharing of information,essential for the maintenance of public order.This has proved invaluable in containingcommunal discord and preventing large scaledisturbances, attributable to discontent amonggroups organised on considerations of language,region, caste or ideology. In particular, such aninformation sharing system has helped to soundearly warnings to prevent economic disruptionsdue to diverse agitations. Particular mentioncould be made of the railway strike in 1974 andthe discontent among police unions in 1979. TheIntelligence Bureau also closely monitored thegrowth of Left extremist thought.The Intelligence Bureau has successfullyanticipated security threats and, whenever theyhave been manifest, the Bureau has been able tofashion appropriate responses. The IntelligenceBureau was required to attend to issues of civilaviation security after the first hijacking of anIndian aircraft in 1971. The Intelligence Bureauset up a dedicated unit to collect intelligencerelated to civil aviation security and conductedmany inspections and sensitisation programmes,till a formal civil aviation security cell wascreated in the DGCA. This was the forerunner ofthe Bureau of Civil Aviation Security. In a similarfashion, the initial efforts by the IntelligenceBureau to ensure the security of industrial unitslaid the foundation of the Central IndustrialSecurity Force.The security of protected persons was always amatter of priority for the Intelligence Bureau, andintelligence pertaining to this important domainrequired dedicated efforts by Intelligence Bureaupersonnel. After the assassination of Smt. IndiraGandhi, the Bureau set up a Special Task Force,which subsequently evolved into the SpecialProtection Group.Another extremely important sphere ofthe work of the Bureau relates to counterterrorism.The growth of terrorism in Punjabin the 1980's presented a new challenge forthe security and intelligence agencies. TheIntelligence Bureau was able to quickly adaptto the changed circumstances and its operativesmastered the craft of collecting information inextremely hostile conditions. The capabilitiesof the organisation were once again put to testin Jammu and Kashmir, where initial setbackswere witnessed due to targeted attacks onIntelligence Bureau posts. The growth of Islamicfundamentalism and the use of terrorism as aninstrument of state policy by Pakistan, have alsostretched the capacities of the Bureau, requiringit to evolve operational methodologies intandem with other agencies and state policeforces. These initiatives have yielded goodresults and the relentless efforts of terroristshave been neutralised on many occasions. TheIntelligence Bureau personnel are, however,acutely aware that every battle has to be won inthis ongoing war.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 23

For Intelligence Bureau officers involvedin counter terrorist or counter insurgencyoperations, especially in areas like Manipur,Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, life can bevery arduous. Personnel working in the field donot have any physical or legal protection. Theworking conditions are often risky and in manycircumstances field officers face imminent dangerto their lives. Due to the nature of their work andthe places of deployment, Intelligence Bureaupersonnel frequently live without their familiesor expose their families to a degree of threat ofphysical harm.It is not only within the country that the IntelligenceBureau ensures security of the nation. Thesecurity architecture of the country requires theBureau to be present also at the borders. Checkposts of the Intelligence Bureau are spread out inpenny pockets along all the international borders,ensuring a presence of intelligence operatives todetect and assess any threat to the country, throughsubversion of the border populace and infiltrationof hostiles from across the borders. This requiresa constant vigil and collection of intelligenceto prevent smuggling of weapons, explosivesand fake currency. Further, the IB personnel arededicated towards ensuring complete integrity ofimmigration control. These responsibilities placea heavy burden on the organisation in terms ofmanpower, and a substantial accretion to thestrength of the Intelligence Bureau, over the years,has been on account of growing responsibilitiesin this sphere.The need to keep our land borders undersurveillance, especially in perspective ofaggressive activities of China, culminatingin the 1962 debacle, made it imperative thatIntelligence Bureau personnel were impartednecessary skills to climb and survive inmountainous areas. A mountaineering institute,subsequently christened as the Sonam GyatsoMountaineering Institute, was, therefore,established at Gangtok in 1963. The SGMI,and climbers of the Intelligence Bureau addedseveral glowing chapters to the annals of Indianmountaineering, with many names being countedamong those who scaled Mt. Everest and variousother high and technically difficult peaks. Thelegendry names include Sonam Gyatso, PhuDorji, H.C.S.Rawat and Sonam Wangyal. Thetradition continues, with the Intelligence Bureaubeing involved in many other mountaineeringexpeditions over the years. Several climbers,including a few 'Everesters', are currently inservice in the organisation. Intelligence Bureaupersonnel are regularly engaged in monitoringborder transgressions, undertaking patrols alongthe borders and validating topographic data.The growth of any intelligence and securityorganisation is directly related to the threatsfaced by the nation. It is, therefore, no surprisethat the burgeoning problems in recent yearshave led to a substantial increase in the strengthof the organisation. Besides traditional areaslike counter terrorism, counter intelligenceand security becoming increasingly complex,altogether new dangers to national securityhave emerged in recent years. The IntelligenceBureau has had to scale up its capacities tothwart economic and cyber threats to thenation. Technological advances require notjust expensive infrastructure but appropriatelytrained manpower. The time lag between therequirement and positioning of infrastructureremains a challenge, and this aspect is likely tobecome a major limitation in future.The Intelligence Bureau has a professionalcore of officers who grow professionally withinthe organisation. While many senior posts areoccupied by police officers, the IntelligenceBureau is not a police organisation. At thesame time, it has a symbiotic relationship withall police forces of the states, as also all centralpolice organisations. The Intelligence Bureauprovides a unique working environment and itis not unusual for officers who have served inthe Intelligence Bureau, to share a special bondwith each other, besides of course the bondof being brother police officers. The securityand intelligence structures in the country havebenefitted from officers who have worked inthe Intelligence Bureau and these organisationshave, in turn, contributed to the efficacy of theIntelligence Bureau.The Bureau serves as the nodal point forcoordination of intelligence and policing issues.It convenes the annual conference of state policeand intelligence chiefs. It also organises eventslike the Inter-State Police Sports Meets and thePolice Duty Meets. Many of the functions relatedto policing were transferred to the Bureau ofPolice Research and Development, which wascarved out of the Intelligence Bureau in 1970.The Indian Police Journal, in fact, continued to24The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

e published by the Intelligence Bureau for someyears, even after the BPR&D was formed.The Intelligence Bureau has a substantial technicalcadre, which performs functions essential forrunning the organisation. These include providingsupport for communications and technical aidsfor the collection of intelligence.The spread of the organisation throughout thecountry and the linking of every unit with thestate capitals and the national capital, throughspeedy and multiple means of communication,constitute an important facet of the strengthof the Intelligence Bureau. Each one of theunits, whether at the district headquarters orin a remote area, is manned at all times andcan be accessed for eliciting information.This network helps the organisation to reporton developments in a timely fashion. Notinfrequently, this organisational spread hasproved extremely useful in reporting naturalcalamities like floods and earthquakes, as alsofor collecting information for other departmentsof the governments. Their utility in times of crisesJust like that!has more than justified the built in redundanciesin the communication networks.Under the Rules of Business of the Government,1925, the Director of Intelligence Bureauwas attached to the Home Department foradministrative convenience and was expectedto provide, either on his own initiative or onrequest, information relating to the security ofIndia to other Departments. The Director wasto decide the manner and extent of sharing ofinformation, commensurate with the requirementof safeguarding the secrecy of his sources and hischannels of information. This mandate providedadequate guidance to the Director, IntelligenceBureau, how to best discharge his functions. TheGroup of Ministers, which made recommendationsfor National Security in 2001, thought it fit tospecify a charter for the Intelligence Bureau. Theorganisation was designated as the nodal agencyfor counter-intelligence and counter-terrorismand was, pithily, charged with protection ofthe Constitution. This is a responsibility, that allpersonnel of the Intelligence Bureau dischargewith sincerity and pride!AJITNINANThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 25

The Reminiscences of anIB OfficerShri T.V. Rajeswar, IPS (Retd.)When I look back on the 21 years that I spent in theIntelligence Bureau (IB), a stream of thoughts andepisodes come crowding to my mind. I reportedat the Intelligence Bureau Headquarters, at NorthBlock in April 1962. Prior to joining the IB, I wasDeputy Commissioner (Law and Order), for thetwin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad.Those days selection to the lB was very exclusiveand was invariably preceded by talent spottingand discussions with and by senior officers oflB, which formed the basis for assessing whetherthe candidate would be suitable for the lB. In mycase, I first met the then DIB, Shri Bhola NathMullick, in 1957 when I was S.P., Guntur district.He was on a visit to Nagarjuna Sagar Dam nearGuntur and I was asked to meet him. Shri Mullickasked me searching questions on various issuesand my work as S.P. Guntur district, which wasthen the largest district in India, with 71 Policestations.It was the system in the initial years of lB, thatevery new officer would undergo three weeks oftour in each of the three States of West Bengal,Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. These three Stateswere known for Communist insurgency, andCommunism was the main issue facing thecountry at that time.After finishing my visits to these three States,my first posting was as OSD, Sikkim. The postwas equivalent to the post of AD of any State.The special designation was due to the fact thatSikkim was then a protectorate and not a State ofthe country.In Sikkim, I undertook a trek around the entireprotectorate, starting from Gangtok and tookthe route of Chungthang — Thangu — Kongrala— Chholhamo — Yum Thang — Lachung andback to Gangtok. The tour took twelve days tocomplete and I had to traverse heights up to18,000 ft. in Kongrala. It was not a problem forme, since I was only 36 years of age and wasaccompanied by Shri Sonam Gyatso, DCIO, amountaineer who later climbed, along with a fewothers, Mount Everest in 1965.BHUTAN INTERLUDEDuring my posting in Sikkim in 1962-1965,I had the occasion to visit Thimphu, the thencapital of Bhutan, along with Shri Avtar Singh,Political Adviser for Sikkim and Bhutan. Therewas a crisis in Bhutan as the Prime Minister ofBhutan, Jigme Dorji had been shot by unknownassassins. Later, a team from India came toThimphu for assisting the investigation. But inthe interim period, the King of Bhutan, JigmeWangchuk, whom I had occasion to meet andinteract with, along with the Political Advisor,asked for my services, as his Security Advisor,and my deputation was approved a few dayslater. I spent about two years in Bhutan in1965—1967, during which I was able to tourthe entire State from East to West.After finishing my assignment in Bhutan whenI returned to lB, in mid 1967, I was asked togo to Siliguri and study the phenomenon ofNaxalism, which had originated from Naxalbari.The movement had started as an anti-landlordstruggle, led by two persons, Kanu Sanyal andJangal Santhal. Charu Mazumdar was the Marxisttheoretician, who later gave the movement aviolent turn. The anti-landlord movement, whichoriginated from Naxalbari in 1967, gave it thenomenclature of 'Naxalite movement'.After I finished my study of naxalism in Siliguriarea and returned to Headquarters, I was postedas Deputy Director (Security) and deputy to JointDirector, Shri G.C. Dutt.26The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

As DD (Security), IB, I had occasion to accompanyvarious VVIPs. I visited along with the then PrimeMinister, Smt. Indira Gandhi, to Burma, presentlyknown as Myanmar, in 1968, and to Afghanistanin 1969. I had also accompanied President ZakirHussain to Nepal in 1968, President V.V. Girito Sri Lanka in 1970, and later in 1974 to USSR,Bulgaria and Hungary.THE BANGLADESH INTERLUDESoon after Mujibur Rehman was released fromJail in Karachi, in 1971, he returned to Dacca aftera brief halt in Delhi. I was deputed as SecurityAdvisor to President Mujibur Rehman. In Dacca, Ivisited and inspected the residence of the Presidentand his office, and later accompanied him on oneof his tours, which took him to Tangail, northof Dacca. During his tours, he was mobbed bypeople as well as the erstwhile freedom fighters,and security arrangements made for him werenegligible. Later in Dacca, I trained a number ofsecurity officers on various techniques of VVIPsecurity, for about two months. I also prepared ascheme for the security of Bangladesh Presidentand gave it to him in 1972 at Calcutta, where hehad come to address a mass meeting along withthe Indian Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi.Mujibur Rehman discussed the salient points ofmy scheme at Raj Bhavan, Calcutta. He moreor less said he did not believe in any securityprecautions for himself and rejected my basicsuggestion that he should move out from hishome in Dhanmandi, which was without anyprotection. Mujibur Rehman asked, “who wouldcause any harm to Bangabandhu?”. It wasunfortunate that only a few months later, he waskilled in his own residence by a few rogue Armyofficers of Bangladesh.AS DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE BUREAUI was appointed as Director, Intelligence Bureauin February 1980.The NAM meet took place in New Delhi inMarch, 1983. Though BSF, ITBP and some armyunits were drafted for providing security by wayof uniformed military and para-military units,the overall responsibility for looking after thesecurity aspects of the Conference fell on the lB.A Special Officer, of the rank of Joint Director/Joint Secretary, was appointed. who was directlyresponsible to DIB and this officer was tocoordinate with MEA, with the visiting delegationsas well as the military and para-military units. Dr.K.V.H. Padmanabhan, from the lB, was chosenfor the job and though he was at the receivingend of flak from several quarters, I fully backedhim and he discharged his duties satisfactorily.He was assisted by several young officers. The lBhad asked various State Governments to deputeyoung officers for being attached to variousdelegations, apart from lB officers, as the numberof delegations were large and the requirementscould not be met entirely from the Headquartersstaff. The selected officers were given orientationtraining for a few days and I spoke to each oneof them personally. Each of the officer was toget himself acquainted with the country whosedelegation he would be attached to, as well as theVIP, his antecedents, etc. The officers were alsogiven a crash course on security procedures.All this was worth the trouble, as Smt. IndiraGandhi, the then Prime Minister suddenly decidedthat she would like to meet these officers and talkto them to satisfy herself that they were reallysuitable for the job. They were asked to report atNo.1, Safdarjang Road residence, while I stayedbehind at the lB Headquarters, quite confidentthat they would pass muster. Smt. Indira Gandhitalked to the officers, asked a few questions ontheir knowledge of the various countries and soon and returned them, quite satisfied with theofficers selected and the training imparted.As the delegations started arriving, our problemsstarted mounting. All the visiting delegationshad been clearly told, several weeks ahead,that weapons brought by Security Officers,accompanying the delegations, would haveto be surrendered at the airport and would bereturned to them when they left the country. Asthe responsibility of security within the countrywas solely that of the host country, no delegationwould be allowed to retain any weapons, withany of their Security Officers. This was, however,observed more in breach than in practice. Theoutgoing Chairman of NAM, Fidel Castro of Cuba,would not move or go to any function withouthis bodyguard, who was a high ranking armyofficer and a long associate of Castro. In his casewe permitted him to go even inside the VigyanThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 27

Bhavan, armed with his high-powered revolver.As for Yasser Arafat, the security procedure hadto be relaxed even more, as he would never bewithout his revolver in his holster, which was apermanent fixture on his person.Saddam Hussein and Col. Gaddafi wanted tobring two plane loads of armed security meneach. But we refused permission and both ofthem cancelled their visit.The NAM inauguration went off without anyhitch on March 7, and the Conference went ontill March 12. On its conclusion, Dr. Alexanderconveyed the PM’s personal congratulations andthanks to the lB officers, and I was asked to sendrecommendations for medals, rewards, etc. toselect staff. President Zia UI Haq of Pakistan wasalso quite impressed with the arrangements andhe went round various rooms of the Conferencecomplex, for about an hour, and expressedconsiderable admiration for the arrangementsmade. A couple of weeks later, he sent his IGPfrom Islamabad to study the arrangements andalso meet the officers concerned and discuss withthem about the same. The IGP from Pakistan metme at the lB Headquarters and I put him on to theconcerned officers.AS LT. GOVERNOR, ARUNACHALPRADESHIn 1983, I was appointed as Lt. Governor ofArunachal Pradesh, which was earlier an UnionTerritory, consisting of the North Eastern FrontierArea (NEFA). It was the first constitutionalappointment for any IPS officer.During my tenure of two years and three monthsas Lt. Governor, Arunachal Pradesh, some of themore important events were as follows:Smt. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Ministervisited Itanagar for a day on February, 4 1984.She addressed a public meeting and later spoketo the MLAs and the Ministers. She also visitedthe Ramakrishna Mission Hospital, and afterlunch at the Raj Niwas, took off for Guwahati,enroute to Delhi.During her short stay, she asked me about thestate of affairs in the Union Territory, and I toldher that an important problem which I was facingpertained to the continuous pressure from theministers and MLAs, for grant of licences foropening saw mills and if such permissions weregiven, the forests of Arunachal would get denudedat a fast rate. While speaking to the Ministers andMLAs, she told them to preserve the forest wealthof Arunachal and not to let too many saw millscome up in the area.President Giani Zail Singh visited Itanagar onMarch 4-5, 1984. During his visit he was in arelaxed mood and at the time of his morningwalk within the Raj Niwas complex, Gianijispoke freely on men and matters with me.On April 13, I visited Vijaynagar, which is thefarthest point of India in the East, with Putaoacross the border in Burma. The helicopter tripfrom Miao took nearly an hour to reach this spot.The tribes of Yobins and Lishus inhabited thearea and they were mostly Christians of Burmeseorigin. Their hair style and clothes were quitedifferent from the rest of the tribes in the area.On April 25, we were camping at Tippi in EastKameng district, on the banks of the turbulentriver Kameng. This was a well known habitatof the hornbills and I could see a lot of themcoming home to roost in the evening. Tippi wasalso the centre for orchids and a devoted team ofagricultural scientists was stationed there. In theevening, I saw a wild elephant swimming acrossthe strong current of Kameng river and crossingover before disappearing into the wilds. It wasone of those rare sights which one comes acrossmost unexpectedly.On the evening of July 28, 1984, a tiger cubstrayed into the Raj Niwas grounds from the thickjungle adjoining the compound, on the westernside. The sentry at a post was shaken when thetiger came and sat a few yards away from him,staring at him. The sentry went on hitting thewooden floor of the sentry post with his rifle buttto scare away the cub, but the cub took its owntime before moving away. Unfortunately, nobodyelse saw the tiger cub, but the sentry’s versionwas corroborated by the pug marks at the site.I was flying from Calcutta to Jorhat in the morningflight on August 13, 1984 and while approachingJorhat I could see on my left a rare sight of thethree great peaks of Everest, Kangchanjanga and28The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Chhomohlohri, all of them juxtaposed in a row,at a distance of over 500 odd miles. It was a grandsight indeed.AS GOVERNOR OF SIKKIMI was sworn in as Governor of Sikkim on November21, 1985. This was the first time that an IPS officeror an lB officer was appointed as Governor of aState. In May 1975, after a referendum had beencarried out, Sikkim had merged with India.After the death of the Maharajah, the Maharajkumarsucceeded him and I was present at the coronationceremony, which took place in the autumn of 1965.Smt. Indira Gandhi had represented Governmentof India at the ceremony.AS GOVERNOR OF WEST BENGALMy appointment as Governor of West Bengal wasnotified on February 19, 1989. I was soundedabout the impending change, about four monthsbefore the appointment was formerly announced.My equation with Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu, asGovernor and Chief Minister, was cordial. Duringour periodical meetings, we used to discuss aboutmen and matters freely and frankly.In our meeting on June 21, 1989, the recentevents in China, centering around the seriousincidents at the Tiananmen Square, on the nightof June 3-4, were discussed. He said that hiscolleagues and himself in the CPM Politbureau,deplored the total failure of Communist party ofChina and its administration in not anticipatingevents, especially since trouble had beenbrewing for over six weeks. I told him that callingout the tanks to put down the student agitationwas extraordinary. In such a situation in India,the police force, followed by para-military forcesand then, in the event of their inability to handlethe situation, the infantry units of the army wouldbe called in, but never the tanks. Mr. Basu saidthat some of his colleagues, and he himself,had asked for a meeting with the ChineseAmbassador in Delhi and these questions wouldbe posed to him. Mr. Basu was also critical ofthe apparent intelligence failure in China, innot finding out what was brewing amongst thestudent community. According to Mr. Basu, therewere about 45,000 students in Beijing Universityalone, with a large number of foreigners, mostlyAmerican, and it was surprising that the brewingtrouble was not detected earlier.THE WIDOWS OF BENGAL INVRINDAVAN AND VARANASIFrom time immemorial, predating the comingof the Aryans, worship of Mother has been anhonoured and celebrated tradition, and anentrenched religious practice in Bengal. Bengalcelebrates the Puja with gay abandon. It was,therefore, particularly sad that the joint familiescould not look after elderly women, especiallythe widows, and that there were so many moreor less abandoned widows from Bengal ekeingout a precarious living at the pilgrim centres ofVaranasi and Vrindavan. There were severalwidows, most of them sent away by theirchildren, taking advantage of an ancient traditionof the elderly wanting to spend their last daysin the holy Kashi. The monthly remittances forthe widows tapered off after a few months andthereafter they were entirely left at the mercyof the religious establishments at the pilgrimcentres. They had to, unless unable to move dueto sickness, attend a few hours of singing sessionsat the temples and then allowed to receive moneyor rice, which would enable them to have frugalmeals. It was difficult to count the exact numberof widows at these pilgrim centres but the largestnumber of them were from West Bengal.I discussed this matter with Shri BuddhadebBhattacharya, the Minister for Social Welfareand requested him to examine the ways andmeans of repatriating the Bengal widows toshelters administered by Government aroundCalcutta, and also to pay them old-age pension,which was being done in some other formby the state. I also convened a meeting of thepresidents and secretaries of nearly 70 socialwelfare organizations which were listed out bythe government. Mrs. Renuka Ray, a well-knownsocial worker, agreed to become the Presidentof the newly formed organization called ShantiVishram, with Dr. Roma Chaudhury as Vice-President and Mr. Rusi B. Gimi as GeneralSecretary. The society was intended to assist theState Government in repatriating the widowsand providing them with shelter and sustenance.On the eve of my departure from West Bengalin Feb. 1990, Mrs. Ray wrote to me saying thatThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 29

my sudden departure had come as a shock, butthe initiative taken for the cause of the widowssuffering in Banaras and Vrindavan would befollowed up. The plight of the widows there,however, continues to be more or less the same.PROBLEM OF BANGLADESHI MIGRANTSThe problem of migration of Bangladeshi’s intoIndia has been of considerable importance fromthe national security point of view. As DIB, Iwas aware of the problem which was slowly butsteadily becoming more and more serious. Duringthe time of Mr. B.N. Mullick, who was DIB from1950 to 1964, he had closely studied the issueand suggested a series of important measures to betaken by the Centre and the States. However, dueto various reasons, including political compulsions,they were not implemented adequately.After I assumed office as Governor of WestBengal. I went into the matter in great detail andI found that the problem was far more seriousthan I had perceived earlier. On this issue, I hadwritten to the President, the Prime Minister andthe Home Minister regularly, during my stayin Calcutta. In my very first monthly report forMarch, 1989 sent to the President of India onApril 6, with copies to the Prime Minister andHome Minister, I referred to my discussionswith the Chief Secretary, the Home Secretaryand the IG, BSF in charge of Bangladesh borderon March 14 and 17, and the problem ofBangladesh immigrants. In my second report forthe month of April 1989, I had drawn attentionto this problem, which was politicised byVishwa Hindu Parishad in its Press Conferenceat Calcutta on April 20. In my third report for themonth of May 1989, I had referred to this matterin fuller detail since I had, meanwhile, visitedthe North Bengal districts of Cooch Behar,Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling and West Dinajpur. I alsohad discussions with the Minister of ExternalAffairs Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao on May 4, 1989at Delhi.After my tour in the North Bengal districts, whenI visited the border checkposts and discussed theproblem with local officials and the BSF officersconcerned, I wrote a detailed letter to ChiefMinister Jyoti Basu on June 5, 1989. The relevantparagraph of this letter is given below:"The question of influx of infiltrants/migrants/refugees from Bangladesh is becoming aserious factor which has to be taken noteof. I am aware of the correspondence on thesubject between the State Government and theCentre and the States request for strengtheningMTF as well as tightening of Passport and Visaformalities, and I fully endorse these suggestions.The BSF which mans BOPs along the border isbeing almost doubled and a strategic road isbeing constructed as a long-term measure alongthe border. However, there seems to be noawareness on the part of the people in the NorthBengal districts, of the serious implications ofsuch influx/infiltration. In none of the fourdistricts, did any MLA or Sabhadipati refers tothis issue on his own, and even when I invitedthem to give their views on this question, theydid not seem to consider it as a serious matter.As you are aware, the Muslim percentage ofthe population in the districts of Murshidabad,Malda and present West Dinajpur was 58.66,45.79 and 30.97 respectively, as per 1981census. The decadal growth rate of Muslimpopulation in 1981 in West Bengal was 29.6%while the overall growth of the State was 23.2%.The serious demographic and geo-politicalimplications of this phenomenon are indeedserious."After the Janata Dal Government assumed officeat the Centre, I wrote in January 1990 to Mr. I.K.Gujral with copy to the Prime Minister and theHome Minister, suggesting that a detailed studymay be carried out by a committee consistingof senior officers from the ministries of ExternalAffairs and Home, as well as from the StateGovernments of West Bengal and Bihar, followedby a thorough census, along with the nationalcensus of 1991, to ascertain the dimensions ofthe problem of Bangladeshi immigrants intoIndia. I left Calcutta on Feb.6, 1990.From 1991 to 2004 I was in Delhi, writingarticles periodically to various newspapers andmagazines. In May, 2004, I was appointed asGovernor, Uttar Pradesh. I served as Governor,UP till May, 2009. Thereafter, I returned to Delhiresuming my usual activities.30The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Dormers Building, ShimlaThe Dormers building, housing the office of Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau,Shimla, is one of the first offices of the Intelligence Bureau. It is a heritagebuilding, constructed in the late nineteenth century. A specimen of Britishcolonial architecture, it evokes nostalgia of Swiss chalets and Englishcountry buildings. The two-storeyed main building, having dimensions of95’ x 30’, 70’ x 40’ and 10’ x 10’, was constructed in "dhajji style", fromstone and mud, while the studio room (41½’ x 12’9”), record room (58’x 18’9”), peons’ quarters (95’ x 11½’) and incinerator were constructedwith brick and lime. The ‘dhajji’ structure consists of wooden frames,primarily of termite proof cedar wood, over a stone base. Clumps of wetearth with stone pieces/ballast were compiled and closely packed into thewooden frames, and thereafter surfaces were plastered with a coat of mudand lime. The external finish of the building is of grit plaster using pebbles.Doors and windows are of cedar wood and have not been changed sinceits construction. The use of local stone and sloping wooden roof gives it anorganic quality, which harmonises with the local landscape.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 31

Indian Intelligence — Imperativesfor ChangeShri Ajit Doval, IPS (Retd.)In a constant race against time and ever searchingfor new ideas to defeat the ingenuity of theiradversaries, for intelligence agencies to changeis not an option, but a compulsive necessity.Regrettably, those who change only when theyhave to, pay an un-affordably high price. Worse,it is often preceded by a nation bruised, if notbled. Imaginative changes, innovation in toolsof intelligence generation and analysis, andconstant up-gradation of capacities can only keepthem a step ahead of their adversaries. This paperanalyses the dynamics of change in the Indiancontext, and some of the new realities that Indianintelligence needs to factor in for designing itsstrategy for change.Intelligence agencies, consciously or otherwise,pursue three discernable patterns of change.First is the evolutionary pattern. Accounting formost of the changes, these are slow, routine andcontinuous in nature. They are mostly triggeredby contemporaneous developments, leadingto resetting of priorities, leadership changes inorganizational hierarchies and evolving pressureswithin the organizations to address professional,structural or administrative problems. Thoughun-noticed, these changes are vital as they keepintelligence agencies progressive, time consistentand forward looking, through constant coursecorrection and problem solving. Most of thesechanges are effected within the organizationand do not impact on the working arrangementswith other organs of the Government, or involvechanges in law or Government’s Rules ofBusiness. Though known to few, the score boardof Indian Intelligence, particularly the IntelligenceBureau, on this count, has been outstanding.Even in the absence of additional resources,new empowerments and living with securityinsensitive, if not illiterate, culture of governance,it has been able to bring about changes inreal time to face new problems of insurgency,terrorism, espionage, border intrusions, sociopoliticalconflicts, etc., even in the remotest partsof the country. Decisional autonomy enjoyed bythe Director, Intelligence Bureau, his proximity topolitical leadership, a strong culture of loyalty andesprit de corps within the organization, besidesquality leadership at various levels, have madethis possible. However, the great contribution ofevolutionary changes notwithstanding, it needsto be underlined that the phenomenon operateswithin a limited band-width and cannot addressfundamental infirmities. It is unfit to bring aboutchanges that have a long gestation period, involvehigh expenditure, require major technologicalor structural changes or have legal implications.It also cannot alter basic approaches towardssecurity management, of which intelligence isonly one component, particularly in a ruckusdemocracy like India. One down side of such inhouseinnovations and improvisations is that itmakes the Governments complacent, mistakingthe success of fire fighting efforts as a solution tothe cause of fire. Quite often, the forewarningsand ignored pleas for action to offset theimpending threats in India, go unaccounted andunpunished, making systemic failures revisit withvengeance.The second set of changes may be called‘reformist’. They are triggered by some majorreverses or failures forcing the Governments,either on their own volition or under pressureof public opinion, to bring about fundamentalchanges. Changes following the attack on PearlHarbour and post war emergence of Communistthreat to the US, India’s 1962 Chinese debacle,post 9/11 threat of jehadi terrorism etc. fall in thiscategory. Often Governments appoint enquirycommissions or experts committees to studythe failures, analyze the causes and recommend32The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

eforms. Warren Commission, on the assassinationof President Kennedy, Senate Committee on theWatergate Scandal, Shah Commission on the roleof intelligence during emergency in India etc. areillustrative. They examine not only the internalworkings of the organization but also functionalrelativity with organizations and systems outsidethe intelligence community. Public committeesserve a very useful purpose as they are ableto examine and evaluate the functioning ofintelligence agencies in the broader context ofpolitical environment, systems of governanceand Iegal-constitutional framework. However,at times, meant only to serve political purposeor silence mounting public criticism, thesecommittees are less than objective and swayedby extra-professional considerations. Theyalso often get over influenced by populistperceptions of the causes and remedies, whichare not always correct. Consequently, theirfindings and recommendations do not alwayslead to improvements in the efficiency andeffectiveness of intelligence agencies. The ShahCommission’s findings and recommendationsare a case in point. On the contrary, committeeson reforms that are led by the professionals, areable to come out with more specific, incisive and‘doable’ recommendations. The Shankar NairCommittee report, despite its limited mandate onintelligence reforms, came out with some highlycommendable recommendations.The third category comprises changes that arebrought about by intelligence agencies on theirown, or in conjunction with the larger securityset up of the country, envisioning futuristic threatsand challenges. Transformational in character,they involve constructing future scenarios,assessing the environment in which intelligenceagencies will have to operate and calculatinggaps between existing capacities and thoserequired to meet emerging threats. This exercisenecessitates intensive study of futuristic trends,their implications for national security, analyzingpolicy options and formulating strategy for change.Forecasting intelligence needs of the country,it should attempt to architect new doctrines,suggest structural changes, aim at optimizationof resources and examine administrative andlegislative changes required for empowerment ofintelligence agencies. While intelligence agenciesin developed countries frequently attempt thisexercise, the Indian intelligence has rarely madea conscious effort in this direction. One suchexercise was carried out in the late eighties in theIntelligence Bureau on the initiative of Shri M.K. Narayanan, just before he was tipped to takeover as the chief.At the national level, the Report of the Group ofMinisters on National Security in 2001, was thefirst macro level attempt in this direction. Thoughit came as an aftermath of the SubramaniamCommittee report on Kargil, it was an integratedfuturistic attempt to restructure nationalsecurity under four categories namely, defence,intelligence, internal security and bordermanagement. It came with some outstandingrecommendations, but unfortunately with thechange in regime the momentum of changecould not be sustained. One of the majorrecommendations, that was lost sight of, pertainedto the review of the national security by a highpowered Groups of Ministers, every five years. Ifimplemented, there would have been perspectiveaction plans for intelligence and other reforms in2006 and 2011. For this category of changes to bereally effective, a political will is necessary, thatrequires serious and enthusiastic involvementof senior political leadership of the country. InIndia, national security is a low agenda item,except when the nation finds itself in the midstof a serious security crisis. Unfortunately, thatis the most ineffective setting for change. In anideal situation, the Government should developa long term bi-partisan consensus for thesetransformational changes.It needs to be emphasized that both theevolutionary and reformist approaches to change,though important by themselves, are inadequateto meet threats of the future. These approachesto change are premised on the assumption thatif shortcomings of the past were redressed, thefuture would be safe. They allow us to analysethe causes of failure, examine existing systemsand processes, and suggest readjustment toprevent their recurrence. The broader legal,administrative and security frameworks are takenfor granted; presuming that intelligence would beable to deliver the moon only through changeswithin — every time, everywhere. Unfortunately,this is an erroneous premise. At best, they equipThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 33

