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out, we saw helicopters undertaking severalsorties to evacuate the dead and the injured fromdeep inside the jungle. I also learnt informallythat General Kumaramangalam, Chief of theArmy Staff, was unhappy with the GOC, as thebulk of the Naga Army gang had been able tobreak through the cordon and the Army hadsuffered casualties more than they had bargainedfor. Politically, however, the operation was athumping success. The Government, for the firsttime, got incontrovertible evidence of Chineseinvolvement in the north-east and their materialhelp to the underground Nagas. On June 19,1968, the Chinese Charge d’ Affaires wassummoned to the Ministry of External Affairsand given a strongly worded Note demarche,charging Peking of complicity in abettingsubversive elements in Nagaland in flagrantviolation of all canons of international behaviour.The Government of India claimed “concrete andirrefutable proof” that arms and other equipmentmanufactured in the People’s Republic of Chinahad been surreptitiously smuggled into Indianterritory, and that the Chinese Government was“master-minding this covert scheme in order tostir lawlessness against the legally constitutedauthority in India”.The documents seized at Jotsoma threw a floodof light on the nature of training imparted tothe underground in China and the politicalindoctrination given to them. The note-bookscontained detailed instructions on the handlingof different kinds of weapons, use of explosives,the techniques of guerilla warfare, and includedquotations from Mao Tse-tung. ”We do not wantwar”, one of these said, “but war can only beabolished through war, and in order to get rid ofthe gun, it is necessary to take up the gun”. Therewere some interesting observations on love andwomen as well. Marriage, it was said, “is a lotteryin which men stake their liberty and women theirhappiness”.The Jotsoma incident was a watershed. It shookthe underground who had hitherto taken theGovernment for granted and believed that theycould get away with violations of the suspensionof operations agreement. The Naga undergroundwere shocked that a secret hide-out of theirs,where the bulk of the China-returned NagaArmy gang was camping, could be raided. Theygrew suspicious that someone had betrayedthem and started making enquiries. A coupleof months later, they learnt that informationhad been developed by the Intelligence Bureauand that the groundwork for the operation hadbeen prepared by me. The so-called Presidentof the Naga Federal Government, thereupon,issued an ahza (order) on September 14, 1968stating that “the attack was planned by PrakashSingh, Deputy Director 'Intelligent', Kohima”,that “the action taken by the Indian Army on 9,10 and 11 September against the Federal Armywas also due to the same Intelligent Officer”,and that therefore the Security Command ofthe Naga Army should take action to annihilatehim. The Security Command was a specialisedwing of the Naga Army which carried out acts ofsabotage like blowing up railway tracks, bridges,vital installations, assassinations, etc. The ahzawas as good as my death warrant. But, as luckwould have it, a copy of the ahza fell into ourhands some time at the end of September 1968.It so happened that one of our sources broughtus a whole bundle of documents which he hadransacked from the ‘Federal’ headquarters atChedema. It was late in the evening and thesource was keen to replace the documents beforenext morning. We hurriedly photocopied themat night. Next morning, as I was scanning thedocuments brought by the source, my eyes ranthrough the aforesaid ahza. I was stunned for a fewseconds. I thought over it very coolly, discussed itwith M.N.Gadgil, the Joint Deputy Director, whowas my senior at Kohima, and we decided thatthe contents of the document should be flashedto the Intelligence Bureau headquarters at Delhi.A coded message was prepared and immediatelytransmitted.There was no time to lose. The ahza had beenissued about a fortnight back and we imaginedthat perhaps some action would already havebeen initiated by the Security Command.Possibly, some Naga Army personnel mayalready have been detailed to do the job. TheSIB got in touch with the State Police to plan formy security. Realising the gravity of the threat,the IG Police, R.D.Pande, promptly despatchedan armed guard to our residence. The sameevening, I told Savitri, my wife, that we had togo on a long tour the next morning and that wemust leave before sunrise. She was taken abackat the pace of events and was surprised thatsuddenly there was Police protection around thehouse. She asked some searching questions butI parried them. I did not consider it advisable to76The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue