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Editorial Board Contents - Bureau of Police Research and ...

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an Intelligence agency. He used to emphasize forinstance, that in Intelligence ‘there is no substituteto reading’. The logic here is that you cannotdiscard information or data before examining it.The ability to sieve through the material, as youare going over it, is important. I recall that one<strong>of</strong> the Chiefs <strong>of</strong> IB, would scan a report so fastthat we thought he had taken a course in rapidreading.An Intelligence organization remains anonymousby choice. This flows from the principle thatwhat it knows about the adversary, proves tobe an advantage, only so long as it is h<strong>and</strong>ledconfidentially. Anonymity <strong>and</strong> its upshot, thelack <strong>of</strong> recognition in public, are two basicfeatures <strong>of</strong> management, not built into any otherorganization <strong>of</strong> the Government. One littleadvantage an Intelligence <strong>of</strong>ficer might enjoy atthe social level is that people might regard himas being privy to some exciting information or tosome sensational subterranean action. A reticentsmile to the occasional leading question, isregarded as the display <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional perfection<strong>and</strong> leaving a party early, an evidence <strong>of</strong> someextremely important call <strong>of</strong> duty. I recall howa family friend <strong>of</strong> ours in the late seventies hada hazy idea that I was an <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> the rank <strong>of</strong>Director in the Ministry’s hierarchy <strong>and</strong> that I wasconcerned with the problem <strong>of</strong> communal riots. Iwas amused when at a dinner party at his househe introduced me to some guests, <strong>and</strong> addedthat I was the Director <strong>of</strong> communal riots in theGovernment.My three years as Joint Director heading theZonal SIB at Ch<strong>and</strong>igarh, between 1986 <strong>and</strong>1989, gave me a h<strong>and</strong>s-on experience <strong>of</strong> Punjab,during a highly disturbed situation there. Thehighly successful operation, "Black Thunder",was designed in a way that would totallyeliminate the chances <strong>of</strong> any collateral damage.In recognition <strong>of</strong> the success <strong>of</strong> the counterterrorismefforts in Punjab, the Governor firstrecommended the award <strong>of</strong> Padma Shri to the<strong>Police</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>and</strong> in the followingyear made the same recommendation for theheads <strong>of</strong> central organizations stationed atCh<strong>and</strong>igarh who had contributed to this success.The <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the BSF <strong>and</strong> CRPF got the award,<strong>and</strong> in a subsequent year the then DIB also gota Padma Shri.An Intelligence organization attaches equalimportance to operational skills <strong>and</strong> the abilitiesto communicate information to the actiontakers.Security fails, if there is a failure <strong>of</strong> eithercommunication or action. An interesting aspect<strong>of</strong> communication <strong>of</strong> intelligence is that theIntelligence organization willingly assumes theextended responsibility <strong>of</strong> ensuring not only thatthe report reaches the recipient, but also that itattracts the attention <strong>of</strong> the action takers. I recallhow an important piece <strong>of</strong> actionable intelligencein relation to the goings-on in the state <strong>of</strong> J&K,failed to evoke a prompt action compelling me,as DIB, to request the highest executive to havethe matter looked into. The failure <strong>of</strong> action wasdetected in the unavoidable long turn aroundperiod that the nearest armed force unit required,on the ground. Necessary corrective deploymentwas then made for the future, in line with theprinciple that security must always learn fromexperience.Reference to J&K also reminds me <strong>of</strong> a plenarymeeting, chaired by the then Prime MinisterLate P V Narsimha Rao, in connection with thedevelopments in the State. The meeting wasattended among others by the Governor <strong>and</strong> theArmy Chief. There was a strong line <strong>of</strong> suggestionin favour <strong>of</strong> a particular course <strong>of</strong> action. The PMwent along with my view, as DIB, that we shouldwait a while longer. When pressed for taking animmediate decision, the PM famously remindedthe gathering that ‘not taking a decision is also adecision’.Intelligence being an instrument <strong>of</strong> nationalsecurity does not cross the path <strong>of</strong> politics. Theonly reason, why in a democratic system a study<strong>of</strong> the political spectrum from the point <strong>of</strong> view<strong>of</strong> security might be in order, is that arrangementsmust exist to detect subversion by alien forces forcausing political instability to the detriment <strong>of</strong>internal security. India is a strong nation <strong>and</strong> atested democracy where there are no such fears.In the last week <strong>of</strong> June, 1996, while I wasout <strong>of</strong> the country attending the first SAARCSecurity Conference at Colombo, as DIB, thethen PM assigned me the Chairmanship <strong>of</strong> JIC,a technically higher post, being in the rank <strong>of</strong>Secretary to Government <strong>of</strong> India. JIC was anenriching experience.The Indian <strong>Police</strong> Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 55

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