the country to win the war that is already over.Reforms exclusively based on experience of thepast suffer from another infirmity. They fail tofactor in the innovations and transformations thatthe adversaries keep on bringing about in theircapacities, resources, strategies, collaborativenetworks, technology, equipments, targets, modusoperandi etc. As former US Secretary of Defence,Donald Rumsfeld, reflecting on the 21st centurythreats, observed that changes will have to be fastand constant to “defend against the unknown,the uncertain, the unseen and the unexpected”.These sets of changes, though more valid inoperational areas of intelligence generation liketrade craft, surveillance, penetration, technologyimprovisation etc. also have relevance in tools ofanalysis.Indian intelligence in the next ten years shouldpress into action an integrated strategy for change,incorporating a judicious mix of all the three setsof changes namely, evolutionary, reformist andtransformational. In working out this strategyfor change, in addition to its long conventionalexperience, it may be necessary to factor in somenew emerging realities. Following are few suchfactors that may impact intelligence work in theyears ahead.Indian Intelligence, in times ahead, will haveto operate under greater public gaze, mediascrutiny and accountability regimen. It willhave to develop capability to operate in atranslucent, if not transparent environment.One of the conventional strengths of theintelligence organizations have been their abilityto operate in a relatively opaque and insulatedenvironment. It was an accepted norm that in thelarger security interests of the state and safety ofits people, intelligence agencies be allowed tooperate outside the public gaze. Even outsidethe government, there was a tacit acceptance ofthis reality and the media, courts, scholars andanalysts etc. implicitly respected this privilegeand were careful not to draw them into publiccontroversies or expose their activities that mightundermine national or public interest. Criticismwas mostly confined to intelligence productionwhen it was felt that intelligence agencies hadfailed to alert or forewarn the governments. Exceptthe interested political groups who occasionallylevelled charges on the use of intelligence forpolitical purposes, the intelligence processes,by and large, remained under a veil of secrecy.This provided the requisite deniability to theintelligence professionals, even when they had nolegal cover to carry out their secretive functions.The voluntary restraint exercised, was not somuch to protect the intelligence agencies or thegovernments, but more to deny undue advantageto the enemies of the state, who stood to gainby such exposures. Today, one of the mainsources of intelligence for the terrorists, spies andsaboteurs are media reports. They learn aboutthe thinking and policies of the Government,movements and plans of the security agencies,details about arrests of their gang members anddisclosures made by them, the people and placeson the radar of intelligence agencies etc. throughopen sources. In addition, media provides wideand prominent coverage to violent groups andtheir depredations, which enables them to getwide publicity and achieve the objective ofterrorizing the people. It also enables them todiscredit and demoralize the governments inpower - the political objective of perpetratingterrorist actions. The live coverage of Mumbai26/11 terrorist attack, that was being monitoredby mentors of the terrorist group in Karachi, andwho in turn were directing tactical movements ofthe terrorists, is a case in point.In times ahead, this problem is going to get furtherdeepened and accentuated. Soft states with opendemocracies, like India, will find themselvesparticularly vulnerable. For political reasons, legalrestraints or advisories to the media will neitherbe enforceable nor advisable. Frequency andintensity of front organizations, supporting thecause of anti-national forces, and masqueradingas human right groups, to put pressure on theintelligence and security agencies will show amarked increase. Even, demands for inclusionof intelligence agencies, or at least part of theiractivities, covered under the Right to InformationAct, may find political support.Unlike in the past when it was not a tabooedsubject, intelligence has entered the arena of publicdiscourse. We have to accept the reality as it is andnot as we wish it to be. Not only the intelligenceproduction -- which can be a legitimate matter ofpublic concern -- but even the processes, structures34The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

and systems will increasingly come under publicscrutiny. Demands for parliamentary oversight,intervention in internal administrative matters,resistance to legal empowerment, like in the caseof National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC),etc. are indicative of the changing environment.It will be desirable for the Indian intelligenceagencies to start revisiting their systems andmaking preparations for change, compatible withthe future realities, without undermining vitalnational interest.The Intelligence agencies should startdeliberating on a public interface mechanismwhich, in the long run, may even include amedia and public relations exercise. The wayIndian democracy is evolving, it will be in thenational interest to educate the media and haveworking relation with it, rather than allow it togo haywire for want of knowledge and authenticinformation. A well thought out action plan, onthis count, may take two to three years before itis made operational.Secondly, it will be desirable to have a group ofexperienced officers examine the entire workingof the lB and R&AW and re-visit its security needs,through VED-analysis. Through a calibratedstrategy, it can secure vital secrets that may impingeon national security, while allowing controlledoversight by parliamentary or other bodies,where it will not hurt the vitals. Besides changesin tradecraft doctrines and practices, the changeswill involve, a whole new regimen of securityre-classification, changes in documentation andfiling systems, communications, maintenanceof records, weeding out of files etc. Intelligenceagencies should be able to bring about thischange in the next three to four years.Technology will have to be another focus areafor transformational change. This has twodistinct dimensions in intelligence. First isneutralizing efforts of the adversaries to acquireand operationalise technologies to undermineour national security. The second, pertainsto up-gradation and integration of state of arttechnologies by us to enhance our own defensiveand offensive capacities.The rate at which terrorists, spies, saboteursand hostile intelligence agencies are acquiringnew technologies, poses a serious threat. Theseinclude a whole ambit of weapon systems,explosives, communication equipments, defeatsystems against conventional intelligencetradecraft etc. Recently, the use of social mediafor creating lawlessness and inciting people toviolence has underlined the scope of technologydriven threats. Incessant efforts being madeby the jehadi terrorists to acquire radioactiveexplosive devices (dirty bombs), is a matterof serious concern. With the conditions ofinstability in Af-Pak region getting accentuatedafter 2014 drawdown, ideologically motivatedIslamists taking charge of senior positions inPakistan Army and intelligence setups, deepeningcollaborative linkages of ISI with home grownradical groups like Indian Mujahedeen, in India,the intelligence challenges will get compoundedmanifold. Terrorist groups are also fast acquiringcapabilities of safe communication which willrender the task of interception quite difficult.In the area of defence, fast technological upgradationthrough heavy investments beingmade by hostile intelligence agencies like ISI ofPakistan, MSS of China etc. in electronic warfare,offensive cyber capabilities, space surveillance,maritime encirclement of India etc. will have to befactored in for developing counter capabilities.Another aspect of technology in intelligencework relates to acquisition, improvisation andintegration of new technologies. Though itsnecessity is disputed by none, the intricacies areunderstood by few. India’s strategic partnershipwith the US and greater security cooperationwith the West notwithstanding, no developedcountry will share real state of the art intelligencetechnologies with India, particularly as a totalsystem. Even where the second rung technologiesare made available, they are fraught with danger,as the suppliers will insist on not transferring thecodes or allowing us to change them withouttheir involvement. Secrecy of our systems in thisdispensation is seriously undermined. India willdo well to take advantage of the offset clause inacquisition of defence equipment and use partof it for indigenous production of intelligenceequipment. With India purchasing over $100billion worth of defence equipments in thenext seven to eight years, 30% of it under theoffset clause, provides us a huge investmentopportunity for this. Development of internalResearch and Development capabilities areThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 35

extremely expensive and time consuming.Unfortunately, even in areas where suchinitiatives were viable, we were not able toexploit them due to paucity of funds and lack offuturistic vision in organizational leadership. Thecoming up of the National Technical ResearchOrganisation (NTRO) is a welcome move but itsfunctioning so far does not inspire confidence. Itsfocus should be more on developing intelligencetechnological capabilities rather than gettinginvolved in intelligence production, for which itis least qualified.Revolution in informatics and emerging cyberthreats will constitute another area of challengefor the security agencies. The task of handlingmassive open data emanating from diversesources, both secret and classified, will makethe task of analysis quite difficult. Deliberateefforts to use the information highways fordisinformation, propaganda and subversion,will compound the problem. Of late, manyyouth in different parts of the world are beingsucked into the vortex of radicalism, withoutany physical contact. Concurrently, terroristand other anti-national forces are acquiringcapabilities to wage cyber wars, targeting criticalinfrastructure, intrusion in classified domains,damaging vital national data etc. The challengeis compounded by the fact that the perpetratorsare able to operate from unknown destinations,using inaccessible platforms, thousands of milesaway from Indian soil.Another futuristic challenge against which Indianintelligence will have to brace itself will be itscapacity and resilience to cope with challengesof Covert Action (CA) and the Fourth GenerationWarfare (4GW). The traditional use of militarypower to further a nation’s strategic, politicalor economic interests has been undergoing achange since the late eighties. This trend is goingto further consolidate in times ahead.With wars increasingly becoming cost-ineffectiveventures of unpredictable consequences, CovertAction will increasingly be used as a newvariant of ‘war through other means’, to achievestrategic and political objectives. Covert Action,is a deliberate state policy, directed against thetarget state manifesting itself in various formslike engineering political instability, causingsocial disruption, retarding economic progress,accentuating disaffection and unrest in civilsociety and manipulating media. In violent forms,it includes promoting terrorism and insurgencies,political assassinations, social disruption,sabotage, subversion etc. It is a low cost sustainableoffensive with high deniability, aimed to bleedthe enemy to submission. Moral pretensions andinternational laws notwithstanding, this optionhas been equally used by developed countrieslike USA, in Afghanistan against the Soviets andpoor countries like Pakistan against India inKashmir, Punjab etc. Unfortunately, the doctrineof ‘protecting supreme national interests throughall means’ has bypassed India.Conventionally, the causes, instrumentalities,resources and consequences of internal threats aredomestic, as against the external threats, in whichthey are of external origin. However, in the newdispensation, internal security has become highlyvulnerable to external manipulations. Hostilepowers target it to achieve their politico-strategicobjectives by internally bleeding the adversary,exploiting its internal faultlines. In Covert Action(CA) the planning, motivation, finances and oftenmanpower is of the sponsoring country and sois the strategic objective it is aimed to achieve.Today, in India, while conventional internal threatsinvolving violence are steadily on the decline,threats from externally sponsored covert actionhas gone up several notches. Though beleagueredfor nearly two decades, India has failed to developcapabilities and a viable national response to theCA threats, both at the strategic and tactical levels.Response has been episodal with short memories,often with time consistency not lasting beyond thenext election. CA is a threat against which Indianintelligence will have to develop capabilities,both in defensive and offensive-defense modes.Their role will assume added importance since inthis war intelligence agencies would be primary,if not the sole, players. Besides collection ofintelligence, the new role will necessitate proactiveand interventionist operational actions requiringadequate legal empowerment. Seen in thisperspective, opposition to the National CounterTerrorism Centre (NCTC) in India was ill-advised.Thus, both the internal and external adversarieswill try to achieve their political objectivesby coercing the Government through internal36The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

violence and destabilisation. This willincreasingly take the world to what is knownas Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), conflictsin which the civil society will play a primaryrole. The subversive and violent groups disguisethemselves as crusaders of disaffected oralienated sections of the society and indulgein violence and other unlawful activities. Thiswill be a war against the invisible enemy hidingwithin the civil society, stunning to silencethe majority through violence, fear and terrorand making the governance impossible forits inability to protect them. Inability of theGovernments to protect their civil societies andredress their genuine grievances, make themhighly vulnerable to the mechanizations ofhostile intelligence agencies.The future pattern of conflicts would increasinglybe more civil society centric. This fight againstan invisible enemy, conceptualised as FourthGeneration Warfare (4GW), will aim at collapsingthe enemy internally rather than physicallydestroying him through military might. Asobserved by William Lind, “Distinction betweenwar and peace will be blurred to the vanishingpoint.” In this nonlinear war against the invisibleenemy, there will no defined battle fields andthe difference between civil and military targetswould get obliterated. The disaffected andalienated sections of the society will be targetedby the enemies, both within and outside, toprovide cause and the cover for subversive andviolent actions. State security apparatus with highfire power, mobility, technology and logistic basewill find themselves at a loss to fight this battle,where there is no defined territory to be dominatedand visible enemy to be destroyed. Propaganda,skilful use of media and information interventionmay be extensively used by the adversaries todiscredit and delegitimise lawfully establishedgovernments. Actions taken by the governmentto protect law abiding citizens or to enforcerule of law will be portrayed as persecutionand oppression, further eroding government’slegitimacy. American war in Vietnam and SovietUnion’s fight in Afghanistan are illustrative.Intelligence will be the primary instrumentalitythrough which these wars would be fought. Tofight these futuristic conflicts, the intelligenceagencies will have to build an extensive networkof agents of information and influence amongpotentially vulnerable sections of the society.Psy-war capabilities, integrating modern stateof-arttechnologies, will have to be adopted. AUS study paper on ‘The Changing Face of War:Into the Fourth Generation’ has rightly assertedthat “Fourth generation adversaries will be adeptat manipulating the media to alter domesticand world opinion to the point where skillfuluse of psychological operations will sometimespreclude the commitment of combat forces.Television news may become a more powerfuloperational weapon than armored divisions.”India with its social fault lines, economicinequalities and fragmented polity is highlyvulnerable to civil society conflicts that can leadto instability. The external factor in the form ofactivities of hostile intelligence agencies, foreignNGOs with a political agenda, trans-borderideological influence of some radical or extremistgroups etc., can exploit alienated groups to theiradvantage. Though these threats have existedfor quite some time but with revolution ininformatics, accessibility to new technologies andcollaborative networking among anti-nationalforces these may become more extensive andacute in future. Indian intelligence will have todevelop new capabilities to meet these threats.The challenges that Indian intelligence is goingto face in the years ahead will be much moreserious and complex. India’s emergence as amajor power centre, provides it an opportunity,as also adds to its vulnerability. There is a need towork out a long term strategy for transformationalchanges, on one hand and internal reforms, onthe other. Under a time bound programme, aplan of action should be prepared and pressedinto action with full earnestness.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 37

A Journey that turnedmy DestinyShri Shyamal Datta, IPS (Retd.)My voyage to the world of Intelligence beganrather late for a variety of reasons. Instead of theyear 1969, I set sail to report to the IntelligenceBureau (IB), New Delhi only in January, 1979, afterhaving served in three districts as Superintendentof Police and Divisional Commissioner of Policein Calcutta. The creature comforts of life in Police,made the initial years of ‘battle inoculation’ in thisgreat Institution, somewhat difficult to bear. It wasnot easy to adjust to the unwritten convention of“doing everything yourself” in the IB.In the midst of trying to come to terms with the‘new culture’, the training in the Basic IntelligenceCourse breathed a fresh air of novelty, of learningsomething new and in such depth. The factthat Intelligence, like the Law Enforcement, isan intricate science was not known. A glimpseinto the world of unknown went a long way inkindling an urge to know more and more in thevast field of knowledge which, in turn, helpedovercome the pains of leading the life of an “aamadmi”.After the basic training, began the most difficultperiod of months of understudy of the DeskOfficer, under the supervision of seniors, knownto be brilliant in their areas of specializationand hard task masters. They would not expressany annoyance or displeasure at omissions andcommissions, but through merciless correction ofdrafts presented for their vetting, would conveyvery loud and clear, in “silence”, that therewere glaring inadequacies in the analysis, andwould express the same analysis with brevityand lucidity. They would also inspire and mouldthe young mind to read, think and to question.However, it would be left to the “green horn” todecipher and take initiative to hone all the skillsrequired for analysis and the IB style of writing.Side by side with this, emphasis was laid onmastering the art of making oral presentation ofthe assessment report, in brief, for the benefit ofthe DIB every week, in the forum of the FridayMeeting. The quality of presentation wouldbe judged, in general, by the impression it leftin the minds of listeners. The institutionalisedmechanism of Friday Meeting singularly helpedinstilling the aptitude of speaking in public withclarity and confidence. I still recall the sweets Ihad to offer as per the prevalent practice, to mycolleagues, including seniors, for the complimentsI received on my maiden performance in theFriday Meeting.Another unique feature was the 'Lunch Club'where all the officers attached to differentanalytical desks, would assemble during the lunchbreak and learn how to break bread with oneanother. This, not only provided some measureof relief, after the arduous morning session ofthe day’s work, but also infused a feeling oftogetherness. Notes were also exchanged, ingeneral, on latest happenings in different parts ofthe country while sharing the lunch. That’s howthe process of cementing of bonds began to makelearning interesting.With the passage of time, a realisation dawnedthat an ‘unstated and inbuilt‘ design in thegrooming of a new entrant in the IB was first tode-romanticize the mind and bring the officerdown to a level where he would be required toslowly assimilate the essential ingredients of alife, which would be faceless, shorn of pomp andsplendour, associated with the uniform job andbehind the curtain, characterised by anonymity.All these called for tremendous understandingand adjustment through continuous mentaltraining.Another implicit focus of the great Institutionwas on “self development”. Nothing would bedone to impose any thing from above to make38The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

one develop. The all pervasive culture would besuch that the quest for learning and excellencewould gradually get ingrained and supplement inample measure, the learning under a ‘Guru’ inthe office. The wisdom would guide that whileresources of the Organisation were limited, thepotential of the resource called ‘self’, innatein every one of us, was most enormous andunlimited. The development of this valuableresource would depend on the discipline andcalibre of the “self” to harness its huge potentialand make a difference.We were made to realise and appreciate, all thetime, that an internal teacher existed in every oneof us. It must assert to train the mind and body withthe help of three instruments of instinct, reasoningand inspiration. The instrument of instinct helpedmake the mind alert and sensitive to anticipatedanger, judge human behaviour, and take steps toward off adversities. The reasoning, on the otherhand, instilled qualities of interpretation, analysis,assessment, understanding and expression.Lastly, the inspiration trained the mind to beimaginative, innovative, motivated and creative.For an optimum development of these traits, allthe instruments needed to work in harmony.A new facet of life in Intelligence opened forme when I was posted at Patna, as the StationChief, Bihar. The focus of work shifted toproduction, with proper assessment of thereliability, of intelligence inputs catered toHeadquarters. The state of Bihar was then one ofthe most politically active in the country. It wasamong the disturbed States on account of theLeft Wing Extremist movement and separatistmovements that raged in its tribal belt. Bothoffered enormous operational opportunities forthe SIB to try and influence the course of thesemovements, and enlarge the domain of peace.The breakthroughs made at the leadership levelsof the two streams of movement, helped createcapacity to prevail over the State Governmentto try and improve governance in the affectedareas, and assuage the feelings of the aggrieved,down- trodden people. Efforts helped in somemeasure, moderating the temper and tenor ofthe mass movements. The influence sustainedon the mind of the tribal leadership later, helpedpave the way for the resolution of conflictthrough the creation of new states.The long stint of over six years, turned out to beindeed a very fulfilling and satisfying experience.Regular briefings of the Chief Minister andthe Governor helped knowing governancefrom inside. The exchange of views helpedprepare better to meet the requirements of theGovernment, and the challenges confronting thestate. The state, on its part, involved the SIB in allpolicy matters relating to security and intelligence.The most satisfying moment that I cherished forlong, was the benign observation made by theChief Minister, Shri Bindeswari Dubey, to thevisiting Special Director, IB, from New Delhi thatthe best informed outfit in the state was the SIB,and that his Government heavily depended onit.On return to IB Headquarters, (April 1997)after doing a stint of two and a half years asthe Director, Special Protection Group (SPG),I noticed a marked spurt in the demand foractionable intelligence to deal with the growingsurge and dimensions of the militancy ofextremist organisations from the late 80s. Thecollective wisdom went in for a real stepping upof the operational capabilities, on a larger scaleupto the SIBx level, taking the state Police underits wings. This called for substantial accretion inthe deployment as well as use of both soft andhardware, required for better technical, transborder,operational, and human intelligence. Insupplementing the initiatives, the state Policealso got seriously engaged in the building upof its own operational mechanism, by speciallytraining personnel for its specialised wings, withadequate wherewithal. It helped reinforce thebonds of cooperation and collaboration betweenthe States and the Centre, on operational planes.Simultaneously, both the IB and the R&AWdecided to harness and optimise the utilisationof their resources and regular sharing of realtime intelligence, so as to impart greater thrustto intelligence operations. The excellentprofessional relations that grew between the IBand the R&AW, on the one hand, and the StatePolice, on the other, not only brought about amarked shift in the mind-set of both Intelligenceand Law Enforcement but also a great refinementin the overall response to detect, deter anddisrupt terror, its plans and preparations, besidesinfrastructure and operational bases. The presentThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 39

day architecture fashioned on the basis of therecommendations of the Kargil Report, has beenan improvement in terms of better monitoringof the development of intelligence input, bothtactical and strategic, and coordination andconcerted action, enlisting participation of otheragencies, including the CPOs.During the Kargil conflict, my unhappy experiencewas that valuable inputs shared by the IB with theArmy and others on the mobilisation and plans ofthe ‘Jehadi’ elements across Kargil sector, did notreceive the attention that the gravity of the reportdeserved. It was not subjected to proper scrutinyby the military minds in the field, to test andretest its veracity, with reference to the situationand developments that prevailed in the borderingareas along Kargil. Had this been done, the Armywould have asked from the IB additional inputs,in order to put together the pieces of the puzzlefor action. Unfortunately, the valuable contentsof the report remained without any properexamination. This only showed the mind setof the Armed Forces to often treat intelligenceinput, including those catered by its own MilitaryIntelligence, with a sense of disbelief and disdain.In the process, intelligence died a prematuredeath for being ignored. No wonder, the worstenemy of intelligence is often, none other thanits own consumers.In sharp contrast to this, Intelligence receivedmuch greater appreciation and understandingfrom the political establishment. The UnionHome Minister L.K. Advani, broke from thepast, and tasked the IB, for the first time, tomake presentations on serious security issuesand challenges that the country faced, beforethe Parliamentary Committee on Home Affairs.Presentations made by senior IB officers dealingwith the concerned subjects like J&K, Terrorism,‘Jehadi‘ activities from across the borders etc.,were highly appreciated by the Parliamentariansof different hues. They were frank enough toadmit that several aspects of the presentationsand the steps taken by the Intelligence Agenciesto deal with the scourge of terror, were not knownto them. They requested the Home Minister tocontinue with the Interactive Sessions with theMPs, on a regular basis.The Prime Minister, himself, once asked the IBto brief a select group of MPs, and some CabinetMinisters on J&K, before embarking upon hisdecision to go for a cease-fire. Needless to say,that the purpose behind the brain stormingsession was kept a closely guarded secret. Onanother occasion, the Prime Minister desired apresentation before the Cabinet Committee onSecurity (CCS), on the situation in J&K in theaftermath of the ceasefire.Unlike the bureaucracy, the political leadershipwas also very much appreciative of the awfultruth that the best of Intelligence Organisationsaround the world, could not escape failure, bigor small. They are not always able to come upto the high expectations of the people to detectand prevent all dangers and untoward incidents.Further, they can neither trumpet their successnor defend their failure. They, therefore, learn toenjoy and suffer both the inevitables, in silenceand stoically. These professional hazards makethe Intelligence profession one of the mostunenviable. It is not every body’s cup of tea.The fact that the political establishment attachedgreat importance to the Intelligence Agencieswas evident when the Central Governmentsent a select team of senior officers of the IBand its Tech unit, R&AW and the MEA to carryout negotiations with the hijackers in Kandaharin the aftermath of the hijacking of the IndianAirlines Flight No.814 on December 24, 1999.The captive communication, established bythe IB Tech Team, facilitated round the clockcommunication, on the progress of negotiations,from the Kandahar Airport, Afghanistan, to theDIB for regular briefing of the CCS, Cabinet,the Home Minister and the Prime Minister, inparticular. The hard bargaining by the joint team,forced the hijackers to climb down from theirover ambitious list of demands. What happenedthereafter, on the night of December 31st, 2000,is known to all.The Special Issue of the Indian Police Journal tocommemorate the 125th Anniversary of the IB,made me reminisce about the rich contributionmade by the Annual Conferences of the DGsand Intelligence Chiefs of the States and theUTs, under the Chairmanship of the DIB. Thisinstitutionalised forum has helped the Policeand Intelligence fraternity to work shoulder toshoulder, even at a time when the federal relations40The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

etween the states and the centre suffered fromserious stress and strain.I recall with a supreme sense of satisfaction howthe Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayeerecognised and appreciated the dire need foraugmenting the grant of funds, on a long termbasis, for the modernisation of the Police Forcesin the country, after his interactive sessionwith a select group of DGs during the annualconference in 2000. Since then, the Policehas not experienced any paucity of funds andits modernisation has continued apace withsincerity and seriousness. The entire creditfor this phenomenal change in the fundingand modernisation of the Police forces, bothat the centre and the states, goes to Shri AtalBehari Vajpayee who set up a Committee,comprising DG, Rajasthan, DG, BPR&D and theDIB, besides the Cabinet Secretary, PrincipalSecretary and the Home Secretary, and onits recommendations, funds got immediatelysanctioned by the MHA. Another feather in thecap of the DGs conference, was its success toprevail over the Finance Commission of thetime, to treat certain aspects of Policing as partof the Plan Budget. This has added to the coffersof the Police administration across the country.Earlier, the “Tenure Rules(1988)”, which werenot considered attractive enough to inspire theyoung IPS officers to pursue Intelligence as acareer, were taken up by me for modification,immediately after assuming charge of the officeof the DIB in 1998. The leadership modified thetenure rules, emphasizing categorically that thecareer prospects in the lB should be dealt withon a footing separate from that of the CPOs.It, however, ran into difficulties because of thereservations recorded by the MHA on some ofthe important recommendations that put the lBon a footing, separate from that of the CPOs.When the file with changes made by the MHA,reached the PMO, the DIB had to seek the kindpersonal intervention of the Prime Minister whoimmediately asked the PMO to reexamine thefile in consultation with the DIB and put up forclearance. The PMO appreciated the specialmodifications made by the lB in the TenureRules, and put its stamp of approval, perhaps inApril 2000, on important recommendations likethe ‘in situ’ promotions for senior officers fromthe rank of Deputy Director to Special Directorafter completion of the required numbers ofyears of service, repatriation of officers on theground of unsatisfactory performance, releaseof the lB officers on promotion to their cadres,in case of promotion not forthcoming in thelB, consideration of Special Directors of lB forthe posts of DG, in organisations dealing withSecurity and Intelligence etc. Later, a strong casemade by the lB before the Kargil Sub Committeeon Intelligence for more foreign assignments forthe lB Officers than the existing few, was alsoagreed. Thus, the career prospects of the officersjoining the IB, stand vastly improved today thanbefore.Personally, I remain most indebted to theIntelligence Bureau which enabled me to havea life time experience of working with the PrimeMinister on a day to-day basis, who adhered tonorms of professional ethics and administrativepropriety.Another great pillar of strength and supportwas the Union Home Minister who wouldring up personally to keep abreast of the latestdevelopments. This required the DIB to tryand remain on toes all the time. It was entirelyhis vision to open a dialogue between theParliamentarians and the Intelligence Agencies ina proper forum for better appreciation of complexissues affecting the security and integrity of thecountry. It generated stupendous confidence andcourage of conviction among the IB officers. Italso helped in adding to the image of the IB.The Home Minister encouraged free and frankexchange of views, even if it meant statingsomething unpalatable for the ruling party.I feel most honoured to have led the Organisationfor three years and more. I remain deeply andprofoundly grateful to late Shri S.M. Mathur,DIB, who took personal interest to prevail overlate Jyoti Basu, the then Chief Minister of WestBengal, for my early release from the state, ondeputation to the IB. I was most fortunate tohave got trained and worked for years underesteemed senior Shri M.K. Narayanan and otherDIBs like S/Shri T.V. Rajeshwar, R.K. Kapoor,H.A. Barari and V.G. Vaidya. I also remaingrateful to a battery of professionals, both inHeadquarters and outstations, known for theirThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 41

outstanding competence, courage, sincerity,dedication, sacrifice and determination. Butfor their unstinted support and cooperation, itwould not have been possible for me to meetthe challenges of critical times. The laurels won,if any, were entirely because of their hard workand cooperation of a very high order. They wereindeed matchless and made the organisationproud. Above all, they helped in transformingmy destiny.It is this rich legacy, combined with competenceand commitment of the present and cominggenerations, that would help the IB attain newerheights of glory and excellence. What they needto pursue, are the cherished values of professionalrectitude to create hopes for a brighter future ofthe country and its people. We, members of theIB family, wish the great Institution the best oftimes and many many more happy returns of theDay, on the occasion of its 125 th Anniversary.42The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Intelligence Agencies inIndian DemocracyDr Ajai Sahni,Executive Director, Institute for Conflict ManagementThe frontiers of criminality in India have beenexpanding exponentially since Independence,with terrorism and the changing internal securityscenario adding a dramatic new dimension tothe character and scale of the challenges facedby the intelligence and enforcement apparatusof the state. Apart from insurgent and terroristviolence, there has also been a noticeableupsurge in organized and transnational crime inrecent decades, including disturbing tendenciesto collusive operations, covering complexeconomic offences, as well as linkages withpowerful politicians and the bureaucracy, on theone hand, and with international criminal andterrorist groupings, on the other.A combination of demographic, technologicaland geopolitical factors suggests that theseproblems have the potential for significantaugmentation in the foreseeable future. Already,many movements of extreme violence are led bymen who are obsessed by apocalyptic visions ofgenocide and omnicide, and who, increasingly,are approaching the possibilities of securing themeans to achieve these ends. Indeed, intelligenceand security agencies across the world nowconcede not only the possibility, but, in fact,the imminence of a future catastrophic attack,potentially involving WMD technologies; amongthese, the most devastating and accessible couldwell be biological terrorist attacks that couldleave millions dead.Terrorism is undergoing radical, generationalshifts, and when this transition manifests itself ina new wave of catastrophic attacks, the resultantshocks could destroy almost all capacities ofresponse within the target systems. With rareexception, however, India’s strategic and policyestablishment continues to prepare to counternothing more than the last terrorist attack,substantially oblivious of the continuous processof reinvention that terrorists are engaged in.There is, in India today, little comprehensionof the magnitude and the evolving nature of thefuture threat of terrorism, consigning much of thediscourse on the subject to the realm of makebelieve.Terrorism, however, does not exhaust the threatthe country faces. India’s democracy is, today,under sustained attack from within and without.In 65 years of independence, the institutions ofgovernance have never appeared as fragmentedand fragile as they seem today. Even as thecapacities for governance appear to be insufficientto fulfil the most rudimentary mandate of modernadministration, the institutions of governance areconfronted with a tsunami of rising aspirations,and by a divisive, criminalized and polarizedpolitics that exacerbates centrifugal tendenciesacross the country.It is within the complex dynamic of these risingdisorders that India’s intelligence apparatus hasto respond, and is to be evaluated. Despite itsconsiderable achievements, there is evidentlya crisis in the intelligence establishment in thecountry today, and it is obvious that the system isunprepared to deal with the projected threats ofthe future. Indeed, it has seen significant failures,even in its efforts to confront the problems of thepresent.There has been much talk of intelligence failureand intelligence reform over the past years,particularly since the Kargil debacle of 1999.Nevertheless, the contours of the crisis ofintelligence in the country may not be those thatexhaust much of the public discourse. The currentdebate on intelligence has overwhelminglyfocused on ‘coordination failures’, centralizationor integration of command and control, includingthe controversial proposals for the NationalThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 43

