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which was completed successfully within sixmonths by the lB and RAW, acting in unison.The responsibility of looking after this operation,Laldenga’s stay and security in India, as also thenegotiations, became the responsibility of a groupin the lB of which I became a nodal member,due to my long stay in the North-East and due toIntelligence Bureau, under my guidance, havingdeveloped excellent contacts amongst studentcommunity from the North-East in Delhi. Itwas through success in this operation, that ShriNarsimha Rao came to know first hand, in all itsintricacies, how the Intelligence Bureau wentabout its job, arduously, meticulously and awayfrom the glare of publicity. It was also throughthis operation, that I came to know not only theHome Minister, but also the Prime Minister.And all this happened at a time when theIntelligence Bureau was really poorly off in termsof resources. The administration had just two cars,communication was only through wireless setswhich involved enciphering and deciphering atboth ends, the only means of pushing intelligencefrom the field to the lB Headquarters was throughregistered post, and the only way of gettingthrough to any of the SIBs in the North-East wasthrough lightning phone calls, which had theirlimitations. This also involved frequent travel tothe North-East, which too was not easy, as it wasalways difficult to get seats in flights with North-East as destination. Financially too, the lB wasvery poorly off. To be able to run an operationinvolving smuggling people out of Pakistansafely into India, was therefore considered a bigachievement.It was because of the Intelligence Bureau andthe value attached to ‘area specialization’, thatofficers like me got a chance to remain in touchwith at least three Prime Ministers. With Mrs.Gandhi, decision making in operational mattersalways came with a 24 hrs delay. She personallyknew several personalities in the North-East andshe would generally take 24 hrs to contact them toascertain their reactions prior to taking decisions.With Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, all decisions were onthe-spot,particularly in operational matters andhe was always ready to listen to lB officials. WithMr. Narsimha Rao, it was totally a different ballgame. He wanted to remain in the picture atall times and so he allowed lB officials to meethim anytime during the day and even late in theevenings. But he left decision making to the bestjudgement of lB officials and ‘area specialists’.Success in operations on several occasions was,therefore, the direct outcome of the interest takenby the respective Prime Ministers in listening toand understanding the constraints under whichthe Intelligence Bureau functioned.It is perhaps not right to go into many details, butsome illustrative cases might help to understandthe interest which the then Prime Ministers took inNational security matters. In the mid seventies, itbecame necessary to send an officer incognito toPakistan to talk to and understand Laldenga, andif he agreed, to get the terms written by him. Themeeting was supposed to have been facilitatedby Laldenga’s ADC. It was a project which wasfraught with risks and grave consequences. Thethen Directors of Intelligence Bureau and RAWdecided to take the Prime Minister on board. Atthe end of the presentation, Mrs. Gandhi foundthe odds loaded heavily against us and ‘denial’being the only way out if the cover got blown off.The then Director, Intelligence Bureau agreedthat the operation was fraught with grave risks,but in the same breath added that risks are whatintelligence officials are supposed to take, day inand day out. It was no surprise that Mrs. Gandhi,and the then Home Minister were elated andwere profuse in their compliments when the taskwas accomplished.It also struck me as to how brutally frank werethe Directors, in expressing their views at anylevel. It was in1983, when an important meetingwas held with the Prime Minister in the chair,for discussing the Assam agitation. The State wasthen under President’s Rule and in addition to somany others, the then DIB, Mr. T.V. Rajeswar,the then Governor of Assam and his Advisor onLaw and Order — a seasoned bureaucrat, werepresent. The Advisor was a man of action andnormalcy and inaction bored him no end. Boththe Advisor and the Governor favoured holdingof elections without any delay. They made itclear that holding elections might lead to somelocalised violence, and the CRPF might have tobe used for delivering lathi-charges wherevernecessary, and that 20-25 persons may die inthe process. The agitators, who had by then notThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 69