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unseemly rivalry, separate Detective Departmentfor Calcutta Police was created in 1909, and aseparate Special Branch, in 1911. To differentiatethe Bengal Special Branch from its Calcuttacounterpart, it was named as IntelligenceBranch.The Provincial Special Branches had to improvetheir collection and processing of intelligence inthe face of growing terrorist activities. Though,both the Central and Provincial intelligence usedto work together, often the Central Intelligenceworked as an umbrella agency for the ProvincialBranches. Between 1908 and 1916, there was aspate of dacoities and assassination of lower levelintelligence and CID officers in Bengal, leadingto a crisis of morale and efficiency, as the Indianofficer declined to work in these organisations.Both, Home Member, Reginald Craddock andDirector of Central Intelligence (DCI), CharlesCleveland, were seriously concerned andextended full support to the Indian officers“who have been murdered, ostracized andthreatened.” 29Reginald Craddock expressed similar concernsand condemned the terrorists for “murderinginformers and zealous Criminal InvestigationDepartment officers, supplemented by murderof school masters who have faithfully done theirbest to suppress sedition under their charge.” 30With the moral support and material assistanceof the Central Intelligence, and under theinspiring leadership of Charles Tegart, DIG of theIntelligence Branch, the morale and efficiency ofthe organization was restored.When the Central Intelligence was under severestress, the Special Branches and the CIDsacted in a body to face the situation. On 23rdDecember,1912 Viceroy Hardinge narrowlyescaped death in the bomb attack in Delhi.The intelligence had no information about theexistence of any secret society in North India. TheCentral Intelligence and its Director, Cleveland,came under severe attack for failure to prevent29 Notes in the CIB, dated 4 February, 1916. Quoted by RichardPopplewell, in Intelligence and Imperial Defence, P20930 Memorandum of R.H.Craddock dated 26 February, 1916..Quoted by Popplewell, op..cit. P 208 Craddock referred tothe murder of the Headmaster of Comilla High School onMarch,4,1915 and the Murder of Headmaster Maldah ZillaSchool on January25,1916 by the revolutionary terrorists.the outrage. As the normal investigation failed toproduce any result and the pressure on Clevelandincreased, a special team was formed under DavidPetrie, with 34 Intelligence and CID officersfrom Punjab, UP, Bengal, Bombay and CentralProvinces. Petrie claimed that by March 1913,there was “scarcely a single person all over Indiacapable of being considered as a potential factorin the bomb conspiracy, whose doings have notbeen subjected to careful scrutiny.” 31 When thisteam also failed to show any positive result, evenafter ten months, the Viceroy’s Executive Councilpassed a formal vote of censure on Cleveland.On Harcourt Butler’s advice, Clevelandconsulted Sir Edward Henry 32 , Commissioner,Metropolitan Police, London for lending Englishand French detectives. But Henry, pointingout the constraints of geography, language andpeople for foreign detectives, advised that thelocal detective talents in India were superior toEnglish detectives. It was really embarrassing thatone of the most comprehensive investigationsever launched in India, failed to trace the culprit.Then, after about 14 months, Denham of theSpecial Team and Tegart of Bengal Intelligencesucceeded in identifying the revolutionary groupfrom the remnants of the bombs which explodedin Sylhet, Calcutta, Lahore and Delhi and froma revolutionary leaflet printed in Calcutta andcirculated in the Punjab and UP. All the culpritswere brought to book, except Rash Behari Bose,who could never be arrested. Thereafter, theSecret Service grant of the DCI was doubled from50 thousand rupees to one lakh rupees.The Government having appreciated theusefulness of the intelligence agencies incontaining revolutionary terrorism, especially inBengal, readily sanctioned the creation of DistrictIntelligence Branches in every district of Bengalin 1917, bringing all important localities andendemic areas under intelligence scanner.31 D.Petrie’s note on the investigation of the Delhi Bomb Case.32 Sir Edward Henry was Inspector General of Police, Bengal.While he was district magistrate, Hooghly in the last decadeof the 19th century, two of his subordinate officer namelyHem Chandra Basu and developed the system of study offinger print for identification. The system was tested andfound to be scientific and has since been adopted all overthe world as the most scientific method of identification.Though developed by an Indian, the system has been namedas Henry’s System.16The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue
The agency more and more fine-tuned theirtrade-craft by adopting still more rigorous systemof recruitment and screening of the sources andkeeping them under deep cover. 33 Armed withwide knowledge about the terrorists and theiroutfits, they acquired the ability to influence thegroups and even engineer a split in the group.Thus, the agencies emerged not only as the mostpowerful instruments against the undergroundmovement, but also as advisors to theGovernment in formulating the policy towardsthe revolutionary movement, in particular andthe political movement, in general.The growing influence of the Intelligence andthe Police on the formulation of the Governmentpolicy was criticized not only at the political levelin England but also in the bureaucratic circles, forturning India into a “Police state”. In January,1918,Secretary of State Montague wrote to ViceroyChelmsford, “I have an uneasy feeling that theCID is being used not merely as a great detectiveagency, but as an instrument of Government: thatits activities are too widespread; that it is growingtoo rapidly; that it is convenient but dangerousto govern by means of your police.” Among theIndians, the only significant voice of protest camefrom Rabindranath Tagore, who in 1917 madea scathing criticism of the Government, policeand intelligence in an article, “The Small and theGreat” 34 , read out to hundreds of people beforepublication.The Government’s decision to enact a newlegislation (Rowlatt Act), to take the place of theDefense of India Act,1915, which would lapseafter the World War, was the result of persistentprodding by the Central Intelligence and theIntelligence Branch, Bengal. Two intelligenceofficers namely J.C.Ker, Personal Assistant tothe Director of Central Criminal Intelligence33 Several European and Indian officers contributed significantlyto the development of the ‘craft of intelligence’ in BengalIntelligence Branch. Similarly