Counter-Terrorism Centre, ‘accountability’, and,in a critique arising from a different direction,the interface with human rights and fundamentaldemocratic freedoms.While many of these concerns are legitimate,they can only be considered secondary, within aframework of priorities, to far more urgent issuesthat plague India’s intelligence establishmentin an environment of rising security threat.Indeed, unless the more pressing imperatives offocus and efficiency, legitimacy, capacity andcapability – including manpower profiles andtechnological resources – are addressed, thebroader ‘architectural’ discourse will remainunproductive, even meaningless.More crucially, all these concerns, both the ‘higherorder’ discourse on meta-institutional reforms andthe more pragmatic considerations of capacity,collapse into the more fundamental enquiry:what are the legitimate concerns and limits toan intelligence apparatus within the frameworkof democracy – and more specifically, India’sdemocracy? And its corollary: how are theseto be realized? If a clear, coherent and detailedanswer could be found to these questions, mostof the remaining conundrums would easily meltaway.Within the theory of democracy, there is apowerful stream of justification that argues thatdemocracy is, itself, to be maximised as an‘ultimate value’, as opposed to the contrastingoptions of ‘authoritarianism’ or ‘tyranny’. Such aframing of the question is obviously emotionallyloaded – for how could authoritarianism ortyranny be preferred to democracy, freedom andthe rights of man? Advocates of this thesis tendto emphasise the value of certain processes, suchas elections, deliberation, and the separationof powers, and various relational and ethicalcriteria, such as freedom, equality, justice, rightsand participation, which are regarded as goodand desirable in themselves, without reference tothe objective circumstances of their operation orthe results they produce.Such an orientation has resulted, in India’simperfect democracy, in an excessive emphasison form, and an enduring neglect of substance,with a new institution or new legislation beingproposed to ‘resolve’ every new – or newlyperceived – problem. The abundance andimpotence of existing institutions and laws tosecure their purported objectives has done nothingto discourage this orientation, which appears tohave deep roots in the highest institutions of thestate, as well as in what passes for the intellectualelite in this country. Within such a framework,clearly, the inherent secrecy of operations ofintelligence agencies would find little legitimatespace, unless it was superimposed with layers ofoversight which, in present circumstances, wouldeffectively paralyse the agencies from performingany but the most innocuous and ineffective offunctions.Such a perspective, however, militates againstfar more vibrant and realistic traditions ofdemocracy, which have never shied away fromthe fundamental truth that democracy is, inessence, a system of government. Few, in India,understand and appreciate the tremendouslyhard-headed realism that underpinneddemocratic theory in its early contours, andthese origins have been buried deep under theincreasingly deceptive and diversionary populismof contemporary electoral democracies, not onlyhere, but, increasingly, across the world. Thetruth is, the idea of democracy as an end in itself,rooted in the intangibles of ‘popular sovereignty’and the ‘will of the people’, cannot provide anysatisfactory justification without reference tooutcomes. Democracy must find its justificationin the world of hard facts. Politics, in our world,is ultimately concerned with the relationshipbetween the governing and the governed, and ittakes little wisdom to conclude that it is aboutpower, and about the outcomes of the distributionand exercise of power. No system of governmentcan be an ultimate ideal without reference towhat it can do, or does, for the governed. AsGiovanni Sartori notes, “a democracy cannotpass the test, in the long run, unless it succeeds asa system of government. For if a democracy doesnot succeed in being a system of government, itdoes not succeed – and that is that.”If democracy is to succeed in practical – and notmerely notional – terms, it must, first and aboveall, be secured. It must recognize the variousthreats to which it is exposed, and acquire thecapacities and capabilities to confront andneutralize these.44The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Democracies are, today, everywhere underunprecedented attack. Fundamentalist creedsand ideologies of hatred and enveloping violencehave created movements that seek millennialtransformations that would destroy, not justdemocracy, but civilization itself and all thefreedoms that have come to comprise it. Suchmovements have, of course, secured only verylimited success against the broader democraticedifice and endeavour, but even where this is thecase, the damage they have done is colossal. Theextraordinary costs they have inflicted, not onlyin the visible terms of lives and resources lost, butof the long term opportunities of development,the loss of freedom for large populations, and theinstability, disorders and suffering they generateeven through occasional acts of disruption, canhardly be quantified.These threats are infinitely compounded by aregime of collusion and criminalization of thestate apparatus that has weakened governanceeverywhere. The Vohra Committee had writtenabout the urgency of breaking down the politicianbureaucrat-criminalnexus after the 1993 Mumbaibombings. Nearly two decades later, if anything,this nexus appears immensely stronger. It needsto be constantly reiterated that the activities of thecorrosive cabal of the corrupt, that is eating awayat the democratic and constitutional edifice fromwithin, is not only a law and order, but an urgentinternal security concern for the country. An elitewhose urge for domination is easily translatedinto a cynical machtpolitik based on force, fraud,and the ruthless use of power, is as much adanger and possibly even more detrimental to thenational interest, than any terrorist movement.It is necessary to recognize, moreover, that majorcrimes occur within an enabling environment thatcomprises a multitude of lesser transgressions;that the distressing theatre of a catastrophicterrorist attack is the culmination of a protractedseries of concealed – and preventable – offencesthat relies on a network that services both pettyand major crime. The same hawala networks, forinstance, service corrupt politicians, bureaucratsand businessmen, as well as terrorists. Smugglingchannels that bring grey market goods intothe country also bring in arms, ammunitionand explosives. And the same compromisedenforcement agencies and personnel ‘look theother way’, when such crimes occur.It is significant that those who have spokenthe loudest – particularly in the wake ofmajor terrorist attacks – about reforming andrestructuring India’s intelligence ‘architecture’,have tended to maintain a deafening silence onan overwhelming proportion of these concerns,preferring to exploit the hysteria provoked byoccasional acts of terrorism to augment thepowers of select institutions, or to surreptitiouslyalter the constitutional distribution of powersbetween the Centre and the States.Nevertheless, within the broader context of themultiplicity of threats to national security andtheir impact on the rights and welfare of theaverage civilian, it is evident that the presumptionof an inherent contradiction between intelligenceand human rights or democratic freedomsis fundamentally false. Indeed, intelligenceoperations are often crucial in the protectionof human rights, particularly where these arethreatened by organised criminal or terroristviolence, by deviant elements within the stateapparatus, and by the distortions that corruptionand abuse of power introduce into the frameworkof constitutional governance. In the absence ofeffective intelligence, no possible preventive orcorrective to these ills can be found. All theseissues necessarily fall within the legitimate andpressing concerns of a principled intelligenceagency within a democratic framework. There is,here, no necessary conflict between democraticvalues and individual freedoms, on the onehand, and intelligence operations, on the other.Principled intelligence operations are, in fact,necessary to the fuller exercise of freedom bythe average citizen. It cannot be the case, withinany just system of democracy, that the rights ofcriminals and those who violently transgress thelaw should have precedence over the rights oftheir victims – both potential and actual; this,however, is what the system for the protection ofrights has come to mean in India. A just societycannot owe its criminals a protection greater thanit affords those who abide by its laws.It is useful to notice, here, that much of theassault on democracy is ideological, subversiveand covert, and is executed through agenciesthat tread the margins of the law. Virtually allinsurgent, terrorist and organised criminal groups,today, set up front organisations, or penetrate andThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 45

exploit groups of ‘useful idiots’, to manipulatethe interstices and peculiar vulnerabilities ofdemocracy, for propaganda, for campaigns ofdisruptive protests and demonstrations, to createlegal obstacles for the functioning of securityagencies, to propagate their virulent creeds, andto clandestinely recruit to their ‘armies’. Theseare constituencies that adopt the language andidiom of democracy, even as they set about todestroy democracy. An overwhelming proportionof these activities cannot be countered withinthe framework of a normal ‘enforcement’apparatus – which is ordinarily galvanizedonly after the commission of a specific offence.More significantly, democracies, in generaland Indian democracy, in particular, havefailed to mount an effective counter-campaignat the ideological level. At least part of such acounter-campaign would necessarily include thesharing by intelligence agencies, of authoritativeassessments and information that does not haveoperational implications. Where these reach thesphere of public discourse, they would generateboth greater awareness and cooperation, on theone hand, and better feedback for the agenciesthemselves, on the other. The wholesale markingof all intelligence information as ‘secret’, is bothcounter-factual and counter-productive. There isa vast quantity of intelligence flows that can andshould be widely published, and such publicationwould generate greater strength and credibilityfor the agencies and help promote India’s securityobjectives. An essential function of the agencies isto create the operational, political and diplomaticenvironment, where India’s security interests arebetter projected and protected. Public advocacyand creating international perceptions on a rangeof issues are essential to this function, and must befacilitated by moderated information flows fromthe agencies. It is useful to recall that a ‘media cell’was established within the Intelligence Bureauin 2004, and operated for a couple of years,but was abruptly and inexplicably dismantledthereafter, with information flows reduced tothe fitful, opportunistic and unreliable system of‘leaks’ once again. A permanent interface withthe media and public would serve both publicand agency interests, and is an integral elementof the modern intelligence apparatus in the moreadvanced countries of the West.These, then, are some of the legitimate andnecessary functions of intelligence agencieswithin a democratic framework. However, just asdemocracy cannot be justified without referenceto outcomes, intelligence agencies will have toroot their own justification in the results theyproduce. To the extent that such results promotethe ends of democracy, the greater securityof the people, and the substance – as againstthe rituals associated with the protection – ofrights, their structures and operations will belegitimized. To the extent that their operationsincline to exceptionalism, partisan interventionsand manipulation, and the further accentuationof the distortions of the system, they becomeprogressively delegitimized – and eventuallywill find their power openly challenged anddestroyed.The crucial question, consequently, is: Whatmatters does intelligence serve? If it is harnessedto partisan interests, to distort democracy andsuppress legitimate freedoms, it is the enemyof the people and of constitutional governance.This, unfortunately, is manifestly the case, forinstance, in Pakistan, where an entire nation hasbeen devastated by the machinations of a corruptelite operating through a lawless intelligenceapparatus.The legitimacy and the effectiveness ofintelligence agencies are best served whereagencies make a clear distinction between thestate and regime – though the state is, of course,represented by the transient regime. Legitimateintelligence operations serve the interests of theconstitutional state, and are required to resistsubordination to the partisan interests of particularregimes from time to time. National security andconstitutional values are the touchstone againstwhich legitimacy is to be defined. Intelligenceagencies discredit themselves by misdirection;by providing false, misleading and ‘convenient’intelligence – intelligence that conforms, not tothe realities of the ground, but to the expectationsof the political executive and other ‘consumers’;or by their willingness to lend themselves topartisan political abuse of powers, or to politicaland electoral manipulation.Within a democratic framework, consequently,the integrity, effectiveness and legitimacy ofintelligence agencies and their operations will46The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

depend substantially on the restraints withinwhich they function. ‘Accountability’ hasbecome the new byword of intelligence reform,and many have quickly lifted current westernmodels of parliamentary oversight as the newpanacea for the ills that follow from the misuseand abuse of the intelligence apparatus. Likemany of our hasty and borrowed ‘solutions’,however, this reflects a misunderstanding both ofthe original ‘models’ and of the ground situationwithin India. Efforts to impose Parliamentary andCongressional oversight in the West have proved,at best, cosmetic in impact, and Western agencieshave remained susceptible to misuse under anaggressive political executive – the case of thedistortion, indeed, fabrication, of intelligenceon Iraq’s WMD capabilities, by both US andBritish intelligence, is an obvious, though notisolated, example. The business of intelligencewill remain, by its very character and mandate,secret. It is unlikely that the relatively immatureinstitutions of Indian democracy would be anymore successful than their Western counterparts,in creating an effective system of parliamentaryoversight though, given the profile of electedrepresentatives in India and the polarized natureof the country’s politics, any such system canbe expected to be far more disruptive of theagencies’ operational effectiveness.The most effective system of restraints would beone that is based on professionalism, efficiencyand integrity of the agencies and their operations.Once again, invasive intelligence gathering andoperations are legitimized by their outcomes.Where intelligence operations result in arrests,if there are clear convictions, within acceptabletime frames, through transparent judicialprocesses, such actions would find broad publicvalidation. Where intelligence-based operationsresult in protracted detentions with negativeor inconclusive judicial outcomes, publicopposition to such actions increases, even aspurported ‘victim communities’ become moreresentful and potentially radicalized. Again,where particular intelligence initiatives are seento serve transparent national interests, they will bepublicly validated; where they are seen to servepartisan and perverse political interests, they willbring the broader powers of the agencies underincreasing and intense scrutiny.This raises the question of one of the most glaringlacunae in India’s present system of intelligencegathering: the very limited quantum of evidentiaryintelligence – intelligence that can stand up tothe scrutiny of the Courts. Such evidentiaryintelligence, and the meticulous documentationof processes that lies at its foundation, has nowbecome an urgent imperative for all intelligenceoperations, both to secure the visible outcomesthat are a necessary component of legitimacy,and to exclude the misdirection and abuse ofintelligence resources. The future legitimacy ofagencies will depend on the integrity of processand the broader integrity and credibility of theagencies and their operations.It is abundantly clear that, given the very widemandate of intelligence agencies within theframework of Indian democracy, and the risingimperatives of a greater efficiency and integrityof processes, current capacities across theboard – human, technological and material – areall drastically insufficient. Given their presentprofiles, it is simply impossible for existingagencies to fulfil their necessary functions, and todevelop processes and records that would meetthe demands of integrity and professionalism.This deficit of capacities lies at the very heartof the failure to meet the requirements ofdemocracy – both in terms of the tasks that are tobe concluded and of the nature of processes thatmust be maintained. This problem also lies at theheart of many of the abuses that are criticized,particularly by the human rights lobby. The shortcuts become a necessity when the capacity,capability and endurance to run the full courseare lacking.The established judicial and human rightsnarrative in India has attributed the denial offreedom and suppression of rights to an excessand consequent abuse of power vested in stateinstitutions, and has thus sought to progressivelyconstrain and emasculate these. A counternarrativedemands greater and greater impunityfor state agencies to counter rising threats tosecurity. Both these positions are a completemisreading of both reality and the imperativesof constitutional governance. The cumulativebrutalisation of the Indian state is a consequence,not of any excess of power, but of a progressiveerosion of capacities and capabilities. It is notThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 47

power but infirmity that brutalizes the IndianState and its agencies. Endemic deficits ofcapacity in every State institution have made itimpossible to secure the necessary and legitimateends of governance through due process, andthe result is a progressive resort to short cutsand quick fixes. As the state weakens, powerbecomes progressively randomized, uncertain,malignant.Intelligence agencies and their activitieshave been demonized within the democraticframework, largely as a result of their abuse ormisdirection by an unscrupulous executive –and such abuse and misdirection is a reality,not only in India, but in varying measure, allover the world. The occasional perversion ofthe essential functions of intelligence agenciescannot, however, take away from the inherentnecessity of intelligence work within anycomplex and large system of management,including democratic governance. It remains,nevertheless, crucial to recognize that democracyis built on an extraordinary tension, a very finebalance, between freedom and restraint; theslightest unevenness, and freedom hurtles intolicence, or restraint into tyranny. The greatestendeavour of civilization is to find ways of beingstrong without being oppressive.This is a time for pragmatic and effective, notidealized or Utopian, solutions. At a time ofextreme uncertainty and risk in India’s internaland external security environment, the demandsfor greater flows of enormously detailed andreliable intelligence can only grow. At this time,moreover, the enemies of India’s democracy willuse the very instrumentalities and freedoms ofthe country’s legal and constitutional processesto attack the structure and operation of theAgencies. In these circumstances, the mostcertain measure to preserve the legitimacy andeffectiveness of these Agencies will be to establishand maintain the highest standards of probity andprofessionalism, of demonstrable efficiency andeffectiveness, and of comprehensive capacitiesand capabilities to serve and protect the state andher citizens. In failing to do this, the Agencieswould not only fail themselves; they would failIndia’s democracy.Just like that!AJITNINAN48The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Of Pistols and Pigs andthe Old Tiddim RoadShri K.C. Verma, IPS (Retd.)“Tension prevails”, a cryptic communication fromthe civint (civilian intelligence) post at Behang,was among the wireless messages that I read onmy very first day of joining as Assistant Director,in charge of the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau,Imphal. I enquired and learnt that tension hadarisen because a 'Hmar' had murdered a 'Gangte'in Behang village. The local Police was aware ofthe situation and taking necessary steps.The message, “Tension prevails”, was repeatedthe next day. And again the next.The day after that, there was a longer message.“Murder case of last week was compoundedthrough the good offices of civint in-charge. TheHmars gave three pigs and ten chicken to theGangte family as compensation. One pig wasslaughtered for a feast for the whole village. Notension prevails.”In 1978, at the age of twenty nine, I was nospring chicken. I had seen a bit of life and sevenyears of service. But the training at the NationalPolice Academy at Mt. Abu and, later, the basicintelligence course at Mt. Anand Parbat, hadbarely equipped me to understand the elementsof policing and trade craft. How a murder couldbe compounded, and that too by a junior officer ofthe Intelligence Bureau, baffled me completely.I turned for guidance to my taciturn deputy,Nogen Singh. I asked, “Tamoh, how can thecrime of murder be compounded?”Nogen Singh had joined the Assam Police as aconstable in the same year that I was born and hehad remained posted in SIB Imphal from aroundthe time I had started going to kindergarten.Quite naturally, I had started addressing NogenSingh as ‘Tamoh’ – respected elder brother.Reflecting the wisdom of the ages he said, “Youwill get used to it, Sir.”Not a word more did he say to explain the matter.I waited a bit more.Clearly that was all that Nogen Singh had to sayabout the compounding of offences.Gradually, over the next three years, I developeda slight understanding of life in this part of thecountry. But at that moment, I did not have thepatience to listen to that which had not beensaid.Barely two months after the compoundingincident, I received a grimy envelope whichhad been posted in Churachandpur, withoutadequate postage stamps. The letter, written incrude English and signed ‘Soithang’, made thebizarre allegation that “Mr. N. Kuki, Esq., thecivint in-charge at Behang, has gone mad andis regularly shooting villagers and pigs with hisSarkari pistol.”Even if bizarre, I had to do something about thecomplaint. But I did not know what action to take.I was much too keen to manage my problems bymyself, rather than seek guidance from my boss,the Deputy Director at Kohima. In any case, anunreliable telephone connection, routed throughthe manual exchange at Imphal, was hardlyconducive to airing departmental dirty linen or toseek instructions for laundering. And yet, I had todo something about this mad officer who was notjust compounding murder cases but also goingabout committing a few on his own account!I spoke with Nogen Singh and expressed that Iwould like to go to Behang to enquire into theallegations.“But Sir,” said Nogen Singh, “It is very faraway.”I dragged Nogen Singh to the map on the wall,and showed him where Behang was; about fiftyThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 49

kilometers South of Churachandpur, which itselfwas barely a two hour drive from Imphal. TheOld Tiddim Road, made famous in the SecondWorld War, snaked down as a bold ribbon fromChurachandpur to Tiddim and Falam in Burma.Behang was prominently marked by a flag on thisroad, just on the border of India and Burma.Behang VillageOld Tiddim RoadEver so politely, Nogen Singh said, “Yes Sir. It isless than fifty kilometers as the crow flies, but twobridges on that road are broken. It will take youtwo days to walk there.”He did not add, “Unless you can fly like a crow.”So much for my map reading skills, I thought.“So what should I do, Tamoh? This is such aserious matter!” I said.“Well, Sir, call Kuki here and ask him,” was thesimple solution suggested by Nogen Singh.“If we call him here, he will deny the allegation.How will we check with the villagers?” Icountered.“Sir, call him and ask him,” said Nogen Singh.“Abstruse concepts of loyalty to the nation meanlittle or nothing in remote areas. But the peopleknow that right is right and wrong is wrong. Sir,the people are fiercely loyal to the village andtribe, and no one would lie.”“Kuki is a respected elder,” explained NogenSingh, “He has his position to think of. Socialhierarchy is often determined by traditionand kinship, rather than economic status orGovernment orders. The village elders, theGaon Burhas, command unquestioning respect.And if Kuki has done something wrong, he willadmit it. He is a man of honour.”Highly skeptical, I agreed to call Kuki to Imphal.In order to avoid alerting him, I directed all civintpost in-charges to come to Imphal for the payescort at the end of the month and to bring theirpistols for a maintenance check. This instructionwas necessary because many of the posts were inremote locations. Some were connected throughinfrequent bus services, and others required longtrudges to the nearest road, from where onecould hope to hitch a ride on a passing truck.Normally, the posts sent information throughmessages in cipher over wireless on a daily basis.Written reports, however, could be sent just oncea month, when one of the personnel of each postwould come to the SIB headquarters to deliverdak and collect the pay of all his colleagues inthe post. The post in-charge did not always makethe monthly trip.When all the post in-charges came at the end ofthat month, I had them and Nogen Singh gatherfor a meeting in my room. After discussing otherissues, I asked each officer to hand his weaponto me for inspection. In anticipation of theinspection, most officers had oiled their pistols,but some weapons were clearly in need ofderusting.With an air of studied indifference, I turned toKuki and asked him to show me his pistol. Kukiseemed as much a relic of the Second World Waras the Old Tiddim Road. His weathered face andslit like eyes showed the years and years of beingout in the glare of the Sun. But his gaze was clearas he reached behind and drew his pistol, whichwas tucked in his belt in the small of his back. Heejected the loaded magazine and in copybookfashion, handed the pistol to me, butt-first. Therewas no vestige of bluing left on the pistol, but ithad that peculiar patina that steel acquires when50The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

it is lovingly caressed hundreds of times everyday. The pistol was spotlessly clean, with just theright hint of oil which a weapon in constant useshould have.I smelt the barrel. It had the faint smell of cordite,a dead giveaway that it had been used recently.“Kuki,” said I sternly, “You have used your pistolrecently!”“Yes, Sir ! I carry it with me all the time. I fired ittwice last week and maybe four times the weekbefore that.”“Are you aware that you have to send a reportto headquarters each time you fire your pistol?I have not seen any report from you! Instead, Ihave a complaint here that you have been usingyour pistol for shooting pigs and hunting in theforest. What do you have to say?”Kuki was quiet. I looked at Nogen Singhmeaningfully, as if to say “Tamoh, now watchhim tell a lie.”Kuki remained quiet for some more time andthen, looking quite perplexed, he asked, “Sir,why do I have to send a report? You have issuedme the pistol for use, have you not?”“Look Kuki, I don’t have the time to go into allthis; but the complaint here says that you shootpigs and villagers with it. What the hell have youbeen doing?” I almost yelled.“Yes, Sir, I do shoot pigs with my pistol,” saidKuki. “Sir, whenever I have to kill a pig, I don’tslaughter him with a ‘dao’ the way commonvillagers do. With a ‘dao’, the pig makes such amess. No, Sir. I shoot him! I call all the villagers,including the Gaon Burhas, to my house. I makethem stand in a circle around the fenced area infront of my house”.“And then what do you do?”“Sir, then I hoist our national flag and makeeveryone salute it.”“Good. Then what do you do?” I asked.“When they have all saluted the flag, Sir, I let thepig loose. The fenced area is quite small, Sir; justabout twenty feet by twenty feet. When the pigstarts running, Sir, I shoot him. Sir One pig. Oneshot, Sir!” said Kuki proudly.“And then what do you do?”“Oh! The whole village then has a feast!”I was speechless.“Sir, you said someone had complained. Who isthis blankety blank who has complained?”I winced. Not so much at the use of the expletiveby a junior official before his senior, but at thevehemence of his outrage.“Look Kuki, this complaint is from some Soithang,a pseudonymous complaint no doubt. But theallegations, by your own admission are correct.”“Oh ho ! That bloody Soithang ! He is a no good,Sir,” declared Kuki. “Last month, I missed oneshot and the ricocheted bullet grazed his temple.Just because of that he complains to the ADSahib!” Kuki was almost apoplectic.“Grazed his temple, you said?” I tentativelysought confirmation but hoped that I had notheard correctly.“Yes Sir. It was just a slight graze and it stoppedbleeding after only two days. I told Soithang’swife to put the special mud from the river bedon the wound and he became ok in less than aweek. I really don’t understand why Soithangshould have complained,” said Kuki, lookinggenuinely perplexed and hurt.“Don’t you understand? Half an inch this side andthis fellow would have been dead!” I shouted.“I agree, Sir, but half an inch that side and thebullet would have missed him completely. Don’tyou agree? ”I agreed but quickly realized that somewhere inthis exchange; I had already lost the argument.So I changed tack.“But why do you need to call the whole village?”I asked.With all the righteous indignation at hiscommand, Kuki said, “Those Gaon Burhas thinkthey are so important! Why, some of them aremuch younger than I am. No one becomes wiseThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 51

or gains authority by merely draping a red blanketon his shoulders!” Kuki was really incensed.“But Sir, I don’t need a blanket. I am yourrepresentative! I am the representative of theGovernment of India in Behang. Sir, as a markof authority of the Government of India, I wearthis pistol in my belt and I have to show to thevillagers that I use it. You have given me theauthority to do so, have you not? I will not askthe Gaon Burhas permission! Do I have to askthem?” he asked rhetorically.The passionate outburst took me aback. Initially,I had expected Kuki to deny the misuse of thepistol, but after he admitted so naturally to usingit, I expected an apology. The last thing I expectedwas to be browbeaten by him.“Sir, I am the Government in Behang and todischarge this duty, I have to continue usingmy pistol for killing pigs.” It was an absolutestatement.I accepted Kuki’s impeccable logic and saidgrandiosely, “Very good, Kuki! You have mypermission to continue acting as the Governmentof India in Behang.” Somewhat condescendingly, Iadded, “And if you should run short of ammunition, Ishall see to it that more rounds are issued to you.”“Oh, that would not be necessary, Sir. You see,when the Mizo gang led by Biakvela ran awayfrom Bualkot in 1976, they left behind a lot ofammunition which they were bringing fromChina. I kept some of it, Sir, and about twothousand rounds are still left.”My jaw must have dropped, and Kukimisunderstood the shocked look on my face.“Oh, don’t you worry about the safety of theammunition, Sir,” Kuki hastened to reassure me,“I keep it quite safe in a dug out cavity beneathmy bed at home!”I just about managed to have the last word. “Carryon Kuki Sahib!”I said.52The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Through the Eyes of an IB OfficerShri DC Pathak , IPS (Retd.)It is a measure of professionalism of India’spremier Intelligence agency, the IntelligenceBureau, that it acknowledges the continuity ofits existence since its inception a century and aquarter back as an instrument for safeguardinginternal security. The evaluation of the threatscenario may have changed from time to time,as it always happens in the security domain, butthe concepts and value systems that guide thisnational intelligence organization have remainedunaltered. This is simply because for IB, the goalof serving the sovereign remains constant.For me, it is a recall of over fifty years- a mix ofserious challenges, a ring-side view of how ademocratic State is governed and some funnymoments as well. I served as DIB at a time whenthe IT revolution had just announced itself,transforming, among other things, the systems ofcommunication so important for an intelligenceorganization. I took over as DIB in mid-1994 andthe cell phones arrived in India only in 1995. I sawthe transition of lB into the Age of Information,before which the best that could be done wasto transmit information through encryption onteleprinters.It was in May 1960 that I reached the NationalAcademy of Administration at Mussoorie forthe first Foundation Course, in which all CivilServices were brought together for a 5-monthjoint orientation programme. It felt like the wholeof India was there, boys from the South who didnot know that Mussoorie was a cold place, otherswho could not draw a line between red wine andcoke, and a few from the Cambridge Tripos whohad problems communicating with the lessermortals. The experience was delightful and a greatenhancer for everybody. The Foundation Courseis one great policy decision of the Governmentof India, as it has helped to produce a lastingsense of kinship amongst the Civil Services to thebenefit of the nation. Years later, as DIB I wouldrun into ‘batch mates’ serving as Secretary toGOI or as the Chief Secretary of the State and the‘Mussoorie days’ would make all the differenceduring those interactions.From Mussoorie to the National Police Academyat Mt. Abu was like shifting to the harsh realitiesof life. Every IPS officer mentally accepts that theyear-long course only as a ‘one time event’. Thetraining programme at Mt. Abu was efficientlyrun, promoting a deep brotherhood of ‘friendsin distress’. For me, a kind of bookworm, it waslike I had reinvented myself. I got the highestmarks in horse-riding and musketry, which wasa great achievement, considering that I hadnever touched a firearm and had never gonenear a horse ever.It was not long after Mt. Abu that I landed as ASPCity, Jaipur, my first posting in Rajasthan. I livedon a floor above the Kotwali PS. I also recall thatsenior officers like Sr.SP and Range DIG wouldoccasionally do the checking of night patrolsthemselves. The police had a firm grip on the lawand order situation in the capital. I rememberthe 'Police Week' we once organized with theobjective of bringing the police and the publiccloser to each other. At a widely attended publicfunction, some slogans were displayed. One ofthem, scripted by the Sr.SP, Shri Bhawanimal,read, ’Friendly but not familiar’. I firmly maintainthat this is the maxim that the Police organizationsanywhere in India must follow to keep themselveson course. In a democratic dispensation Police isthe only coercive arm of the State, and it ought tobe friendly to all law- abiding citizens but beyond‘approach’ for an offender. We need to work forre-establishing the institutional importance ofPolice for creating equality amongst citizens.My next major shift in job, that proved to be acareer switch, came in 1964. It was in early Maythat year, I was ASP, Ganganagar City when Ireceived a phone call from the Inspector General ofPolice, Rajasthan, Late Pt. Govardhan, informingme of my selection for Intelligence Bureau. ThePolice chief spoke to me on a note of pride thatone of his officers had made it to a career inthe country’s premier Intelligence organization.Those days only the first few in the yearly batchof IPS officers were considered for a long-rangeThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 53

deputation to the Bureau. I too was excited aboutthe prospect of working at the national plane.The last time I wore the uniform of an SP was inthe initial months in lB, when once a week onFriday, newly inducted officers were supposedto participate in the marching drill at the PoliceLines at Kingsway Camp in the old city. Thethen DIB, Late B N Mullick had introduced thispractice to underline the importance of Policefor lB. My wife still keeps, in our sitting room, apicture of mine in that uniform.I joined the lB on May 16,1964, at a juncturewhen the political atmosphere was one oftransition after the death of Pt. jawaharlal Nehru.There was soon a change of guard at IB. Shri SPVerma the then Police Chief of Bihar succeededShri Mullick. lB those days worked out of SouthBlock and those corridors looked formidable toa young entrant. External intelligence then wasa part of lB, and officers inducted for permanentdeputation, were put on a year-long foreignlanguage course, in preparation for a possibleposting abroad. My Spanish has rusted, but Ican still read a novel in that language. In thosetimes, four Joint Directors represented the topleadership of the organization, and they all hada larger than life image. There were months ofunderstudy before a young Assistant Director wasgiven charge of a Desk, and the Desk Officer hadto be the best-informed person on his subject.It may not be easy for outsiders to appreciatehow rigorous the training regime in lB is, for allnewcomers, high or low. I recall having madea presentation just a few years after joining theIB. Interestingly the group whom I addressed hadamongst them to senior officers, one of whombecame my immediate superior after a fewmonths and the other rose to become the DIB.I spent nearly six years (1969-74) as CentralIntelligence Officer in charge of the undividedBihar. It was a challenging but enjoyableassignment that gave me all the grooming Ineeded in field-work. It is instructive to recall thateven in those early days of left- wing extremism,we traced and apprehended a group of Naxalitesin the deep jungles of Jadugoda, led by a highlyeducated young man from West Bengal. Thegroup also included a British girl, who wasobviously an ideological convert. By the time Ileft Bihar, the JP movement was on the rise andon way to triggering a major political upheaval.In 1975, I was sent out to London for a trainingcourse and appropriately on return from thatexposure, posted as AD Training. Power-pointpresentations were not in vogue then, but asexpected, an enormous amount of work wasbeing produced by the IB Training School fromthe desolate hilltop of Anand Parbat. Facultymembers included many officers who were inthe midst of conducting live operations, andthe knowledge and insight they provided to thetrainees, would never be found in any text- book.I got them to submit a summary of every singletalk they delivered and, thus, enriched the recordof the School.In lB, the rank of Deputy Director is one ofexceptional importance, for the simple reasonthat at that level the officer for the first timehas the authority to inform and educate theGovernment on developments on the subjectsor areas under his or her watch. I rememberthe first communication, called a UO, whichaddressed to the Government as a DD, on thestate of communal situation in the country, mademe acutely conscious of the significance of thatoccasion, enough to make me go through thefair version twice before signing it. IB has alwaysbeen a good example, in a classical professionalsense, of how centralism of authority combineswith decentralized decision making.In an Intelligence organization you deal with therealities of human existence. Intelligence is allabout human activity, it can never be about acts ofnature. The organization followed managementpractices that were far ahead of what the expertswould discover and prescribe much later. Myinitial years in IB were guided by a senior, LateShri KN Prasad, whose constant advice was thatI should learn to ‘distinguish essentials from nonessentials’.I do not know if he was aware of theprinciple enunciated by the nineteenth centuryItalian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Paretothat ‘there are a significant few amongst theinsignificant many’. What is abundantly clear,however, is that he was giving an advice basedon the institutional wisdom that he had gainedduring his long years of experience in theorganization. He had a rare insight into what canbe called, in today’s parlance, the ‘software’ of54The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

an Intelligence agency. He used to emphasize forinstance, that in Intelligence ‘there is no substituteto reading’. The logic here is that you cannotdiscard information or data before examining it.The ability to sieve through the material, as youare going over it, is important. I recall that oneof the Chiefs of IB, would scan a report so fastthat we thought he had taken a course in rapidreading.An Intelligence organization remains anonymousby choice. This flows from the principle thatwhat it knows about the adversary, proves tobe an advantage, only so long as it is handledconfidentially. Anonymity and its upshot, thelack of recognition in public, are two basicfeatures of management, not built into any otherorganization of the Government. One littleadvantage an Intelligence officer might enjoy atthe social level is that people might regard himas being privy to some exciting information or tosome sensational subterranean action. A reticentsmile to the occasional leading question, isregarded as the display of professional perfectionand leaving a party early, an evidence of someextremely important call of duty. I recall howa family friend of ours in the late seventies hada hazy idea that I was an officer of the rank ofDirector in the Ministry’s hierarchy and that I wasconcerned with the problem of communal riots. Iwas amused when at a dinner party at his househe introduced me to some guests, and addedthat I was the Director of communal riots in theGovernment.My three years as Joint Director heading theZonal SIB at Chandigarh, between 1986 and1989, gave me a hands-on experience of Punjab,during a highly disturbed situation there. Thehighly successful operation, "Black Thunder",was designed in a way that would totallyeliminate the chances of any collateral damage.In recognition of the success of the counterterrorismefforts in Punjab, the Governor firstrecommended the award of Padma Shri to thePolice officers of the State and in the followingyear made the same recommendation for theheads of central organizations stationed atChandigarh who had contributed to this success.The officers of the BSF and CRPF got the award,and in a subsequent year the then DIB also gota Padma Shri.An Intelligence organization attaches equalimportance to operational skills and the abilitiesto communicate information to the actiontakers.Security fails, if there is a failure of eithercommunication or action. An interesting aspectof communication of intelligence is that theIntelligence organization willingly assumes theextended responsibility of ensuring not only thatthe report reaches the recipient, but also that itattracts the attention of the action takers. I recallhow an important piece of actionable intelligencein relation to the goings-on in the state of J&K,failed to evoke a prompt action compelling me,as DIB, to request the highest executive to havethe matter looked into. The failure of action wasdetected in the unavoidable long turn aroundperiod that the nearest armed force unit required,on the ground. Necessary corrective deploymentwas then made for the future, in line with theprinciple that security must always learn fromexperience.Reference to J&K also reminds me of a plenarymeeting, chaired by the then Prime MinisterLate P V Narsimha Rao, in connection with thedevelopments in the State. The meeting wasattended among others by the Governor and theArmy Chief. There was a strong line of suggestionin favour of a particular course of action. The PMwent along with my view, as DIB, that we shouldwait a while longer. When pressed for taking animmediate decision, the PM famously remindedthe gathering that ‘not taking a decision is also adecision’.Intelligence being an instrument of nationalsecurity does not cross the path of politics. Theonly reason, why in a democratic system a studyof the political spectrum from the point of viewof security might be in order, is that arrangementsmust exist to detect subversion by alien forces forcausing political instability to the detriment ofinternal security. India is a strong nation and atested democracy where there are no such fears.In the last week of June, 1996, while I wasout of the country attending the first SAARCSecurity Conference at Colombo, as DIB, thethen PM assigned me the Chairmanship of JIC,a technically higher post, being in the rank ofSecretary to Government of India. JIC was anenriching experience.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 55

