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stated that Prakash Singh, Assistant Director,Intelligence had visited their location undercover, that he should not have done that, and thatif the Naga Army personnel had discovered hisreal identity, the consequences would have beendisastrous. In retrospect, I should thank God thatI could come out of the Naga Army camp withmy head still in place (Nagas were earlier a tribeof head-hunters)!Jotsoma RaidThe other unforgettable incident relates to theSecurity Forces’ raid on the Jotsoma camp of theNaga underground in 1968. The Government’spolicy hitherto had been to intercept the incomingor outgoing gangs outside the area covered bythe suspension of operations agreement, thatis in the three mile belt along the internationalborder where the Security Forces’ right to patrolwas recognised. The underground, on the otherhand, moved about with arms and in uniformwith impunity, collected taxes, recruited men,and imported arms from abroad brazenly. It wasobvious that they were abusing the agreementto regroup their ranks and build up their fightingpotential. A more positive approach was calledfor on the part of the Government. It was usheredin by B.K.Nehru, the new Governor of Nagaland,who openly declared that the Government shalltake necessary action to see that “breaches ofcease-fire by the underground are nullified”.The GOC 8 Mountain Division, Maj. Gen. N.C.Rawlley, was also a man of tremendous driveand initiative. This combination of Nehru andRawlley brought about a complete transformationin the situation in Nagaland. The undergroundswere forced to give up their aggressive postureand the fangs and claws of the ‘Naga FederalGovernment’ were for once broken.China had around this time started meddling inthe north-east; the objective being to weakenIndia’s flanks. The first Naga Army gang to China,about three hundred strong, had crossed theTuensang border in November 1966 and wentover to China for training and weapons. It wasled by Thinuselie and Muivah. The gang returnedin January 1968 and dispersed in the Angami,Chakhesang and Ao areas. About two hundredand fifty of them set up a camp in a deep junglenear Jotsoma in the Angami area. Here they werejoined by some other Naga Army personnel also.The total strength, in due course, swelled to aboutfour hundred and fifty.The Government had intelligence about the reentryof the Naga Army gang from China, but itwas in the dark about their exact location. TheGOC was particularly anxious and he asked meto develop information about the exact locationof the China-returned gang. It took me about amonth to get pinpoint information. The gang waslocated near village Jotsoma in the Angami area ofKohima district. A plan of action was thereuponworked in consultation with the GOC 8 MountainDivision. We gave two sources who would leadthe Security Forces’ columns to the camp. TheArmy mobilised about one Brigade strength oftroops to surround and attack the camp.The operation was launched in the early hoursof June 7, 1968. The Security Forces marchedthrough an unfrequented route and weresuccessful in laying siege to the camp. This wasby itself no mean an achievement, in an areawhere intelligence about the movements ofSecurity Forces, more often than not, reached theunderground in advance. However, while thecordon was being laid, one of the hostiles goingfrom the camp to perhaps another village noticedthe movement of troops, and he rushed back toalert the Naga Army personnel. In the next twohours, before the engagement actually began, theunderground hurriedly packed their weapons,and the hard core, including Thinuselie managedto sneak out. One company of the Security Forcesled by Major Biswas walked into an ambush andthey were sprayed with bullets. Several of them,including Major Biswas, fell. A fierce encounterfollowed on the precipitous heights. Sporadicfighting continued on June 8 and 9 also. TheSecurity Forces captured twenty-five Naga Armypersonnel, together with a large quantity ofChinese arms and ammunition. The equipmentseized included 60 mm mortars, 7.62 mm selfloadingrifles with folding bayonets, sten-gunsand .303 rifles. Besides, a substantial volume ofdocuments, papers and diaries, giving conclusiveevidence of the underground’s collusion withChina were recovered.The Jotsoma encounter was militarily not muchof a success. The Indian Army suffered casualties,and though the exact number was never givenThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 75