in the central IntelligenceH.A.Stuart, Charles R. Cleveland, David Petrie, GodfreyDenham, Horace Williamson were some of the pioneers ablyassisted by the Indian officers.34 Tagore wrote,”What kind of statesmanship was this whichcan afford to hand over such youths and boys to the tendermercies of the secret service? And what makes the calamitygreater is that any tender shoot once bitten by the policethrives no longer, and will bear neither flower nor fruit, forthere is poison in their touch.”and Charles Tegart, DIG of Bengal IntelligenceBranch had assisted the Rowlatt Committee fromthe preliminary stage of their investigation tothe drafting of the Bill. The Report and the Billevidently reflected the attitude of the Police andIntelligence to the terrorist movement in thecountry. But, by 1919, public resentment wasso strong against repressive measures that theGovernment had to permanently shelve the Act.The intelligence failed to gauge the depth of publicresentment and the magnitude of the protest,which eventually resulted in the Jallianwalla BaghMassacre in April, 1919. The Indian nationalistmovement and the colonial government hadreached a point of no compromise.5. IN THE TRAIL OF THEREVOLUTIONARIES: INDIANINTELLIGENCE ABROADDuring the War years (1914-1918), the Indianintelligence operatives went to three continentsof Asia, Europe and America following therevolutionary terrorists. As early as in 1908,Stevenson-Moore, Director of Central Intelligencewrote to the Government, “it is quite impossiblefor a group of separate Provincial Secret Service todeal adequately with political conditions of suchextent and character that prevail in India. Thechief centres of the Indian political movementare Calcutta, Lahore, Poona, New York, Paris andperhaps Japan. The chief agitators in these placesare in close connection with each other and thenecessity of secret agents in America and Londonhas recently been brought to notice in lettersfrom London and Dublin.” 35 In pursuit of them,the Central Intelligence sent its operatives to allthese countries. The British had the advantageof unchallenged supremacy on the high seas,colonies in all parts of the globe and aboveall, their expertise in interception, in breakingcodes and recruiting sources and informers,in building up a network for information evenin the countries where they had little politicalauthority or influence. The Indian intelligence,however, aimed at monitoring the activities ofthe revolutionaries and subverting their plans inall the three continents of Europe, America andSouth East Asia.35 Note by Stevenson-Moore dated13th May 1908. Quoted byPopplewell:op. cit, P.70The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 17
Page 1 and 2: The Indian Police JournalOctober -
Page 3 and 4: From the Director’s DeskNew Delhi
Page 5 and 6: 23rd December, 1887: TheJourney beg
Page 7 and 8: Courtesy - National Archives of Ind
Page 9 and 10: The Logo released on the completion
Page 11 and 12: Helmsmen of the IB during thePre-In
Page 13 and 14: SHRI V.G. VAIDYA, IPS(MAR 1992 TO J
Page 15 and 16: “Sleeman sahib ki jai”“No Cri
Page 17 and 18: their life and their problems relat
Page 19 and 20: Settling down of criminal tribes wa
Page 21 and 22: perish. Between 1841 and 1848, anot
Page 23 and 24: In conclusion, I would like to reco
Page 25 and 26: own race alone, had to be withdrawn
Page 27 and 28: a bee in his bonnet” 17 , and abo
Page 29: epresented by Tilak and his followe
Page 33 and 34: US was brewing, one William Hopkins
Page 35 and 36: came under the control of Indian mi
Page 37 and 38: neutralised many efforts by inimica
Page 39 and 40: e published by the Intelligence Bur
Page 41 and 42: As DD (Security), IB, I had occasio
Page 43 and 44: Chhomohlohri, all of them juxtapose
Page 45 and 46: Dormers Building, ShimlaThe Dormers
Page 47 and 48: eforms. Warren Commission, on the a
Page 49 and 50: and systems will increasingly come
Page 51 and 52: violence and destabilisation. This
Page 53 and 54: one develop. The all pervasive cult
Page 55 and 56: etween the states and the centre su
Page 57 and 58: Intelligence Agencies inIndian Demo
Page 59 and 60: Democracies are, today, everywhere
Page 61 and 62: depend substantially on the restrai
Page 63 and 64: Of Pistols and Pigs andthe Old Tidd
Page 65 and 66: it is lovingly caressed hundreds of
Page 67 and 68: Through the Eyes of an IB OfficerSh
Page 69 and 70: an Intelligence agency. He used to
Page 71 and 72: My J&K ExperienceShri R.K. Kapoor,
Page 73 and 74: there. We remained stranded there f
Page 75 and 76: Scaling Himalayan Heights withthe I
Page 77 and 78: proceed to Dungti to supervise the
Page 79 and 80: tour of the White House and Lincoln
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into unconsciousness two hours earl
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which was completed successfully wi
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leaders. This happened around the t
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My Unforgettable Yearsin the North-
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stated that Prakash Singh, Assistan
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take her into confidence. That woul
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Police - Intelligence InterfaceShri
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Shreekant Bapat and I surveyed the
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excellence, dedication and commitme
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Immigration, Inter-State Disputes,
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Observations on India’s State and
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assessments that arose after the ca
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levels. The deficiencies of one par
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of laying a network of useful roads
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Technology in Intelligence-Future S
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These are just some of the aspects
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Figure 6: Open Source Information o
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events) and inference from evidence
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9North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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Shri Dave was posted back to the lB
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He even suggested separate pay scal
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The Unsung HeroesThe Intelligence B
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