I retired in 1997 and took to reading subjectsthat I had not had the time to brush up on,and scribbled some thoughts that would shapeeventually into three books on Intelligence,meant as much for the general readers, as theywould be for the professionals. In 2004, PrimeMinister Dr. Manmohan Singh nominated meas a member of the National Security AdvisoryBoard for two years. I am happy to mention thatthe two studies that I led at the NSAB, one onNaxalism and the other on Governance, impactedthe policy in a way that helped the Governmentto move forward. Considering Naxalism notmerely as a Police problem, but as a problem ofSecurity-Development interface, and enhancingthe accountability for both decision-making andexecution, were the crucial suggestions thatfound acceptance with the Government.I am glad lB has kept up the tradition of beingin live interaction with its former Chiefs. Securityis always regarded as work in progress, since ithas to continually respond to the changing threatscenario, both past and present, to help gain aninsight into what lies ahead. End of the Cold War,success of the IT revolution that heralded theadvent of the Age of Information, and the rise ofa new form of global terror, all happening aroundthe same time, have posed an unprecedentedchallenge for India’s Intelligence, as they have allvery directly impacted on our national interests.We have to blend new technology with theIntelligence tradecraft, ensure that information ofintelligence value, produced by various agenciesconverges at a point at the national apex fromwhere coordinated response could be set off.What is equally important, is to eliminate the gapbetween information and action. It is a matter ofsatisfaction that all these matters are receivingconstant attention.In the Indian setting, all threats other than anopen attack on our borders, translate on our ownland and, therefore, rightly become a part of theInternal Security problem and the prime concernof the Intelligence Bureau, as the country’spremier counter- intelligence agency. This holdsgood for the rising threat to the security of ourEmbassies and Missions abroad too, as thelatter are an extension of the territory of India.It is important that the Ministry of Home Affairs(MHA) has a stronger framework of functionalcoordination with the State Governments andother stakeholders in areas of Internal Security.The latter include the new contributors ofeconomic security, this being in line with the newdoctrine, that national security is inseparable fromeconomic security. India is only too well awareof how the adversary can use the instrument ofterrorism to attack economic targets.The Police is a state subject, whereas, thenation’s internal security is to be acknowledgedas a concurrent matter, in which the Centrewould be the lead player. A useful tradition hasbeen built over the years, by which, the DirectorIntelligence Bureau convenes and chairs theAnnual Conference of the Directors General ofPolice and the Directors General of Intelligenceof the States. The objective of this conference is toupdate the state agencies on the security environof the country and strengthen the operationalcooperation between the Centre and the States,in the sphere of internal security. In the domain ofSecurity there is nothing that is functionally ‘high’or ‘low’, as the strength of the chain here truly liesin the strength of its weakest link. Security workswell without an excessive bureaucratic formality.A critical matter that has to be attended to, isthe functional, not organizational, integration ofState Special Branches, and through them, of theDistrict Intelligence Units, for the best interestsof the Nation’s internal security. Central agenciesconcerned with security should have the facilityto utilize the State Intelligence resources. All thisis happening already and needs to be built upon.The turf of Security is non-political.56The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

My J&K ExperienceShri R.K. Kapoor, IPS (Retd.)After working for ten years in various districtsin UP, I joined the Intelligence Bureau as anAssistant Director, in March 1960. At that time,Shri B.N. Mullick was the Director and therewere only two Joint Directors. Shri Mullick wasa man of strong personality, and he was knownto carry a lot of weight with the Government andenjoyed full trust of Prime Minister Nehru. Inthe IB, he commanded great respect, but he wasalso feared a lot. His word was law, and very fewcould muster courage to express a counter viewon any subject.After working in IB Headquarters for two years,I was posted to J&K in February 1962 and wasordered to report at Srinagar. My colleaguesand some seniors said that it was a difficult andsensitive posting, but they added that I wouldenjoy it fully. They proved to be absolutelyright. I reached Srinagar in my fiat car, alongwith my family, late in the evening. It was myfirst experience of driving 180 miles on a verydifficult road in hilly region.The staff and resources of the IB in J&K were verymeagre at that time, although we had to handleall aspects of intelligence work viz., internal,foreign and counter. We were just two ADs andour offices-cum-residences were located nextto each other and had history attached to them.It was said that Smt. Indira Gandhi had spent apart of her honeymoon in one of our residences.I could, however, not verify this. The area wasfull of snakes, who visited our house frequently.Fortunately, they were non-poisonous.Sheikh Abdullah was in jail, and Bakshi GhulamMohammad was the ‘Prime Minister’ of J&K. Hisparty, National Conference had an overwhelmingmajority in the State Assembly. He ruled the Statewith an iron hand and pro-Pak elements wereruthlessly suppressed. He and his family memberswere, however, notorious for corruption. Heamply rewarded those who were loyal to him.He was reported to have made his barber a Sub-Inspector of Police and he succeeded in prevailingupon the Government of India to make one ofhis DIGs, Sheikh Ghulam Qadir, an IPS officer,though he was a non-graduate.The situation in J&K was generally peaceful, andwe could move about freely in all parts of theState, without any security threat. Of course, thelocal Muslims often made it clear that we wereoutsiders who had ‘come from India’.The presence of the Indian army in the State andits deployment on the border was thin. The armydepended mostly on the IB for border and Pakintelligence. It also gave maximum cooperationin our border operations. The importance of IBwas also accepted by the State Government, andsome State ministers would sometimes drop inmy office or that of my colleague Hamir Singh,without prior intimation.Only two jeeps had been provided to the lB atSrinagar. Both were in a bad condition and theyhad to be used in winters as well, when thetemperature was often below freezing point. Wewere told that a proposal for sanction of a staff carhad been pending with the MHA for many years.Soon after settling down, I made an intensivetour of the Valley and the Jammu region in myrickety jeep. I am strongly of the view that inorder to fully understand the various problemsof J&K, an intensive tour of all the regions of theState, by road, is absolutely essential. During thesummer of 1962, while touring on the border ofJammu region, I passed through a village calledMendher. Half of that village was in P0K while theother half in J&K. I was told that in 1949, when‘Cease Fire Line’ was marked by a ‘chuna line’,it divided the village into two parts. This divisionThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 57

could, however, not prevent the residents of thetwo parts from free mixing and interaction. Evenmarriages used to take place.The ‘Darbar’ (i.e. the State Government and itsoffices) used to shift, every year, from Srinagar toJammu during the winter months and of the twoADs, one used to move, with the entire office andstaff to Jammu to coincide with the movement of‘Darbar’. In view of the sensitive nature of thesituation in the Valley, one AD, with only his PA,used to stay back at Srinagar.In November, 1962, I moved down to Jammu,while my colleague Hamir Singh stayed behindat Srinagar. Apart from handling all aspects ofintelligence and establishment work, I was alsoresponsible for arranging supplies for the entireIB staff posted in Ladakh.In December 1962, an incident of burning of atemple by a muslim mob occurred at a very remoteplace called Kishtwar in Jammu region. At about100 miles on the Jammu-Srinagar highway, thereis a place called Batote. There is a road diversionfrom there towards Kishtwar, which is locatedat a distance of 50 miles from Batote. The roadwas extremely bad and we had no IB personnelposted there. The news of the temple burningwas announced by the AIR. Despite an extremelybad weather, I directed DCIO, Jammu to go toKishtwar immediately, to obtain full information.Shri Mullick telephoned me at Jammu and wantedto know full details of the incident. Getting adirect phone call from Shri Mullick was rare and itcertainly gave us shivers. I told him that our DCIOhad left for Kishtwar but had got stranded in hisjeep, at Batote, and could not proceed further asthe Batote-Kishtwar road was badly breached dueto heavy landslides at a number of places. ShriMullick ordered — ‘TELL THE DCIO TO WALK’and put his telephone down with a bang. I neednot describe the plight of the poor DCIO.In Ladakh, AD, Leh had been given the task ofestablishing a number of IB posts along the borderof the area, which China had illegally occupied.The personnel at these posts were living in tentswhich used to get damaged frequently due to rainand snowfall. They required repeated repairs andAD Leh had employed some local people, ona permanent basis, for this work. During wintermonths, all supplies to AD Leh were sent fromJammu by IAF planes, which would very oftencome back after flying over Leh airport withoutlanding there, due to bad weather. In January1963, I received a frantic WT message from ADLeh to send to him 200 needles, as the repairwork of tents was suffering. AD, Leh never failedto mark copies of his messages to Shri A.K. Dave,DD at lB Headquarters, who immediately startedtelephoning me to express his annoyance at myalleged failure in not immediately arranging thesupply of needles for AD, Leh. After three days,when I had got the seventh such call from Mr. Dave,I told him “Sir, 200 needles were air-dropped byan IAF plane today on Leh airport and all of themhave been successfully collected by AD, Leh”. AsShri Dave didn’t believe me, I asked him to checkup with AD, Leh. To air-drop the needles, we hadput them in a small cardboard box which was putin a big heap of straw and made into a ball of aboutfive feet diameter, packed in a gunny bag.In our days, there used to be only one flighteveryday between Srinagar and Delhi. It wasa hopping flight with stopovers at Jammu andAmritsar. The plane used was a Dakota, whichwas non-pressurised and had the capacity of only28 passengers. Very often, in rainy weather andduring winter months, the Dakota could not landat Srinagar airport.There was always very heavy traffic on theSrinagar-Jammu highway, especially before thecommencement of winter. The road was notadequately wide and was poorly maintained. Atany point of time, there would be hundreds oftrucks, buses and cars moving on the road fromboth sides. At the time of shifting the ‘Darbar’in November 1963, I travelled from Srinagar toJammu in a jeep, with a trailer attached behind.My wife and two sons and the driver were allcramped in the jeep. The weather was quite bad.After we had travelled about sixty miles, it startedsnowing heavily. We somehow managed toreach Batote, which is almost midway betweenSrinagar and Jammu and is a temporary haltingplace on the highway. By that time, about 20miles of the road, on each side of Batote, hadgot covered with snow, and hundreds of busesfull of passengers and trucks were stranded. Wesomehow managed to get a room in the small tworoomBatote dak-bungalow and lodged ourselves58The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

there. We remained stranded there for four days,cut off from the entire world. Fortunately, somedry firewood was available at the dak-bungalow.This helped us in melting snow to meet ourrequirement of water for drinking and use inthe toilet. We bought tea from one of the local‘dhabas’. The price of a glass of tea was doubledwith every passing day. For each of the threemeals of the day, the chowkidar-cum-cook of thedak-bungalow gave us just ‘namkin paranthas’.Fortunately, we were able to buy some candlesfrom the local market for use at night. After fourdays, we were able to drive out our jeep towardsJammu, with great effort.On 27th December 1963, one of the majorincidents in the history of J&K took place -- thetheft of the ‘Holy Relic’ from Hazratbal Shrineat Srinagar. The entire muslim population ofthe valley rose in revolt. Life and administrationwere paralyzed. The local administration provedentirely incapable of handling the situation. ShriB.N. Mullick, our Director, was specially sentby the Prime Minister to direct and guide theinvestigation for the recovery of the ‘Holy Relic’.Despite an extremely bad weather and against theadvice of IAF officers, Shri Mullick insisted that hisspecial plane be flown to Srinagar, even at graverisk. The IAF pilot managed to land in Srinagar withgreat difficulty. We all heaved a sigh of relief.The Holy Relic was recovered late in the eveningof January 4, 1964 and it had to be immediatelyestablished that it was genuine. The lock of myhouse was broken and the recovered Holy Relicwas kept in the drawing room. Muslim religiousleaders and clerics were called from all partsof the Valley and when each of them was, oneby one, taken to that room, he immediatelyprostrated before the recovered Relic and thankedAlmighty that he had ‘Didar’ of ‘Mua Muqaddas’.After this each one of them then testified throughan affidavit, before a magistrate, sitting in theadjoining room, that the recovered Holy Relic wasgenuine. This process went on till early morningon the next day, and then it was made public thatthe Holy Relic had been recovered and installedin Hazaratbal Shrine. There was great jubilationthroughout the valley. Prime Minister Mr. Nehruwas reported to have highly praised the IB for thisgreat achievement.During the pre-recovery crisis, Shri Vishwanathan,the Home Secretary, had also reached Srinagar,and he and Shri Mullick were staying in adjoiningrooms in the State Guest House. The weatherwas extremely bad, either raining or snowing.One morning at about 8.30 a.m., Shri Mullicktelephoned Hamir Singh, AD, that he shouldreach the guest house without any delay. His jeepbeing out of order, Hamir Singh reached the guesthouse on a cycle, fully drenched, in below zerotemperature. Shri Mullick and Shri Vishwanathanwere standing in the verandah of the guest house,waiting for Hamir Singh. Shri Mullick asked himabout his staff car. Hamir Singh replied that hisjeep was out of order, and a proposal for sanctionof a staff car for AD, Srinagar had been pendingwith the MHA for many years. Shri Vishwanathanimmediately went into his room and wrote with apencil, a two line order on a sheet of paper that astaff car be sanctioned for AD, IB Srinagar and it besent to him immediately. Shri Vishwanathan signedhis pencil written note with a pen borrowed fromHamir Singh. A new car reached Srinagar withintwo days. However, the auditors refused to acceptthe pencil written order of the Home Secretaryand it took me many years to convince them thatit was a genuine order. It was said that the pencilwritten order of the Home Secretary was unique inthe history of Government of India.Another major event in J&K, which took placeduring my posting there, was large scale infiltrationin the Valley of armed civilians and Pak- army men,in plain clothes, in August 1965. We had beenproviding good intelligence to the army abouttraining of civilians in P0K in handling of firearms,and their collection in large numbers along theCFL. However, the presence and deployment ofour army on the borders in the Valley was verythin at that time, and infiltration from P0K side waseasy. A few groups of these ‘raiders’ were able toreach Srinagar. Some of them managed to hidein the forests near our official residences. Therewas immediately a big induction of Indian armyand armed Police battalions in the State to dealwith the ‘raiders’. Although, the infiltrators wereable to entrench themselves in some pockets,Pakistan’s hopes of making Kashmiri muslimsrise in revolt did not succeed. At serious personalrisk, our officers moved deep into various partsof the Valley and were able to provide preciseinformation about pockets of concentration of theinfiltrators. That helped our troops considerably inneutralizing and capturing the infiltrators. By thatThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 59

time, a regular war between India and Pakistanhad started. The officers of almost all the CentralGovernment offices, located in Srinagar, sent backtheir families to their homes. I and my colleagueHamir Singh, however, took no such action. Wedecided to keep our families with us, as we feltthis was essential to keep up the morale of ourmen working in different parts of the Valley. Thiswas highly appreciated by the ‘bosses’ at Delhi.We, had, however, made detailed plans fordestroying our records, in case we were forced toleave Srinagar.Sheikh Abdullah was arrested in August 1953and was detained under the PSA. In May1958, the Kashmir Conspiracy Case (KCC) wasstarted against him and some others. The mainaccused were the Sheikh and Mirza Afzal Beg.A special jail was established in Jammu wherethey were lodged. In the same campus, a courtroom was built. There were also two residentialhouses. One of them was occupied by ShriTikkoo, the Special Judge trying the case, andthe other was given to Shri M.L. Nanda, a DDof the lB. Shri Nanda was originally from thepublic prosecutor stream of Punjab Police. Hewas appointed as the public prosecutor of theKCC. A team of senior lawyers headed by ShriG.S. Pathak was also engaged on behalf of theprosecution. Most of the evidence in the KCCwas collected by the lB and it was submitted tothe court through J&K Police. In the initial stages,the case was vigorously pursued by both thesides. The functioning of the IB in the State wasalso challenged on behalf of the accused. Theycontended that since J&K State had acceded toIndia, only with regard to three subjects, viz.,defence, foreign affairs and communications,the lB could not constitutionally function in theState. In the beginning, our position appearedweak, but ultimately it was argued that the IBwas a part of the defence set-up in the State and itwas meant to assist the Indian army in its securityresponsibilities. Our stand was finally acceptedby the court. Gradually, due to political reasons,the KCC assumed a very slow pace. The casewas finally withdrawn, unconditionally, in April1964, and Sheikh Abdullah and Afzal Beg werereleased from prison. The Sheikh had remainedincarcerated for almost eleven years. After hehad been in prison for nine years, the Sheikhinformally said to Shri M.L. Nanda: “NandaSahib, you have kept me in jail for nine years. Ifyou produce nine Kashmiri muslims whom youhave won over for India, I would confess beforethe court whatever you say”.A very important prosecution witness of the KCCwas one Sattar Khande, who lived in a very remotevillage of Tangdhar area of the Valley. It wasessential to keep in touch with him. One of ourofficers had been doing this job exceedingly well.Normally, an officer is not posted for more thanthree years in J&K. We, however, had to retain thisofficer for almost nine years for this task. We gavehim accelerated promotion, too. Unfortunately,his continued stay in J&K started creating domesticproblems for him. His wife even threatened todivorce him. She had started suspecting that hehad married a Kashmiri woman and wanted tosettle down in J&K. We, then, had no alternativebut to get him posted to his home town.I was posted back to Delhi in July 1966. My fourand a half years posting in J&K was professionallyhighly rewarding. It was also our good fortunethat we got an opportunity to live in one of themost beautiful parts of the country. I and myfamily left Srinagar with a heavy heart.Militancy, terrorism and Pakistan’s proxy warstarted in J&K in all severity from the years 1988-89. I am, however, of the view that preparationsfor these sinister designs of Pakistan had started asfar back as in 1972, when J&K Jammat-e-Islami,a staunchly pro-Pak body, decided to participatein State Assembly elections on directions fromJeI Pakistan. This gave an indirect license to theState party to start spreading a large network of‘madarsas’, to subvert the mind of the Kashmiriyouth by indoctrination for ‘jehad’.After the Sheikh-Indira Accord of 1975, SheikhAbdullah came to power in the State once again.The Sheikh was a towering personality and wasvery courteous and hospitable, but he was alsohighly egoistic. I met him a few times and whenI broached the subject of the increasing spreadof ‘madarsas’, he said that we ‘dilliwalas’ knewnothing about Kashmir. He stressed that Kashmirhad had a tradition of ‘Sufism’ for centuries.He claimed that the ‘madarsas’ would not lastlong and would ‘fade away’ soon. Such was thecomplacency of the State Government. Theyrefused to foresee the developing signs of the Paksupported ‘jehadi war’ in the State.60The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Scaling Himalayan Heights withthe Intelligence BureauCapt. (Retd.) M.S. KohliIn June, 1962, Sonam Gyatso (IntelligenceBureau’s strongest climber), Hari Dang andmyself, after surviving three nights at about28,000 feet, missing the summit of Everest by amere 100 metres, and after the world media hadgiven us up as lost, safely returned to Delhi to therelief of all. We received a warm reception, fromthe I.B. and the Indian Navy. Many options aboutmy posting were being considered by the IndianNavy. However, the sudden Chinese invasionof India on 20 October, 1962, placed me underthe magic spell of the I.B., where I was destinedto lead India’s Greatest Climb and the world’sgreatest Intelligence Operation.I was born and brought up in the hilly Himalayantown of Haripur, situated on the banks of riverIndus and close to the borders of Kashmir,Afghanistan, Tajikistan and China. In 1824, achilling chapter in the history of courage andvalour was written here, when General HariSingh Nalwa, the bravest known General ofMaharaja Ranjit Singh, in whose memory thetown of Haripur was founded, had conqueredNorth-West Frontier and part of Afghanistan.Haripur and its neighbouring town of Abbotabadhave recently hit the headlines, as Osama BinLaden had chosen these towns, close to no man’sland, for hiding during the last seven years of hislife. Interestingly, in 2005, when I happened tovisit Haripur for the sixth and the last time afterPartition, as a guest of Gohar Ayub Khan, son ofthe former President of Pakistan, Osama was alsothere in hiding!Haripur had shaped my future life and also mycareer spanning the Indian Navy, the IntelligenceBureau and Air India. Though scaling dizzyHimalayan heights and other pioneeringadventures remained a part of my life throughout,the decade of sixties with the Intelligence Bureau,full of dare-devil climbs and death-defyingexpeditions, some of which remained underwraps for years, will always remain the mostthrilling period of my life.During my years with the I.B., while facing someof the greatest challenges, I thoroughly relishedthe pleasure, privilege and the thrill of workingclosely with some of the best known legends ofthe I.B., such as, Shri B.N. Mullick, Sardar BalbirSingh, Shri MML Hooja, Shri R.N. Kao, Shri B.Chatterjee and Shri A.K. Dave – all illustriousImperial Police Officers. Of my colleagues, Ifondly remember Shri M.K. Narayanan, who roseto become the National Security Advisor of India,and now is the Governor of West Bengal.First ContactMy very first contact with the I.B. was throughSonam Gyatso. I had first met him in 1959 inDarjeeling, where we had assembled for the pre-Everest expedition to Ratong. Sonam had comewith fresh laurels. Two years earlier, he hadtaken on Nanda Devi, missing the summit by 500feet. A year earlier, he had set foot on Cho Oyu,the sixth highest peak in the world. With his talland sturdy figure, face like a rock and strengthof a mountain, he exuded confidence. On thevery first sight, we became close friends and ourfriendship continued till the end of his life.The following year, we were on Everest together.Unfortunately, due to a storm on 25 May andearly break of Monsoon, we got trapped on themountain. Sonam, during the gallant attempt,missed the summit by 200 metres. The followingyear, in 1961, I happened to read the book bythe legendary British climber, H.W. Tilmanwho, after circling the Annapurna range, hadremarked, ‘Annapurna III cannot be reached atall.’ Immediately on reading this, I decided toaccept the challenge of Annapurna III. SonamThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 61

Gyatso was on top of my list. Another interestingmember was Lt. V.S. Shekhawat, who rose tobecome the Chief of the Naval Staff. In the annalsof mountaineering, Annapurna III expeditionwas the most dramatic. We were looted by thelocal Bhotias, two members – Sonam Gyatsoand Captain Jungalwala – were taken hostage.Prime Minister Nehru asked for our immediatereturn. His Majesty, the King of Nepal sent troopsfrom nearby Jomsom to rescue us. Despite thesetbacks, we got the equipment back and gotour two colleagues released. Sonam and I, alongwith Sherpa Sona Girmi, in stormy weather,succeeded in reaching the summit. This ascentbrought India international prestige.Short of SummitIn 1962, I was the Deputy Leader of the SecondIndian Expedition to Mount Everest. In this, SonamGyatso and I, along with Hari Dang, had toabandon the peak, due to a strong blizzard, whenwe were only 100 meters short of the summit. Onour return, at nearly 28,300 feet, Sonam suddenlyslipped and was heading for a 10,000 feet. fall.Hari Dang was swept unaware. God gave mestrength to drive my ice-axe hard into the iceand that stopped their fall. In pitch dark, we saidour last prayers. After a few minutes, we startedcrawling on all fours; standing up was dangerous.At 10 p.m., we miraculously hit our last camp andspent the third night at a height of nearly 28,000feet. It remains till date, the highest survival in theworld. On return from Everest, Sonam and I weregiven a warm reception at I.B. Headquarters bySardar Balbir Singh and Shri R.N. Kao.The Naval Headquarters had now receivedrequests for my posting from various quarters.Pending finalisation, I was given the post of SOS(Staff Officer Spare) at Naval Headquarters. On20th October, 1962, China invaded India. Withina few days, I received an interesting offer from theMinistry of Defence to become their Advisor onSnow-Clothing and Equipment. I always welcomea change. I immediately accepted the offer andreceived orders to move to Kanpur to join theDefence Ministry’s snow-clothing department.For almost three days, the idea of moving toKanpur gripped me. I felt I should instead dosomething exciting which would give me thrilland adventure. An idea suddenly struck me. Whynot seek some exciting opening in the I.B.? Withsome difficulty, I found the telephone numberof Sardar Balbir Singh and rang him up. “Sir, doyou remember me? I had led the Annapurna IIIteam in 1961 and was the deputy leader of thesecond Indian Expedition to Everest in 1962.You had called me for the I.B. reception. I havesomething urgent to discuss with you. Can I seeyou immediately?” Sardar Balbir Sigh was verywarm and positive. He invited me to meet himstraightaway in his office. Excited, I almost ranto his office. I told him about the forthcomingposting to Kanpur and my keenness to dosomething exciting in the I.B.I Was ElatedSardar Balbir Singh seemed equally excited. Hewas already planning to secure the services of aneminent mountaineer for a new mountaineeringforce sanctioned by the Government. He gotup from his chair and asked, “Kohli, can youhandle a rifle?” I promptly replied, “I think I can.I have done a weapons training course duringmy naval training.” Sardar Balbir Singh said,“We are starting a new force on the Chineseborder, which will be named ‘Frontier Rifles’.A number of battalions are being raised and ifyou agree, I could offer you an assignment in theFrontier Rifles immediately.” I was elated andimmediately gave my acceptance. Sardar BalbirSingh shook hands with me and said, “You arein”. He immediately referred the matter to theNaval authorities and my posting to Kanpur wascancelled. Orders were issued deputing me tothis new force, whose name was subsequentlychanged to the Indo-Tibetan Border Police.New doors of adventure now suddenly openedto me. Besides ITB Police, Government had alsosanctioned three other special organisations– ARC, SSB and SFF. Since Shri Mullick wasin overall command, he started giving meexciting tasks concerning these organisations. S.Senapati, then Assistant Inspector General of theITB Police, would call me once or twice everymonth and give me some interesting mission onthe border. I enjoyed doing all such challengingassignments. Once I was asked to fly to Leh and62The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

proceed to Dungti to supervise the induction ofSFF Personnel. On another occasion, I was sentto Chakrata to give a motivational talk to the staffof Establishment 22.Trisuli And Nanda Devi EastIn 1964, I was asked to lead an Indian Expeditionto Trisuli and Nanda Devi East. At Trisuli, whenwe were poised to reach the virgin summit, amajor ice-tower under the pressure of heavysnowfall crashed down, triggering a 14 foot highice-avalanche, destroying our summit camp.Fortunately, I had ordered the withdrawal ofthe entire team a few hours earlier and a neartragedy was averted. Harish Rawat of the I.B.was a member of my team. He belonged to theillustrious family of ‘Pandit Brothers’, who madehistory in mountaineering in the 19 th century.Rawat’s grand-father, Rai Bahadur Kishan Singh,known as A.K. Pandit, and his granfather’scousin, Mr. Nain Singh, were both in the Surveyof India and could be considered as pioneers ofmountaineering in India.Immediately after abandoning Trisuli, weproceeded to Nanda Devi East. On NandaDevi, three climbers and three sherpas fell morethan 3000 feet, but survived. Harish Rawatwas one of them. 1964, thus, proved to be abad year.Leader of Everest ExpeditionThe following year, I was chosen leader ofthe third Indian Expedition to Mount Everest. Ineeded six months to complete the preparations,four months on the actual expedition and twomonths to wind up and write a book on theexpedition. Immediately after the announcement,I went to meet Sardar Balbir Singh. Afterexpressing happiness at my selection, he said,“Kohli, your are only on deputation to us fromthe Navy. How can we give you one full yearoff? Go and see Chatterjee.” Those days, SardarBalbir Singh was Joint Director-I cum InspectorGeneral, ITB Police and Shri Chatterjee wasSpecial Inspector General. Somewhat confused,I proceeded to the office of Shri B Chatterjeewho said, “Congratulations, Sardar Balbir Singhhas agreed to grant you one year off, a specialcar with a driver and an office for organising theforthcoming Everest Expedition.” Sardar BalbirSingh had an interesting sense of humour.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 63

The third Indian Everest Expedition wasspectacular in many ways. The scaling of Everestfour times in succession in 10 days was a featthat drew the world attention it richly deserved.The second team consisted of Sonam Gyatso andSonam Wangyal, both IB officers. They were theoldest and the youngest climbers to have steppedon the summit together. Sonam Gyatso, duringthe climb, was frostbitten on his back. He wasin severe pain. But with determination and willpower, he reached the top.On 23 June, 1965, we returned to Delhi. Todemonstrate the nation’s gratitude, Acting PrimeMinister Gulzarilal Nanda headed the receptionat the airport.Historic Reception at Palam AirportWorld’s Highest Intelligence OperationAs soon as the formalities of meeting the dignitariesat the Palam Airport were over, Sardar Balbir Singhwhispered into my ear, “Kohli, go and see RamjiKao behind the aircraft. He has a very importantmessage for you.” I quietly slipped away from thecrowd. Shri Kao, was at that time, Director ARC. Hewas very brief, “You are required to immediatelyproceed to the USA for a highly importantoperation. See me as soon as your hectic scheduleof receptions is over.” A week later he told methe objective of the mission. I was asked to take ateam of strong Indian climbers with me and leada joint Indian-American expedition for trials onMount McKinley, the highest peak of USA.As far as the Indian climbers were concerned, therewas no problem. I straightaway selected SonamGyatso, Harish Rawat, Sonam Wangyal andGurcharan Bhangu, all I.B. officers from our 1965Everest team. Devi Singh Sisodia and Dr. ‘Pedro’Tripathi, working in para-military organisations,were also added to the team. On the morning of19th July, we were at the international terminal atPalam. We were discreetly taken to the tarmac,after the rest of the passengers had boarded theAir-India flight. In New York, we were received bya CIA official. The following day, after a lightning64The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

tour of the White House and Lincoln Memorial, weflew to the Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska. OurAmerican counterparts included Barry Bishop. BillMcKniff, a senior CIA officer, was in charge of theAmerican side. He was of small built, extremelypolite, affable and a cheerful person. We instantlybecame friends.After trials on Mount McKinley, we returned toNew Delhi towards the middle of August. For me,the project was a major mountaineering challenge.The Americans had chosen Kanchenjunga, thethird highest peak in the world, for installing anuclear powered sensor. I vehemently opposedthis and recommended Nanda Kot (22,510 ft).Finally, Nanda Devi (25,645 ft.) was agreed as acompromise. Without wasting any time, we madefrantic preparations.Before the middle of September, we were at thebase camp of Nanda Devi. The initial progressof our mission was fairly fast. Despite spells ofbad weather, higher camps were establishedand stocked. On 7th October, America’s topnuclear scientist, Jim, broke the safety seals ofthe special box and peeled off the top. Inside,seven radioactive plutonium rods were nestled inindividual glass cradles. With great dexterity, hedelicately pulled each one out and inserted it intothe generator. As soon as the loading was over,heat started emanating from the generator. Wewere now ready for the final act. Sherpas enjoyedcarrying the hot generator and named it ‘GuruRimpoche’!Bad LuckOn reaching Camp IV (23,700 ft), we ran into badluck. A severe blizzard stopped further progress.America’s best climber, Tom Frost, was not ableto acclimatise himself well and stayed below.The other two Americans, Lute Jerstad (AmericanEverester) and Sandy, were able to reach betweenCamps III and IV, from where they slipped some300 feet in an avalanche, but fortunately stoppedshort of a crevice and survived. A party consistingof Rawat, both the Sonams and Sherpa SirdarPasang and Dawa Lama rushed essential suppliesfrom Camp II to Camp III and returned at 10.00p.m. under difficult and dangerous conditions.We, however, kept up the efforts, defying hostileweather conditions.On 13th October, when Bhangu reached CampIV along with his Sherpas, Sandy and Lute Jerstadwere at Camp III. The generator was carried byBhangu to Camp IV. For the safety of the climberscarrying the generator, white-coloured radioactivitymeasuring plates were pinned on their chests. Incase of radioactivity exceeding minimum safetylevels, these plates would change colour. Thetransceivers (B1 and B2) were also carried, butthe power-pack, which was to be attached to thegenerator and which we believed was to convertthe nuclear energy into electrical energy, was keptbetween Camp III and Camp IV. Bhangu had donean excellent job. On the 1965 Everest Expedition,he was looking after communications. He nowproved to be a strong climber.On 16 October, 1965, under worsening weatherconditions and the end of the climbing season, Icalled off the attempt. Bhangu and party carefullysecured the nuclear generator and other sensorequipments to the rocks, so that the following yearwe could pick them up and complete the mission.The Americans accompanying us were quitesatisfied with our decision to leave the device atCamp IV. After an exchange of messages withNew Delhi, the approval to leave the device atthat height in the mountains was conveyed to us.Operation RecoveryThe year 1966 was fully spent on ‘OperationRecovery’. After futile endeavours, the Americansdecided to bring in two legendary Huskies,rotary-wing aircrafts from NATO. They were theantithesis of aerodynamic beauty. On 16 August,the maiden flight of Huskie, with Bill Brewer ofthe CIA on board, attained a height of 22,500 feet.Reaching near Camp IV and keeping the planesteady, some canisters were tossed. Next day,search for the canisters began. Of the 12 canisters,10 were never found. At the site where twowere found, search was carried out without anysuccess. During the search operation, two ascentsof Nanda Devi were made. Gurcharan Bhanguaccompanied by Sherpa Tashi reached the summitin a heroic endeavour on 8th June. Later, on 20August, Rob Schaller made a daring solo ascent ofthe peak. During the year, Shri Mullick once withShri MML Hooja, made two visits to the NandaDevi Sanctuary for discussions.Since the search for the nuclear device on NandaDevi did not yield any result, the Americansaccepted my original proposal to set up themonitoring device on the Dome of Nanda Kot ata height of nearly 22,000 feet, i.e. 500 feet belowthe summit. I had climbed this peak in 1959 andknew the route well. I was sure there would be noThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 65

