Editorial Board Contents - Bureau of Police Research and ...

eforms. Warren Commission, on the assassinationof President Kennedy, Senate Committee on theWatergate Scandal, Shah Commission on the roleof intelligence during emergency in India etc. areillustrative. They examine not only the internalworkings of the organization but also functionalrelativity with organizations and systems outsidethe intelligence community. Public committeesserve a very useful purpose as they are ableto examine and evaluate the functioning ofintelligence agencies in the broader context ofpolitical environment, systems of governanceand Iegal-constitutional framework. However,at times, meant only to serve political purposeor silence mounting public criticism, thesecommittees are less than objective and swayedby extra-professional considerations. Theyalso often get over influenced by populistperceptions of the causes and remedies, whichare not always correct. Consequently, theirfindings and recommendations do not alwayslead to improvements in the efficiency andeffectiveness of intelligence agencies. The ShahCommission’s findings and recommendationsare a case in point. On the contrary, committeeson reforms that are led by the professionals, areable to come out with more specific, incisive and‘doable’ recommendations. The Shankar NairCommittee report, despite its limited mandate onintelligence reforms, came out with some highlycommendable recommendations.The third category comprises changes that arebrought about by intelligence agencies on theirown, or in conjunction with the larger securityset up of the country, envisioning futuristic threatsand challenges. Transformational in character,they involve constructing future scenarios,assessing the environment in which intelligenceagencies will have to operate and calculatinggaps between existing capacities and thoserequired to meet emerging threats. This exercisenecessitates intensive study of futuristic trends,their implications for national security, analyzingpolicy options and formulating strategy for change.Forecasting intelligence needs of the country,it should attempt to architect new doctrines,suggest structural changes, aim at optimizationof resources and examine administrative andlegislative changes required for empowerment ofintelligence agencies. While intelligence agenciesin developed countries frequently attempt thisexercise, the Indian intelligence has rarely madea conscious effort in this direction. One suchexercise was carried out in the late eighties in theIntelligence Bureau on the initiative of Shri M.K. Narayanan, just before he was tipped to takeover as the chief.At the national level, the Report of the Group ofMinisters on National Security in 2001, was thefirst macro level attempt in this direction. Thoughit came as an aftermath of the SubramaniamCommittee report on Kargil, it was an integratedfuturistic attempt to restructure nationalsecurity under four categories namely, defence,intelligence, internal security and bordermanagement. It came with some outstandingrecommendations, but unfortunately with thechange in regime the momentum of changecould not be sustained. One of the majorrecommendations, that was lost sight of, pertainedto the review of the national security by a highpowered Groups of Ministers, every five years. Ifimplemented, there would have been perspectiveaction plans for intelligence and other reforms in2006 and 2011. For this category of changes to bereally effective, a political will is necessary, thatrequires serious and enthusiastic involvementof senior political leadership of the country. InIndia, national security is a low agenda item,except when the nation finds itself in the midstof a serious security crisis. Unfortunately, thatis the most ineffective setting for change. In anideal situation, the Government should developa long term bi-partisan consensus for thesetransformational changes.It needs to be emphasized that both theevolutionary and reformist approaches to change,though important by themselves, are inadequateto meet threats of the future. These approachesto change are premised on the assumption thatif shortcomings of the past were redressed, thefuture would be safe. They allow us to analysethe causes of failure, examine existing systemsand processes, and suggest readjustment toprevent their recurrence. The broader legal,administrative and security frameworks are takenfor granted; presuming that intelligence would beable to deliver the moon only through changeswithin — every time, everywhere. Unfortunately,this is an erroneous premise. At best, they equipThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 33