Editorial Board Contents - Bureau of Police Research and ...

Observations on India’s State andCentral Intelligence ApparatusShri K.P.S. Gill, IPS (Retd.)When I look back on my 38-year career inPolicing, including positions in some of themost troubled areas of the country, in their mosttroubled of times, I am astonished at the verylimited interface I have had with India’s centralintelligence apparatus. I am, indeed, quiteamused when I hear Police leaders from acrossthe country — particularly after a terrorist attackor other major security debacle — complain, forinstance, that the Intelligence Bureau had notprovided them with ‘actionable intelligence’ thatcould have allowed them to prevent or betterdeal with specific incidents (these grumblesare quickly picked up and amplified by thepolitical executive and the media). lB inputs andadvisories are, of course, the staple of Policingin the country, but were hardly pivotal in StatePolice responses to security threats or crises, atleast in my experience.I understand, of course, that things have changedsomewhat since then. Many terrorist and organisedcriminal enterprises now have trans-borderdimensions, both across a multiplicity of States inIndia and often across international borders. Centralagencies, particularly including the IntelligenceBureau, the Research and Analysis Wing and theNational Technical Research Organisation, have aspecific mandate and technical and technologicalcapabilities that are not available to the StatePolice apparatus, and, consequently, the Stateshave developed a certain dependence on inputsfrom these organisations. This is not, however, anecessary or natural consequence of the evolvingnature of crime and terrorism, but is, rather, anindex of the failure of State Police organisations tokeep pace with emerging challenges and necessarytransformations of their mandate, structures andcapabilities.In any event, the more things change, themore are they the same. While more noise ismade about ‘cross border terrorism’ today, thetruth is, terrorism and insurgency had crossborder implications from the earliest rebellionsin India. Certainly, every insurrection in thecountry’s Northeast — starting with the Nagauprising — has found safe haven and supportoutside the country, and has had implicationsfor neighbouring States within the country. TheNaxalite movement found support in China; theKhalistani and Kashmiri separatists in Pakistan.Crucially, even where threats have trans-borderdimensions, it is far from the case that the StatePolice and intelligence are impotent to respond.It has been my personal experience, and myunderstanding from the experience of otherexemplary officers, that the best intelligence andoperational capabilities are often vested in theState apparatus. This has certainly been the case,to take some prominent examples, in Punjab,Tripura and Andhra Pradesh, where State Policecapabilities were developed to extraordinarylevels of effectiveness, operating far beyond thenominal jurisdictions of the State’s territorialboundaries. This should not surprise anyone;the State Police has the largest presence in theaffected areas, including border areas, and it isimpossible that any central agency would everhave a comparable reach. If borders are ‘porous’,as we often (quite rightly) protest, they are porousboth ways, and an enterprising Police leadershipwill find ways to exploit this permeability toadvantage.Unfortunately, this tremendous structuraladvantage has been progressively eroded acrossmuch of the country by the continuous declinein the Police intelligence infrastructure and itspenetration, crucially, into the ‘interior’. Ruralinformation networks, operating through thenow defunct village watch scheme and througha range of subordinate Government officials,The Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 87