serious difficulty in reaching the Dome. Besides,we could leisurely carry out the installationoperation. Absolute secrecy was maintained forthe Nanda Kot expedition also. Besides me, otherIndian members of the expedition to Nanda Kotwere Sonam Wangyal, H.C.S. Rawat and G.S.Bhangu. The American team consisted of two newclimbers, Barry Prather and James Barry Corbet,both of the 1963 American Everest team. TomFrost, Rob Shaller and Sam Curry of the NandaDevi attempt returned to join the team.This expedition was extremely successful.Despite several obstacles, we were able to reachthe Dome according to our plans and installedthe entire equipment on the summit. We gotsignals from Delhi that the tracking equipmentwas functioning well. There were jubilations inWashington and Delhi. Shri B.N. Mullick andShri A.K. Dave, who had taken over from ShriR.N. Kao as Director, ARC, flew to Base Camp topersonally congratulate us. The CIA now realisedthat had they accepted my original advice ofselecting Nanda Kot, the catastrophe on NandaDevi would not have taken place.After a few months, the equipment at Nanda KotDome stopped functioning. I flew over NandaKot to explore the mystery. When my plane wasexactly over the summit, an air pocket suddenlybrought my plane down about a thousand feet.I thought it was crashing. Thank God, there wasno collision. On return, the photos showed noequipment on the dome. I immediately mountedanother expedition to Nanda Kot. On reaching theDome, we saw a white out. After removing a fewlayers of snow, we sighted the sensor equipmentwhich then started functioning.CIA RequestDuring the summer of 1968, on the request ofCIA, a small team under Rawat was sent to NandaKot to retrieve the sensor equipment which hadstopped functioning once again. When the teamreached the Dome, as earlier, there was no signof the equipment. They dug a few feet, and whatthey saw was a real fantasy. There was a perfectsemi-spherical cave formed by the hot generatorat the centre. The continuous heat emanating fromthe generator had melted the snow up to eight feetin all directions. ‘Guru Rim boche’ had stood inthe Centre as a ‘deity!’A few days later, the nuclear-powered generatorwas placed in a special plane at Charbatia. Beforethe plane took off, Shri Mullick touched the hotgenerator and felt relieved. This top-secret missionwas strictly kept under wraps. However, on 12thApril, 1978, the mission suddenly explodedin America, rocking the world media and theIndian Parliament. Prime Minister Morarji Desaiaddressed the Parliament on 17th April, 1978. Iwas summoned from Sydney where I was postedas Air India’s Manager. On reaching Delhi, Idictated the full account from my memory fortwo days to Shri V. Shankar, Principal Secretaryto the Prime Minister. This was carefully recorded.With full world exposure, I was advised by thePM’s office to certainly include this mission in myautobiography, as otherwise distorted versions asof 12th April, 1978 will continue. Finally in 2002,in consultation with Shri R.N. Kao and Shri A.K.Dave, I gave this story a full-book treatment. KenConboy, who was already going ahead with thebook and whom I had ignored for two years, wasmy co-author.With the completion of our mission, I was nowdeputed to Chakrata for an important SurvivalCourse by a British expert. On the morning of 22ndApril, 1968, when I was in the midst of the Course,a Mi-4 circled over Chakrata and landed on theparade ground. I figured that it must be carryinga dignitary from New Delhi and did not give it asecond thought. To my surprise, however, thecamp administrator called me out of the class andsaid that the chopper had come to rush me to thecapital. Fearing a family emergency, I demanded toknow the reason. The chopper crew said that theyhad come on the orders of Shri Mullick. SonamGyatso was critically ill at the military hospital andhad expressed a desire to see me.Landing in New Delhi, I headed straight for thehospital. Ironically, Shri Mullick was occupying aroom in another hospital in New Delhi with someailment. Entering Sonam’s ward, I looked at myfriend and began to sob. Barely alive, Sonam’srobust frame looked frail and shrunken. His face,normally burned a rich chocolate from the strongultraviolet rays at high altitude, was waxy andlifeless, the color drained from his lips. His eyeswere pinched tight, and his chest showed littlesigns of breath.Next to the bed was Sonam’s wife. The beautifuldaughter of a prosperous nobleman from westernSikkim, she had managed to retain every ounce ofdignity despite her inner pain. Sonam had beenwaiting for you, she told me, but he had slipped66The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

into unconsciousness two hours earlier. Thedoctors thought it unlikely that he would open hiseyes again. I moved towards Sonam and touchedhim. As if by a miracle, Sonam opened his eyes,leveled a distant stare in my direction, and feeblytried to lift his right arm. Pointing a finger at hiswife, his eyes grew slightly more focused. “Lookafter her,” Sonam whispered. He tried to saymore, but nothing came out. His eyes and fingerremained frozen, soon his chest stopped moving.Book On GyatsoA few months after Sonam’s death, Shri B.N.Mullick called me and said, “I want to write abook on Sonam Gyatso. You have led most ofthe expeditions in which he had participated”.We worked together and in 1970 “The Sky WasHis Limit” was released. Later, “Sonam GyatsoMountaineering Institute” came up at Gangtok– amonument to India’s fabulous climber.Laurence School, Sanavar and Manager, Air India.I chose the last. On first February, 1971, I joinedAir India. It gave me a world-wide platform. Withina few days, I became the first man in the worldto conceive and personally promote "Trekking inthe Himalayas". During the next 19 years, I visitedover 50 countries, some multiple times. Duringthese overseas tours I came across several news ofintelligence value which I was pleased to pass onto Shri Kao, Shri Shankar Nair and others.On 31 December, 1989, when I retired from AirIndia at the age of 58, I received several highlylucrative offers. Disregarding all these, I acceptedtwo honorary offers, one as an Advisor to theITBP and second, Presidentship of the IndianMountaineering Foundation. These gave me anopportunity to make further contribution to thecause of ITB Police and Indian mountaineering.Capt. M.S. Kohli and Shri B.N. MullickGlorious YearsIn 1970, Shri B.N. Mullick realised that I hadan overdose of Himalayas and badly needed achange. He asked Shri Ramji Kao to post me toKathmandu in RAW as India’s Consul General. Iwas thrilled. But destiny had something else in storefor me. Three days after offering the assignment atKathmandu, Shri Kao called me, “Kohli, you aretoo well known to be sent to Kathmandu.”There were three other offers at that time – D.G.of National Institute of Sports, Patiala, HeadmasterToday, at 81, on the occasion of India celebrating125 glorious years of the I.B., my thoughts go backto one individual. He, like Prime Minister Nehru,was one of the greatest patriots of India, utterlyself-less, dedicated, noble and loyal. He had setthe highest standards of service to the I.B. and thenation. He was none other than Shri Bhola NathMullick, the first Indian Director of the I.B. I haveevery hope that his spirit and his pioneering workin the I.B. will continue to inspire generations ofI.B. officers.(The author, a former President, IndianMountaineering Foundation, is regarded as theFather of Indian Mountaineering and Adventure.He was responsible for shaping the Indo-TibetanBorder Police into a formidable mountaincapable force.)The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 67

My Experience of lifeand work in lBShri O.N. ShrivastavaI believe that a lot in life is about being at theright place, at the right time — and that to me,is Destiny. It is difficult to say at this point oftime as to when I got on to the road, which,notwithstanding its total absence of sign posts,its ups and downs, twists and turns, its episodesof sunshine and defeating darkness, ended upin the Raj Bhavan. Of two facts, however, I amcertain; both interlinked, which have made thedifference. The first one was in Oct 1962, whenalready in Bhind for over two and a half years,I was offered a ‘choice’ and I decided to takethe road least frequented to the North-East. Andthe second; a corollary to the first one, was tocome on deputation to the Intelligence Bureau, adeputation from which I never returned.It was during my deputation to Nagaland that Icame across eminent Intelligence Officers likeMr Atma Jayram, Mr. R. D. Pande and Mr. R. P.Joshi and got an opportunity to see them workfrom very close quarters. It always amazed meto visit SIB offices in Kohima or Shillong, whereeven as late as 9.30 in the night, their typewritersand their wireless sets would be relentlessly atwork. As luck would have it, Mr Jayram visitedNagaland around the time my deputation of fiveyears to Nagaland was coming to an end. Hewas accompanied by Shri R. D. Pande. This visitprovided me a rare opportunity of interactingwith Mr. Jayram, and also gave Mr. Jayram anopportunity of evaluating my work in Nagaland.He obviously would have been impressed,for when he was leaving the Police Mess inChumukedima (Nagaland), he called me asideand asked me if I would like to join the IntelligenceBureau. I left the choice to him and to Mr. Pande,telling both of them that “Yes, provided theyfound me to be right material for induction intothe lB and provided they succeeded in makingIGP, MP agree to a third stint of deputation forme.” I had earlier done two stints in Nagaland,a total of eight years. Having received no firmindication from either of them and havingfinished my deputation in Nagaland, I returned toMadhya Pradesh. A year went by, when one finemorning I received a call from Mr. Pande tellingme that having finished the 'cooling off’ period ofone year in the State, the Government of MadhyaPradesh had agreed for my deputation to lB, andthat I should keep myself in readiness for movingto Delhi at short notice.I joined the Intelligence Bureau in 1974 andwas posted as Assistant Director dealing withthe North-East as a subject. I had worked inNagaland and Mizoram and had developeddependable contacts during my stints there. In1975, Intelligence Bureau received informationthat Laldenga (President, Mizo National Front),who was then living under ISI’s care in Karachi,was fed up with the Governments of China, USAand Pakistan, for their unwillingness to intervenephysically against India on behalf of the Mizos.According to him, these Governments wereonly interested in causing pinpricks, which werehardly of any help. The sufferings of his peopledue to Army/Police operations in Mizoram werealso causing him concern. He was, therefore,willing to negotiate peace with the Governmentof India. Smt. Indira Gandhi too supportedpeace talks with Mr. Laldenga, but for that, Mr.Laldenga, along with his five family membersand five other senior MNF officials, was requiredto be smuggled out of Pakistan — into India —considered to be an impossible task, since theentire group was living under ISI’s arrangements.Smt. Indira Gandhi’s scepticism about the successof the mission notwithstanding, she did not holdback her approval. The then Home Minister MrNarsimha Rao too nurtured serious doubts aboutthe success of this mission. But he too was goodenough to extend his good wishes to the project-68The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

which was completed successfully within sixmonths by the lB and RAW, acting in unison.The responsibility of looking after this operation,Laldenga’s stay and security in India, as also thenegotiations, became the responsibility of a groupin the lB of which I became a nodal member,due to my long stay in the North-East and due toIntelligence Bureau, under my guidance, havingdeveloped excellent contacts amongst studentcommunity from the North-East in Delhi. Itwas through success in this operation, that ShriNarsimha Rao came to know first hand, in all itsintricacies, how the Intelligence Bureau wentabout its job, arduously, meticulously and awayfrom the glare of publicity. It was also throughthis operation, that I came to know not only theHome Minister, but also the Prime Minister.And all this happened at a time when theIntelligence Bureau was really poorly off in termsof resources. The administration had just two cars,communication was only through wireless setswhich involved enciphering and deciphering atboth ends, the only means of pushing intelligencefrom the field to the lB Headquarters was throughregistered post, and the only way of gettingthrough to any of the SIBs in the North-East wasthrough lightning phone calls, which had theirlimitations. This also involved frequent travel tothe North-East, which too was not easy, as it wasalways difficult to get seats in flights with North-East as destination. Financially too, the lB wasvery poorly off. To be able to run an operationinvolving smuggling people out of Pakistansafely into India, was therefore considered a bigachievement.It was because of the Intelligence Bureau andthe value attached to ‘area specialization’, thatofficers like me got a chance to remain in touchwith at least three Prime Ministers. With Mrs.Gandhi, decision making in operational mattersalways came with a 24 hrs delay. She personallyknew several personalities in the North-East andshe would generally take 24 hrs to contact them toascertain their reactions prior to taking decisions.With Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, all decisions were onthe-spot,particularly in operational matters andhe was always ready to listen to lB officials. WithMr. Narsimha Rao, it was totally a different ballgame. He wanted to remain in the picture atall times and so he allowed lB officials to meethim anytime during the day and even late in theevenings. But he left decision making to the bestjudgement of lB officials and ‘area specialists’.Success in operations on several occasions was,therefore, the direct outcome of the interest takenby the respective Prime Ministers in listening toand understanding the constraints under whichthe Intelligence Bureau functioned.It is perhaps not right to go into many details, butsome illustrative cases might help to understandthe interest which the then Prime Ministers took inNational security matters. In the mid seventies, itbecame necessary to send an officer incognito toPakistan to talk to and understand Laldenga, andif he agreed, to get the terms written by him. Themeeting was supposed to have been facilitatedby Laldenga’s ADC. It was a project which wasfraught with risks and grave consequences. Thethen Directors of Intelligence Bureau and RAWdecided to take the Prime Minister on board. Atthe end of the presentation, Mrs. Gandhi foundthe odds loaded heavily against us and ‘denial’being the only way out if the cover got blown off.The then Director, Intelligence Bureau agreedthat the operation was fraught with grave risks,but in the same breath added that risks are whatintelligence officials are supposed to take, day inand day out. It was no surprise that Mrs. Gandhi,and the then Home Minister were elated andwere profuse in their compliments when the taskwas accomplished.It also struck me as to how brutally frank werethe Directors, in expressing their views at anylevel. It was in1983, when an important meetingwas held with the Prime Minister in the chair,for discussing the Assam agitation. The State wasthen under President’s Rule and in addition to somany others, the then DIB, Mr. T.V. Rajeswar,the then Governor of Assam and his Advisor onLaw and Order — a seasoned bureaucrat, werepresent. The Advisor was a man of action andnormalcy and inaction bored him no end. Boththe Advisor and the Governor favoured holdingof elections without any delay. They made itclear that holding elections might lead to somelocalised violence, and the CRPF might have tobe used for delivering lathi-charges wherevernecessary, and that 20-25 persons may die inthe process. The agitators, who had by then notThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 69

seen a strong Iathi-charge, would run away andthe agitation would fizzle out. DIB’s interjectionduring this otherwise ambitious monologueis worth recalling, “What are you talking? Oursenior officers have just the other day assessed thesituation in detail... violence will be so widespreadthat Assam administration would run out ofPolicemen to reach everywhere.., the number ofcasualties would run into thousands...?” It did nottake a month for the DIB to be proven right.Similarly, in 1989, Tripura went through asudden spurt in violence, spearheaded by theTripura National Volunteers (TNV) and directedagainst the Bengali speaking people of the State.As a way out, and in consultation with the thenPrime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, it was decidedto explore the possibility of secret parleys withthe then TNV, chief, B. K. Hrangkhawl. The TNVsupremo was then based in Bangladesh and waslocated next to a Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) campin Khagrachari (Bangladesh). The then DIB in hiswisdom decided to entrust the responsibility ofcontacting the TNV supremo, to me. I launchedmyself on this mission with a wireless set whichstopped working just 20 Kms inside Bangladeshand had to be left behind hidden in the forest,and a spring loaded camera with a declaredcapability of 6 shots, but an onground capabilityof only 3 shots for secret photography. However,these shortcomings notwithstanding, the projectwas launched. I remained missing for 3 days,reappeared in Agartala after 5 days and everyoneheaved a sigh of relief. The operation turned outto be a major success. The Intelligence Bureaudid manage to get Hrangkhawl into India andpersuade him into joining the mainstream alongwith his followers. This was another operation,solely negotiated by the Intelligence Bureau,which has stood the test of time, like the MizoramAccord.While on this subject, it would be worthwhilementioning the kidnapping of 15 officials inAssam, out of which12 belonged to the Centre/Central agencies, by the United LiberationFront of Assam (ULFA). Such was the faith ofthe then Prime Minister Shri Narsimha Rao inthe capabilities of the Intelligence Bureau, thathe reverted forthwith to Shri M K Narayanan,the then DIB, seeking assistance in the releaseof the kidnapped officials. The DIB recalledme from a training course abroad and askedme if I could try getting the kidnapped officialsreleased without any serious quid pro quo. Thisfeat was accomplished in a record time of 15days and negotiations with ULFA leaders abouttheir coming over ground and joining the mainstream, were the end product of these parleys.The success in this operation further endearedthe Intelligence Bureau to the Prime Minister.In all humility, I believe that all this would nothave been possible without the opportunitiesand support provided by the IntelligenceBureau. I only converted these opportunities intosuccesses. I am grateful to each and everyonein the Intelligence Bureau, to all my bosses, mycolleagues and all my team members.The Intelligence Bureau, as I have mentionedsomewhere earlier, was an organization withouta solid technical base till as late as the late 70’s.Credit must go to Shri T. V. Rajeswar for takingthe Intelligence Bureau out of the wirelessage and into the teleprinter age. This resultedin a communication upsurge, which helpedparticularly, the far-flung posts in the North-East.Then came Shri Rajiv Gandhi and the inimitableMr M. K. Narayanan. Mr Rajiv Gandhi wasquite impressed with the Intelligence Bureau’sachievements in the North-East, particularly theMizoram Accord, the Assam Accord and the TNVAccord. He had immense faith in the IntelligenceBureau in handling sensitive negotiations. Hewas further impressed when the IntelligenceBureau brought to Delhi, the entire leadershipof many under ground organizations, away fromthe prying eyes of the media.He did notice the Intelligence Bureau officialsgoing round their jobs sans publicity. I cannot forget my last meeting with him, in whichhe advised that the lB should not ignore theyoungest or even the simplest of groups ofmalcontents, operating particularly in the volatileenvironment of the North-East. The upshotwas the establishment of contact with Bodounderground leaders. He didn’t live to see thefructification of these parleys, but they climaxedin Shri Narsimha Rao’s time with the signing ofthe Bodo Accord between the Government ofIndia represented by Shri Rajesh Pilot, the AssamGovernment represented by Chief Minister ShriHiteshwar Saikia and five Bodo underground70The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

leaders. This happened around the time when Iwas about to retire.Life is a continuous process of learning; onecontinues to learn literally till his last breath.Mr. Rajeswar was a man of great contacts, Mr.Narayanan an officer of nuts and bolts, a down toearth man, and Mr. Vaidya was a visionary, a manof great imagination. I learnt extensively from allthree of them. However, about imagining theimpossible and making it possible, I learnt onlyfrom Mr. Vaidya. Hats-off to all three of them.Till the late 70’s, women were not represented inthe Indian Intelligence. It was then that Renukamoved in as my Assistant Director. And when Ibecame Additional Director and Establishmentwas added to my charge for a brief period, Irecruited three girls who had just then finishedtheir Masters from Bombay University. Theywere desperate to join the Intelligence Bureau asthey wanted to do something for the nation, thenpassing through a difficult phase on the law andorder front. The Board, during interview, madethem aware of the difficult living conditionswithin the Intelligence Bureau, and still moredifficult postings. They were, however, firedwith patriotic zeal and were ready to savourany hardship for the sake of the nation. They leftthe Board with no option but to take them in asACIOs-Il, and what amazing results they producedwhile working in the Intelligence Bureau. OneACIO-Il, I used to call her ‘KK’, was utilized byme in the ULFA operations and there was nostopping her from producing results to an extentthat she received more than 30 rewards, bothcash and commendations, from a DIB as toughand as legendary as Mr. Narayanan. I am surethat even today, women officers can do wondersin the field of intelligence, provided the middlelevel leadership in the lB shows no hesitation inexposing them to risks which is the bread andbutter of any good intelligence officer.While having a lot of contacts in the field assuresone of the ability of on the spot verification andof being forewarned, a lot can be achieved inthe field of intelligence mainly through goodteam work. I am convinced no intelligenceorganization can flourish in officer-subordinatesyndrome. In intelligence organizations, youshould not be giving orders but you should bejoining shoulders with subordinates, in meetingan objective. Excellent results can be achievedonly when the lowest in the team has confidencethat all laurels would necessarily visit him,and that the senior most in the team wouldaccept responsibility for all failures. I am sure, Isucceeded in generating that level of confidencein my teams. Consequently, they ended up doingall the leg work and all the unpleasant work andI just shared their achievements.The Intelligence Bureau is an excellentorganization to live and work in. It is also awonderful organization in retirement, since itcontinues to treat you as a family member tillyour last breath. It contains excellent officers,for some of whom the word impossible does notexist. I personally knew two such ADs, includingthe one who is presently the DIB and Doval, theformer DIB. To both of them, no obstacle wasinsurmountable. Both Doval and Nehchal raisedexcellent teams of intelligence officers and I usedthem to the organisation’s advantage at the oddestof places. Twice we missed out on contact withthe underground leaders inside a foreign countryand twice the ACIOs-Il in our teams took a coverwhich took them deep inside, and contact wasre-established. It was a feat all the same, hiddensecurely from publicity and media glare-like mostof the Intelligence Bureau operations are.I am now retired for 20 years, of which 11years I have spent in Bhopal. I can’t envisageIntelligence Bureau not being around me. Theyhave looked after me in my happiness and in mygrief. I remember and deeply mourn the deathof Mr. Trikha who did spend some years in theIntelligence Bureau, though he finally retired fromthe State Police. What I remember most about hisillness were the last few days and nights that hespent in a nursing home in Bhopal. During thosedays and nights, it was only the lB officials whohelped Mrs Trikha by spending the nights anddays with him in the hospital. Even his funeralwas an exclusive lB affair.It has been 25 years since the IntelligenceBureau celebrated its centenary. For organizingthe centenary celebrations a committee wasconstituted at the lB headquarters, nicknamedC.O.C.K (Committee for Organsation ofCentenary Karyakram) and I was entrusted theThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 71

onerous responsibility of being its Chief, joviallycalled the ‘Chief C.O.C.K’. We had no guardfile to refer to and the organization had no onewith experience to fall back upon, excepting ofcourse our imagination. But everyone extendeda helping hand. Shri Narayanan was then theDIB and Shri Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister.The Intelligence Bureau, when it celebrates its125 th anniversary, has something to fall backupon, some record which they can refer to.There are also several officers with centenarycelebration’s experience, including the presentDirector Shri Nehchal Sandhu. I wish him andthrough him, everyone serving the Organization,many anniversaries and many years of glory. Weshould remember that everyone cannot becomean intelligence officer. It should be a matter ofgreat pride to have been given an opportunity towork for an intelligence organization. It shouldalso be a matter of great satisfaction to haveworked quietly, in total anonymity, contributingto national security, braving odds and risks andto have retired with grace, to live yet anotherlife of dignity and anonymity. My best wishesonce again to everyone serving the IntelligenceBureau.Just like that!AJITNINAN72The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

My Unforgettable Yearsin the North-EastShri Prakash Singh, IPS (Retd.)My association - and fascination - for the northeaststarted at a very young age when I was stillan Assistant Superintendent of Police. I waspicked up by the Intelligence Bureau under the‘earmarking scheme’. It was the brain-child ofB.N. Mullick, the then Director, IntelligenceBureau, under which top position holders fromevery batch were picked up for the IB. Mullickwas a colossus among the police officers of thosedays. He was held in great awe and esteem. Oncehe had earmarked an officer, there was no gettingaway from it. I was released for deputation to theIntelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs inDecember 1963.It would be interesting to place on record aninterface I had as a probationer with B.N.Mullickin the Police Training College, Morabadad onDecember 1, 1960. It so happened that the sevenIPS probationers, undergoing training, had beentaken to a scene of dacoity in the countryside.Here we were told by the instructor that thedacoits always came with their faces covered,but this fact was never mentioned in the FIR. Onthe contrary, it was always recorded by policethat the villagers saw the criminals and identifiedthem in the moonlight or in the light caused byburning of haystack. This fudging, we were told,was necessary to meet the requirement of law.What is laid down in theory and what is donein practice greatly agitated our young minds. Weknew it was wrong but we also knew that statingthe truth would mean letting the criminal getaway from the clutches of law. “Law is an ass”,we remembered.A few days later, Mullick arrived at Moradabadand was staying in the Police Training CollegeMess. We had dinner with him. At Mt. Abu,we had got into the habit of having frank andinformal talks in the Mess with our seniorofficers. We told the DIB of our experience at thescene of dacoity and underscored the differencebetween the theoretical and practical aspectsof police working. Mullick was an idealist andunfortunately did not appreciate our views. Heinsisted that police officers should be truthful,irrespective of the consequences of their actionon crime or criminals. Not that we were bereft ofidealism, but we found his views impractical. Atthis stage, I committed the indiscretion of sayingthat we would then be, in Matthew Arnold’swords, “beautiful but ineffectual angels beatingour luminous wings in the void in vain”. Havingbeen a student of English literature, I was fondof quoting the great authors. Mullick, however,was not amused at the poetical reference. Theconversation ended abruptly and he left the Messin a huff. The next morning, he called QamrulHasan, Principal of the Police Training College,and said that he was greatly disturbed at theway the probationers had talked to him and wasworried about the future of the Indian PoliceService. He even said that he had not been ableto sleep soundly the previous night. Mullick’sstature being what it was, the Principal wasupset. He called us to his room and wanted toknow what had actually transpired. We told himfaithfully the entire sequence of conversation.Fortunately for us, he understood our point ofview better. Nevertheless, he advised us to becircumspect while talking to senior officers infuture.I served in the Intelligence Bureau for nearly adecade and had the good fortune of serving understalwart Directors like BN Mullick, MML Hooja,and Atma Jayaram. Two other officers who greatlyimpressed me by their intellectual brilliance wereAK Dave, an expert on International Communism,and KN Prasad, an expert on North-East. It wasreally unfortunate that neither of them couldrise to the rank of DIB, though they eminentlydeserved to occupy the high office.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 73

The most memorable part of my stint in the IBwas the four year period (1965-68) I spent inNagaland. It was a very exciting period. Every daythere was a new challenge, a new development,a new threat or an otherwise disturbing pieceof information. I had all the time, a feelingof contributing to the country’s fight againstinsurgency in a very sensitive area. This was astrong motivation and brought the best out of me.There were far too many challenging incidents. Iwould reminisce just two of them– one when Iwalked incognito into a Naga Army Camp andspent the night there, and the other when Nagarebels, on learning that I was the brain behindthe raid on their Jotsoma camp, issued an ahza(order) for my annihilation.Visit to LephoriThe Naga underground had a well organisedparallel government – it was called ‘Naga FederalGovernment’ with a President, Prime Minister(Ato-Kilonser) and Ministers (Kilonsers). The armedwing, known as ‘Naga Army’, had a Commanderin-Chiefand it was divided into battalions. Thetenth battalion had its headquarters at Lephoriin the Pochury area, quite close to the Myanmarborder. During one of my tours, I went to Meluri,which was our outpost in the Pochury area. TheAssistant Central Intelligence Officer incharge ofthe outpost was one Chandrika Singh, a daringofficer who was a storehouse of information onthe Nagas. He suggested that we undertake a trekto Lephori, with a view to getting an idea aboutthe strength of the Naga Army camp there, theweapons stored and their defences. ChandrikaSingh was known in the area as he met theunderground leaders quite frequently. My goingas Assistant Director of the Subsidiary IntelligenceBureau (SIB) was a different proposition. It wasbound to be viewed with suspicion. However, Idecided that we should go. For reasons of safety,a story was cooked up to camouflage my identity.I was to be introduced as an Assistant Professorof History from Allahabad (which, in any case, Ihad been), who had come to collect material onthe history of the Nagas.Meluri to Lephori was a ten mile stretch. It wasnot much of a distance. But half the distance was adescent and the remaining half was a steady uphillclimb. It was a difficult trek. We reached Lephorilate in the afternoon. The Naga Army personnelwere playing volleyball at the time. As they sawus approaching, they stopped the game and weresurprised that we should have ventured into theircamp. We were, of course, unarmed. Self-styledLt. Col. Henito Sema, who was Commandant ofthe tenth battalion, accosted us. He in fact gaveus a hostile reception. He shouted at ChandrikaSingh for having come to the camp without anyprior notice or permission. Chandrika Singhused all his tact and persuasive skill to convinceHenito that we had no evil designs and that it waspurely a friendly visit. Arguments and counterargumentswent on for about ten minutes beforeHenito could be pacified. I was a silent spectatorto their exchanges. Henito finally relented andasked his men to usher us into a basha (hut),where we could stay for the night. I must say theNaga Army personnel treated us very well. Wewere offered madhu (rice beer) by a young girl ina chunga (mug). I did not like the taste of it, but ithad to be consumed. Sleeping in the Naga Armycamp was an unforgettable experience.Next morning, to keep up the facade of research,I collected some village elders of Lephori andpretended to elicit information out of them aboutthe origin of the Nagas. They could tell me onlyabout a folk tale on the subject. At the beginningof creation, according to the story, God gave theknowledge of reading and writing both to thehillman as well as the plainsman. The plainsmanwas given paper to write upon while the hillmanwas given skin. As it happened, the hillmandevoured the skin when he found it edible. TheNagas have consequently no record of their past.I told them that the Nagas were none else thanthe Kiratas, frequently mentioned in old Sanskritliterature. The Mahabharata mentioned the Kingof Kamrup fighting on the side of Kauravas alongwith the Kirata warriors. The Ramayana alsomentioned the Kiratas. The village elders listenedto me with interest, but they appeared confused.Thereafter, we bade good-bye to Henito and theNaga boys of the camp and left for Meluri. Wewere both thrilled with the experience. We werealso relieved that everything had gone accordingto plan.A few months later, we came across an intercepteddocument from self-styled Lt. Col. Henito Semato another person which contained a reference toour visit to the Naga Army camp at Lephori. Henito74The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

stated that Prakash Singh, Assistant Director,Intelligence had visited their location undercover, that he should not have done that, and thatif the Naga Army personnel had discovered hisreal identity, the consequences would have beendisastrous. In retrospect, I should thank God thatI could come out of the Naga Army camp withmy head still in place (Nagas were earlier a tribeof head-hunters)!Jotsoma RaidThe other unforgettable incident relates to theSecurity Forces’ raid on the Jotsoma camp of theNaga underground in 1968. The Government’spolicy hitherto had been to intercept the incomingor outgoing gangs outside the area covered bythe suspension of operations agreement, thatis in the three mile belt along the internationalborder where the Security Forces’ right to patrolwas recognised. The underground, on the otherhand, moved about with arms and in uniformwith impunity, collected taxes, recruited men,and imported arms from abroad brazenly. It wasobvious that they were abusing the agreementto regroup their ranks and build up their fightingpotential. A more positive approach was calledfor on the part of the Government. It was usheredin by B.K.Nehru, the new Governor of Nagaland,who openly declared that the Government shalltake necessary action to see that “breaches ofcease-fire by the underground are nullified”.The GOC 8 Mountain Division, Maj. Gen. N.C.Rawlley, was also a man of tremendous driveand initiative. This combination of Nehru andRawlley brought about a complete transformationin the situation in Nagaland. The undergroundswere forced to give up their aggressive postureand the fangs and claws of the ‘Naga FederalGovernment’ were for once broken.China had around this time started meddling inthe north-east; the objective being to weakenIndia’s flanks. The first Naga Army gang to China,about three hundred strong, had crossed theTuensang border in November 1966 and wentover to China for training and weapons. It wasled by Thinuselie and Muivah. The gang returnedin January 1968 and dispersed in the Angami,Chakhesang and Ao areas. About two hundredand fifty of them set up a camp in a deep junglenear Jotsoma in the Angami area. Here they werejoined by some other Naga Army personnel also.The total strength, in due course, swelled to aboutfour hundred and fifty.The Government had intelligence about the reentryof the Naga Army gang from China, but itwas in the dark about their exact location. TheGOC was particularly anxious and he asked meto develop information about the exact locationof the China-returned gang. It took me about amonth to get pinpoint information. The gang waslocated near village Jotsoma in the Angami area ofKohima district. A plan of action was thereuponworked in consultation with the GOC 8 MountainDivision. We gave two sources who would leadthe Security Forces’ columns to the camp. TheArmy mobilised about one Brigade strength oftroops to surround and attack the camp.The operation was launched in the early hoursof June 7, 1968. The Security Forces marchedthrough an unfrequented route and weresuccessful in laying siege to the camp. This wasby itself no mean an achievement, in an areawhere intelligence about the movements ofSecurity Forces, more often than not, reached theunderground in advance. However, while thecordon was being laid, one of the hostiles goingfrom the camp to perhaps another village noticedthe movement of troops, and he rushed back toalert the Naga Army personnel. In the next twohours, before the engagement actually began, theunderground hurriedly packed their weapons,and the hard core, including Thinuselie managedto sneak out. One company of the Security Forcesled by Major Biswas walked into an ambush andthey were sprayed with bullets. Several of them,including Major Biswas, fell. A fierce encounterfollowed on the precipitous heights. Sporadicfighting continued on June 8 and 9 also. TheSecurity Forces captured twenty-five Naga Armypersonnel, together with a large quantity ofChinese arms and ammunition. The equipmentseized included 60 mm mortars, 7.62 mm selfloadingrifles with folding bayonets, sten-gunsand .303 rifles. Besides, a substantial volume ofdocuments, papers and diaries, giving conclusiveevidence of the underground’s collusion withChina were recovered.The Jotsoma encounter was militarily not muchof a success. The Indian Army suffered casualties,and though the exact number was never givenThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 75

out, we saw helicopters undertaking severalsorties to evacuate the dead and the injured fromdeep inside the jungle. I also learnt informallythat General Kumaramangalam, Chief of theArmy Staff, was unhappy with the GOC, as thebulk of the Naga Army gang had been able tobreak through the cordon and the Army hadsuffered casualties more than they had bargainedfor. Politically, however, the operation was athumping success. The Government, for the firsttime, got incontrovertible evidence of Chineseinvolvement in the north-east and their materialhelp to the underground Nagas. On June 19,1968, the Chinese Charge d’ Affaires wassummoned to the Ministry of External Affairsand given a strongly worded Note demarche,charging Peking of complicity in abettingsubversive elements in Nagaland in flagrantviolation of all canons of international behaviour.The Government of India claimed “concrete andirrefutable proof” that arms and other equipmentmanufactured in the People’s Republic of Chinahad been surreptitiously smuggled into Indianterritory, and that the Chinese Government was“master-minding this covert scheme in order tostir lawlessness against the legally constitutedauthority in India”.The documents seized at Jotsoma threw a floodof light on the nature of training imparted tothe underground in China and the politicalindoctrination given to them. The note-bookscontained detailed instructions on the handlingof different kinds of weapons, use of explosives,the techniques of guerilla warfare, and includedquotations from Mao Tse-tung. ”We do not wantwar”, one of these said, “but war can only beabolished through war, and in order to get rid ofthe gun, it is necessary to take up the gun”. Therewere some interesting observations on love andwomen as well. Marriage, it was said, “is a lotteryin which men stake their liberty and women theirhappiness”.The Jotsoma incident was a watershed. It shookthe underground who had hitherto taken theGovernment for granted and believed that theycould get away with violations of the suspensionof operations agreement. The Naga undergroundwere shocked that a secret hide-out of theirs,where the bulk of the China-returned NagaArmy gang was camping, could be raided. Theygrew suspicious that someone had betrayedthem and started making enquiries. A coupleof months later, they learnt that informationhad been developed by the Intelligence Bureauand that the groundwork for the operation hadbeen prepared by me. The so-called Presidentof the Naga Federal Government, thereupon,issued an ahza (order) on September 14, 1968stating that “the attack was planned by PrakashSingh, Deputy Director 'Intelligent', Kohima”,that “the action taken by the Indian Army on 9,10 and 11 September against the Federal Armywas also due to the same Intelligent Officer”,and that therefore the Security Command ofthe Naga Army should take action to annihilatehim. The Security Command was a specialisedwing of the Naga Army which carried out acts ofsabotage like blowing up railway tracks, bridges,vital installations, assassinations, etc. The ahzawas as good as my death warrant. But, as luckwould have it, a copy of the ahza fell into ourhands some time at the end of September 1968.It so happened that one of our sources broughtus a whole bundle of documents which he hadransacked from the ‘Federal’ headquarters atChedema. It was late in the evening and thesource was keen to replace the documents beforenext morning. We hurriedly photocopied themat night. Next morning, as I was scanning thedocuments brought by the source, my eyes ranthrough the aforesaid ahza. I was stunned for a fewseconds. I thought over it very coolly, discussed itwith M.N.Gadgil, the Joint Deputy Director, whowas my senior at Kohima, and we decided thatthe contents of the document should be flashedto the Intelligence Bureau headquarters at Delhi.A coded message was prepared and immediatelytransmitted.There was no time to lose. The ahza had beenissued about a fortnight back and we imaginedthat perhaps some action would already havebeen initiated by the Security Command.Possibly, some Naga Army personnel mayalready have been detailed to do the job. TheSIB got in touch with the State Police to plan formy security. Realising the gravity of the threat,the IG Police, R.D.Pande, promptly despatchedan armed guard to our residence. The sameevening, I told Savitri, my wife, that we had togo on a long tour the next morning and that wemust leave before sunrise. She was taken abackat the pace of events and was surprised thatsuddenly there was Police protection around thehouse. She asked some searching questions butI parried them. I did not consider it advisable to76The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

