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epresented by Tilak and his followers.” 23 Thisis not borne out by the plethora of intelligencerecords 24 , which show that, not to speak ofpolitical leaders, non-political personalities likeRabindranath Tagore, were under surveillance ofthe Special Branch. On the same issue, anotherBritish author, Patrick French has written, “Forthe last three decades of British rule in India,intelligence gathering was extended massively,since with the rapid rise of Congress it was seento be the only way of retaining the upper hand.Covertly obtained information began to takeon an increasing importance in the formulationof policy and decision making…” 25 There isno doubt that in the post-Curzon period, thecolonial regime depended more and more onsecret intelligence. But it may be noted herethat both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State,discouraged the DCI to have an independent networkof sources or separate units in the provincesunder its control, without the knowledge of theProvincial Governments.With the bomb making its appearance onthe political scene in India, DCI became,exclusively, an agency for collection and analysisof political intelligence. The term ‘criminal‘in the nomenclature became more and moreincongruous. In the Government of India Act,1919, the change of name was first indicated insection 40(2) which enjoined, inter alia, that theIntelligence Bureau should keep the Governmentposted with matters relating to the security ofthe Indian Empire. Even before the Act cameinto force in 1921, the name was changed toIntelligence Bureau in 1920.4. PROVINCIAL SPECIAL BRANCHESThe Provincial Special Branches were ignored tillthe anti-Partition swadeshi movement broke outin 1905 and the underground terrorist activitiescame to the surface in 1907-1908, in Bengalpresidency. When in April, 1906, the CriminalInvestigation Department (CID) was set up inBengal, as also in other provinces, the SpecialBranches were made a part of the ProvincialCIDs under one DIG. Later on, with the increasein the work-load of the Special Branches and due23 Richard Popplewell: op.cit. P4524 Circulars of Intelligence (Special) Branch, No 6SB dated 27July 1909.25 Patrick French: Liberty or Death, 1997, Pp 98-99to growing political unrest, in the big provinces,the Special Branches were delinked from CIDand brought under officers of a suitable rank.Bengal’s Special Branch had a faster growth,both in size as also in quality of intelligenceoutput, due to strident political movement,both surface and underground. In September,1907, Stevenson-Moore 26 , Director, CriminalIntelligence Department, predicted in his reportthat the Bengalis ‘had no capacity for violence’.One district magistrate of Dacca, who held theview that bhadralok Bengalis were incapableof physical aggression, was shot at the station 27 ,while he was leaving Dacca on transfer. In thiscontext, the discovery of arms and explosives inMuraripukur Garden at Calcutta, and the arrestof Aurobindo Ghose along with 40 educatedbhadralok youths, made them change theirideas. Home Secretary, Harold Stuart wrote, “therevolutionary movement will gain in influenceand strength until, at no distant date, it willbecome a serious menace to law and order.”But the Government was of the consideredview that “while a revolutionary rising is outof the question”, an efficient secret service wasessential” to contain any widespread disturbancein the province.The Bengal Special Branch, like Special Branchesin other provinces, was placed as a separate unitunder a Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID.An officer of the rank of SP, named Denham 28 ,was appointed as Special Officer of the SpecialBranch, which was strengthened by posting agood number of officers.There was one Special Branch and one CID forthe whole of Bengal, including Calcutta, bothdrawing officers from Bengal and Calcutta policeforces because they were statutorily separateentities. This led to mutual recrimination, in whichhigher officers like DIG, CID and Commissionerof Police were involved. Eventually to resolve the26 Sir Charles Stevenson-Moore succeeded H.A. Stuart whobecame Home Secretary.27 B.C.Allen had praised the social service and discipline of themembers of the Dacca Anushilan Samiti, a member of whichshot him. The assailant was never caught.28 Godfrey Denham was a fine intelligence officer and some ofhis reports are valuable source materials of the revolutionaryterrorist movement in India. An unsuccessful attempt wasmade on his life in 1911 in Calcutta and in 1912 he joinedthe Central Intelligence and played a key role in unravelingthe plot to kill the Viceroy. In 1917 he was with the MI5helping the prosecution in San Francisco Conspiracy case.He did not return to the service in India.The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 15