Growth <strong>of</strong> Intelligence Institutionsin British IndiaShri Amiya K. Samanta, IPS (Retd.)Intelligence gathering is an ancient pr<strong>of</strong>essionwhich can claim scriptural authority from theearliest literature – the Rig-Veda, which records:“As the wind moves everywhere <strong>and</strong> penetrates allcreated beings, so also should the king penetrateeverywhere, by the means <strong>of</strong> his mysteriousagents.” 1 In the West too, engagement <strong>of</strong> spies hasscriptural sanction. The Lord instructed Moses tosend secret agents “to spy out the l<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> Cannan<strong>and</strong> give him valuable advice on the intelligencerecruitment.” 2 In the ancient <strong>and</strong> medievalperiods, the engagement <strong>and</strong> deployment <strong>of</strong> spies<strong>and</strong> informers was by <strong>and</strong> large personalised; aninstitutionalised intelligence system grew up onlywith the growth <strong>of</strong> the apparatus <strong>of</strong> a modernstate.1. POLITICAL SETTING ANDADMINISTRATIVE NEEDSIn the first half <strong>of</strong> the 19th century, the Company’sGovernment in India came to possess immense“power-knowledge” from the reports <strong>and</strong> writeupson trade <strong>and</strong> commerce, socio-economic<strong>and</strong> religious practices <strong>and</strong> various other matters.Such ‘power-knowledge’ became useful informulating policies on education, social reform,l<strong>and</strong> revenue etc., but had little to do withsecurity. Since army was the mainstay <strong>of</strong> Britishrule, threat to security, both internal <strong>and</strong> externalwas largely taken care <strong>of</strong> by it. After the First War<strong>of</strong> Indian Independence in 1857, the Governmenthad realized that India could not be ruled bythe sword alone. Though the administrationcontinued to suffer from the “Mutiny Complex”for several decades, the institution <strong>of</strong> a modernstate, with justice <strong>and</strong> individual liberty as acornerstone, started emerging after the Queen’sProclamation <strong>of</strong> 1858.1 S.D. Trivedi : Secret Services in Ancient India: Techniques<strong>and</strong> Operations. New Delhi, 1988, P.232 Christopher Andrews: Her Majesty’s Secret Service, P.1While the Indian Council Act <strong>of</strong> 1861 containedthe ideas <strong>of</strong> representative government <strong>and</strong>provincial autonomy in seminal form, the newPenal Code (1861), Criminal Procedure Code(1868), Evidence Act (1872) <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Police</strong> Act(1861), set up a criminal justice system in whichthe ideas <strong>of</strong> justice <strong>and</strong> equality were ingrained.Thus, under the direct rule <strong>of</strong> the British Crownwith ultimate authority vested in the Parliament,India started emerging as a modern state.In the 1860s, when the Wahabi movement brokeout, followed by the Hindu revivalist movement,the Government’s anxiety about a possibleconnection between religious revivalism <strong>and</strong>political unrest increased. The British rulers,infected by “Mutiny Complex” suspected everyreligious movement as preparation for politicaluprising. Though the Wahabi movement inIndia, created little more than some low-keydisturbances in Bengal, 3 Bihar, Punjab <strong>and</strong> theNorth West Frontier Province, yet the bogey<strong>of</strong> Muslim uprising in India, or the rebellion <strong>of</strong>the fiercely independent frontier tribes underWahabi influence, haunted the British. In dealingwith the Wahabis, the concept <strong>of</strong> ‘sedition’ wasintroduced in criminal jurisprudence by addingsection 124A to the Indian Penal Code.But the Indian nationalism, which eventuallyended the British rule, was slowly gatheringstrength. Hollowness <strong>of</strong> the British claim to theintroduction <strong>of</strong> a system <strong>of</strong> justice, equity <strong>and</strong>individual liberty in India, was exposed whenthe Arms Act <strong>of</strong> 1876, dispossessed Indians <strong>of</strong> firearms for self-defense, the Vernacular Press Act <strong>of</strong>1878, restricted publication <strong>of</strong> newspapers inIndian languages, the Ilbert Bill <strong>of</strong> 1883, seeking toabolish the trial <strong>of</strong> Anglo-Indian by judges <strong>of</strong> their3 In Bengal the rebellion <strong>of</strong> Titu Mir was a Wahabi upsurge. Hedefied the British authority, but was eventually defeated bythe army.10The Indian <strong>Police</strong> Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue
own race alone, had to be withdrawn in the face<strong>of</strong> strong opposition from the racist Europeans.In this context, in 1877, Surendra Nath Banerji’sstirring “lectures in English, in upper Indiaassumed the character <strong>of</strong> a triumphant progress”<strong>and</strong> they “excited as much enthusiasm amongthe rising generation in Multan as in Delhi.” 4 Thetop level <strong>of</strong> the Government did not have muchclue about the depth <strong>of</strong> resentment amongst theeducated section <strong>of</strong> the society.When one Wahabi convict assassinated ViceroyMayo in the Andaman jail in 1872, ViceroyNorthbrook (1872-1876) felt the need for “adetective police for political purposes” <strong>and</strong> askedthe Thugee <strong>and</strong> Dakaity Department to take upthe job.Viceroy Lytton (1876-1880), aware <strong>of</strong> theinadequacies <strong>of</strong> Indian intelligence, felt that hehad, “no Special Officer whose duty requireshim to receive <strong>and</strong> to submit to the head <strong>of</strong> theGovernment, confidential <strong>and</strong> secret information<strong>of</strong> political <strong>and</strong> military importance. 5 ”Northbrook’s experiment evidently had failed.Lytton’s advice to the Local Governments, toadopt the experiment <strong>of</strong> 'Special Branch', set upin 1876 in Punjab 6 , was not followed. ViceroyRipon (1880-1884) had a consensual approach tothe problems <strong>of</strong> administration. “We cannot nowrely on military force alone; policy as well as justiceought to prompt our endeavour to govern more<strong>and</strong> more by means <strong>of</strong>, <strong>and</strong> in accordance with,the growing public opinion, which is beginningto show itself throughout the country.” 