take her into confidence. That would have upsether greatly. Our luggage was loaded on a trailerlate in the evening itself and next morning,before sunrise, we left Kohima in our jeep forMokokchung and onwards to Tuensang. Ourtwo little children (Pankaj and Piyush), thenaged seven and five years, accompanied ushalf asleep. The office staff was not told aboutmy tour programme, which was known onlyto Gadgil. In fact, I worked out code namesfor myself for the next one week with separatenom-de-plumes for different days, and toldGadgil that I would be keeping him posted withmy movements. The idea was that my locationand movements for another week or so shouldbe secret until we were able to assess the threatpotential. While at Tuensang, I got a messagethat I should immediately report at Delhi forconsultations. Thereupon, I proceeded to Jorhatand took the flight for Delhi.At Delhi, I appeared before M.M.L.Hooja, thethen Director, Intelligence Bureau. K.N.Prasad,the Deputy Director who looked after the North-East, was also present. The contents of the ahzawere discussed. The DIB was magnanimous tosay that I need not go back to Nagaland and thathe would give me a posting at Delhi then andthere. He also added that he would arrange tohave a helicopter sent to Kohima to evacuatemy wife and children. Hooja wanted myreaction. I thought for a moment and then saidthat I would be falling in my own estimation ifI just disappeared from Nagaland even thoughthere was threat to my life. I told him of myconviction in the philosophy “Jako rakhe Saiyanmaar sake na koi” (None can kill a person whomGod protects), and said that I would be contentif I was transferred from Kohima by the end ofthe year, as was originally stipulated. Hoojapromptly agreed to that. He advised me on theprecautions I should take during the remainingperiod of my stay in Nagaland. He also directedK.N. Prasad to order a bullet-proof vest for me.A signal was sent to SIB Bombay for the same.The vest however never arrived; it was a rareitem those days.For the next three months, I lived under the shadowof Death. All possible care was no doubt taken.A shadow was attached for my personal security.There was an armed guard at the residence. Butthese were no more than kindergarten measuresin an area where well armed platoons were wipedout by the Naga hostiles in a single ambush. Itwas a great mental strain for me. Every morningwhen I left for work, I was not sure if I wouldcome back to see my wife and children.One reason why the underground could notexecute their plan was that serious differenceshad meanwhile developed within their ownranks. Kaito Sema, a firebrand undergroundleader who had led the first gang of Naga hostilesto the then East Pakistan and was dissatisfiedwith the Angami hegemony of the movement,ransacked the Naga Army headquarters atGaziphema and carried away the bulk ofarms, ammunition, wireless equipment andan enormous amount of money kept there.Kughato Sukhai, his brother, who was the Ato-Kilonser (Prime Minister) of the ‘Naga FederalGovernment’ was accused of having abettedthe coup and also criticised for the failure ofnegotiations with the Government of India.Kughato, therefore, resigned in October, 1967.The Semas, a powerful component of the Nagatribes, thereafter set up a parallel ‘RevolutionaryGovernment of Nagaland’. They even abductedMhiasiu and Ramyo, self-styled President andHome Minister respectively of the ‘Naga FederalGovernment’, and occupied the Chedema camp,which had hitherto been headquarters of therebel Nagas. These internecine power strugglesupset the apple cart of the underground andprevented them from any destructive movesagainst the Government of India or any of itsrepresentatives.The Almighty saw us through that terrible periodand, in December 1968, I joined the IntelligenceBureau headquarters at New Delhi. Whileproceeding on transfer, we took the train fromDimapur. The four of us - myself, my wife andthe two children - travelled in a first class coupe.As the train steamed out of Nagaland, I told mywife for the first time of the threat I had faced.She heard me with a sense of disbelief but soonrealised what I had gone through and was ableto link my unexplained movements and theprotection given to me, with the events of the pastfew months. The nightmare was over. Yamarajhad stared me in the face but realised that I had alonger lease of life.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 77

ITBF Ladakh: A Saga of Courageand ServiceThe term Ladakh comes from a Tibetan word“La-Taghs”, which literally means a mountainouscountry with passes, and Leh, which is theheadquarters of this region in Ladakhi languagemeans an oasis. Ladakh is strategically located,surrounded by Pakistan in the west, Sinkiangprovince of China in the north and Tibet (occupiedby China) in the east.The ITBF played an important role during theChinese aggression in 1962 and sacrificedmany of its personnel in the war in NorthernSector. A ‘Police Memorial’ was built at "HotSpring" to commemorate the martyrs and everyyear, a Police party visits "Hot Spring" to payhomage to the martyrs. ITBF personnel havealso excelled as mountaineers and Padma ShreeSonam Wangyal, was the youngest to climb Mt.Leh 40 years backThe Intelligence Bureau started functioning in theLadakh region from November 7, 1950, with askeletal staff of one Deputy Central IntelligenceOfficer, one stenographer and two gunmen, whoformed members of the Indo-Tibetan Border Force(ITBF), a name given by Shri B.N Mullick, the thenDirector of Intelligence Bureau. It was the onlyplace where IB personnel were a truly uniformedforce, with all the associated paraphernalia.Since then, the ITBF personnel have been servingthe nation at the borders, under extremely difficultweather conditions, terrain and circumstances.Since its inception, ITBF, besides catering to theintelligence requirements has also remained alifeline for the local people. Infact, till the 1990'sthe local people were fully dependent on ITBFfor communication, transport, medical facilities,ration and fodder items, both in the remote areasas well as in Leh town.Officer’s Mess ITBFEverest while Phu Dorjee, climbed Mt. Everestwithout oxygen. Both were from ITBF.The professional expertise of ITBF employeeswas also acknowledged during the Kargil crisisin 1999, when ITBF was the first agency to reportthe intrusion by the Pakistani army. During theconflict it provided pin-pointed information andtechnical support to the armed forces.In an air crash at Khardung La, which resultedin the death of almost all passengers on board,ITBF personnel were first to reach the crash siteand start rescue operations. The same spirit wasexhibited by ITBF personnel during recent flashfloods in Ladakh.The Ladakhis identify themselves with ITBF andvice-versa, as on all occasions, be it joy or sorrow,they have always found the ITBF standing besidethem.78The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Police - Intelligence InterfaceShri Julio Ribeiro, IPS (Retd.)My last official interface with the IntelligenceBureau was in August 1992, when I was warned ofan assassination attempt by Khalistani terrorists. Ireceived a letter in Bucharest, capital of Romania,where I was serving as Ambassador of ourcountry. I immediately intimated the RomanianForeign Ministry and was provided security. Thatsaved my life because fifteen days later, whenmy wife and I were strolling down the HerestrauBoulevard in Bucharest, a car screeched to a haltabout fifty meters from us. Four men jumped outof the car, while two stood on guard besides theircar, the other two chased me firing all the timewith their AK47.The Romanian security which was following meat a short distance spoke to a colleague on theirwireless handsets and he rushed to the spot inhis car, shot two of the assailants and capturedone. Only one got away. I received a bullet onmy back and was removed to hospital for surgerywhich involved reconstruction of the urethra,severely damaged by that single bullet. If it wasnot for the lB’s warning, I may not have beenalive today! The lB had received inputs fromRAW as mentioned in the book “The Kaoboys ofR&AW” by a former RAW officer B. Raman. Butmy interaction was with the lB, and I am eternallygrateful to that organization for the gift of life. Ithas been twenty years now since that secondassassination attempt.My very first introduction to the lB beganin the Police Academy at Mount Abu. Four ofmy batch mates, R. Govind Rajan (father of theinternationally acclaimed Economist, RaghuramRajan), Anant Kumar Verma, Hari Ananda Barariand Ram Kishan Khandelwal were earmarked forthe Intelligence Bureau because of their sheerbrainpower. Personally, I was quite happy toserve in uniform as it suited my temperamentand my penchant to interact with people inneed of help. But I certainly admired and lookedup to those four colleagues whose intelligencequotient was far superior to mine. They workedquietly, behind the scenes all their working life,unknown and unsung, wrestling incessantly withfacts, figures and information, analyzing the samewith their sharp minds.Hari Ananda Barari was the Director, lB when Iwas Special Secretary in the Ministry of HomeAffairs. We were in close touch then. One of thejobs entrusted to us by the Government was toselect a capable officer to serve as DGP Punjab,in the background of the terrorism unleashedby Khalistani elements. We pored over the listof IPS officers who could be considered andshort listed some names. These were discussedwith the Minister of State for Home, ArunNehru who in turn consulted Mr. Barnala, ChiefMinister of Punjab. Ultimately, they hit on onename. I was entrusted to sound this officer whounceremoniously turned down the assignment,angering Arun Nehru considerably. The endresult was that I was sent in his place!On two occasions, Barari arrived at myresidence in the wee hours of the morning,woke me up from my deep slumber, literallybundled me into his car and drove to ArunNehru’s residence to confabulate with himon matters that needed urgent attention. Suchnocturnal meetings were a part of the HomeMinistry’s daily existence. I never really gotused to them. I wondered how the DIB couldkeep awake well after the city retired for thenight, on almost a daily basis. Later, duringmy stay in Punjab, when I was Advisor to itsGovernor, Barari was appointed Governor ofHaryana, and since we were batch mates, I wasa frequent visitor to Haryana’s Raj Bhavan. Ipresume he was able to catch up on his sleepin the Governor’s Residence!The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 79

My first interface with the lB was a mundane oneinvolving a junior operative. In 1956, a youngprobationary Sub Inspector of the lB was assignedfor a short period of training to Nasik, where Iwas the Assistant Superintendent of Police. Sincethe cadets, as they were then called, had beentrained in Mount Abu, I took particular interestin his initiation and he too appreciated mycontribution to his grooming. On letting off witha warning, a villager who he had accosted forriding a cycle after dusk without the mandatorylight, the villager repaid the kindness by givinghim some information that led to the arrest of agang of cattle lifters. It was a lesson in humangratitude that I needed to learn at the very start ofmy own service!In 1958, I was promoted as Superintendent ofPolice and posted to Parbhani in the Marathwadaarea of the old Nizam’s territory. Fringe elementsof the Muslim gentry, who were the privilegedones in the Nizam’s times, were not verycomfortable with the new regime, particularlyafter the State of Hyderabad was split and somedistricts (five) were merged into the new Stateof Maharashtra. The activities of some of thesedisgruntled elements were the subject of closewatch, not only by my own intelligence branch,headed by a Sub Inspector of Police, but also ofthe lB’s representative stationed in Nagpur. Hewas a senior man of the rank of Dy. SP, whocame in every month or so to brief me about thepolitical activities in my jurisdiction.Twice a year, S.E. Joshi, who later becameDirector of RAW, and a very eminent one at that,visited my district. In 1958, he was the CentralIntelligence officer of the lB based in Mumbai(then Bombay). Joshi, who was a year senior inservice, stayed with me when he visited Parbhani.I had a huge bungalow, which, as a bachelor,I occupied in solitary splendor till I got marriedin April 1959. But even after my marriage, Joshiwho belonged to a very renowned family ofAmravati and whose father, or was it grandfather,had been Knighted by the British, was happy tostay with us. We continued our contacts till mynext district, Nanded, which also came within hisjurisdiction.Joshi was one of the finest human beings I havecome across. A lesson he taught me is etchedin my memory. I was praising the acumen ofhis deputy from Nagpur. His reaction was that agood intelligence officer should never harbourprejudices. His deputy, he felt, was somewhatbiased against Muslims. Anybody with abias could never report objectively or judgesituations, as they needed to be judged, fortaking vital decisions at the administrative and,more importantly, political levels. This pieceof wisdom coming to me from an intelligenceofficer, seconded to the lB under the earmarkingscheme, has remained in my subconscious eversince. To overcome the normal human failingsof bias or prejudice is not easy at the best oftimes. Every time I struggle, I think of S.E. Joshiwhose recent death in Mumbai left me grieved.Joshi was offered an extension in service but herefused on principle. His thoughts were for thosewho aspired to succeed him and many moredown the chain who aspired for promotions inthe vacancies that would automatically be causedby the senior levels moving up. Not many officersof Joshi’s caliber and strength of character can befound today. On the other hand, those lobbyingfor extensions are a dime a dozen!My next significant interface with the lB wasin Mumbai when I was Police Commissionerbetween 1982 and 1985. Shreekant Bapat,whose marriage I had attended in Pune nearlyfifteen or more years earlier, was the Jt. Directorin charge of the lB in the Western Region, withhis headquarters in Mumbai. During our watch,we received intimation from his headquarters inDelhi, that Bindranwale was travelling to Mumbaifrom Gujarat in a bus, with followers who werearmed to the teeth. Some of these men wereperched atop the bus brandishing guns! A clearviolation and defiance of the law! I offered to takethem on when they crossed into my jurisdictionbut was advised to hold my hand since a plan hadbeen put in place to confront the law breakerson their return journey. A crack detachment ofparamilitary personnel was assigned to disarmthem in an uninhabited area of the highway, soas not to cause damage to person or property ofinnocent civilians. My mandate was to monitorthe movements of Bindranwale during his stay inthe city and report back religiously to the CentralGovernment.80The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Shreekant Bapat and I surveyed the area aroundthe Dadar Gurudwara where Bindranwale andhis followers were staying. I assigned ParvindarSingh Pasricha, a Sikh IPS officer, then in chargeof traffic, to mingle with the devotees in theGurudwara and report regularly to me. We wereto ensure that he did not disappear without ourknowledge. The lookout provided two hourlyreports and based on Pasricha’s and the lookout’sfeedback, we reported Bindranwale’s movementsto Delhi.After a week of this exercise, we learnt to ourconsternation, that Bindranwale had reachedAmritsar and was back in the Golden Temple,whereas we thought he was in the DadarGurudwara in the heart of Mumbai. Bapat andI rushed to the observation post and lookingthrough the binoculars, we were convinced ofBindranwale’s presence in the room. It took ustime to realize we had been taken for a ride!The person occupying the room was a lookalikeof the Khalistani supremo! The matter came upfor discussion in Parliament and Smt. IndiraGandhi was forced to admit that Bindranwalehad hoodwinked both her local intelligencechief and the Police Commissioner of Mumbai.I do not know how Bapat and I were let off thehook by a Prime Minister who was known notto suffer fools!I had begun these reminiscences with my verylast interface with the lB in Romania. AndI will end this piece with my last interface inIndia at the fag end of my Police service, whichwas in the Punjab. This interface involved ayoung officer called Nehchal Sandhu who istoday the Director of lB and easily one of thesmartest young men I had come across in mythirty-six years in the Police. Nehchal was a trueoperations man in the mould of Doval, whoalso retired as Director a few years ago. Theamount of information that the Punjab Policegot from the lB, which worked silently behindthe lines cannot be enumerated and shouldnot be. lB officers were on the job 24X7. I sawNehchal himself at work on one memorableoccasion, when operation Blue Thunder —II was in progress. He had his contacts in theGolden Temple, which was under siege, withthe security forces comprising the NSG, the CRPand the Punjab Police surrounding it from allsides. Nehchal’s contact used to speak to himon phone and provide him with the correctsituation reports from inside the Temple wherethe terrorists were holed up. Their discussions,their plans, their numbers, their identities, thestate of their morale, all were known to Nehchaland he fed us with this information, helping usto successfully manage a massive and criticaloperation that gained worldwide attention aswell as admiration. Two senior IPS officers,one incharge of the Punjab Police and other ofthe NSG were awarded the Padma Shri for thisoperation. Nehchal Sandhu was an lB operative,anonymous and silent -- and so was left out!And let me not forget to mention O. P.Sharma, who was sent to me in Punjab fromthe lB, on deputation, as my State IntelligenceChief. What would I have done without hisskills in the art and the science of intelligencegathering. On retirement, he was rewardedwith the Governorship of Nagaland, just ashis predecessor, Gurbachan Singh Jagat, wasrewarded with a Governor’s assignment. Theseare two Intelligence men I cannot and will notever forget.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 81

My Journey through theIntelligence BureauShri K.P. Singh, IPS (Retd.)To begin with, my innate fondness for the I.P.S.(to the exclusion of all other Services) is a storypeculiar and personal to me. Excelling in bothacademics and sports, right from my schooldays, I went on to acquire a first class Masters’degree in Physics from Agra University, leadingto my appointment as a Lecturer in my almamater, Meerut College, Meerut. Additionally, Iemerged as a hockey player of some standing,having played the game at the University andState level, besides participating in various majorhockey tournaments across the country. Myobsession with hockey made me an ardent fan ofMr. Ashwini Kumar, l.P., the redoubtable PoliceOfficer who was at the helm of the Indian HockeyFederation, in an era when our global supremacyin the game was virtually unchallenged. Yearningto emulate Mr. Kumar, I appeared only for thel.P.S., got selected in the very first attempt andnever appeared again for any other Service.Equally fondly, I remember with gratitude Mr.Nikhil Kumar, l.P.S. (presently Governor ofNagaland), whom I chanced to meet at DelhiRailway Station, while on way to the U.P.S.C. forthe l.P.S. interview; he gave me some tips whichproved extremely useful.Fortunately, I was allotted the Madhya Pradeshcadre, which boasted of a very strong Policehockey team, which I represented, perhaps theonly IPS officer to do so. Alongside, I thoroughlyenjoyed my job in uniform, first at Jabalpur andthen at Dabra and Gwalior, chasing the dacoitgangs of Mohar Singh and Madho Singh, in achain of never-ending raids. Life could not havebeen better, with a job in uniform with attendantauthority, responsibility and social recognition,which I thoroughly enjoyed; bungalow to livein; a chauffer driven vehicle; couple of orderlies;and a young wife! As I awaited my promotion andposting as S.P. of a District, came the unforeseennews that I was one of the young l.P.S. officerswhom IB had considered meritorious and suitablefor long term deputation. If, on the one hand, wasthe uneasy feeling of virtually saying ‘good bye’to uniform, on the other, was the elation andpride of having been specially selected by thelB. (of B.N. Mullick’s fame) whose Director, asper I.P.S. Rules, was the highest paid and highestranking Police officer in the entire country. Also,there was the simultaneous fear and charm ofbeing catapulted in one leap from the hinterlandof a district to the national capital. Incidentally, Iwas to recall at this point of time, as to how somemonths ago, Mr. Devendra Singh, IPS, had comeall the way to meet me with the hinted purposeof seeking a matrimonial alliance; I then beingan eligible bachelor. This indeed was my firstexperience of the finesse with which lB conductsa secret enquiry. With the adoption of a suitablecover story, Mr Devendra Singh feasted on thespecial 'black partridges lunch' served by me,all the while evaluating my suitability for lB, while Iwas hoping to get a beautiful wife !On joining I.B. in September 1970, life in Delhiwas least comfortable, specially for my wife,living, first, in a rented accommodation, andlater, in a small Government flat, without help ofany kind. On the brighter side, was the beautifulcity of Delhi with its monuments, gardens,avenues and charming landscape. Above all, wasthe immense joy and pride of having an officein the imposing North Block. Also, the medicaland educational facilities in Delhi, as comparedto those available in districts, were extremelygood. Both our children were born in the V.I.P.ward of Wellingdon Hospital and later had theirschooling in some of the better known publicschools of Delhi.Soon enough, however, the absence of materialcomforts in lB/Delhi was more than compensatedby lB’s invigorating professional environment of82The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

excellence, dedication and commitment to dutywithout any quid pro quo, which to say the least,was simply sublime. Those days, our TrainingSchool was located in a ramshackle rented buildingin Anand Parbat, but it nonetheless could boastof some outstanding teachers (all non-IPS) on thefaculty. Their articulation, clarity of concepts,and width of knowledge were awesome. Thoughmore than 40 years have since elapsed, I still doremember their names, alongwith the subjectsthey taught; and failing to mention them wouldbe unfair to my own conscience.Mr. Shanti Swarup on Agents and Sources;Mr. Murthy on Progressive and RevolutionaryMovements; Mr. Seth on Communalism; Mr.Kapoor on Trade Craft and Mr. Kriplani onCommunications and Liaison (may God blessthem all).To add to my excitement of sitting in North Block,I was assigned to the Branch dealing with LeftWing Extremism, this too at a time when CharuMazumdar himself had stepped up the ‘prairie fire’of revolution that swept through large parts of thecountry, with endless violence, countless slogansand more than a hundred revolutionary journalsin English and various vernacular languages. Itwas a subject difficult to comprehend in its subtledimensions and complexities, and even moredifficult to keep pace with, because of the rapidityof events. Endless hours were spent, virtually everyday (24X7 in today’s jargon), by us, going throughplethora of reports, analysing them to discernemerging trends and keeping the Governmentconstantly informed and alerted, besides issuingadvisories to State Police/Intelligence. Thisindeed was a great beginning to my debut in thelB, under the guidance and care of my seniorcolleague, the impeccable Mr. Prakash Singh,whose contribution to the cause of Indian Policeis too well known. Another inspirational figureoccupying an adjacent room was Mr. M.K.Narayanan (now Governor of West Bengal andearlier the National Security Advisor), whoseprowess of conceptual analysis and projectionwas regarded as matchless. We all lookedupto him in awe and reverence. Above all, myimmediate boss, Mr. R.K. Khandelwal (laterretired as Chairman, J.I.C.) was perhaps the besttrainer a young officer could aspire for; a manobsessed with professional excellence in bothdesk and field work alike. Highly industrious andcommitted, and a hard taskmaster, he took greatpains to groom his wards. In a sense, he taughtus virtually how to hold the pen and write. Amoment of great personal joy, right to this day,is when Mr. Khandelwal fondly calls me his‘Arjun’.For a young entrant into the lB, particularlythrilling but initially unnerving was the exposureto the weekly Friday Conference, chaired bythe D.I.B. and attended by a galaxy of seniorofficers, rich in multifaceted experience andexpertise. Here, the Assistant Directors makepresentations regarding developments in theirareas of responsibility and more importantly,respond to queries and comments made by theirmore experienced seniors. This weekly exercise,which has become a kind of an institution in itself,is immensely helpful in improving the prowess ofarticulation, analysis and projection of the officersbesides giving them the confidence to face anyaudience. Virtues of precision and brevity are,thus, inculcated into l.B. officers from the verybeginning.In keeping with lB’s policy of rotation of officersbetween the lB Hqrs and SlBs, I was due for afield posting and was offered a choice betweenSIB, Lucknow (i.e my home state of U.P.) or SIB,Shillong, in the North-East. Believe me, in myquest for newer territories and people, I opted forShillong, a three year long posting that indeedproved a boon, both professionally and socially.One got the opportunity to go on inspectiontours, driving through the entire length andbreadth of the North-East, including distant placeslike Kohima, Manipur and Aizwal, soaking intotheir rich cultural diversity. In a similar vein, itwas soul satisfying to see numerous lB officersand men serving in every nook and corner, andin the mountainous border area, unmindful ofthe severe health and security hazards faced bythem. A sizable number of these middle levelfunctionaries were Keralites/South Indians, andno wonder, at many places, they used to run their‘Malyali Canteens’ serving delicious food, notonly unto themselves but to the culinary delightof other colleagues as well! As an lB officer, onecame face-to-face with top functionaries, bethey Ministers, top bureaucrats, Police officersand the like, while the entire family enjoyed theThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 83

social gatherings, and the vibrant cultural life ofShillong, amidst occasional visits to spots likeCherapunjee, regarded as the wettest place onearth. This tenure also afforded the much neededopportunity to work in close coordination andcooperation with, not only the State Police/administration, but also with other CentralOrganisations, be they the Armed Forces, diversepara military forces or sister intelligence agencies.My exposure to the North-East was to come invery handy later, particularly in the matter ofpeace dialogues with the Nagas, Bodos and suchother groups, since many of their leaders hadbeen educated at Shillong.My return to lB Headquarters in 1976 witnesseda fragile environment, marked by instabilitiesof different kind amidst the imposition ofEmergency in the country. All these problemskept the I.B. and its officers more than busy andoverworked, but nonetheless imparted themwith once in a lifetime experience. Believe itor not, for almost two years, it was 24×7 callof duty. Another nightmarish experience for mewas the coverage and reporting of the Policeagitations of 1979, which erupted in one Stateafter another, and in different organisations,including their reverberations in the I.B. itself.However, I do cherish this turbulent periodfor an entirely different reason. One of the twoyoung and energetic IPS officers inducted intothe lB and assigned to assist me, was NehchalSandhu, presently the DIB, while the other wasKoshy Koshy, who retired as Director General,BPR&D — for both of them, it was the proverbial‘Baptism by Fire’.In late 1983, on being interviewed personallyby Mr. R.N. Kao (then Security Advisor to thePrime Minister) and found suitable, I moved onas head of SIB, J&K — a tough but scintillatingassignment, that was to last a good four years.SIB, J&K, covering the diverse regions of Kashmir,Jammu and Ladakh, is traditionally regardedas the toughest professional theatre, with itsmyriad concerns and issues, with a blend ofdomestic, national, trans-border and internationaldimensions, marked by an extremely sensitiveand delicate polity. Here, even seemingly trivialissues were prone to flaring up in no time, andas such, the requirements of advance preventiveintelligence were perhaps nowhere greater thanin J&K. On the other hand, was the definite charmof having visited numerous famous places like theHazratbal Shrine, Dal Lake, Gulmarg, Pahalgam,Amarnath, Vaishno Devi, Drass, Zojilla Pass,Kargil, Leh and surrounding Buddhist monasteries,Ponggong Lake, Chushul and above all, literally,the Khardungla Pass (over 19000 feet in altitude).Equally cherished is my personal associationand acquaintance with Governors, B.K. Nehruand Jagmohan, political stalwarts like FarooqAbdullah, Mufti Mohammad Syed, Maulvi IftikharHusain Ansari, Chief Secretary Mir Nasrullah,DGP, Peer Ghulam Hasan Shah, the ‘thinkingGeneral’ M.L. Chibber of Northern Command,and of course, Justice A.S. Anand, who rose tobecome the Chief Justice of India. These namesI have mentioned, just to focus on the extremefinesse and knowledge that a senior lB officerrequires in order to meaningfully interact withsuch bigwigs on a sustained basis. In fact, J&K is apolishing stone that grinds, chisels and fine tunesone’s professional persona, thereby, converting agenerally ‘good’ officer into an ‘outstanding’ one.No wonder today, I understand, there is a waitinglist of lB officers at junior and middle levels alike,volunteering to serve in J&K. As a by productof my posting in J&K, our daughter acquiredproficiency in Urdu language, which she retainstill date, while her mother added a B'Ed degreeof Kashmir University as a suffix to her M.A.(Economics), from Lucknow University.My return to Delhi presented me with severalopportunities to further widen the sweepof my professional expertise. This includedparticipation, during 1988, in the 11 monthlong course at the prestigious National DefenceCollege, in the company of selected officersfrom the Indian Army, Navy, Airforce and CivilServices, besides those from more than a dozenforeign countries including USA, UK, Russia,South Korea and Australia. A unique opportunityto have a closer look at various facets of policingand law-enforcement, and problems connectedthereto came my way in 1991, while acting asthe Secretary of the Annual Conference of theDGPs of States and CPOs. The next decade wasspent on acquiring expertise on a plethora oftopics like socio-ethnic conflicts, Labour, Kisanand Student Movements, Religious and Regionalissues, Human Rights, Security (Departmental,Industrial, Civil Aviation, Communications),84The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Immigration, Inter-State Disputes, movementsfor creation of new States, problems of North-Eastern region, Maoist terror, etc. This wasreflective of the ‘brick by brick’ and ‘step by step’process of career development in the lB. It isessentially because of their decades long, multifacetedgrooming that quite a few earmarked IBofficers were deputed, in recent years, to headother organisations including R&AW, JIC, CISF,BCAS, SPG, Secretary (Security) and even thosewho reverted back to their State cadres, ended upinvariably as DGPs. It is also no coincidence, thatmore than half a dozen of them were appointed,post retirement, as Governors and successfullyadorned that high office.l.B. also offered me the opportunity to reviewmy association with sports, as I became theSecretary of the All India Police Sports ControlBoard (AIPSCB), that oversees the holding ofroughly a dozen Police tournaments in differentdisciplines every year, with the participation of alarge number of Police sports persons, many ofwhom have represented India with distinction atthe Olympics, Asian Games, SAF Games, etc. Forthe sake of senior officers, an All India Police GolfTournament was introduced in the mid-nineties,and the first one was held in Shillong. Anothermatter of pride is the record haul of medals wonby the Indian Police contingent in successiveWorld Police Games, including those at ColoradoSprings, USA (1993) and Melbourne, Australia(1995), when I was the Team Manager. Yetanother achievement of the Indian Police was thedeputation of about a dozen DIG/Commandantlevel officers from various States/CPOs - all ofthem proven sports administrators - to the AtlantaOlympics (1996). Another notable achievementof the Police forces, particularly the I.T.B.P., is inthe field of mountaineering; a little known fact,however, is that almost a dozen lB mountaineershave successfully made it to the top of MountEverest, and these include the legendary SonamGyatso, Sonam Wangyal and Phu Dorjee. lB’sjourney into mountaineering continues, thanksto the Sonam Gyatso Mountaineering Institute(SGMl), Gangtok.As regards the role of the Director, lntelligenceBureau, a position I was privileged to hold formore than three years (2001-2004), it wouldbe appropriate to mention, that apart from hisonerous responsibilities unto National Security,DIB owes a special duty towards the professionaladvancement and welfare of the entire Policecommunity of the country. It is for this reason thathe is designated as the Chairman of the AnnualConference of DGPs of States/CPOs, All IndiaPolice Sports Control Board, All India PoliceDuty Meet and the All India Police MemorialCommittee, besides being the only Policemember in the committee for empanelment ofIPS officers as Additional DGs/DGs. Of course,DIB’s participation in the meetings of the CabinetCommittee for Security (CCS) and his easy accessto dignitaries like the President of India, PrimeMinister, Union Home Minister and the NationalSecurity Advisor ensures the projection of Policepoint of view on important issues.On this count, successive DIBs have playeda crucial role, starting from the IegendaryB.N. Mullick, a great visionary responsiblefor designing virtually the entire security andpolicing architecture of the country. Shri T.V.Rajeswar was instrumental in the upgradationof Police Chiefs of States/CPO's to the level ofDGs from IGs earlier. To Shri M.K. Narayanangoes the credit for inclusion of the Indian Policein the global community of the InternationalAssociation of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and fororganising its Asia-Pacific Conference, in Delhiin early 1992, with the active participation ofState DGPs and CPO Chiefs - perhaps the firstever International Police Conference in India.Incidentally I was the Organising Secretary of thisConference. From the days of Shri D.C. Pathak,an Indian delegation led by the DIB, regularlyparticipates in the Annual Conference of PoliceChiefs of SAARC.I too did my bit in terms of operationalising theproject relating to the National Police Memorial(which should hopefully be completed soon);setting up of an All India Police Band Institute atCRPF Campus, Manesar, near Gurgaon; initiatingthe proposal for canteen facility to CPOs (sinceformalised); raising the IPS intake through theUPSC to over 80, which had dipped previously toonly 30-35 per year; Reunion Seminars at N.P.A.Hyderabad for IPS officers; and in the matter of thel.P.S. Memorandum to the Vth Pay Commission,which resulted in quicker promotion to IGrank (within 20 years now, as against 25 yearsearlier). Also, not known to many is the behind-The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 85

