that <strong>Police</strong> responsibilities can be ‘<strong>of</strong>f-loaded’,in any significant measure, to citizens, or tothe increasingly fashionable panacea <strong>of</strong> privatecorporations, needs to be strongly discouragedamong the <strong>Police</strong> leadership.If the <strong>Police</strong> <strong>and</strong> intelligence apparatus in Indiais to embrace <strong>and</strong> execute its fullest m<strong>and</strong>ate,both State <strong>and</strong> Central agencies will haveto enormously augment their capacities <strong>and</strong>capabilities, <strong>and</strong> learn to pull together. Such aneffort, however, will have to be preceded bya far deeper underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> appreciation,within the <strong>Police</strong> leadership, <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>and</strong>significance <strong>of</strong> intelligence, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> their role inits acquisition <strong>and</strong> employment. The unfortunatereality is that enormous distance has progressivelybeen created between the grassroots <strong>of</strong> law <strong>and</strong>order management <strong>and</strong> the superintending <strong>Police</strong>establishment, <strong>and</strong> this has worked to the abidingdetriment <strong>of</strong> both crime control <strong>and</strong> intelligencework.I recall that, when I got my first District, lessthan 14 years after Independence, I was postedto Naogaon, a communally sensitive District, byHaider Hussain, then IG <strong>of</strong> <strong>Police</strong>. At the SP’sOffice there, I discovered certain old boundrecords in the almirahs. In these, I found the mostdetailed records, including, for instance, the annualhistories <strong>of</strong> dacoities in India, disseminated bythe Intelligence <strong>Bureau</strong>. I also found the volumes<strong>of</strong> weekly intelligence reports sent out by earlierSPs, written in their own h<strong>and</strong>. I found similarrecords in my subsequent posting to Tezpur, withdetailed, h<strong>and</strong> written correspondence between,for instance, the SP <strong>and</strong> the lG, on a range <strong>of</strong>intelligence <strong>and</strong> administrative issues. Over theyears, however, such practices fell into disuse. SPsstopped writing reports in h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> these camenormally to be prepared by subordinate <strong>of</strong>ficers,<strong>of</strong>ten the Inspector who was heading intelligencein the District, <strong>and</strong> were merely corrected <strong>and</strong>signed by the SP, <strong>and</strong> sent on to the DIG CID,who oversaw Intelligence <strong>and</strong> Crime. This wasnot merely a technological shift — with theadvent <strong>of</strong> the typewriter <strong>and</strong> later, the computer— but a major psychological <strong>and</strong> administrativeshift, reducing such tasks to a bureaucraticroutine, <strong>and</strong> snapping the vital link between thesuperintending <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>and</strong> the continuous flows<strong>of</strong> intelligence generated within his jurisdiction.This problem has been further compoundedby the fact that hardly anyone wants to go intothe intelligence system, except to the lB. This isparticularly the difficulty within the lower echelons<strong>of</strong> the State <strong>Police</strong> apparatus, there is extremereluctance among most <strong>of</strong> the subordinate ranksto be posted into the intelligence department.I think the central intelligence system has alsosuffered in some measure as a result <strong>of</strong> the system<strong>of</strong> earmarking <strong>of</strong>ficers to the lB at inception. Ibelieve all <strong>of</strong>ficers must work in the Districts fora substantial tenure. Keeping the lB as a closedhouse has not helped it in its capabilities torecruit intelligence sources <strong>and</strong> develop efficientinformation networks.Another factor that has undermined the quality<strong>of</strong> intelligence is the growing corruption <strong>and</strong>politicization <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Police</strong> Force. No policing <strong>and</strong>intelligence apparatus can perform its functionswith requisite competence, if it is compromisedby corruption, or where its <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>and</strong> personnelare mixed up with the very people they are meantto monitor. Nor can an intelligence system fulfilits m<strong>and</strong>ate if it is constantly looking to pleasepolitical masters by telling them what they wantto hear, rather than what is actually the case; orworse, when the agencies are directly involvedin orchestrating political mischief — somethingneither State nor Central agencies are innocent<strong>of</strong>. On at least some occasions, the consequences<strong>of</strong> this last deviation have been devastatingto the national interest. This was certainly thecase in the initial troubles in Assam <strong>and</strong> inPunjab, for both <strong>of</strong> which the nation has paidan extraordinary price. In the external sphere,the record <strong>of</strong> India’s meddling with the Tamilinsurgency in its early phases in Sri Lanka readsas a cautionary tale against such waywardness.At least in the Sri Lanka case, <strong>and</strong> on the externaldimension, lessons appear to have been learned.On the domestic front, however, the seduction<strong>of</strong> political manipulation through an abuse <strong>of</strong>the intelligence agencies, even to the extremedetriment <strong>of</strong> law, remains great <strong>and</strong> agenciesneed to be watchful <strong>of</strong> the same.It is clear that the intelligence apparatus in India,today, is hobbled by a range <strong>of</strong> defects <strong>and</strong>infirmities, <strong>and</strong> a tremendous effort is required forits reconstruction, at both the State <strong>and</strong> Central90The Indian <strong>Police</strong> Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue
levels. The deficiencies <strong>of</strong> one part <strong>of</strong> the systemshould not become the grounds for an inordinateemphasis on developing other parts. The inability<strong>of</strong> many States to pull their weight cannot be anexcuse to attempt to replace their networks withan overwhelming Central apparatus. There mustbe acute consciousness <strong>of</strong> the natural confines<strong>and</strong> limitations <strong>of</strong> each system, as well as <strong>of</strong> theircomparative strengths <strong>and</strong> advantages. Turf warsare, at least occasionally, inevitable in any system<strong>of</strong> shared power <strong>and</strong> responsibility, but they mustnot be allowed to subvert the national interest.There is a tremendous <strong>and</strong> mounting challenge<strong>of</strong> governance, <strong>of</strong> security, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> law <strong>and</strong> ordermanagement in India today, <strong>and</strong> every nationalinstitution appears to be in, or headed for, a crisis.At such a time, the intelligence apparatus has ahuge role to play, <strong>and</strong> each <strong>of</strong> its failures, errors<strong>and</strong> excesses will be magnified manifold. It is <strong>of</strong>little utility, in the complex scenario that presentlyprevails, to propose ideal or utopian solutions;the <strong>Police</strong> <strong>and</strong> intelligence leadership will haveto function within the vagaries <strong>of</strong> the given state<strong>of</strong> affairs. This will dem<strong>and</strong> even greater integrity,commitment <strong>and</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> purpose on the part<strong>of</strong> the national security leadership. I am deeplyaware <strong>of</strong> the many <strong>and</strong> grave failings <strong>of</strong> thisleadership. Nevertheless, I am also witness to thefact that, when the national interest is at stake, thesame leadership has demonstrated extraordinarycapacities <strong>of</strong> dedication, courage <strong>and</strong> sacrifice.Though no single crisis or challenge, today,constitutes a decisive threat to the national interest,the cumulative impact <strong>of</strong> the many disorders <strong>and</strong>infirmities that afflict the system is tantamount toan existential threat to India. It is now time, onceagain, as in so many past instances, for India’ssecurity leaders <strong>and</strong> Forces to prove themselves.The Indian <strong>Police</strong> Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 91
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The Indian Police JournalOctober -
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From the Director’s DeskNew Delhi
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23rd December, 1887: TheJourney beg
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Courtesy - National Archives of Ind
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The Logo released on the completion
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Helmsmen of the IB during thePre-In
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SHRI V.G. VAIDYA, IPS(MAR 1992 TO J
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“Sleeman sahib ki jai”“No Cri
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their life and their problems relat
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Settling down of criminal tribes wa
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perish. Between 1841 and 1848, anot
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In conclusion, I would like to reco
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own race alone, had to be withdrawn
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a bee in his bonnet” 17 , and abo
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epresented by Tilak and his followe
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The agency more and more fine-tuned
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US was brewing, one William Hopkins
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came under the control of Indian mi
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neutralised many efforts by inimica
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e published by the Intelligence Bur
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As DD (Security), IB, I had occasio
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Chhomohlohri, all of them juxtapose
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Dormers Building, ShimlaThe Dormers
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eforms. Warren Commission, on the a
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and systems will increasingly come
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violence and destabilisation. This
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