7 EvidentlyRipon implied that the Government should keeptrack <strong>of</strong> the public opinion in India through analternative method.2. AN INSTITUTION FORINTELLIGENCE COLLECTIONEventually, after the formation <strong>of</strong> the IndianNational Congress in December 1885, theSecretary <strong>of</strong> State addressed his secret despatch4 Henry Cotton wrote this in his book” New India” referred tothis tour. See S.N.Banerji’s “A Nation in Maling,” Pp59-605 Amiya K. Samanta: History <strong>of</strong> Intelligence in Modern India,(Restricted circulation) P.356 This was mentioned in an enclosure to Dufferin’s letter toLord Cross dated 15th November,1887.7 Judith M. Brown: Modern India: The Origins <strong>of</strong> an AsianDemocracy, P. 100.No.11, dated 25th March, 1887, on the subject<strong>of</strong> ‘collection <strong>of</strong> secret <strong>and</strong> political intelligencein India’. After consulting the Governors <strong>and</strong> top<strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> the Presidencies, Viceroy Dufferin(1884-1888) wrote to the Secretary <strong>of</strong> State:“I desire to utilise in British India, the services <strong>of</strong>the <strong>Police</strong> force, <strong>and</strong> in Native States, the existingmeans at the disposal <strong>of</strong> Political Officers, forcollection <strong>of</strong> intelligence on political, social <strong>and</strong>religious movements.” Dufferin then gave out thedetails <strong>of</strong> his scheme. “Being <strong>of</strong> opinion that theformation <strong>of</strong> a large detective staff would be opento very serious objections, I propose to work asfar as possible, through the Local Governments,imposing on them the responsibility <strong>of</strong> collectingsuch intelligence as may be necessary for theirown purposes <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> reporting to Government<strong>of</strong> India, whatever may be desirable for the latterto know. At the headquarters <strong>of</strong> the Government<strong>of</strong> India <strong>and</strong> the Local Governments, I desire toemploy special agencies <strong>of</strong> the lowest possiblestrength, consistent with the work <strong>of</strong> collecting<strong>and</strong> recording intelligence received, <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong>initiating <strong>and</strong> conducting at the instance <strong>of</strong>the Government <strong>of</strong> India, such enquiries asmay be necessary in special cases.” Dufferin’ssecret despatch had, thus, broadly divided theresponsibilities <strong>of</strong> the proposed Central <strong>and</strong>the Provincial Special Branches, <strong>and</strong> also laiddown the roles <strong>of</strong> the Central <strong>and</strong> the LocalGovernments, with regard to the Central <strong>and</strong> theLocal outfits. The provincial Special Brancheswould remain under the control <strong>of</strong> the LocalGovernment but it would be obligatory on theirpart to share all relevant intelligence with theCentral Special Branch.To curtail the cost, Dufferin suggested the use<strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>and</strong> the manpower <strong>of</strong> the Thugee<strong>and</strong> Dakaiti Department as a launching pad.“The privileges <strong>and</strong> facilities that the Departmenthad acquired over the years should be shared.”The General Superintendent <strong>of</strong> the Departmentwas entrusted with “the supervision <strong>of</strong> the newlyconstituted “Special Branch.” 8The financial commitment <strong>of</strong> the Governmentwould be Rs 46,800 per annum. Dufferinselected D McCracken, an <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> the PunjabCadre, to head the Central Special Branch,8 The name was apparently taken from the Special Branch <strong>of</strong>Metropolitan <strong>Police</strong>, London.The Indian <strong>Police</strong> Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 11
- Page 1 and 2: The Indian Police JournalOctober -
- Page 3 and 4: From the Director’s DeskNew Delhi
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- Page 71 and 72: My J&K ExperienceShri R.K. Kapoor,
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Scaling Himalayan Heights withthe I
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proceed to Dungti to supervise the
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tour of the White House and Lincoln
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into unconsciousness two hours earl
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which was completed successfully wi
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leaders. This happened around the t
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My Unforgettable Yearsin the North-
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stated that Prakash Singh, Assistan
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take her into confidence. That woul
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Police - Intelligence InterfaceShri
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Shreekant Bapat and I surveyed the
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excellence, dedication and commitme
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Immigration, Inter-State Disputes,
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Observations on India’s State and
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assessments that arose after the ca
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levels. The deficiencies of one par
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of laying a network of useful roads
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Technology in Intelligence-Future S
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These are just some of the aspects
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Figure 6: Open Source Information o
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events) and inference from evidence
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9North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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Shri Dave was posted back to the lB
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He even suggested separate pay scal
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The Unsung HeroesThe Intelligence B