the-scenes role played by the DIB in respect ofthe Cabinet approval for pay parity betweenthe State DGP and the Chief Secretary. At thisjuncture, I strongly recommended the setting upof an ‘Indian Police Foundation’, a dream projectthat should be one of the main concerns of theDelhi based Association of Retired Senior I.P.S.Officers, presently presided over by Shri A.K.Verma and ably guided by Police stalwarts likeShri B.S. Das and G.C. Saxena.In the end, what makes the IB, regarded as theoldest National Security Organisation, retain itscharm and attraction, even now, is that this is anorganisation; thanks to its strong leadership overdecades, that has remained non-controversial,mainly because of its highly professional andunbiased approach and conduct. No wonder, it isone of the few organisations that zealously guardsand retains its credibility, believing as it does, inquiet efficiency without any craving, whatsoever,for publicity or populism. In lB, reputations arebuilt over a period of time, even decades, throughhard meritorious work and no one parachutesto the top on extraneous considerations. In amanner of saying, lB and its officers believe in the‘ladder and staircase approach’ to the top. Also,the congenial environment within the lB over theyears has not allowed any divergence of opinionand approach amongst its leadership to degenerateinto ill will or rancour. It is a happy family with alarge number of high achievers, past and present,which is constantly blessed by its elders.My journey through the lB, I reckon, has been acontinuation of my journey in the l.P.S. To methe two are integrally intertwined. To the query,if given another chance, may be in next birth,would I like to repeat this journey, my answer isan emphatic ‘yes’. Long live the Bureau to pursueits basic charter of ‘Protection of the Constitutionof India’.(C.V. Venkatraman)86The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Observations on India’s State andCentral Intelligence ApparatusShri K.P.S. Gill, IPS (Retd.)When I look back on my 38-year career inPolicing, including positions in some of themost troubled areas of the country, in their mosttroubled of times, I am astonished at the verylimited interface I have had with India’s centralintelligence apparatus. I am, indeed, quiteamused when I hear Police leaders from acrossthe country — particularly after a terrorist attackor other major security debacle — complain, forinstance, that the Intelligence Bureau had notprovided them with ‘actionable intelligence’ thatcould have allowed them to prevent or betterdeal with specific incidents (these grumblesare quickly picked up and amplified by thepolitical executive and the media). lB inputs andadvisories are, of course, the staple of Policingin the country, but were hardly pivotal in StatePolice responses to security threats or crises, atleast in my experience.I understand, of course, that things have changedsomewhat since then. Many terrorist and organisedcriminal enterprises now have trans-borderdimensions, both across a multiplicity of States inIndia and often across international borders. Centralagencies, particularly including the IntelligenceBureau, the Research and Analysis Wing and theNational Technical Research Organisation, have aspecific mandate and technical and technologicalcapabilities that are not available to the StatePolice apparatus, and, consequently, the Stateshave developed a certain dependence on inputsfrom these organisations. This is not, however, anecessary or natural consequence of the evolvingnature of crime and terrorism, but is, rather, anindex of the failure of State Police organisations tokeep pace with emerging challenges and necessarytransformations of their mandate, structures andcapabilities.In any event, the more things change, themore are they the same. While more noise ismade about ‘cross border terrorism’ today, thetruth is, terrorism and insurgency had crossborder implications from the earliest rebellionsin India. Certainly, every insurrection in thecountry’s Northeast — starting with the Nagauprising — has found safe haven and supportoutside the country, and has had implicationsfor neighbouring States within the country. TheNaxalite movement found support in China; theKhalistani and Kashmiri separatists in Pakistan.Crucially, even where threats have trans-borderdimensions, it is far from the case that the StatePolice and intelligence are impotent to respond.It has been my personal experience, and myunderstanding from the experience of otherexemplary officers, that the best intelligence andoperational capabilities are often vested in theState apparatus. This has certainly been the case,to take some prominent examples, in Punjab,Tripura and Andhra Pradesh, where State Policecapabilities were developed to extraordinarylevels of effectiveness, operating far beyond thenominal jurisdictions of the State’s territorialboundaries. This should not surprise anyone;the State Police has the largest presence in theaffected areas, including border areas, and it isimpossible that any central agency would everhave a comparable reach. If borders are ‘porous’,as we often (quite rightly) protest, they are porousboth ways, and an enterprising Police leadershipwill find ways to exploit this permeability toadvantage.Unfortunately, this tremendous structuraladvantage has been progressively eroded acrossmuch of the country by the continuous declinein the Police intelligence infrastructure and itspenetration, crucially, into the ‘interior’. Ruralinformation networks, operating through thenow defunct village watch scheme and througha range of subordinate Government officials,The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 87

including the Panchayati Raj and villagerevenue administration apparatus, village schoolteachers, and development workers, have losttheir integral and close linkages with the Thana,and information flows upwards have becomefitful and unreliable. This is often even morethe case where such intelligence flows are mostneeded, in regions of violence and disorder.An illusion of ‘intelligence’ may be created bymonitoring urban and political gossip centresand such ‘intelligence’ may even be quite usefulin drafting general risk assessments — but thereal substance of operational intelligence flowsfrom the grassroots, from rural and mofussilconcentrations, or from the most degraded andneglected areas of the urban complex.The enormity of what can be achieved by thePolice is illustrated by an interesting case in thelate 1960s, when the Naxalites were trying toestablish a foothold in Assam. In Kamrup, wewere able to break the emergence of Naxalism,because an alert constable, who was getting hisslippers repaired, saw a pair of shoes, wrapped ina Naxalite poster, which had also been given tothe same cobbler. A trap was laid and the ownerof the shoes was arrested. His interrogation led tothe arrest of others, and systematically, the entirechain was broken, with a number of inter-Stateoperations and arrests also resulting from thisvery humble beginning. Ironically, the constablewas almost illiterate, and we had to exempt himfrom various requirements to promote him to thepost of ASI as a reward.It is the sensitivity and responsiveness of thisgrassroots apparatus that creates intelligencesuccesses of the highest order. Unfortunately,the problem, in substantial measure, is that thesystem, today, has come to be dominated byPolice and intelligence bureaucrats; what it needsis leaders. The efficiency of an organisation canoften be judged by the frequency at which its topleadership visits its most remote outposts, and bythis measure, it is unlikely that most State Policeand intelligence organisations can presently bejudged very positively.Effective Police leaders in some of the worstinsurgency-afflicted areas have, nevertheless,established highly efficient networks of listeningand operational posts across their jurisdictions.Here, significantly, the internal-externaldichotomy is also found to be substantiallyfalse, and such leaders have been able to createlinkages across borders essentially through thepopulations that inhabit the border areas, oftenamong those who are notionally ‘sympathetic’to the insurgent cause. Through the extendedperiod of terrorism in Punjab, it was alwayspossible to keep very close tabs on the terroristleadership across the border through a numberof intermediaries and informers. Among thosewho will betray their country, you will alwaysfind some who will betray their cause as well.I was, moreover, personally able to establishcontinuous contact with several of the terroristleaders holed up in Pakistan. I recall, also, thatin the early Sixties, as SP Naogaon, I was able toidentify and process the deportation of as manyas 300 illegal migrants from what was then EastPakistan (now Bangladesh) on the average day,and an overwhelming proportion of intelligencerelating to these came to me from other migrants,who had long been settled in the area. Crucially,there was also ample intelligence coming fromacross the border, regarding the resettlement ofthese expelled groups along the border, and theviolence that was orchestrated by them, at thebehest of Pakistani State agencies, against Hindusin those areas. Other Police leaders have beeneffective in doing as much, for instance, G.M.Srivastava in both Assam and Tripura, in the mostcrucial phases of the counter insurgencies there,had developed excellent capabilities both withinand across borders. Similarly, the Andhra PradeshPolice has been instrumental in generatingeffective intelligence on the Maoists virtuallyacross the country, leading to arrests of topMaoists in the most widely dispersed locations.The ‘home advantage’ that a State Police Forcehas, and the linkages these can create evenbeyond borders, cannot easily be replicated bya central agency.These are not aberrations or deviations.There are imperatives of modern policing andintelligence operations, dictated by the verynature of contemporary security threats, and willbe ignored at terminal risk to the authority andcapacity of the Indian State. With our proclivityto look westward for our ‘models’, it is useful,in this regard, to notice the response of the NewYork Police to the new challenges and threat88The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

assessments that arose after the catastrophic 9/11attacks in that city. Over the intervening decade,the New York Police Department (NYPD) hasgone on to create what has been described asthe most powerful and technologically advancedcounter-terrorism bureau that anyone has everseen. First providing the rationale of what wasdone, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly stated,as far back as in February 2003, “We couldn’trely on the federal government alone. I believedthat we had to create our own counter-terrorismcapacity, indeed our own counter-terrorismdivision.” 1,2 Within the first years after the 9/11attacks, this Division was set up with a colossalcapacity for human and technical intelligencegathering, and exceptional technical capabilities,extending to the detection of extremely low levelsof nuclear radiation and threat. Emphasising thecore of human intelligence gathering, the Divisionincludes personnel who speak 60 languages anddialects, and, crucially, posts its own officersacross the world.It is not the intention, here, to suggest that everyState and city in India must immediately rushoff to try to create comparable capacities. Oursolutions do not lie in imitating systems that haveresource capabilities that we cannot even imaginefor ourselves — though we may draw lessonseven from these. The point is, our capacities, ourcapabilities and our responses — including thedistribution of tasks within the system — mustbe dictated by the contours of the challengeand by the potential of the executive agencies,not by some prior distribution of immutablejurisdictions. The approach must be pragmatic,problem solving, not bureaucratic.None of this is, of course, intended to suggest thatthe Central Agencies are irrelevant or marginal tothe effort of intelligence gathering, or to nationalsecurity. Indeed, there is no either-or propositionhere. Both Centre and States have to developtheir capacities and capabilities to their maximumpotential. Each has certain natural advantages.I have had, through my career, extraordinaryepisodes of close and productive coordination,for instance, with the lB. During Operation BlackThunder, I was in daily contact with the NehchalSandhu, now the DIB, among others, and therewas an exemplary sharing of purpose andintelligence. Nevertheless, despite continuousinputs from the IB, the State intelligenceapparatus remained crucial for a completepicture of events. I must confess, moreover, thatthe extraordinary cooperation with the lB duringthe Black Thunder episode is not something thathappens often. The relationship between Stateand Central agencies tends to be mixed. Theyoften operate independently of each other, andat least occasionally, at cross purposes, thoughexamples of successful collaboration are also notdifficult to locate.It is important to recognize, moreover, that bothState and Central agencies begin to harp on thequestion of mandate only when they are unwillingor incompetent to do what is necessary, or whensomething goes abysmally wrong. Otherwise,there are perfectly healthy signs of coordinationand cooperation, with joint operations betweenState and Central agencies, as well as betweenthe agencies of different States, executed withsurprising frequency and success. Indeed, it iswhen an acute lack of capacity, or of will, exists,that operations hobble and questions of turf beginto rankle.This is, increasingly, aggravated by a proclivity,everywhere, towards the eager abdication ofresponsibility, though the craving for power andpelf remains intense. There is a strong trend in thepopular discourse regarding the purported roleof ‘the public’ in countering terrorism and crime,greater ‘public-private’ partnerships, and eventhe flogging off or off-loading of a range of Policefunctions to the private sector. This is not a subjectthat needs detain us here, though it is importantto emphasise, in passing, that an overwhelmingproportion of such proposals are misconceived,misdirected and counter-productive, and militateagainst the most fundamental and inalienableduty of the State to provide security and justiceto every citizen, irrespective of station or othergrounds of identity. While it is right for the Policeto expect cooperation from citizens, the idea1. “Fighting Terrorism in New York City,” 60 Minutes, September 25, 2011http://www.cbsnews.comf2lOO-18560 162-2011 1059.html2. Craig Horowitz, “The NYPD’s War On Terror”, New York, February 3, 2003, http://nymag.comlnymetro/news/features/n 8286/.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 89

that Police responsibilities can be ‘off-loaded’,in any significant measure, to citizens, or tothe increasingly fashionable panacea of privatecorporations, needs to be strongly discouragedamong the Police leadership.If the Police and intelligence apparatus in Indiais to embrace and execute its fullest mandate,both State and Central agencies will haveto enormously augment their capacities andcapabilities, and learn to pull together. Such aneffort, however, will have to be preceded bya far deeper understanding and appreciation,within the Police leadership, of the nature andsignificance of intelligence, and of their role inits acquisition and employment. The unfortunatereality is that enormous distance has progressivelybeen created between the grassroots of law andorder management and the superintending Policeestablishment, and this has worked to the abidingdetriment of both crime control and intelligencework.I recall that, when I got my first District, lessthan 14 years after Independence, I was postedto Naogaon, a communally sensitive District, byHaider Hussain, then IG of Police. At the SP’sOffice there, I discovered certain old boundrecords in the almirahs. In these, I found the mostdetailed records, including, for instance, the annualhistories of dacoities in India, disseminated bythe Intelligence Bureau. I also found the volumesof weekly intelligence reports sent out by earlierSPs, written in their own hand. I found similarrecords in my subsequent posting to Tezpur, withdetailed, hand written correspondence between,for instance, the SP and the lG, on a range ofintelligence and administrative issues. Over theyears, however, such practices fell into disuse. SPsstopped writing reports in hand, and these camenormally to be prepared by subordinate officers,often the Inspector who was heading intelligencein the District, and were merely corrected andsigned by the SP, and sent on to the DIG CID,who oversaw Intelligence and Crime. This wasnot merely a technological shift — with theadvent of the typewriter and later, the computer— but a major psychological and administrativeshift, reducing such tasks to a bureaucraticroutine, and snapping the vital link between thesuperintending officer and the continuous flowsof intelligence generated within his jurisdiction.This problem has been further compoundedby the fact that hardly anyone wants to go intothe intelligence system, except to the lB. This isparticularly the difficulty within the lower echelonsof the State Police apparatus, there is extremereluctance among most of the subordinate ranksto be posted into the intelligence department.I think the central intelligence system has alsosuffered in some measure as a result of the systemof earmarking officers to the lB at inception. Ibelieve all officers must work in the Districts fora substantial tenure. Keeping the lB as a closedhouse has not helped it in its capabilities torecruit intelligence sources and develop efficientinformation networks.Another factor that has undermined the qualityof intelligence is the growing corruption andpoliticization of the Police Force. No policing andintelligence apparatus can perform its functionswith requisite competence, if it is compromisedby corruption, or where its officers and personnelare mixed up with the very people they are meantto monitor. Nor can an intelligence system fulfilits mandate if it is constantly looking to pleasepolitical masters by telling them what they wantto hear, rather than what is actually the case; orworse, when the agencies are directly involvedin orchestrating political mischief — somethingneither State nor Central agencies are innocentof. On at least some occasions, the consequencesof this last deviation have been devastatingto the national interest. This was certainly thecase in the initial troubles in Assam and inPunjab, for both of which the nation has paidan extraordinary price. In the external sphere,the record of India’s meddling with the Tamilinsurgency in its early phases in Sri Lanka readsas a cautionary tale against such waywardness.At least in the Sri Lanka case, and on the externaldimension, lessons appear to have been learned.On the domestic front, however, the seductionof political manipulation through an abuse ofthe intelligence agencies, even to the extremedetriment of law, remains great and agenciesneed to be watchful of the same.It is clear that the intelligence apparatus in India,today, is hobbled by a range of defects andinfirmities, and a tremendous effort is required forits reconstruction, at both the State and Central90The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

levels. The deficiencies of one part of the systemshould not become the grounds for an inordinateemphasis on developing other parts. The inabilityof many States to pull their weight cannot be anexcuse to attempt to replace their networks withan overwhelming Central apparatus. There mustbe acute consciousness of the natural confinesand limitations of each system, as well as of theircomparative strengths and advantages. Turf warsare, at least occasionally, inevitable in any systemof shared power and responsibility, but they mustnot be allowed to subvert the national interest.There is a tremendous and mounting challengeof governance, of security, and of law and ordermanagement in India today, and every nationalinstitution appears to be in, or headed for, a crisis.At such a time, the intelligence apparatus has ahuge role to play, and each of its failures, errorsand excesses will be magnified manifold. It is oflittle utility, in the complex scenario that presentlyprevails, to propose ideal or utopian solutions;the Police and intelligence leadership will haveto function within the vagaries of the given stateof affairs. This will demand even greater integrity,commitment and sense of purpose on the partof the national security leadership. I am deeplyaware of the many and grave failings of thisleadership. Nevertheless, I am also witness to thefact that, when the national interest is at stake, thesame leadership has demonstrated extraordinarycapacities of dedication, courage and sacrifice.Though no single crisis or challenge, today,constitutes a decisive threat to the national interest,the cumulative impact of the many disorders andinfirmities that afflict the system is tantamount toan existential threat to India. It is now time, onceagain, as in so many past instances, for India’ssecurity leaders and Forces to prove themselves.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 91

A House Named BlessingtonMany who drive past Late Capt. Beale’s houseat South Point also know that the house on theopposite side of the road is called Blessington.However, not many know how the housegot the name, or who its first occupantswere, before it became the property of theGovernment of India. Like many old housesin Port Blair Blessington too has a tale to tell.James and Amelia Whitby had one daughter,Violet Emelie, born on 8 th December 1877 atPort Blair. She was educated in a school situatedon Ross Island. Reuben and his wife Jemima hadfive children, all born in Port Blair. Reuben diedin the year 1900. His tombstone can still be seenin the cemetery at Aberdeen.BlessingtonIt is a tale of three families whose fortunes werelinked to the Andaman Islands for more than threegenerations – the Whitbys, the Boomgardts andthe Delaneys.The first of the three families to come to theAndamans were the Whitbys. James Whitby Sr.was born in Romford, Essex, England in 1822. Heenlisted in the British Army and travelled on the S.S.Elizabeth to Madras in 1841. His son, also namedJames, was born in 1846 in Poonamallee. James Jr.married Amelia Jane Shandley, whose grandmotherwas born in a little village named BLESSINGTONnear Dublin, Ireland. A job in the Jail Departmentbrought them to Port Blair. Soon James Whitby’sbrother Rueben also joined them at Port Blair. Theywere there at the time of the assassination of LordMayo on 8th February 1872.As the settlement expanded, a young civil engineerAllan Joseph Boomgardt from Travancore (nowTrivandrum), arrived in the Islands to plan theroad system throughout the Andamans. Allanbelonged to an old Dutch East India family andhis father worked for the Dewan of Travancore.His mother, La Bouchadere, was French. Allanmet Violet Whitby and they were married on11th April 1898 at Vellore. They returned andsettled down in Port Blair.Allan and Violet Boomgardt had two children:Coralie, born in 1900 and John, born in 1907.Allan continued to work till his retirement. Agrateful Government allotted him a large coconutplantation at South Point called Mt. Haughtonestate measuring 53 acres and land to build ahouse. This was the pension for his loyal service92The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

of laying a network of useful roads into the thickforest of South Andaman. Blessington cameup on this land and Allan and Violet led quiet,retired lives raising chickens, keeping a few cowsand tending to their plantation of coconuts andcashews. Sitting in the forecourt of Blessington,they could behold the magnificent view of theentrance to Port Blair harbour and Ross Islandwhile, on the other side of the bay was NorthPoint, from where a light house winked at themduring the nights.Meanwhile Coralie and John were growingup. They went to school in Darjeeling butalways returned to their beloved Port Blair.Coralie married Leslie Vincent of the WirelessDepartment and they moved to Rangoon. Theyhad three children and were frequent visitors toPort Blair, until Vincent’s work contract forcedhim to return to England, and the family left Indiain 1938. This must have been a time of greatsadness for the Boomgardts. Soon the Whitby/Boomgardt family would unite with another PortBlair family, the Delaneys.John Delaney was born in Brentwood, Essex,England in 1852, and he married MargaretGibbons from Ireland. He joined the British ArmyOrdnance Survey and was posted to India. Theyhad five children, all born in Madras; one of thesons was Patrick, born in 1886. Patrick becamean officer in the Jail Department and was put incharge of the rehabilitation of the convicts at PortBlair. His popularity led to a part of the townbeing named after him as Delaneypur, a namethat continues even today. At Patrick’s invitation,his elder brother John Delaney joined him in theJail Department at Port Blair in 1930. Before this,John was in the Royal Horse Artillery and hadbeen sent to England where he met and marriedNora Maguire. They had two daughters, Mollyand Monica. In 1930, John and Nora Delaney,with their two daughters aged 18 and 14, movedfrom Southampton, England, to Port Blair.John Boomgardt fell instantly in love with Mollyand they were married on 16th May 1933 at theRoman Catholic Chapel on Ross Island.James Whitby died in 1882, Amelia in 1937 andAllan Boomgardt in 1938. They are all buried inthe cemetery at Port Blair. Violet continued tolive at Blessington surrounded by friends -- theDelaneys, Monins, Myers, Youngs and manymore old Port Blair families, leading an idyllicexistence, except for the absence of her daughterand family.When World War II broke out, John Boomgardtenlisted and was commissioned as an officer inthe Maratha Light Infantry. He was sent to NorthAfrica where he was severely wounded. He wasadmitted to the military hospital in Poona. Mollyand daughter Eileen joined him and they stayedthere till the end of the war. John Boomgardt waslater awarded the Military Cross.Meanwhile, the Andaman and Nicobar Islandswere occupied by the Japanese. Most Europeansleft the Islands. Violet reluctantly left on the lastship and went to Calcutta. The few who stayedwere brutally treated by the Japanese. To set anexample for all, Maj. A.J. Bird was beheaded inpublic by the Japanese. Cato, a Swede, was killedbecause he refused to bow before the Japanese.John Delaney was severely beaten, which lefthim blind in one eye, and transported to TavoyP.O.W Camp in Burma (now Myanmar). ChiefCommissioner Waterfall and many local residentswere tortured. Forty-four local residents, on thesuspicion of being British spies, were shot deadby a firing squad at a place called Homfray Gunj.A group of elderly and infirm men, among themthe father of Molly’s close friend Ivy Myers,were taken out to sea and forced overboard; twosurvived.The war ended with the dropping of two atomicbombs on Japan. On August 14th, 1945, Japanannounced its surrender. All the Japanese soldiersin the Islands became prisoners of war and Alliedtroops retook the islands. The Japanese garrisonat Port Blair surrendered to Brig. A. Solomon atthe Gymkhana Grounds.As soon as the war ended, Maj. John Boomgardt,now recovered from his injuries, was posted toCar Nicobar as Assistant Commissioner. Violetreturned to her beloved Blessington. Molly andchildren joined John Boomgardt at Car Nicobar.His job was to oversee the reoccupation and healthe wounds of the Japanese atrocities during theoccupation. When India won Independence on15th August 1947, it was Maj. John BoomgardtThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 93

who hauled down the Union Jack and hoistedthe Tricolour for the first time at Car Nicobar.Although his family had been in India formany generations, John Boomgardt was ofEuropean descent and it was the wish of the newGovernment to appoint an Indian to the post ofAssistant Commissioner.The Boomgardt family moved to Mysore, whereJohn built and managed a bobbin factory forthe jute industry in Calcutta. Violet stayed atBlessington, looked after by a dear friend Mrs.Mary, whom she called ‘Mary-girl’.Tragedy struck when Coralie died in England in1949, sadly, never having been able to return tovisit her mother and homeland. Six months later,Maj. John Boomgardt died of a massive stroke, hewas aged 42 years.Molly decided to return to England (aftertwenty years in India) with daughter, Eileen andPenny, aged 14 and 5 years. She invited Violetto accompany them, but there were too manymemories for Violet to want to leave the onlyplace she had called home. Eventually, old ageand illness forced her to leave Blessington andgo to Calcutta in 1951. The terrible sadness of theold lady can only be imagined. She died a fewmonths later and was buried in Calcutta, but herheart and spirit are somewhere near her belovedBlessington at Port Blair.With the departure of Violet, Blessingtonbecame the property of Government of India.It was neglected for a long time, but the sturdytimber Allan Boomgardt chose to build thehouse, withstood the ravages of the tropicalclimate. Thanks to the efforts of a dynamicyoung officer, ‘Blessington’ is now with theIntelligence Bureau, and it has been restoredto its former glory. It now radiates the samewarmth its former occupants must have felt inbygone times.The descendants of those who built the houselive in far-off England, the area from where theWhitbys and the Delaneys started their epicjourney in the early 1800’s. This coincidencehas only been discovered in recent years. EileenArnell and Penny Buck, grand daughters ofAllan and Violet Boomgardt visited the Islandsin 1998. They hope and plan to visit again.Blessington has cast a spell over them. Eileenis the custodian of the family photographs andmaintains the family tree. It is her desire thatthe story of Blessington be told as a memorialto their ancestors, especially Violet, and for thechildren and grandchildren who they hope willvisit in future. Paul Arnell, the great grandson ofViolet and Allan Boomgardt, has already doneso and fallen under its spell.There are more such old houses still standing inPort Blair which have a story to tell.94The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Technology in Intelligence-Future ScenarioDr. V K SaraswatSecretary,Department of Defence (R&D) andScientific Advisor to Raksha Mantri“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear theresult of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you knowneither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” 1– Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 511 B.C.Sun Tzu, one of the greatest military theoristsof the east has clearly elucidated the fact thatfor any campaign to be successful, or moreeloquently, for any success against an adversary,information about him and one’s own strengthsand weaknesses is the key. Throughout thehistory of warfare and in-hitherto the historyof mankind, strategists such as Chanakaya 2 ,Clausewitz 3 , Jomini 4 , Machiavelli 5 , Sun Tzu 6 etc.have always emphasized on the perpetual needfor information, and subsequently its effects onnational security; thus resulting in the creationof specialized institutions within the nationalsecurity apparatus i.e. the Intelligence wings.These institutions over decades have evolvedin multifarious ways, catering to informationgathering, analysis and dissemination to thedecision makers, thus acting as pinnacleinstitutions of national security apparatus. One ofthe key challenges which these organizations faceis to evolve, keeping abreast with the evolvingtimes, thus channeling innovation, technologyand human geniuses for achieving the ultimateobjective of national security. Among the three,one of the key aspects is technology, as it, to anextent, enables or in certain aspects, compensatesthe lack of the other two.With 21 st century being considered as an eraof technological revolution, the effect of thesame has, to a larger context, changed theway or is in process of changing the way inwhich these intelligence institutions work; thusmetamorphosing them into next generationorganizations, with technology being a criticalforce multiplier. This paper elucidates this forcemultiplier effect of technology and its futuristicimplications on vital phases of intelligencegathering, analysis and dissemination to decisionmakers, consequently implying the herald of nextgeneration of technologically enabled future forthese pinnacle institutions of national securityapparatus.1. ROLE OF TECHNOLOGYIN VARIOUS PHASES OFINTELLIGENCE CYCLE 7Technology, in a way, has revolutionized themere genesis of intelligence, with it being a criticalenabler in every phase of the intelligence cyclei.e. Intelligence gathering; intelligence analysisand intelligence dissemination. The impact oftechnology is not only limited to revolutionizingthe traditional means of intelligence such as theThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 95

Human Intelligence (HUMINT), but has evolvedin the creation of all together new disciplines,dependent almost totally on technology, suchas Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Geospatialintelligence (GEOINT), Measurement andSignature Intelligence (MASINT), Imageryintelligence (IMINT), Open Source intelligence(OSINT) and so on.Figure 1: Intelligence CycleSource: Author, adapted from Henry 1. Stimson CentreReport 70 s .1.1 Phase 1: Intelligence Collectionand Technology1.1.2 Human Intelligence (HUMINT)Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is one of theoldest disciplines of intelligence institutions.HUMINT is usually defined as “a category ofintelligence derived from information collectedand provided by human sources” 9 . In contrastto the conventional dictum, this discipline isextensively dependent on technology in variousaspects. Covert communication and exchange ofinformation from foreign agents, i.e. the “deaddrops” 10 , is one most critical component of aclandestine HUMINT operation. Technologyis extensively employed in terms of advancedencryption systems for the creation of securecommunication channels on IP as well as RFlink 11 .Some of the techniques commonly used arecipher based communication, involving milgrade symmetric encryption of 512bit keyand above 12 ; Digital steganography 13 basedtechniques of embedding information in imagesand videos(Figure 2); IP based covert channelsof communication involving embedding covertinformation as part of protocol streams orredundant bits, thus obfuscating contemporaryInternet interception mechanisms 14 ; Use of remoteVPS and VPN servers for obfuscation of agent’s IPdetails and communication path for track back,along with mail-eliminator for removing the tracesof emails sent from the agents, especially to evadecounter intelligence cyber forensics; and hushmaillike services involving a single mail creationfor a single communication and subsequentlypurging of the account and auto creation ofsubsequent accounts for next communication 15 ;Spread spectrum and frequency hopping basedencrypted communication channels for tacticalcommunication devices required extensivelyin covert reconnaissance and direct actionoperations; Espionage based equipment suchas digital transmitters, GPS locators; Similarlyadvanced bugging devices for surveillance andso on.Similarly, one of the key components in HUMINTis the process of interrogation. Here again,technology has revolutionized the way in whichinterrogation is conducted with advances suchas the Psychoactive medication 16 , or the truthserums and advanced behavioral analysis basedlie detectors, involving vital bodily parametricmeasurement and correlation.Figure 2: Digital Steganography process 17 .Source: Onathan Cummins, Patrick Diskin, Samuel Lauand Robert Parlett, Steganography And DigitalWatermarking, School of Computer Science, TheUniversity of Birmingham, 2004.96The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

These are just some of the aspects where technologyhas evolved the conventional processes in theHUMINT discipline of Intelligence.1.1.2 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is usually definedas “A category of intelligence comprisingeither individually or in combination of allcommunications intelligence (COMINT),electronic intelligence (ELINT), and Foreigninstrumentation signals intelligence, howevertransmitted. Intelligence derived fromcommunications, electronic, and foreigninstrumentation signals.” 18 This discipline ofIntelligence, if not fully, is extensively dependenton technology, as is evident from the meredefinition itself. One of the starting points inSIGINT is Signal detection, i.e. to know whetherthe signal/communication exists and subsequentlyto find the location of the transmitter and thereceiver. This process is extensively aided by set ofreceivers for particular frequencies of interest, incases where there is information about frequencyof interest, else usually by, the analysis of powertransmitted on primary or sideband frequenciesusing a spectrum analyzer.Figure 3: Spectrum Analyzer display for RF analysis. 19Source: Tektronix Data Sheets for RSA3300B Series.Similarly, another key component of SIGINTincludes direction finding. Here againtechnologies such tunable directional antennasand large omnidirectional arrays, such as theWullenweber, can be used for multipoint signalarrival time measurment and GPS correlationmethod for precise time synchronization. Apartfrom the above, COMINT or CommunicationIntelligence dealing with interception of voice,text etc. use techniques such as Automaticcomputation of session key (Kc) in real time forA5/1 and A5/2 algorithms, without disclosingtraces to subscribers; Invisible active interceptof A5/1, A5/2 and A5/0 GSM conversation;Full targeted recording through TMSI, IMSIand IMEI identification; multi-channel tunableCDMA Monitoring system operating at 450MHz,850MHz and 1900MHz CDMA band forinterception of voice conversation, Text Messageand service channel information automaticallyform the CDMA IS-95A, IS-95B and CDMA 2000-1x networks 20 ; and so on.In terms of Direction finding and location tracingof adversary, RF transmitters technologies basedon Single channel Direction finder involvingmulti-antenna array with a single channelradio receiver with amplitude, phase andhybrid comparison; Pseudo-doppler technique;Watson-Watt / Adcock antenna array; andCorrelative interferometer etc. are extensivelyemployed. Other sub disciplines of SIGINTwhich are extensively dependent on technologyinclude FISINT (Foreign Instrumentation SignalsIntelligence) and TELINT (Telemetry Intelligence)based extensively on collection and analysis ofsensor information from enemy weapon systemsand Air borne platforms.1.1.3 Measurement and SignatureIntelligence (MASINT)“It measures and identifies battle space entitiesvia multiple means, that are difficult to spoof andit provides intelligence that confirms the moretraditional sources, but is also robust enoughto stand with spectrometry to differentiatebetween paint and foliage, or recognizing radardecoys, because the signal lacks unintentionalcharacteristics of the real radar system. “William K. Moore 21As defined by William Moore, MASINT is atechnologically intensive intelligence gatheringsub-discipline, which relies extensively onInformation gathering from various technologicalsensors/systems such as Airborne Electro-OpticalSensors;(Figure 4) Infrared; Optical Measurementof Nuclear Explosions; LASER based sensors;Spectroscopic sensors; Hyper spectral Imagery;Space-based Staring Infrared Sensors; Nuclearsensors involving Radiation surveys anddosimeter on airborne and space based platforms;Space-based Nuclear Energy Detection;Geophysical sensors for detecting undergroundfacilities/bunkers such as the Weather and SeaThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 97

Intelligence sensors, Acoustic Sensors; Seismic,Magnetic Sensors based on Magnetic AnomalyDetection using scalar and vector magnetometersfor detection of buried weapon systems andminefields; Gravitimetric Sensors involvingSuperconducting Quantum Interference Devicegradiometer; Radar, such as Line-of-Sight Radar,Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)(Figure 5),BoomSAR using an ultra-wideband low-frequencySAR for validating electromagnetic models anddevelop target detection algorithms and InverseSynthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR), involving Non-Cooperative Target Recognition, Multi-static andPassive Covert Radar with one of the primaryaims of Coherent change detection; and othersensors involving analysis of CBRN Materials,such as non-dispersive infrared analyzer and gaschromatographs coupled to mass spectrometersand surface acoustic wave technology basedChemical Agent Detecor for Chemical Explosivesand IED detection; Biological warfare sensorsinvolving Analytical methods such ELISA,Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), Liquidchromatography-mass spectrometry (LC-MS),and high performance liquid chromatography(HPLC).PLATFORM SENSOR RANGE (meters)P-3 EO/IR 75000P-3 SAR 200000RC-135 SIGINT 300000RQ-1 EO/IR 50000RQ-1 SAR 200000RQ-4 EO/IR 75000RQ-4 SAR 200000RQ-4 SIGINT 300000U-2 EO/IR 100000U-2 SAR 250000U-2 SIGINT 4000001.1.4 Open source intelligence (OSINT)Figure 4: Electro Optical(Left above) and IR (Rightabove based MASINT Images.22Source : Freye Jeffreyt, Naval Postgraduate School USFigure 5: Synthetic Aperture Radar SAR(left above)based MASI NT Image and Airborneplatforms with Sensor range (Right above). 23Source: Freye Jeffrey t, Naval Postgraduate School US.“95% of the information an enterprise needs canbe acquired through open means”.Henry Stiller,Direetor General of Histen RillerAs referred by Henry Stiller, one of thecontemporary changes with intelligence setup) iswith respect to the vast amount ot informationin open domain. With the use of the Internet,people around the world are extensively sharinginformation on the net, and in most of the cases,potential adversaries utilize it for orchestratingtheir nefarious designs. In view of thisphenomenon, a new sub-discipline is extensivelyemerging, which is known as the Open SourceIntelligence (OSINT). This sub discipline reliesextensively on open media such as the news,blogs, social media such as Twitter, Facebook,YouTube etc., online forums, chat rooms andso on (Figure 6).98The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Figure 6: Open Source Information on A1 Qaeda and affiliate terroristOrganizations on websites (Bottom left: regarding IED makingtechniques, Bottom Right: Radical comments posting alongwith planning etc.), YouTube, Facebook (Radical Material andrecruitment information) etc.This vast amount of information, in most of thecases, holds the key to a potential crime whichthe only challenge is to extract these in patternsfrom this plethora of information. Here again,technology is playing the key role in extractingthese patterns almost equivalent to the extractionof a needle in a haystack. The first step is toextract target information from the internet/otheropen sources, one of the key technologies usedin it is, crawler engine (Figure 7).Figure 7: Social Network analysis of Al Qaeda and affiliate terroristOrganizations. Source: FMS Advanced Systems Group 24The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 99

This is in principle, an autonomous program whichcrawls the interconnected web of information,subsequently indexing them using techniquessuch as Suffix tree with linear time lookup, Invertedindex with atomic search criterion, Citationindex with Bibliometrics, Ngram indexing,Document-term matrix etc. 25 Then techniquessuch as tokenization, Document parsing,natural language processing, word boundarydisambiguation, tagging, text segmentation,content analysis, text analysis, text mining,concordance generation, speech segmentation,lexical analysis are used to convert them intological elements. 26 These elements, which byusing statistical techniques such as correlation,factor analysis, and time series analysis alongwith ontology 27 and taxonomy involving creationof Individuals instances, Classes, Attributes,Relations, Function terms, Restrictions, Rule,Axioms and Events, are subsequently usedto generate models, with the primary goal ofsemantic extraction of patterns (Figure 7). Thesemodels and patterns when corroborated withother sources of information, in most of the cases,actually point to credible intelligence and if notthen, a suitable starting point for the next phaseof intelligence gathering.1.1.5 Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT)and Imagery intelligence (IMINT)Geospatial intelligence is an intelligence gatheringsub-discipline which involves the analysis ofgeospatial information and imagery with respectto Geographically referenced adversary activities.GEOINT involves spatial and imaging technologiessuch as photogrammetry which is based on opticsand projective geometry and uses algorithms suchas Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm; Cartography;Remote sensing involving passive remote sensorssuch as film photography, infrared, chargecoupleddevices, and radiometers and Activesensors such as RADAR like Interferometricsynthetic aperture radars, Laser altimeters,Radiometers, photometers, LiDAR, multi-spectraland hyperspectoral sensors; Terrain Analysis; andStereo-photogrammetry, with feeds from sensorssuch as the SPOT6and7 Satellites producingAutomatic orthoimage with location accuracy of10 m; simultaneous acquisition of panchromaticand multispectral imagery of 1.5 m panchromatic(0.455 [im - 0.745 [im) 6 m multispectral, 4bands: blue (0.455 [im - 0.525 [im), green (0.530[im - 0.590 [im), red (0.625 [im - 0.695 [im), nearinfrared(0.760 [im - 0.890 [im), Pan-sharpened:1.5-m colour merge combining panchromaticand four multispectral bands 28 ; Digital ElevationTerrain Models; Map Projection systems anddatum analysis; GPS and GNSS Mashups; SpatialDatabases; and Applied Multivariate StatisticalAnalysis.1.2 Phase 2: Intelligence Analysis andTechnology“One of the effects of living with electricinformation is that we live habitually in a state ofinformation overload. There’s always more thanyou can cope with.”-Marshall McLuhanIntelligence analysis is on of the most criticalphase of the intelligence cycle, as it is the process,which extracts tangible results in the form ofactionable input, by correlating and analyzinginformation under certain context, for a necessaryobjective. Technology plays a key role in enablingintelligence analysts by providing mechanisms toextract patterns. One of the first step in this phaseis in regard to collaboration of information in acommon grid i.e. the data fusion, for generatingcollaborative frame works. This involves highlycustomized data warehouses for different typesof data such as text, web and semantic data,SIGINT data, geo referencing of maps, images,spatial data involving normalization of coordinatesystems, projections, datum etc. and infusion ina spatial MIS based GIS interface as subsequentfeeder to analytical reasoning modules.Once it is achieved, the next process involvesKnowledge management, analytical reasoningand pattern extraction tools and technologies,which are used so as to enhance the Intelligenceanalysis and include modeling tools based onColored Petri nets algorithms; Influence netsthat can be used for modeling and analysis ofeffects based operations; temporal modeling andanalysis critical incidents, events/activities ofinterest to identify hidden patterns of temporalrelations; Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents;Cultural Adversarial Game Engines; BayesianBelief Networks and influence diagrams;graphical decision- theoretic model CausalAnalysis based on uncertain causal reasoningfor forecasting (uncertain prediction of future100The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

events) and inference from evidence (analysisof how observation of modeled events changeboth our future forecasts, and our understandingof events in the past); Predictive EnvironmentGeneration along with statistical techniques suchas correlation, factor analysis, and time seriesanalysis. 29Subsequent to the construction of the specifiedmodels for pattern extraction, a key requirement,which emerges, is the visual analysis of theproduced data (Figure 8}. The visual analysisof these models makes it easier for the analystto comprehend the granular details andsubsequently exacting valuable intelligenceout of the plethora of data, by correlating itwith the context and the objective of the wholeintelligence cycle. Here again, visual analysistechnologies play a critical role.Figure 8: Multi-source fusion of information and extraction of patterns along withvisual analysis as an aid to conventional Intelligence analysis.30Source: Green Tim, “Mumbai terrorist attack”, Visual analysis, 10th February 2009, Updatedon 24th March 2012, Version 1.2 GSA 2009, Available at: www.visualanalysis.com1.3 Phase 3: Intelligence Disseminationand Technology“Information can tell us everything. It has all theanswers. But they are answers to questions wehave not asked, and which doubtless don’t evenarise.”-Jean BaudrillardThe final phase of the intelligence cycle is withregard to dissemination of intelligence to thedecision makers, hence completing the completecycle. Here again, technology plays a critical role,especially by providing secure and survivablenetworks for dissemination of information basedon the premise of confidentiality, availability,non-repudiation and integrity. 31 In order toThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 101

achieve this, multi-redundant networks shouldbe designed with strong Encryption systemspreferably mil grade 512 bit key symmetricencryption, accompanied with strong multi-factorauthentication, preferably biometric system.This should be accompanied with Intrusiondetection/prevention systems, Proxy integratedGateway firewalls, Network behavior analyzers,UTM, Application sandboxes, Integritymanagement systems with event logging, secureoperating system specifically hardened for highgrade security, disk encryption systems, hardwareconfiguration management/alert systems, dateware houses with disaster management systemsalong with multi redundant active-activemode high availability clusters etc. 32 All thesemechanisms will ensure a multi level securitysystem with integrated survivability mechanismssupporting a secure intelligence disseminationsystem. Although, survivability and security arethe key requirements in this phase, the aestheticsare again a critical component especially inthe visual representation of information to thedecision makers. These visual systems should haveback correlation and linkages to all the phases ofintelligence cycle, which may be required duringthe final briefing to the decision maker. Also, thesystem for dissemination should have a feedbackloop, which may induce the strategic directivesand necessary comments to intelligence cycle forfurther refining the information. All of the aboveare extensively technology driven processes,thus reiterating the fact that technology is a vitalcomponent in every arena of Intelligence.2. CONCLUSION“Intelligence is an intellectual process. Regardlessof the means by which it is collected, the ultimateproduct is the result of smart people ponderingwhat is known, what is unknown and trying todetermine what it all means.”Mark Lowenthal 33As referred by Dr. Lowenthal, Intelligence is anintellectual process, which ultimately relies onthe intelligence of the man behind the machine.Technology can enable this person by acting as aforce multiplier, thus enhancing his productivityand capacity to handle information, thus enablinghim to identify answers to the question, which initself is unknown. This paper has beyond doubtproven the fact that technology plays and willplay, a critical role in every aspect of intelligencecycle i.e. the Intelligence gathering; intelligenceanalysis and intelligence dissemination; andin a way has revolutionized the way in which,intelligence as an intellectual process has evolved.The impact of technology in the various disciplinesof intelligence such as Human Intelligence(HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT),Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), Measurementand Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Imageryintelligence (IMINT), Open source intelligence(OSINT) etc. is without any doubt indelible. Theauthor predicts that, as technology is evolving,the discipline of intelligence will also evolveto a level where technology would become aninseparable component that will metamorphosefrom a tactical force multiplier to a strategicenabler.REFERENCE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY1Sun Tzu Sun Tzu translated Griffith Samuel B, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).2Kautilya translated by Rangarajan L.N, The Arthashastra, (New Delhi: Penguin Classics,1992).3Carl Von Clausewitz Translated by Matthijs Jolles, On War (New York: Random House, 1943).4Jomini, Antoine-Henri, translated by Col. S.B. Holabird, Treatise on Grand Military Operations: or A Criticaland Military History of the Wars of Frederick the Great as Contrasted with the Modern System, (New York:D. van Nostrand, 1865).5Machiavelli Niccolo, The Prince -De Principatibus / Il Principe (Florence: Antonio Blado d’Asola, 1532).6Sun Tzu Sun Tzu translated Griffith Samuel B, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).7Henry l. Stimson Center, New Information and Intelligence Needs in the 21st Century ThreatEnvironment,(Washington: Henry l. Stimson center, September 2008);8Henry l. Stimson Center, New Information and Intelligence Needs in the 21st Century ThreatEnvironment,(Washington: Henry l. Stimson center, September 2008);102The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

9North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Standardization Agency, NATO glossary of terms and definitions,AAP 6-2004,10Secrets of the spies,11http://www.eyespymag.com/SECRETS%20OF%20THE%20SPIES.pdf (Accessed on 10-09-2012)12Stallings William, Cryptography And Network Security, (New Delhi: Pearson Education, 2006).13Morgan T,” Secure satellite communication and beacon tracking device”, Technologies for HomelandSecurity, 2009 HST ‘09. IEEE Conference 11-12 May 2009, pp188-19214Johnson, Neil F., Duric Zoran, Jajodia Sushil, Information Hiding: Steganography and Watermarking-Attacksand Countermeasures Steganography and Watermarking - Attacks and Countermeasures (Massachusetts:Springer, 2001).15Zander S, Armitage G, Branch P, “A Survey of Covert Channels and Countermeasures in Computer NetworkProtocols”, IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, 3rd Quarter 2007, Volume: 9, Issue: 3, pp. 44-5716Based on author’s experience of using Hushmail.17Siegel Ronald, Intoxication: The Universal Drive for Mind-Altering Substances, (Vermont: Park StreetPress,2005).18Onathan Cummins, Patrick Diskin, Samuel Lau and Robert Parlett, Steganography And Digital Watermarking,School of Computer Science, The University of Birmingham,2004.19US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military andAssociated Terms, Available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (Accessed on 10-09-2012)20Tektronix Data Sheets for RSA3300B Series.21CDMA IS-95A and CDMA 2000 1X Interception and Logging System by Shogi Communications. http://shoghi.com.br/cdma_is_95a.htm22Moore William K, “MASINT: new eyes in the battlespace”, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin,March, 2003.23Freye Jeffrey t, Design of experiment and analysis for the joint dynamic allocation of fires and sensors(JADAFS) simulation,( CALIFORNIA: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, 2007). 23Freye Jeffrey t, Designof experiment and analysis for the joint dynamic allocation of fires and sensors JADAFS) simulation,(CALIFORNIA: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, 2007).24Sentinel Visual Analyzer, FMS Advanced Systems GroupAvailable at http://www.fmsasg.com/fmsasg/SocialNetworkAnalysis/ (Accessed on 10-092012)25Golliher Sean A, “Search Engine Ranking Variables and Algorithms “, semj.org volume 1, supplementalissue, august2008.26Kao Anne and Poteet Steve, Natural Language Processing and Text Mining, (London: Springer, 2006).27Holsapple, Handbook of Knowledge Management, (New York: Springer, 2003).28“SPOT 6and7 products: the right balance between high resolution and large-area coverage”, Astrium EADS,Availaible at http://www.astrium-geo.com/en/147-spot-6-7 (Accessed on 10-092012)29Intelligence analysis tools and theories at intelligence gateway US Air force University http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-ntel.htm#tools30Green Tim, “Mumbai terrorist attack”, Visual analysis, 10th February 2009, Updated on 24th March 2012,Version 1.2 GSA 2009Available at www.visualanalysis.com (Accessed on 10-092012)31Qia YiJoshi James,Tipper David and Krishnamurthy Prashant, Information Assurance: Dependability andSecurity in Networked Systems-Morgan Kaufmann series(Burlington: Elsevier,2008).32Stallings William, Cryptography And Network Security, (New Delhi: Pearson Education, 2006).33Dr. Mark Lowenthal is an author and Adjunct Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs,Columbia University. Lowenthal has written five books and over 90 articles or studies on intelligence andnational security.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 103

Window into the World ofIntelligenceShri M.K. Rathindran, IPS (Retd.)As I proceeded to join IB Headquarters on ahot summer day in May, 1967, the magnificentstructures of North and South Blocks of the CentralSecretariat, silhouetted in the distance seemedparticularly awe-inspiring. Having crossed the NorthBlock, I walked in the direction of the South Block.Behind me the words “Liberty will not descend toa people. People must raise themselves to Liberty.It is a blessing that must be earned before it canbe enjoyed”, stood out from the façade of NorthBlock. Very queer, I thought. Wasn’t liberty one’sbirth right ! Even after 20 years of independence,why should such imperialist slogans be allowed toremain, I thought to myself as I journeyed throughthe labyrinthine corridors of the huge building toreport to the AD/Establishment. Herbert Barker’s“Seat of Government”, described by later daycommunists as the ‘citadel of reaction’, was indeeda very imposing one and housed all the importantministries.Fresh from the spoilt comforts of district life,joining the lB was a harsh revelation. Without thetrappings of any authority or any material help,one felt quite lost in the colourless anonymity ofDelhi life. The lB Training School was situatedin a distant area in Anand Parbat, housed in arather dilapidated building. The training wasprofessional and we familiarized ourselves inthe various nuances of Intelligence Trade Craft,walking through the back alleys of Ajmal KhanRoad on various surveillance exercises. Aftertwo months of training, we were posted atHeadquarters, and I was thrilled to be included ina group headed by Shri R N Kao. The training inhis group was a very elaborate affair and includedtours to 5 states, including the newly emergedNaxalbari. Finally, I was given the charge of adesk and was privileged to share a room withShri M K Narayanan.Analyzing endless reports, culling the essenceand finding trends, was no ordinary task. All thisrequired a great deal of time and we, very soon,got into the habit of sitting late in office. Fridaymeetings were particularly interesting when allofficers got together to review developments ofthe week. Soon after, I was sent for the AdvancedCourse in Mount Abu. I returned in January 1968.The lB, soon after, was bifurcated and moved toNorth Block, while the RAW remained in SouthBlock itself. Here as well, I had the privilege ofsharing a room with Shri Narayanan.Shri B N Mullick had retired in 1964, after aterm of 14 years as DIB and had been replacedby Shri S.P. Verma, an IG from Bihar. Even in1967, the shadow of Mr Mullick still lurked inthe corridors of the lB, where he had stridden likea colossus. Shri M M L Hooja, who presided overthe dissolution of the lB empire in 1968, wasably assisted by his second in command, Shri A KDave. Things were very difficult and the relationswith the new organisation, RAW were strained.Apart from bifurcating some of the border SIBs,reallocating personnel, division of assets etccaused many difficulties. Shri A K Dave was abrilliant and impressive Police officer who hada style of his own. His subordinates disliked himfor his treatment of juniors. In fact, when it wasrumoured that Shri Dave was returning to the lBfrom his tenure as Director, ARC, early in 1968,two conflicting groups of officers sought divineintervention regarding Shri Dave’s posting. Onthe one hand, officers in the ARC who wantedto see him go early, were breaking coconutsat the famous Ganesh Temple in Trivandrum,even while officers of the lB were also offeringcoconuts at the same temple, to ensure that ShriDave did not come back to the lB. Needless tosay, the impassioned pleas of the ARC officerswere more than a match to those of the lB, and104The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

Shri Dave was posted back to the lB. He laterresigned from service in 1972 and joined theITC, which he headed with great distinction for anumber of years.The IB, shorn of its international burden, became avery compact unit with only about 5 JDs, a dozenDeputy and Jt. Dy. Directors and about 2 dozenADs. The Outstation posts were usually mannedby ClOs. The general atmosphere for the ADs inthe IB was never riddled with tensions and stresses,despite the unending demands made on it. Sinceat the senior level, practically all the officersbelonged to the IPS, there was never any cause forjealousy or bickering. Even senior officers neverpulled rank in dealing with subordinates andthere was general informality, quite unknown touniformed service, which prevailed most of thetime. Frayed tempers, shouting at subordinatesetc. were unheard of. This surprisingly nevercaused any insubordination or situations ofindiscipline. Work was never discussed publicly,while the lunch clubs in each building gaveopportunities for officers to congregate duringlunch and indulge in banter. This helped builda camaraderie, seldom witnessed in any Policeorganisation. The average lB officer was alsoa shade different from his counterpart in thedistricts, and could be credited with having anintellectual bent of mind.With Headquaters work becoming a little stifling,and the lure of the borders captivating me, Iopted to go to Leh, which was considered asone of the most difficult stations. Leh, where Iremained posted for 2½ years, turned out to bethe best and most challenging assignment of mylife. Apart from looking after the lB work andcheck posts, I was also the Area Organiser ofthe SSB, AD/ARC and Incharge of the CRP. TheITBP also came within my operational control.Working closely with the Army and the AirForce, travelling to the furthermost remote areas,right from the Karakoram pass through the snowywilderness and seeing the grandeur of the highpeaks and lakes, one really came to like this life.Motoring through some of the highest passes inthe world, playing Polo and Cricket at sub zerotemperatures and wading through half frozenrivulets of Indus, became highlights, which oneremembers even to this day with nostalgia.For the check post personnel, particularlythose who were posted in the Northern sector,things were really tough and survival itselfwas a triumph. The posts were located abovel6,000 thousand feet and the temperatures werebelow -40 degrees centigrade. Even though Ihad completed my tenure by Sept 1971, I wasasked to continue in Leh, since a war withPakistan was imminent. Ladakh has areas opento both Pakistan and China and while there waslittle Chinese activity on the Tibet side duringthe December war, things became difficult inJanuary 1972. The Chinese used to come closeto Demchok post and fire mortars in the directionof our post. While there was enough justificationfor withdrawing from this area, our boys hungon, saving the embarrassment of withdrawal andwere duly rewarded later. On the Pakistan side,the infantry division based in Leh had tremendoussuccess across the LoC. When the ceasefire wasannounced, all the top brass of the Army and theAirforce in Leh were present for a gala victorydinner that night at the lB mess.One of the most remarkable experiences inLeh was the time I acquired two snow leopardcubs. I bought these pets from a local villager.They were of the size of two small kittens andproved to be good company to my one year olddaughter. Unfortunately, one of them died anda problem soon arose, since it was against thelaw to keep such rare wild animals in the house.Therefore, I dispatched the cub to one of theforward check posts, where it grew up to be amagnificent animal with a long bushy tail. Shewas very friendly, particularly with one of ourdhobis who used to look after her. To escape theclutches of the law, I then hit upon a plan. ThePrime Minister Mrs. Gandhi was visiting Leh andI chose the opportunity to discuss the presentingof the snow leopard to Mrs. Gandhi. I spoke toMr Dutt, JD Security, accompanying the PM, whochecked with her and told me to bring the cub toDelhi for presentation.So “Lucy”, one of the rarest snow or cloudedleopards in captivity was brought to Delhi in ajonga along with my dhobi. Lucy spent one nightin my brother’s apartment in Bengali marketand the next morning I took her to one of the lBoffices in Akbar Road to pick up my friend RattanSehgal, who had agreed to accompany me toThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 105

the PM’s house. I opened Rattan’s office doorleading Lucy on a chain. On seeing the Leopard,Rattan was so bewildered that he made a suddenleap and stood on his table. The leopard notknowing what the fuss was all about, also madea mighty leap and landed on the same table andto the relief of everyone, started licking him. AtPM’s house, Mrs. Gandhi told me that as muchas she would love to keep Lucy, it would not bepossible and that she would have to give it tothe Delhi Zoo. The Zoo Director was summonedand a presentation ceremony was held. In laterdays, I used to go and visit Lucy in her cage at theZoo. In summer months, she would be sent offto Shimla. Lucy unfortunately did not survive forlong and left behind fond memories.In the summer of 1972, I was posted to SIBTrivandrum, indeed a model SIB, which I headedfor almost 10 years, in two stints. Each districtwas headed by a DCIO with a complement oflower staff. Since the whole State was compact,every nook and corner was covered by the lB.Intelligence work was of a very high quality andthere were very few gaps in coverage. Mr Mullickhad ensured that top quality officers were availableto the State during the communist rule and so,a galaxy of people like S/Shri A.C.N. Nambiar,Raveendran, M K Narayanan and GopalakrishnaMenon were Incharge right from 1955. The lB’spresence in the State was far reaching and wedid not function in complete secrecy. The termCentral Intelligence was widely known and itcarried a certain degree of awe. So much so, thatwhen our DCIO’s house in Calicut was burgled bycommon thieves, the Deshabhimani, the MarxistParty’s mouthpiece headlined the event on itsfront page as “Ants eat through burning coals”.That is to say that the fortress of an organisationconsidered impregnable and unassailable wastrespassed into by ordinary mortals.The politics of Kerala had always been hyper subtleand tortuous and even a minor event could rockthe fragile coalition, frequently functioning witha wafer-thin majority. In the State, the lB officeralso functioned as an Adviser to the Governor.Armed with the power of precise intelligence,the CIO could use his clout to get many thingsdone.In 1975, as part of an arrangement between theSecretary RAW and DIB, some lB officers of therank of ADs were sent to the RAW for a five- yearterm in order to be posted abroad. I was selectedfor the honour. Accordingly, I joined the RAWand was sent off on a posting to the middle East.This experiment of taking officers from the lB forforeign postings, however, did not last, largelybecause the RAW did not want to fill up theirforeign posts with lB officers. The experienceof living in a foreign country as a diplomatunder cover and doing intelligence work wasvery exciting. On return from the RAW, I wasearmarked to be sent to the NDC. But before Icould join the NDC, I was asked to proceed toTrivandrum since some important intelligenceoperations were taking place there. Even thoughI regretted missing out the NDC, the tenure atTrivandrum was very rewarding professionally.I continued at Trivandrum for another 7 years,before I got my promotion and came to Delhi asJoint Director.After Shri Hooja, Shri Atma Jairam had takenover as DIB. His close friendship with Mr Kao,brought the two organisations very close. ShriJairam was followed by Shri S.N. Mathur whowas succeeded by Shri Rajeshwar, who broughtabout a lot of reforms and turned the lB into acrack efficient outfit.In 1987, Shri M K Narayanan took over as DIB. Thiswas a particularly interesting phase in lB’s history.With Rajiv Gandhi, who was very interestedin the functioning of Intelligence agencies, lB’srelations with the PM came on a different footingaltogether. The young PM was impressed withthe “fine mind” of the new DIB and promisedall help. The lB Centenary was celebrated thefollowing year with all the SIBs holding seminarsand ensuring the presence of Governors, CMsand intellectuals at these functions. At lB Hqrs,the PM spent an entire day meeting senior andjunior officers, visiting the Control Room, goinginto the technical possibilities of intelligencework and having tea with a wide cross section oflB employees. He also attended a dinner at theDIB’s house later that evening. At an impressivemeeting in Vigyan Bhawan earlier in the day,attended by all the top political and bureaucraticelite, Rajiv Gandhi said that no intelligenceagency could function on bureaucratic lines. Hewanted the lB to break out of its bureaucraticmould and become a true intelligence agency.106The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

He even suggested separate pay scales for theIB, promising every help. Unfortunately mostof his promises could not be fulfilled, since helost power soon after. Thanks to the PM, thelB’s resources soon improved radically and theorganisation itself became an efficient and eliteone. During Shri M.K. Narayanan's, term, thelB’s stock soared to dizzy heights.In 1987, I had assumed the charge of JD atHeadquarters. Twenty years after my Ladakhposting, the border fever persisting, I volunteeredto go to Shillong in 1989. JD, Shillong had thecharter of looking after the seven sisters (at thattime Sikkim was not included) and the longborder with Burma, Bangladesh and Tibet. With alarge territory which involved hours of travellingby chopper, there never was a dull moment. TheMizo insurgency had died down but Nagaland,Tripura and Manipur were in ferment.In 1990, the Ulfa movement peaked and asexpected all hell broke loose in Assam. In the wakeof a break down of the law and order machinery,President’s Rule was imposed. ‘OperationBajrang’ by the Army was carried out and thoughthe Ulfa movements were restricted, it was onlyafter the next Operation Rhino that near normalcywas restored. But throughout 1990, one lived inthe shadow of unprecedented violence. Murders,kidnapping, etc. were resorted to in front of thePolice Stations. The lB was at the top of Ulfa’s hitlist and travelling became a big problem. Two ofour junior officers were also kidnapped and onlyone of them could be saved.After I left Shillong and returned to Delhi in1991, the Army requested for my servicesduring 'Operation Rhino’, and once again I hadto return to Guwahati for a short while. Thereason was that I had good relations with theArmy and during ‘Operation Bajrang’, I hadeven persuaded lB Headquarters to supplementthe Corps Intelligence operations with somebadly needed funds. In those hard days, onenever thought of separate organisations, but lenta helping hand towards achieving a commoncause. The two years spent in the North East werehectic and rewarding. One traversed the far flungidyllic spots all along the borders, studying thevast panorama of India with its vastly differentgeography and ethnicity.In 1990, Shri M.K. Narayanan was transferred asChairman JIC and Shri Joshi took over as DIB.The next year, however, Shri Narayanan returnedas DIB and continued till his retirement. Buthis stewardship of the IB continued for severalyears even after his retirement. As advisor to thePM and later as National Security Advisor, ShriNarayanan maintained close links with the lB.The lB will always remain beholden to him forhis guidance.Part of the charm in having been in the lB is thevaried kind of jobs one got to learn. On return fromShillong, I was allotted the counter intelligenceportfolio. Catching spies was a very rewardingwork and perhaps there was nothing as satisfyingas seeing your target finally being nabbed, aftera testing time. In this, you had to pit your brainsagainst some of the very clever and experiencedintelligence officers in various Embassies, whowere using vastly superior gadgets. Very often,the good work of the counter intelligencedepartments could not be publicized due todiplomatic niceties and protocol. However, whenIndian agents were involved, the press alwaysgot a chance to mention it. This is one aspectof lB work, where the credit always is given tothe local Police. Some years later, as AdditionalDirector (Operations), we had several successesagainst Pak terrorist modules, who were nabbedby the Delhi Police at our instance. Though thelB’s contribution is always recognized by theGovernment and a few knowledgeable circles,the credit is always given to the local Police.This is part of the lB work profile and nobodygrudges it. As head of the CI unit, we had somememorable successes, particularly against somediplomats of Western countries in Delhi, whohad targeted the lB.I recall an interesting incident about the activitiesof an extremist organisation. In May 1992, theMinistry of Defence, which was expecting aconsignment of missiles and other militaryhardware from Russia, informed the lB thatalong with the defence cargo, a consignmentof 20,000 AK-47 rifles and 30 million roundsof ammunition, which was never indented forby MoD, was arriving at the port of Cochin.The consignment had been fully paid for and$4 million had been transferred through someSwiss banks and manifested as defence cargo forthe Ministry of Defence. Since the whole thingThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 107

was very suspicious, the MoD wanted the lB toinvestigate. The ship was expected to berth inCochin the next day. That very night, I led a teamof lB officers and reached Cochin. Without takingeither the Navy, Coastguard or the Customs intoconfidence, we decided to wait for the claimantof the consignment. The ship, “Bratislava”,berthed on the morning of May 18 and someof our officers, posing as Customs officials wenton board and examined the packages. Theconsignment was unloaded along with the otherdefence cargo while we waited.Even after 48 hours of unobtrusive watch, noone came to claim the packages. We thenopened up some packages, satisfied ourselvesthat it contained genuine AK-47 rifles, and thendispatched the entire consignment in two trainsto the Ordnance Depot, Jabalpur, making thedepot richer by $4 million.Our enquiries, subsequently, revealed that thisconsignment, in all probability was meant forthe LTTE. Normally all ships from Russian portscarrying defence cargo would come directly toCochin. In this case the “Bratislava” had dockedin a port near Yemen for 14 days before comingto Cochin. The fact that $4 million had alreadybeen paid by some foreign agency and theMoD stamps and signatures had been forged onthe certificates of origin, clearly indicated thatthere was a foul play. The LTTE was known tohave the capacity for piracy on the high seasand had earlier effected transhipments off theport of Cyprus. In this case, apparently, due tocircumstances beyond their control, the LTTEwas unable to offload the shipment at the Yemenport or in the high seas.One shudders to think what would have happenedif the consignment had fallen into wrong handsand ended up with the extremists or the insurgentgroups. Though no one group had the capacity toabsorb such a huge quantity of arms, it was knownthat groups like ULFA were maintaining linkswith LTTE and could have sought its assistance toprovide the weapons. Our presence at the dockscould have thrown a spanner into the works andblown up their entire plans.At the fag end of my service, I was promoted asSpecial Director and took over the responsibilitiesof VIP security. Work was very routine, thoughfull of anxious moments and often punctuatedwith advance liaison visits abroad to destinationslike South America and other far flung regions.One really saw the world during these visits andwas compensated for an otherwise desultorywork.Though fundamentally a Police Organisation, thelB vastly differs in many ways from other Policeservices in the states. The pandering to authorityis hardly visible and succumbing to politicalpressure is totally absent. Since colleagues arefrom various States, one gradually gets to imbibea culture which is national rather than parochial.The exposure to International developmentsand issues is vast and training courses invarious aspects, of Police and security work aremultifarious. As the premier Police organisation,lB officers are always sent for many trainingcourses. Liaison sessions with foreign Police andsecurity departments are frequent and all thesehelp to broaden the outlook of officers. Beingposted to the far corners of the country also bringsabout a national outlook which is very valuableand vital.Looking back on the years spent in the Bureau,I feel humbled at the opportunities I hadreceived in the lB, the biggest one being theopportunity to travel, study and in some waysto make a difference for the better, in far flungareas of our country. The lB’s active presencein these border regions has always broughtabout a marked change. Many of the Accordsin the region, particularly the Mizo and theTripura ones were the result of, or brokered bythe lB. While ones own life benefitted throughthe valuable “experience” gained, one also hadthe opportunity to make a small difference inthese areas. The lB’s yeoman service to preservethe integrity of the nation must rank as one ofits foremost contributions to this country. Infurtherance of the objectives to preserve thisintegrity, a number of human lives have beenlost and it is to these heroes that I would like topay homage today.108The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue

The Unsung HeroesThe Intelligence Bureau personnel work under a shroud and in a veil of secrecy, their achievementsare not acknowledged publicly. They work without any protection in disturbed areas, infested byinsurgency, terrorism and left wing extremism. The personnel of Intelligence Bureau are deployedahead of the Army in some border posts, and unarmed they keep vigil, being the eyes and ears ofthe Nation.From the frozen heights of the Himalayas to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal andIndian Ocean, and the vast landmass in between, the personnel of the organisation, grapple with thewidest array of challenges from inimical quarters, estranged sections of the society and subversiveelements, committed to causing disruption. In fact, the personnel of Intelligence Bureau, in order toprotect national security have their fundamental rights abridged under Intelligence Organisations(Restrictions of Rights) Act, 1985.The personnel of the Intelligence Bureau, have with unwavering commitment stood to protect thesovereignty and integrity of the nation. Unknown to many the Intelligence Bureau personnel haveoffered the Supreme Sacrifice for the Nation and continue to remain unsung and unknown martyrs.The Martyrs from Intelligence Bureau, who sacrificed their today for our tomorrow are.....Name Rank/Designation Date of MartyrdomInato Sumi S.A. NARamprakash Constable September 19, 1965Phendo Constable September 19, 1965Ningey Constable September 19, 1965Sapula Constable January 1, 1968C.K. Francis Constable August 2, 1969Loktsu S.A. January 30, 1970Sonam Topden JIO-I January 1, 1971Yogendra Jha S.A. April 24, 1971Megh Nath Banerjee ACIO-II/G September 1, 1971Bhaben Saikya JIO-I/G May 17, 1973Anant Kumar ACIO-II January 1, 1974B.P. Singh JIO-I/G January 1, 1974The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 109

Name Rank/Designation Date of MartyrdomMam Chander ACIO-II/G June 23, 1982Satish Kumar Varma ACIO-II/G June 2, 1983Phu Dorjee ACIO-I/G May 26, 1986Gurnam Singh JIO-I/G December 1, 1987Bhupen Das S.A. March 29, 1989Krishan Gopal ACIO-I/G January 9, 1990R.N.P. Singh ACIO-I/G January 31, 1990M.L. Bhan ACIO-II/G January 15, 1990Jasbir Singh JIO-II/G February 11, 1990T.K. Razdan ACIO-I/WT February 12, 1990Nachattar Singh JAD June 4, 1990Bijit Debnath S.A. June 28, 1990Md. Rafiq Rather S.A. July 10, 1990A.K. Saikia JIO-II/G December 26, 1990C.T. Chandi JIO-II/G September 10, 1991R.B. Chetri JIO-II/G June 11,1991S.S. Pandey ACIO-II/G May 1, 1994Yeheto Sema JIO-I-/G December 12, 1994K.T.C. Nunga S.A./G May 3, 1995A.D. Sharma ACIO-II July 19, 1995Krishan Lal Sharma ACIO-II/G October 17, 1996Katoshe Yeptho S.A./G November 26, 1996Chandra Sekar Mandal JIO-II/MT February 17, 1997Birendra Nath Medak A.D. September 3, 1997Soumitra Kumar Das JIO-I/WT February 16, 2000Dawa Sherpa JIO-I/G September 24, 2005Vinod Kumar JIO-I/WT April 12, 2006110The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue